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INTRODUCTION 
The defeat of the Smuts government in 1924 1 
In April 1923 Smuts's opponents Hertzog ond Creswell, leaders of the 
Afrikane r Notional Party and the predominantly English Labour Party, 2 formed on 
electoral poet. Their express gool was to unseat Smuts's government which hod 
been in power since 1919. So, in 1924, began the Pact government. Ten years 
later, in 1934, these former political rivals together led their parties into fusion 
and the United South African Notional Party (UP) was born. 
Between the Pact and Fusion (1924-1934) Hertzog ruled South Africo, 
and faced the major inter-related issues of franchise, land, African adm inistration 
and labour, against the background of rapid industrialisation of Africans and whites. 
For the Smuts period, see A G Smurthwaite, 'The pol icy of the Smuts govern-
ment towards Africans 1919-1924', unpub MA thesis, UNISA, 1975; R J Bouch, 
'South African Party in opposition 1924-1929', unpub BA (Hans) essay, Univer-
sity of the Witwatersrand, 1972; P Kallaway, 'F S tvIolan, the Cope Liberal 
tradition and South African politics 1908- 1924', Journal of African History, 
v 15, 1, 1974, pp 113-129; N G Garson, 'Party politics and the plural society 
1910-1929', unpub Collected papers of the Seminar on the Societies of Southern 
Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Lon-
don, 1970) (unpub ICS sem inar papers), v 1, pp 127-137. 
2 General J C Smuts, leader of the South African Party (SAP) and Prime Minister 
1919-1924 and 1939-1948; General J B M Hertzog, leader of the Notional 
Party (NP) and Prime Min ister 1924-1939; F H P C reswe ll, leader of the Sou th 
African Labour Party which joined Hertzog in the Pact government 1924-1933. 
For biographical deta ils on these and other pol itical leaders, see W K Hancock, 
Smuts - The fields of force 1919-1950; W K Hancock & J von der Poel, Selec-
tions from the Smuts papers, v 5; B K Long, In Smuts's ca~; C M von de;:;--
Heever, General J B M Hertzog; l E Neame, General Hertzog; 0 Pirow, 
James Barry Munnik Hertzog; M Creswell, An ~h;;" the political history 
of South Africa in the I ife of Frederic Hugh Page Creswell; T Boydell, My 
luck was in; l Blackwell, African ;ccas ions; l E Neame, Some South African 
politicians; A Barlow, Almost in confidence. 
2 
In the task of working out his 'native policy' Hertzog did not draw 
primarily on the South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC) report 1903-
1905 or the principles within the Natives' Land Act of 1913. These, it will be 
shown, were based largely on Cope pol icies and practices. Instead he rooted his 
pol icy of baasskap and adm in istrative autocracy in the republ icon traditions of the 
North, and also much of the Notal experience. Contrary to the traditional view, 
therefore, which sees a lineal progression in the evolution of the segregation 
pol icy, this interpretation suggests Hertzog's concept of segregation differed in 
certain respects from thaI of his immediate predecessors, Botha and Smuts. These 
differences and the nature of Hertzog's segregation sol ution are analysed in the 
chapters that follow. 
But Hertzog's 'native policy' also took shape from his alliance with the 
Labour Party and from the problems he inherited from Smuts. We must therefore 
examine briefly why the Smuts government fell and why the pol itical forces were 
realigned in the Poet of 1924. 
Society and the economy were in cris is in the early 1920s. South Africa 
hod left the gold standard in 1920, just when the post-war depression struck. 
Credit was abruptly shortened, speculators lost severely, and the gold premium 
dropped, forcing some low-grade mines to close. Unemployment followed and 
poor whiteism grew alarmingly. Calls for aid all round stroined the government's 
limited resources still more. Smuts's political fortune was certainly at low ebb, 
as the 1924 session and the early election that year were to prove. It was against 
this background that Smuts's rivals formed the Poet. 
Contrary to Smuts's predictions the Poet was not a brief marriage of 
convenience for the 1924 election. 3 Into the early 1930s, despite a split in the 
Labour Party in 1928,4 the Pact group not only held together, it even launched 
policies, some of them revers ing those of the SAP. Why was this alliance so 
powerful? 
3 Smuts had reason, for Hertzog during his election campaign hod promised 
that on the night of the election the Pact would end. This decision was 
reversed after the Labour Party Conference held the Sunday immediately 
following the e lection. For negotiated terms on which Labour agreed to 
continue the Pact, see House of Assembly Debates, 29 january 1929, 
col 59. 
4 The so-called Councillites, led by W A Iv\odeley and j Christie, broke 
away. Creswell and Boydell continued in the Poet. See below, chap 7. 
The relationship between the Afrikaner notional ists and the mainly 
Engl ish-speaking white workers of the Labour Party was apparently not clear to 
Smuts who misinterpreted his success in the 1921 election. 5 That election hod 
been fought and won by the SAP on the secessionist issue,6 and no doubt many 
Lobourites registered their opposition to Hertzog's anglophobia by voting for the 
SAP. Yet three years later the secessionist issue was set aside by the NP as a 
condition of the Pact alliance. NP supporters and Labourites hod common fears 
and grievances to override earl ier divisive ethn ic barriers. 
3 
Clouse 3 of the agreement between the Pact partners shows that secession 
had been definitely shelved. 7 Yet judging by Smuts's attempt to exploit this 
issue during the 1924 election campaign 8 it appears that he remained unconvinced 
about just how peripheral it hod become. 
For many Afrikaans supporters of the SAP, Unionists were anathema. 
Smuts hod misjudged the sentiments of his Afrikaans-speaking compatriots who sow 
the Unionists (whom Smuts had courted for votes in 1921) as 'jingo imperialists' 
with little understanding or tolerance for Afrikaner histary, language or culture. 
This lost him the support of many former Botha supporters. He lost the backing of 
the English-speaking working closs as well, for by 1924 they were for less concerned 
about imperialism than about the quality and security of their jobs. 
J H Hofmeyr wrote of Smuts at the time that 
what Smuts locks is just Botha's intuition ... he does not feel the 
pulse of the people as Botha did. And that of course is ever so much 
more important where, as in this country, he has to deal primarily 
with a people in the main pol itically inarticulate and guided by 
sentiment, not by reason. 9 
5 In 1920 the SAP lost their parliamentary majority. The results were : NP 44, 
SAP 41, Unionist Party 25, Labour Party 21 and Independents 3; a year later 
Smuts's SAP merged with the Unionists and the SAP won the election with a 
large majority. The Nationalists, however, held their own. The results of 
the 1921 election were SAP 79, NP 45, Labour Party 9 and Independents 1. 
6 Smuts tried to bring about a reunion of the SAP and NP but this broke down 
when Hertzog insisted on freedom for secessionist propaganda, see Hancock 
pp 30-33. 
7 Cope Times, 24 January 1923, and D W Kruger, South African parties and 
policies 1910-1960, pp 74-80, for basis of Pact agreement. 
8 In his election programme announced to his Pretoria constituents on 23 April 
1924 Smuts included the SAP theme of white racial co-operation in the fusion 
with the Unionists and the defeat of the secessionist issue in the 1921 election. 
For interesting insights on SA P party organisation and the election, see Bouch; 
C E M O'Dowd, 'The general election of 1924', SA Historical Journal, v 2, 
1970, pp 55-75. 
9 A Paton, Hofmeyr, p 86 
By contrast, Hertzog by this time represented the reviving force of 
Afrikaner nationalism and perceptively gauged his people's needs. Many 
Afrikaners began to find greater secur ity and a sense of identity within the 
Hertzog fold. He championed the cause of the common man against jingo 
capitalists and promised to secure whites in their position of privilege. Hertzog, 
in his determination to uplift poor whites ond in his alliance with Lobour, was 
for more sensitive than Smu ts to the demands of the working class in their increas-
ing struggle with capita l. 
4 
Skilled workers, mainly English, fighting against the deskill ing ond the 
cheapening of labour, had looked increasingly to the Smuts government to guoran-
tee their jobs . The struggle intensified with the deepening depression, the closure 
of low-grade mines, and large-scale unemployment which together gave the mines 
their excuse to reorganise the work process. The mines were retrenching a number 
of workers, reduc ing wages and abandon ing the 1918 Status Quo Agreement which 
set a ratio in wages and numbers between Africans and whites. 10 This protected 
white miners from being replaced by African labour at cheaper rates. 
Tensions between capital and labour increased. The SAP found itself 
hav ing to reconcile the radically diverse interests and demands of these two 
classes, and it failed. A general strike was declared in 1922 and when violence 
broke out Smuts declared martial law. With the army and air force ranged against 
them the South African Industrial Federation coiled off the strike, but by then 
between 150 and 230 men had died. This was to have repercussions for race 
relations for more significant than Smuts's foil from power 18 months later; but in 
the short term it was a powerful political weapon for it united the opposition in 
their fight to keep South Africa safe for the white workers. 
Smuts's assoc ia tion and then amalgamation with the Wi twatersrand Rand-
lords had already earned him the title of 'puppet of the goldbug' and 'lackey of 
the capitalis ts and imperialists' . It is noteworthy, as Johnstone says, that Creswell 
first approached Hertzog in October 1921, before the 1922 strike. Creswell 
pointed to the 'concentration of Credit Power and Industrial Power in South Africa', 
which he declared was 'the great danger to the deve lopment of soc iety'. He urged 
an examination of the 'structure of economic and financial power in South Africa' .11 
10 F A Johnstone, Class, race and gold: A study of class relations and racial 
discrimination in South Africa, pp 125-136 
11 Exchange of letters between Hertzog and Creswell, 26 October 1921, Creswell-
Hertzog correspondence, Creswell papers, National Archives, quoted by 
Johnstone, p 153 . 
5 
Hertzog's remarks on the fiscol pol icies of the Smuts government show that he also 
was convinced that Smuts was in league with the capitalists: 
I cannot but feel that the pol icy of the government has led to whole-
sale surrender to Capitol istic influences, or at any rate is leading 
thereto. The more the people is thrown into helplessness and the 
government into debt, the more will the moneyed few extend their 
influence and their enterprises, and the more will they become the 
real governing factor. 12 
This common couse of Creswell and Hertzog against the unfa ir distribution 
of capitol and power of the 'moneyed few' drew the two parties closer together . 
Smuts's use of force in the Rand revolt and a court declaration in 1923 that the job 
colour bar implicit in the 1911 Mines and Works Act was ultra vires confirmed 
white workers in thinking that Smuts was leagued with the capitalists. The 
Afrikaans press launched a strong campaign against Smuts. Ons Vaderland took up 
the cry of white c ivil isation in danger and denounced Smuts's support of industry's 
cheap labour policy which exposed the poor whites to competition. They con tinued: 
Door is oak opgewys hoe die kaffers in beskerming geneem word 
terwyl nog niks vir die mense von ons eie ras, vir die arme blonke 
gedaan is nie. Om goedkoop arbeid te verskaf, veral aan die buite-
landse ge ldwolwe, word die kaffer se status verhoog bi) die von die 
witman . 13 
Creswell fought in Pori iament for the thousands of unemployed workers 
hit by the post-war depression; the retrenched railwaymen laid off work by on 
ex-Unionist Minister, J W Jogger; and the white workers who SUddenly found they 
would have to compete for jobs with Africans at 'uncivilised' rates of pay. This 
gave Creswell ample political ammunition and he launched his attock on Smuts by 
challenging: 
Let us insist on standards of civilisation, on economic standards 
compatible with life according to European standards, standards 
such as we look upon as civil ised. That will interfere with profit. 
It will diminish the possibilities of great fortunes, but it will be 
vastly better for the people of South Africa and for the future 
notional destiny. I know that some of these may be hard words for 
hon. members over there, but be they hard or be they not, the fact 
remains that when you open your eyes and look around, you see the 
appl ication of this iron low, this inhuman competi tive system with-
out any regard ta the standard of I ife, gradua ll y el iminating the 
European from occupation, withering the race, the white race, and 
touching the future of this country in a manner which is endangering 
the white race from every po int of view. 14 
12 Ibid, p 154 
13 Ons Vaderland, 20 February 1923 
14 House of Assembly Debates, 2 April 1924, col 1289, and below chop 7 
6 
The root couse of these ills, Creswell said, was the government's support of 'ideas 
and principles of a commercial kind'. Their ideo was 'to buy in the cheapest 
market and sell in the dearest' . 
The threat to wh ites was of vital concern to tens of thousands of impover-
ished formers who, suffering after droughts' and devastation by locusts, were 
streaming to the towns only to find that what jobs there were, were filled mostly 
by Africans. Hertzog championed them. He demanded aid to keep whites on the 
land, 15 and eviction of Africans squdtting illegally on unoccupied crown land so 
that landless whites could be given land in their place. These squatters, he said, 
could then be forced into the service of formers ta rei ieve the labour shortage. 16 
The Smuts government's failure to arrange for the land promised in the 
1913 Natives' Land Act meant that they could not enforce the Act's anti-squatting 
measures.
17 Instead, in 1923 Smuts hod taken administrotive action to release 
certain areas from the restrictions of the 1913 Act18 so that Africans already 
evicted from fams in the white areas could be resettled in the reserves. Extra 
land was also to be mode available only to rei ieve the position in the most conges-
ted areas in the reserves. 
Smuts's action was deplored by many of Hertzog's NP supporters. They 
argued that his actions merely aggravated the labour shortage by providing a refuge 
for landless Africans in the reserves. The NP Transvaal executive denounced the 
government, stating that 
die naturelle vraagstuk moet opgelos word met handhawing von die 
bestaan von die Europeaan aan sy beskawing, en die beskerming von 
beskaafde. Met die oog hierop is dit noodsaaklik om 'n behoorlike 
en doordregte pol itiek van segregasie von die naturel uit te voer wat 
die Boer nie sol beklemmer of sy plaasvolk sol wegneem nie. 19 
As for aid for needy formers, under the stringent financial conditions the 
SAP declared that it could only help formers who could prove that their misfortune 
15 House of Assembly Debates, Unemployment and Poverty Motion, 5 February 
1924, cols 87-104, and chop 7 below 
16 House of Assembly Debates, Orange Free State Native (Barolong) Land 
Relief Bill (2R), 28 February 1924, cols 539-541 and 3 March 1924, cols 
582-594, and chops 4 and 5 below. 
17 See chops 2 and 4. 
18 See chap 2. 
19 Meeting of the Transvaal executive reported in Ons Vaderland, 13 May 1924 
was directly related to the recent calamities. A second criterion was that 
farmers being assisted should be a good security risk. Thomas Smartt, Minister 
of Agriculture, elaborated: 
The person to be benefited under this Bill must be the owner or 
occup ier of the land, ond it must be made perfectly clear that he is 
in a position through drought, and through no circumstances over 
which he hod control himself, of not being able to carryon his 
forming operations; but if the State should come to his assistance 
he will be in a position to rehabilitate himself and remain on the 
lond ond not drift into the towns to swell the numbers of the unem-
ployed, of whom there are too many at the present time. 20 
Limited or generous, rei ief measures coming from on ex-Unionist leader 
were bound to cause a negative response. It cOme from F J du Toit, J D Heyns 
7 
and D F Malan, the MPs for Victoria West, Middelburg and Calvinia. All three 
implied that the Drought Relief Bill introduced so late in the session was politically 
motivated by the forthcoming Wakkerstroom by-election. But above all, they 
said, the Bill foiled to rei ieve all impoverished formers, in particular the landless 
bywoners being driven in tens of thousands into the towns. The poor whites, they 
pointed out, were even harder hit than many of the farmers who had su ffered 
temporarily in the recent calamities. They would support the Bill fully but 
insisted it should apply to the bywaner closs as well. 21 
This was not the first time that the SAP hod been castigated for alleged 
indifference towards bywoners. Within the first week of the 1924 session, the 
Minister of Lands, D Reitz, had been attacked for not promoting land resettlement 
schemes for poor whites. He had replied: 
Let me soy that in my experience there is no royal road to a solution 
of the [poor white] problem; there is no universal panacea for this 
evil which is eating into the body social. The bulk of the people in 
this country consider that the one solution is 'back to the land'. It 
is quite natural. Mast of the unemployed and most of the poor 
whites come from the land, and it is very naturol for anyone to say 
'back to the land' .... There are only two bodies who have attempted 
to solve this problem of placing poor whites on the land. These are 
the Dutch Reformed Church and the State. 22 
But, Reitz went on, schemes like the Dutch Reformed Church one at Kakamas had 
foiled. Despite a grant of 52000 morgen and a state loan of £30000, not a penny 
had been repaid. And then, a few months before the start of the session, the 
20 House of Assembly Debates, 31 March 1924, col 1212 
21 Ibid, col 1222 (Du Toit); col 1223 (Heyns); col 1214 (Malon) 
22 Ibid, 5 February 1924, cols 93-94 
------------ -
state 'had to remove no less than 70 heads of families from Kakamas to prevent 
their starving'. One out of every 10 londowners - 60000 souls - 'had been put 
there by the State'. These families together with those given relief jobs in 
forestry and the rai lways had brought the total dependen t on state aid to 80 000 
souls, or 6 per cen t of the white popu lation. Given the economic crisis, he 
believed the state had been judged unfairly and the criticism from the opposition 
was unwarranted. 23 
8 
Yet because the government had no defined pol icy for the poor whites 
they left themselves wide open to a ttack . 24 As the unemployed and underemployed 
in the towns increased, their cause was taken up with renewed vigour by Creswell, 
who now strongly backed the NP in fighting for the predominantly Afr ikaner poor 
whi te class. He kept denouncing the SAP throughout 1924 for failing to tackle 
the poor white problem, which he put down to unfair competition by A.fricans . 
Reject ing Re itz's exp lanation, he argued that 
under the arrangements which obta in in this country these unfortunate 
victims of our system are crushed down below that civilisation line 
and lose morale, they lose hope, and they even lose sympathy of a 
very large portion of the people of this country. You hear them 
alluded to ... as 'mean white trash'. We say on these benches that 
Our quarrel with the government party goes for deeper than the 
inadequacy of the rei ief measures. Our quarre l is that they do not 
recognise that of all the issues before this country this is the most 
essentially national issue for the people of South Africa . 25 
Such appeals swung whites into the Pact camp. Hertzog and Creswell offered a 
definite alternative to social equality and mixing, for they promised segregation 
and the preservation and protection of the whi tes untouched by any 'contaminating' 
influences. This was the aggressive attitude which boded ill for the SAP, who 
seemed to have nothing to offer but an allegedly directionless anti-white pol icy. 
As W K Hancock points out, Smuts and his governmen t were portrayed 
by the opposit ion as 'at one and the same time, violent, irresolute and incompe-
tent'. He vividly shows how this image of Smuts grew. He rtzog, he says, 
accused Smuts of platskiet pol itiek - the pol icy of shooting peop le down 26 - or, 
as the Cape Argus reported, 
23 Ibid 
24 Ibid, attempt by Smuts to terminate debate on Hertzog's Unemployment and 
Poverty tvIotion , and opposition attack, col 101 
25 Ibid, col 102 
26 Hancock, p 162; Pi row, p 87 ff 
General Hertzog went on to refer to the happenings or the past, 
declar ing that everywhere General Smuts had indulged in a pol icy 
of shooting down. The passive resistance movement was the first 
occasion. [27J Then came the shooting in 1913, [28J and then the 
illegal deportations .. . . Then the rebell ion - shooting down and 
murder. [29J Then the war, which had distracted the Prime Minis-
ter's attention. Then the native trouble at Port Elizabeth - shooting 
again; [30J and then the trouble on the Rand [31J- shooting again. 32 
These events were a s devastating for Africans. Address ing the Industrial 
and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) shortly after the Bulhoek affair, in wh ich 
163 members of an Israel ite sec t were shot dead, Selby Msimang denounced the 
Smuts government: 
It is not for me to pass judgement against Ngikima's [sic] teachings, 
bu t I think it is within our right to condemn any system of Government 
wh ich encourages lawlessness and defiance to const ituted authority. 
Man is not bound to confess loyalty to a tyrant. History has shown 
that the human soul naturally revolts against injustice. 33 
African support for Smuts had waned so for that the ICU, through its leader 
Clements Kadalie, joined the anti-Smuts coalition of the Na tionalists and the 
Labour Party during the 1924 e lection . Probably the ICU were persuaded that 
the 'ousting of a government closely associated with the Chamber of Mines might 
27 On passive resistance see P S Joshi, The tyranny of colour, and 
9 
S Radhakrishnan (ed), Mahatma Gandhi: Essays and reflections on his life 
and work 
28 On the 1913 strike see E Katz, A trade un ion aristocracy 
29 On the rebell ion and the execution of Jopie Fourie see G D Schol tz, Die 
rebellie 1914-1915; N G Garson, 'The Boer rebellion 1914', History TOdOy, 
v 12, 2, February 1962; and T R H Davenport, 'The South African rebe llion 
1914', English Historical Review, v 77, 306, 1963. 
30 For Bondelzwarts rebellion see G Lewis, 'The Bondelzwarts rebellion 1922', 
unpub MA thesis, Rhodes University, 1977; for Bulhoek massacre see B G M 
Sundkler, Bantu prophets in South Africa and Cape Times, 26 May 1921; 
for African unrest and strikes see P Walshe, The rise of African nationali sm 
in South Africa, M Benson, South Africa : The struggle for a birthright and 
E Raux, Time ranger than rope. Hancock has good accounts of both Bondel-
zwarts and Bulhoek. 
31 For 1922 strike see Hancock; H Simons, Class and colour in South Africa; 
Johnstone; and I C Walker & B Weinbren, 2000 casual ties. 
32 Cape Argus article quoted in Hancock, p 87 
33 Address by Se lby Msimang, President, ICU of SA, 23 July 1921, in T Ka ris 
& G M Carter, From protest to challenge, v 1, doc 490-1, pp 317-320. 
(The Karis & Carter volumes of documentary sources referred to in this 
thesis by number have the following titles: v 1 - Protest and hope 1882-
1934; v 2 - Hope and challenge 1935-1952; and v 4 - Political profil es 
1882-1964 . ) 
10 
be to the benefit of African labour'. 34 But there is no doubt that Smuts's 
handling of the Bulhoek and Bondelswartz maSsacres hod left on indelible mark on 
most Africans' minds. 35 
These were not the only events that pol iticised Africans. The Secretary 
for Native Affa irs noted that during the war the Africans hod 'maintained on 
attitude of strict loyalty and hod refrained from any action calculated to embarrass 
the Government'. 36 Both he and Smuts blamed renewed African unrest portly on 
'the psychology of war' and on increased political aWareness. This, Smuts said, 
hod led to a deterioration in race relations, and the Africans' 'attitude of respect 
and trust was being replaced by on entirely different thing'. 37 He did not 
e laborate; but clearly there were several basic grievances in the unrest and 
violence which soared in 1919 and 1920. 
One of the main ones was the government's failure, after the Godley 
Commission had advocated reforms, to abol ish or at least standardise pass laws; 
another, the devastating social and economic consequences of the government's 
failure to release the land pramised in 1913. Impoverishment and landlessness 
forced Africans onto the labour market for longer periods, while many more, 
deprived of subsistence on the land, had to migrate to the towns with their 
families. 
There they met with appalling squalor, inadequate housing, low wages, 
lock of educational facilities, lorge-scale unemployment, and a panoply of laws 
restricting and controlling their every movement. Politically impotent, Africans 
resorted to passive resistance, strikes and deputations to have their grievances 
redressed. 
Several government commissions appointed to investigate the unrest in 
1919 urged the need for reform. But no action was taken. In December 1919 the 
Superintendent of New Brighton in Port EI izabeth warned that 
there is no doubt that nearly every Native is smarting under a 
burning sense of injustice which is accentuated by a feeling of 
impotence. None who have heard the men could have any doubt 
34 Karis & Corter, v 1, p 155 
35 Z K Matthews stated at the treason trial that the Bulhoek massacre is a story 
told to African children 'as on incident thot has passed into what one might 
call the political history of the people.' See M Benson, African patriots, 
p 51. -
36 Native Affairs Deportment (NAD) report 1919-1921, UG 34-22, p 1 
37 Cope Times, 27 May 1920 
that it is highly urgent and desirable that the Railways and Harbours, 
the Chambers of Commerce and the City Council should take steps 
to explain to the Native the position and what it is intended to do 
to assist him in the fight for existence at present prices and to reassure 
him that he 'has the sympathy of the White man in his troubles. 38 
Although the unrest in 1919 had not spread to the mines there was 'abundan t 
evidence to show that al/ was not we ll ', Smurthwaite notes. 39 By early 1920 
42 000 Rand Afri cans, mainly from the mines, were on str ike. Sporadic str ikes 
throughout the Union followed, the most serious occurring in Port Elizabeth after 
the arrest of Masabalola, the ICU President. A peaceful demonstration ended in 
shots and a crowd stampede. Twenty four people died and twice as many were 
.. d 40 tnlure • 
A flurry of law-making followed, togethe r with in-depth investigat ions 
into pass laws, urban condi tions a nd wages. They produced the Native Affairs 
Act of 1920, the Natives' Registration and Protection Bill41 and the 1923 Urban 
Areas Ac t. 
11 
One way or another, these laws were both deplored and welcomed. But 
overa ll, Smuts was accused of a pol icy of drift. Smuts, argues Hancock, 'de l i-
vered himse lf into the hands of his enemy' by using phrases 'about letting things 
42 develap', when 
on every disputed issue the challenges demanded an answer in terms 
of either-or; but the defenders responded in terms of more-or-Iess. 
Such a response was psychologically ineffective. 43 
In the propaganda battle, writes O'Dowd, Smuts 
38 NA 215;768/18/F473, 10 December 1919 quoted in A Smurthwaite, 'The 
policy of the Smuts government ', unpub MA thesis, UNISA, 1975, p 40 
39 Ibid, pp 40-53 
40 See Report of the Commission to Enquire into the Native Riots at Port Eliza-
beth, October 1920, PM 4 17/ 277/20, and NAD report 191 9-1 921, UG 
34-22. 
41 The Bill recommended substantial reforms in the pass lows but it was rejected. 
Section 12 of the Urban Areas Act, a restrictive measure, was introduced 
instead. See T R H Davenport, The beginnings of urban segregation in South 
Africa - the Natives' (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 and its background, occa-
sional paper 15, ISER, Rhodes University, 1971, p 27, and chap 8 be low. 
42 Hancock, p 87 
43 Ibid, p 163 
did little to enlighten the electorate as to what its policy was. In 
fact its propaganda seemed to bear out the accusations made by 
Nationalists that it had no policy at all in respect of the 'native 
problem'. 44 
Smuts often conceded that his approach was piecemeal. Introducing the Urban 
Areas Bill he said 
we are left with a sort of policy however modest and humble it may 
be. The large principles we must leave for the future ... however 
much a policy of going step by step may be criticised, and it is 
subject to criticism, st ill it seems to me that we shall have our 
hands full and more than full if we deal with the situation as it 
arises. Let us not be led astroy by vague formulas which do not 
work in regard to Native Affairs. 45 
12 
Both the Botha and Smuts ministries had leamt from experience, though, 
that 'vague formulas' were acc'eptable in theory but rejected by whites when put 
into practice. The number of Bills drafted and then withdrawn or dropped testified 
to this . 46 Between 1910 and 1923 ot least five segrega tion Bills failed. The 
Natives' Land Act, embodying the catch-all principle of segregation, had unani-
mous white backing until its complement, the Native Administration Bill, was 
tabled. This Bill would have brought same rei ief to Africans by adding about 8 
million morgen to the 10 million morgen already scheduled in 1913. Parliament 
agreed in principle that segregation should be the law of the land, but then the 
Select Committee showed that clashing needs and demands - especially on how to 
resolve the labour shortoge in the primary sectors - meant that consensus on land 
pol icy would be difficul t if not impossible to achieve. Since several other 
measures depended on the prior definition of reserves these too had to be dropped. 47 
In consequence Smuts turned pragmatic. He was even prepared to modify 
his Bills to suit his opponents. As Davenport paints out, rather than let 'native 
policy' become a party-political football, the Smuts government refused to force 
h B'II h h" .. I f 48 tel t roug In Its ongma orm. 
44 0' Dowd, p 70 
45 House of Assembly Debates , 12 February 1923. 
46 Native Squatters Bill 1911, Native Disputes Bi ll 1912, Native Administration 
Bill 1917, Natives (Urban Areas) Bill 1918, Natives' Registration and Protec-
tion Bill 1923, Class Areas Bill 1923 
47 See chap 5. 
48 T R H Davenport, 'The triumph of Colonel Stallard: The transformation of 
the Natives' (Urban Areas) Act between 1923 and 1937', SA Historical 
Journal, v 2, November 1970, p 78 
13 
'Native palicy was not 0 fit subject for party politics', 49 to which 
Garson adds that 'dedicated and expert administrators' (mo inly Cope officials) 
were concerned to keep African affairs outs ide the party-political system because 
os they saw it 
the party system encouraged lobbying by special interests, such as 
farmers, landowners, the mines, I iquar producers and traders. 
Cancessians ta these would mean arbitrary decisions and their 
frequent reversal instead of a coherent and consistent pol icy based 
upon their own kind of expertise. 50 
Smu ts appreciated this. Within his own party he had been unable to 
reconcile the different interest groups and classes. His failure to devise an 
ac ceptable 'native pol icy' was therefore a primary reason for his fall. 
By this time the electorate was prepared to give the Pact a chance, and 
everywhere support for the SAP declined. By April 1924 the government majority 
had fallen to eight. When a SAP candidate was defeated at the Wakkerstroom 
by-election on April 5, Smuts decided to go to the country. On June 17, barely 
two months later, with Labour holding the balance, the Pact was in power. 51 
49 T R H Dovenport, 'African townsmen? South African natives' (urban areas) 
legislation through the years', African Affairs, v 68, 271, p 98 
50 N G Garson, 'Party politics and the plural soc iety : South Africa 1910-1929', 
unpub ICS seminar paper, v 1, 10, pp 128-129 
51 The results of the 1924 generol e lection were: NP 63, SAP 53, Labour 18 
a nd Independent 1. Thus the Pact won an overall majority of 27 seats. 
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THE EROSION OF TH E 
CAPE AFRICAN FRANCHISE 
The first attack 
Hertzog's political segregation solution 1924 - 1934 
a Representation at 0 national level 
b Representation ot a local level 
Reversal in counc i I pol icy ofter 1927 
White fears and the franchise question 
The final attack on the Cape franchise 
An assessment and unanswered questions 
_________ 1_ 
On coming to power in 1924, Hertzog,who hod never really accepted 
the franchise compromise negotiated at Union, launched his attack on the Cape 
African vote. 1 Although its abolition was not a major political issue during the 
election campaign, he made it the keynote of his revised 'native pol icy' which 
he announced publicly at Smithfield in November 1925. He declared it thus: 
The time has arrived for a definite native policy, a pol icy which 
will remove all doubt from the native mind about the position which 
he will hold in political society . " but he will have to be told in 
the most unequivocal language that the European is fully determined 
that South Africa shall be governed by the white man, and the white 
man will nat tolerate any attempt to deprive him of that tosk. In 
this connection there should be no false issue as regards the European. 2 
15 
Within ten years a uniform system had been substituted, segregating Africans poli-
tically at both the local and national level, and Cape Africans had been despoiled 
of almost all their rights. 
What moved the Hertzog min istry to destroy a vested right that had ex isted 
unabused by Africans for 80 years? What decided the Pact government to upset 
the Union constitution that had been mode only 15 years earl ier? These questions 
lead us back to earl ier days and a tradition that had substontially eroded the Cape 
African franchise by the time of Union in 1910. Hertzog merely carried this on, 
adding new dimensions to what he had inherited. 
For discussion of the Cape franchise issue see M Hodgson, 'The vicissitudes 
of the Cape franchise', unpub article, Ballinger papers, UCT collection, 
D 70/80 6(e); P Lewsen, 'The Cape Liberal tradition - myth or reality?', 
unpub Institute of Commonwealth Studies (ICS) seminar paper, v 1, 10, 
pp 56-72; C C Saunders, 'The new African el ite in the Eastern Cape and 
some late nineteenth century origins of African "nationalism"', unpub ICS 
seminar paper, v 1, 10, pp 44-55; S Trapida, 'Liberalism in the Cape in 
the 19th and 20th centuries', unpub ICS seminar paper, v 4, 17, pp 53-67, 
and 'African divisional politics in the Cape Colony 1884-1910', Journal of 
African History, v 9, 1, 1968; T R H Davenport, 'The consol idation of a new 
society: The Cape Colony' in M Wilson & L M Thompson (eds), The Oxford 
history of South Africa, v 1, pp 321-324, and South Africa: A modern history; 
H J Mondelbrote, 'Constitutional development 1834-1858' in E Walker (ed), 
Cambridge history of the British Empire, v 8, pp 380-388; J S Marais, The 
Cape coloured people 1652-1937; J L McCracken, The Cape Pari iament 
1854-1910; C F J Muller (ed), Five hundred years: A history of South Africa; 
L D Ngcongco, 'Imvo Zabantsundu and Cape native policy', unpub MA thesis, 
UNISA, June 1974. 
2 J B M Hertzog, The segregation problem, p 3. This address was issued by the 
Federal Council of the Notional Party in 1925, and also published in full In 
the Cape Times, 14 November, and 2 and 4 December 1925. 
The fi rst attack 
In 1853 the Cape Colony got a constitutianol settlement that ignored. 
colour in its electoral provisions. Furthermore, its franchise qualifications were 
low by the standards of the time. All adult males could vote if they occupied 
immovable property to the value of £25 or had an income of £50 a year. Since 
voting was by word of mouth, a literacy test was nat required. 
These arrangements came up aga inst considerable pressure. Even in 
1852, before the constitution had been fina lised, the Attorney-General William 
Porter had to make a forceful case for a liberal franchise : 
Why should you fear the exercise of the franchise? This is a del icate 
question but it must be touched upon. I do not hesitate to say that I 
would rather meet the Hottentot at the hustings voting for his represen-
tative than meet him in the wilds with his gun on his shoulder. Is it 
not better to disarm them by granting them the privileges of the Con-
stitution? If you now blast all their hopes and tell them they shall 
not fight their bottles constitutionally, do not you yourselves apply 
to them the stimulus to fight thei r battles unconstitutionally?.. If 
you are prepared to sow the wind and reap the whirlwind, if you are 
prepared to tell these peop le that you fear ta admit them to the freedom 
of the Constitution, if you are prepared to do all this, I, for one, would 
be prepared to tear this draft to pieces ... As a body, there are nowhere 
to be found a more qu iet and honest people than the coloured classes 
of this colony. I appeal to anyone who has travelled, that person and 
property are safer in no other part of the world. 3 
16 
Parter's arguments helped to assuage fears in 1852, but later they grew 
again and the franchise provisions became the focus of opposition. These fears 
became all the greater as the Cape African voters increased, especially after the 
introduction of responsible government (1872), the subsequent emergence of political 
parties, the registration campaign, and the incorporation of the Transkei in the 
Cope Colony. By the turn of the century virtually all 46 constituencies hod African 
voters, the greatest concentration being in the Eastern districts. As McCracken 
points out, the African part of the electorate increased by 477 per cent in the 
1880s. 4 One Cape ministry after another between 1886 and 1894 responded to 
white fears of being swamped at the polls by Africans. They were determined to 
cut down the power of the African vote by changing the franchise qual ifications 
and by more rigorous electoral regulations. 
3 M Ballinger, 'Fancy franchises: A page from the history of the Cape native 
vote', unpub article, Ballinger papers, UCT collection, D 70/80 6(d), p 5 
4 McCrocken, p 80 
The Upington ministry in 1886 suggested seporate Africon elective 
boords should be created to vote for their own pa rl iamentary representative. The 
measure was defeated. It was still felt that 'to create "fancy franchises" and to 
allow various types of citizenship within one state' would be a form of 'basta rd 
representation' and would result in 'Kaffirs voting for Kaffirs'. 5 
The Sprigg ministry made the second attack on the franchise, and 
succeeded. The Parliamentary Voters' Registration Act of 1887 excluded tribal 
and communal tenure as a qual ification to vote and introduced stricter registration 
controls. J T Jabavu, editor of Imvo Zabantsundu, described the 1887 Act as 
'about the severest blow that has ever been aimed at Native rights since represen-
6 
tative institutions were introduced in this country'. Although white feel ing was 
that the safeguards built into the Bill to prevent irregular disenfranchisement of 
voters made the 'purification of the voters' I ist cumbersome and costly', Africans 
felt that the Bill gave whites an unfair advantage. Their main objection was that 
field-cornets acting as registration officers under the new system could force 
voters to stand cross-examination. As Imvo put it , the govemmen t had gone to 
the extreme of raking up the' Inquisition from debris of the Middle Ages'. 7 After 
this date the white voters continued to increase but the number of Africans stayed 
the same, according to McCracken. 8 So this law effected 'a substantial pruning 
of the African electorate, 9 - suggesting that Jabavu's assessment was val id. 
In 1892 the Franchise and Ballot Act raised the occupational franchise 
from £25 to £75 and introduced a compulsory educational test whereby voters had 
to be able to write their names and occupations. The Act modified only the con-
ditions of the franchise, and did so for everyone 01 ike. 
17 
In the 1890s Rhodes's ministry wanted to further deprive the Cape Africans 
of their vote by what J W Sauer called 'a side wind'. The Glen Grey Act of 1894 
was passed to settle the land question in the Glen Grey district where disputes had 
been going on for years. But the occasion gave Rhodes the opportunity of dealing 
5 Ball inger, p 4 
6 Imvo Zabantsundu, 23 March 1887, quoted by Ngcongco, p 82 
7 Imvo Zabantsundu, 23 March 1887 and Alice Times, 1 April 1887; and see 
Ngcongco, p 74 for details of several newspapers . 
8 McCracken, p 80 
9 E Roux, Time longer than rope, p 50 
--------
with the franchise issue as well, and in a way acceptable to both Bondsmen and 
liberals. 10 The granting of individual tenure to Africans was successfully linked 
with setting up local councils and a separate pol itical system for Africans. 11 
The reduction of the Cope African vote was influenced not only by 
domestic concems. In the decodes after the 1890s there was also the wider issue 
of federotion or union of the South African states and colonies. Many obstacles 
arose, the main one being the divergence in 'native pol icy' between the Cope 
Colony and Notal and the republics. Rhodes's Glen Grey Act of 1894 can be 
seen as on attempt to align the Cope trodition with the conservatism of the North. 
Rhodes clearly sow 
the possibilities of a system of land tenure which would satisfy the 
upholders of native rights by giving to the natives all the advantages 
of individual tenure together with security ... and which would 
appeal to the North by carrying with it the political disabilities of 
land held on triba l or communal tenure, and the possibilities of 
separote administrotion through native councils. i2 
The issue of closer union become particularly important after the Anglo-
Boer War. In those years from 1902, the 'native question' and the whole future of 
inter-state relations were intimately bound up with it. Merits aside, it was seen 
that for on amalgamation between the four states to work, the different traditions 
of liberal South and conservative North hod somehow to be reconciled. Hence 
the appointment in September 1903 of the inter-colonial South African Native 
Affairs Commission (SA NAC). 
18 
SANAC's report in 1905 covered the gamut of 'native affairs' - franchise, 
labour, land and urban policy. The recommendations on franchise and representa-
tion leant heavily on Cape traditions and practice. 13 They stressed that Africans 
already qualified to vote - on the some basis as whites - should in future be put 
on a separate voters' list; that they should elect their own special representatives; 
and that once the republics became self-goveming they too should be required to 
enfranchise Africans on this basis. 14 SANAC's recommendations thus commented 
10 Davenport, 'The Afrikaner Bond', unpub PhD thesis, UCT, 1960, p 303 
11 Bollinger, p 7. Th~ effect of land tenure on the franchise, and the separate 
administrative system established, are examined in chop 2, pp 101-102 and 
chop 3, pp 105- 114 respectively. 
12 Boll inger, p 7 
13 C Tatz, Shadow and substance in South Africa, p 6 
14 Ibid, pp 10-11. Clouse 8 of the Treaty of Vereeniging prevented Britain 
from introducing franchise reforms in her newly acquired South African 
colonies. This WOs ta be left to the colonial legislatures once they hod been 
granted responsible govemment. 
on the African franchise in the Cope Colony and also stressed the need to extend 
the franchise to Africans elsewhere. 
SANAC's recommendations rationalised the fears of the white electorate 
19 
- fears like those that hod swayed the Cope ministries during the 1880s and 1890s. 15 
African witnesses before the commission had expressed the hope that under British 
low full equality would be extended ta all 'civilised' Or 'detribalised' Africans, 
and not be confined to those in the Cope. Karis and Corter assessing documents 
of the time conclude 
Although statements reflected in port the distinctive situations of 
each colony, all the arguments were similarly directed toward expand-
ing the participation of the African in the evolving new society. The 
emphasis was upon the need for greater economic opportunity and 
political representation. The key issue for Africans throughout South 
Africa was the franchise. 16 
African hopes were counter-productive in that they heightened white fear. It was 
believed that Africans were qualifying for the vote at a foster rate than whites and 
that this would threaten white supremacy at the polls. 
SANAC sympathised with these fears and wonted to reconcile differences 
in Africon pol icy between the four British colonies. In the Cope, they noted, all 
but five .of the 46 constituencies had African vaters. 17 It mode the bogey of the 
African vote all the more real. The commissioners were troubled by their own pre-
diction that Africans would outnumber whites in some of the Cope constituencies 
because they feared that the enfranchisement of Africans was 'a threat to white 
political hegemony and to the very survival of European Colonialism'. 18 Like 
Rhodes and Hofmeyr before them, the commissioners hod union of the colonies as 
their overriding gool. Their recommendations were tailored towards a solution that 
the whole country would accept . This meant sacrificing African rights on the 
altar of white demands. Accordingly, they emphasised the need to control and 
diminish the importance of the Cope African franchise. 
15 See SANAC report 1903-1905, paras 417-442. 
16 Karis & Carter, vI, p 9 
17 SANAC report 1903-1905, para 419 
18 Ibid, para 441 
Yet when the National Convention met in 1908-1909 to drqw up a con-
stitution for the Union, SANAC's solution was rejected. 19 Delegates found it 
hard to reconcile the different traditions of African policy in a form acceptable 
to all. Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (OFS) unanimously 
opposed palitical rights and privileges an Cape Colonial lines . To prevent the 
unification movement collapsing, the delegates agreed to differ and ta keep the 
status qua . This amounted to a concession by the 'Cape Liberals'. It meant that 
the Northeners had won and were virtually free to dictate whatever race pol icy 
they wanted in South Africa. 
Britain's willingness to 'trade African rights for Afrikaner co-operation' 
20 
to secure her interests contributed to the victary of the Northern tradition. 20 
Having first campromised by granting the Transvaal and OFS responsible government 
with only the whites enfranchised, and then bowed to white abhorrence at the idea 
that an African might one day sit in Parliament, the imperial government was like 
a judge who had sold out his right ta judge in future. This to the eventualdespair 
and disillusionment of the Africans who went on hoping that Britoin would intervene 
for them and failed to real ise what the British imperatives were. 
This Northern victory meant that the issue of the African franchise, 
whether in its Cape or Union cantext, would face the South African government 
in the years after Union. 
Hertzog's political segregation solution 1924-1934 
When Hertzog started his attack on the Cape African franchise he was 
continuing a tradition that sought to undermine and reduce the power of the 
African vote. But it was also a new move, in that Hertzog decided to impose the 
Northern tradition on the Cape. This would mean, finally, eliminating the Cape 
19 L M Thompson, The unification of South Africa, chap 3 has a detailed analysis 
of the franchise issue and the National Convention's decision. 
20 A Ngcobo, 'The development of African poli ti ca l protest in South Africa 1882-
1910: An analytical approach', PhD thesis, University of Cal ifornia, 1973, 
p 164 quoted in V Klein, 'African responses in the Eastern Cape to Hertzog's 
Representation of Natives in Pari iament Bill 1926-1936', unpub BA (Hons) essay, 
UCT, 1978. I am grateful farhaving had the opportunity of consulting this 
meticulously researched essay . See also A B Xuma, 'Bridging the gap between 
wh.e and !:lock inSouth Africa', address at the Conference of European and Bantu 
Christian Student Associations, Fort Hore, 27 June - 3 July 1930, Karis & 
Carter, v 1, doc 41 d, p 221; and A Smurthwaite, 'The policy of the Smuts 
government towards Africans 1919-1 924', unpub MA thesis, UNISA, 1975, p 5. 
21 
African franchise. 
As early as 1911 Hertzog had written to Fred Bell, chairman of the N~tive 
Affairs Society: 
I feel that the policy of drift in connection with this momentous 
question is going to do South Africa irreparable harm. Ever since 
1903 I have advocated segregation as the onl}' permanent solution 
of the question and it is to me verY clear [sic] that unless such a 
pol icy is undertaken soon, the conditions necessary for its real isa-
tion will .. . vanish. It is with a feeling akin to horror that I look 
into the future with this question unsolved. 21 
On becoming Prime Minister in 1924, Hertzog wasted no time in formula-
ting a permanent segregation solution. Despite his admission in the first parliamen-
tary sess ion that he had no detai led plan,22 within the year - on 11 November 
1925 - in addressing his Smithfield constituents he announced his fOlT-point 'native 
policy' proposals. 23 A few months later these had been embodied in four Bills24 
wh ich Hertzog tabled in a joint sitting of the Houses the following year. 
The Representation of Natives Bill proposed to deprive Cape Africans of 
their right to vote on the same terms as whites. Instead Africans throughout the 
Union, voting through their chiefs, headmen and councils, were to elect seven 
whites who would sit in the House of Assembly except when African representation 
was being debated. These seven elected Members would have no power to vate on 
matters of confidence unless these directly affected Africans. 25 
A second Bill - the Union Native Council Bill - projected a Native 
Council which was to be partly nominated and partly elected by the constituencies 
defined in the first Bill and which would (under strict official control) pass 
21 Letter from Hertzog ta F W Bell dated 9 May 1911, reproduced in the Sunday 
Times, 11 May 1924, quoted in Tatz, p 15 
22 Davenport, South Africa: A modern history, p 175 
23 See n 1.2 for referencesfar Hertzag's Smithfield address. 
24 Unian Native Council Bill, Coloured Person s' Rights Bill, Representation of 
Natives in Parliament Bill, Natives' Land (Amendment) Bill. See Gazette 
Extraordinary, 23 July 1926. ---
25 For further details on Hertzog's franchise Bills see H Burton, The native 
franchise question; D B Malteno, Betraya I of 'natives' representation'; 
DDT Jabavu, Criticisms of the Native Bills, The segregation fallacy and 
other papers, Native disabilities in South Africa, and Native views on 
Native Bills; J D Rheinallt-Jones & R V S Thema, Cape franchise and 
Bantu status; SAIRR, Political representation of Africans in the Union; 
E A Walker, The Cape native franchise. 
ordinances binding on Africans only. 
These two Bills, together with the Coloured Persons' Rights Bill and the 
Natives' Land Act (1913) Amendment Bill, formed the basis of Hertzog's roce 
policy. Because the Cope non-rocial fronchise was entrenched, a two-thirds 
majority of a joint sitting of both Houses of the Union Parliament would have to 
be secured for its abolition. Undaunted by the fact that he would have to upset 
the Union constitution secured in good faith only 15 years earlier, Hertzog tabled 
his four droft Bills on 23 July 1926. However, these Bills were not proceeded with 
in the House, and in 1927 were reintroduced and sent to a Select Committee. 
In 1929 the Select Committee reported. The Native Council Bill was 
held over pending further trial of the council system originally provided for under 
the Native Affairs Act 23 of 1920 and later modified under Act 27/1926 and Act 
15/1927. 26 
a Representation at a national level 
In 1929 the Committee produced a new Natives' Representation Bill. 
22 
Under that Bill, Africans were ta be represented by two Senators elected by commu-
nal vote. They were to elect two more after a lapse of 10 years. In the Cope, 
Africans already registered as voters were to retain the franchise but no more were 
to be registered on the common roll: new voters were to go on a separate African 
roll. The voters thus registered, as their numbers grew, were gradually to elect 
more pari iamentary representatives up to a maximum of two Senators and three 
Members of the House of Assembly. In the end, therefore, Africans in the four 
provinces would be represented by six Senators. Those in the Cape would, in 
addition, be represented by three MPs. All the pari iamentary representatives were 
to be white. 
This Bill was introduced in a joint sitting on the eve of the 1929 election. 
At its third reading it failed to get the two-thirds majority and therefore lapsed. 
Despite Hertzog's electoral success in 1929, and also his increased 
majority and the improved Nationalist strength in the Upper House after 1926 with 
the Amendment to the Senate Act, the ministry 'took the prudent and unprecedented 
step of referring its four Non-European bills to a Joint Select Committee of the two 
26 For discussion of modifications see below pp 30-31. 
Houses. 27 Most contemporary accounts suggest that Hertzog took this step because 
he knew he still did not command the required two-thirds majority. But there is 
evidence that he had the support of at least some SAP Members, and on the strength 
of this the SAP had agreed to co-operate with Hertzog on a non-party basis if 
Hertzog agreed to send the' Native Bills' to a Select Committee before the second 
reading. On 21 February 1930 a report in Die Burger suggested this was indeed the 
case. Part of it read: 
We state on the best authority that the Bill for the Representation of 
Natives in Parliament will be laid before a Select Committee of 
Members of the House of Assembly and the Senate before the second 
reading. 28 
The report continued: 
As our readers know, it was the original intention of General Hertzog 
that the Bill should be read a second time before the Joint Session of 
the House of Assembly and the Senate and after that - that is to say 
after the principles of the Bill had been entrenched - it was to be 
referred to a Select Committee. 29 
Smuts took exception to these articles. 30 Next day in the House he refuted the 
allegation that he and Hertzog had agreed to co-operate, 3r stating 'it was a 
mistake and that he had promised nothing beyond that he, on his part, would not 
insist on calling upon any unnecessary evidence to be placed before the Committee'. 
He said he had 'never given any undertaking to pass the Bill but said that they 
would endeavour to find a solution' • 32 
For Smuts himself this was more than likely true. But articles in Die 
Weste, Die Burger and Ons Vaderland33 all said that opinion within the SAP on 
the native question had polarised after Hertzog's 1929 election victory and that 
He rtzog could count on the support of dissident Natol and Transvaal SAP Members. 
The tensions already evident in the SAP election congress in December 192834 had 
thus surfaced and probably encouraged Hertzog to appoint the al l-party Joint 
Select Committee. It was a good decision, from his point of view. The Bill that 
27 E A Walker, A history of South Africa (1935 edn), p 620 
28 Die Burger, 21 February 1930 (my translation) 
29 Ibid 
30 See sub-leader, Die Burger, 22 February 1930, commenting on Smuts's denial 
in the House the previous day. A Iso Hancock & Van der Poel, v 5, p 323 and 
23 
chap 2, p 66 where Smuts's specific objections to Hertzog's Bills are discussed. 
31 Ons Vaderland, 22 February 1930 
32 Ibid, and House of Assembly Debates, 21 February 1930. 
33 Die Weste, 21 February 1930; Die Burger, 21 February 1930; Ons Vaderland, 
22 February 1930 
34 See Cape Times and The Friend, 8-10 December 1928, particularly on the hard 
I ine taken by Calonel Stollard and Colonel Mentz, both prominent Transvaal 
Members. Also G H Nicholls, South Africa in my time, p 283. 
emerged from this Committee in 1935 had the support of most of the Committee 
members; and what is more, it was mainly the handiwork of the two arch-
segregationist SAP Members, Colonel Stallard and Heaton Nicholls. 35 As 
Nicholls wrote, 'the whips were off ' , and no leader tried to get their Members 
to toe the party line. 36 
The Natives' Representa tion Bill - debated and revised by the Joint 
Select Committee between 1930 and 1935 and later introduced as the controversial 
Bill No 1 - contrary to traditional interpretations was not something agreed on 
only after the SAP and NP fused in 1934. The Natives' Representation Bill, in 
essentially the same form as the 1936 Bill No 1, had been accepted by most 
Members as early as 1932. 
To pursue the point: although the 1936 Representation of Natives Bill 
No 1 stemmed directly from the Representation of Natives in Parliament Bill and 
the Union Native Council Bill of 1926, and also from the Representation of 
Natives in Parl iamen t Bill of 1929, it differed from them in several important 
ways. It excluded Africans completely from voting for Members of the House of 
Assembly.37 Instead it inaugurated a uniform and Union-wide system of political 
representation for Africans through four white Members of the Senate 38 elected by 
four purely African electoral colleges. These changes came from the Joint Select 
Committee, so we can say that the specific formulation of Bill No 1 grew from the 
Committee's work between 1930 and 1935. 
Further, on 2 May 1930 Heaton Nichalls, a SAP Member on the Joint 
Select Committee, introduced a new draft Bill. 39 Th is too proposed having four 
35 Ibid, p 285 where Nicholls discusses 'what I may call, the Natal Bill, intro-
duced by me' and Stallard's contribution, 'an add itional clause to my Bill, to 
provide for the constitution and powers of a Grand Committee on Native 
Affairs in the Senate'. These Amendments were proposed on 2 May 1930. 
36 Ib id, p 284 
24 
37 Compared with Union-wide House of Assembly representation by seven Members 
in 1926 and Cape House of Assemb ly representation by three Members in 1929. 
38 There was provis ion for a possible increase after seven years in the number of 
electoral areas to six, and the number of Senators would increase accordingly. 
39 The Bills discussed and compared in this section can be found in the Reports 
and proceedings of Joint Committees on Natives and Colou red Persons during 
the period 1930-1934 (Supplement to Joint Committee 1- 1935) (JSC 1-35), 
Nicholls' draft - Natives' Parliamentary Bill 1931, appendix A, p 54; and 
Representation of Natives Bil l 1936 printed as An 4-1936 (commonly known 
asBil1 No 1). 
African electoral colleges to represent African interests in Parliament, and that 
the Senators might be 'British subjects of Non-European descent'. By 17 votes to 
9,40 the Joint Select Committee accepted the principle in Nicholls' proposals 
that Africans should not be given representotion in the House ot Assembly. On 
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14 May 1930 an amendment limiting representation to 'European' Senators was 
adopted by 18 votes to 8. 41 Bill No 1 thus kept the main features of Heaton 
Nicholls' Bill, which the Joint Select Committee instructed the law adviser to 
draw up on 18 March 1931 42 after the majority had voted in favour of its proposals. 
Eight SAP Members dissented and three voted with the NP. Yet this 
vote is not really true ot the SAP's stance on African representation. Despite the 
voting, there are indications that the SAP had agreed from the first to abide by 
the majority decision. First, the whips were off for the entire proceedings, Hertzog 
and Smuts having agreed not to pressure people on a party basis. Second, as 
Nicholls recorded, 'The Committee laid this self-denying ordinance on itsel f: that 
the whole Native question should disappear from the political party arena until the 
Committee reported to the House. ,44 Third, despite the fact that on the 9 May 
1930 the Committee resolved 'to retain the right to re-open any decision arrived 
at', not one of the eight dissidents exercised this right on any of the main 
provisions of the Bill after March 1931. 45 
This evidence supports the allegation of pro-govemment newspapers that 
Smuts had agreed to co-operate with Hertzog on a non-party basis if the Bills were 
46 
sent to a Select Committee before the second reading, 
Further, the Bill drafted and accepted by the Select Committee by 1932 
shows a definite change in Hertzog's original idea of how to give Africans political 
40 JSC 1-35, p 20. Those dissenting were F S Malan, Senator Spies (the only 
NP Member), Senator Wessels, the Hon P Duncan, J H Hofmeyr, C J Krige, 
A 0 B Payn, General J C Smuts, Major G B von Zyl. 
41 At this stage Senator Spies voted in favour of the proposals. 
42 There were a few changes in 1932 with the redefinition of electoral boundaries; 
conditions for increased representation after a 10 and not a seven-year period; 
and the composition of electoral colleges. But otherwise no further amendments 
were made to Nicholls' draft. See 'Memorandum on the Native Bills as dealt 
with by the Commission which sat at Pretoria in November 1932', JSC 1-35, 
appendix A, p 130. 
43 Nicholls, p 284 
44 Ibid, p 285 
45 JSC 1-35, p 19. For discussion of the franchise measures and Fusion see con-
cluding chapter. 
46 See above pp 15-23. 
representation. In his attack on the Cape African vote Hertzog, in the words of 
4/ Ngcobo and Mtimkulu, hod mode 'progress backwards'. 
In plans for an elective, extra-pari iamentary body, there was the same 
tale ot retrogression. Under the 1926 Union Native Council Bill it would have 
had 50 members, 15 of them nominated by the Governor-General, and been given 
both a 'deliberative' and a limited 'legislative' function. But b.y 1933 attitudes 
hod changed. The Union Council Bill was dropped. 48 In its stead a clause 
embodied in the Natives' Representation Bill provided for 'a new organ - the 
Natives' Representative Council (commonly called the NRC). The NRC was to 
have only eight members elected by an elaborate voting procedure. Electoral 
colleges dominated by the chiefs were to be set up to elect both the four Senators 
and the eight NRC members. 49 The block voting system was a bad one, as Julius 
Lewin showed. 50 The del imitation of voting areas was so weighted in favour of 
rural and tribal interests that 'no candidate need pay much attention to the urban 
voting units because their value is so very small in comparison with the block 
votes cast by chiefs and Electoral Committees'. 51 The constituencies were 
unwieldy, and senatorial representation was no substitute for representation in the 
Lower House. 
Searching rhetorical questions on senatorial representation were posed by 
an anonymous writer. He wished to know why represen tation for all Africans had 
been confined to the Senate when Senators appointed under the South Africa Act 
'to guard African interests hod proved ta be utterly ineffective'. And why 'did 
the candidates have to be of European descent owning £500 in fixed property' if 
not to ensure that they had 'absorbed the normal closs-prejudice?' This and the 
lengthy residence qualification cut out people like conaerned clergy from accept-
ing nomination, the writer suggested. In all, the communal, tribal voting system 
was a mechanism to undermine the opposition of African nationalists and the urban 
voter, The writer went on: 
47 D G S Mtimkulu & S B Ngcobo, 'Some criticisms of the Act and its results', 
Pol itical representation of Africans in the Union, SA IRR New Africa pamhlet 
4, p 30 
48 See below p 30. 
49 Alternative clause 6, JSC 1-35, appendix A, p 55 
50 J Lewin, 'The electoral system in practice', Political representation of 
Africans in Parliament, SAIRR New Africa pamphlet 4, p 12 
51 Ibid 
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It is easy to tabulate ingenious bu t disingenuous replies to all these 
queries but it is nat warth the labour for obviously the representation 
is intended to be impotent. Otherwise there is no real reason for 
this elaborate, inconvenient and confusing structure. 52 
This complicated machinery was set up to accommodate tribal ism, 53 iust 
as the communal voting system was a deliberate ploy to slow down detribalisation. 
It also succeeded in wip ing out any problem of land ownership being linked to the 
franchise qualification in the Cape. These, however, were side issues as far as 
Africans were concerned. The Bill meant disenfranchisement. 
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As if this were not enough to quell white fears, the government had seen 
fit to create a monstrous representational system which few whites would cope with, 
Gude wrote: 
This would be a difficult task for an en lightened European Community 
to perform but one can imagine the 'agony and bloody sweat' on the 
brows of the Native Caunc il lors vating for several candidates in the 
order of their preference. 
It is unnecessary and unreasonably complicated. If we are debarred 
from 'common representation in Pari iament' with Europeans and may 
not be 'enrolled on any list or rail af Parliamentary voters' for the 
election of members of the House of Assembly may we not be enrolled 
on a I ist to vote for our very own Senators? 
Even to be enrolled on a list for that purpose would temper 'the blow of 
being excluded from the' other and more honourable and valued list 
reserved for the few who ere not of our race or colour. 54 
He reminded the government that over 5 000 Africans had died in the Great War; 
that Africans were already in responsible positions, often made to act as the gove rn-
ment's administrative representatives. These facts in themselves qualified Africans 
for the vote. To accommodate white fears he conceded: 
There would of course have to be qual ifications even for such a 
'Kaffir list' and it is suggested that in addi tion to the oft proposed 
(a) Monogyny (b) a standard of l iving (c) an educational qualifica-
tion (d) one of either . . . property, or income or salary Or wages, 
•.. recognised chiefs , headmen, past or present Genera l or District 
52 Anon, 'The disfranchising Bill', unpub mimeo, J D Rheinallt-Jones papers, 
SA IRR archives, University of the Witwatersrand, B (1 OO)C 
53 On 27 February 1931 the NAD submitted a report to the Joint Select Commit-
tee setting out suggestions 'to determine electora l areas on a tribal basis', 
which the secretary said 'r.as much to commend itse lf if it were at all prac-
ticable', JSC 1-35, p 31 . For detailed ana lysis see c hap 3, 
54 D Gude, member of the Johannesburg Joint Council, 'Memorandum on 
Native Bills', unpub mimeo, J D Rhe inallt- Jones papers, B (100)e 
or local Councillors or members of any native advisory boord, or 
reserve boord, any recognised minister of rei igion, school teacher, 
policeman, warder, prison guard, forest guard or the like, any 
Government pensioner or any notive who was a member of the 
Native Labour Corps and served Overseas in the Great War be 
ipso facto entitled to be registered. 55 
But Hertzog not only refused to extend the meagre pol itical rights of 
Cape Africans to their t'-brthern counterparts - he also sought to toke away the 
few rights the Cape Africans had left. He devised a system to exclude Africons 
permonently from any political combination which would be strong enough to have 
a pol itical influence or the status of a rul ing majority. By abolishing the Cape 
African franchise and putting Africans on a communal roll, Hertzog would turn a 
racial group into a permanent political minority and so make them politically 
impotent. The nature of this impotence is clear from the system of national and 
local councils he offered Africans in return for the Cape franchise. It suggests 
'progress backwards' on the separate representational system as well. 
b Representation at a local level 
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Hertzog's views on local and notiona l representation were clearly stated 
at Smithfield in 1925. He granted then that 'a lorge majority of the European 
population of the Cape, and also a large number in the other provinces, would 
oppose the abolition of the Cope franchise' and said: 'We must, therefore, put 
something in its place •.•. We sholl have to do this or there will be no solution of 
the notive problem'. 56 In this sense Hertzog saw the extension of I imited represen-
tation as a guid pro quo for the loss of the Cape franchise. But this was not his 
only argument. Taking up the theme of Africans being encouraged to 'develop in 
their own areas', he said: 
within all native areas the native [will be] trained and encouraged 
to be as much as possible self-rei iant, to make those areas as attrac-
tive as possible for himself, and also to govern himself as far as 
possible •.• the object must be so to build up and train the natives 
that within their own territory they will order their own household. 57 
To this end Hertzog at Smithfield committed his government to giving 'effect to 
the spirit and object of Act 23 of 1920',58 the Native Affairs Act. Th is Act hod 
already approved the setting up of local and general councils. Hertzog declared 
that his admin istration would be encouraged to introduce these councils wherever 
·55 Ibid 
56 J B M Hertzog, The segregation problem, p 6 
57 Ibid, p 6 
58 Ibid, p 4 
possible. He therefore accepted the principle of locally elected councils; of 
white oppointees who would serve just as advisers; of limited juridical and 
plenary powers - over the construction and maintenance of roads, droins, dams 
and furrows, water conservation, the bottle aga inst stock diseases, san itation, 
afforestation, education, and agricultural improvements. In other words, these 
local councils were to hove followed in the tradition of the long-establ ished 
Transkeian General Council (Bunga). One new feature was important: Hertzog 
apparently agreed that local councils be allowed to make and enforce by-laws 
and levy rates. 
Once estobl ished, general councils were primarily to co-ordinate 
activities in the regions and - as we have noted - were to be modelled on the 
apparently successful Bunga which became fully fledged in 1931 with the inclusion 
of Wes t Pondoland . Hertzog sa id: 
[These councils] will give an opening for the developed native to 
exercise his powers and tolents •.•. Here he will be given the oppor-
tunity to do everything for his own people, within his own territory, 
and thot without the interference of the white man, except in so far 
as the white man gives him the necessary lead. 59 
Reversal in council policy after 1927 
The 50-member Union Council proposed by Hertzog extended the idea 
of the annual Native Conference established under the 1920 Native Affairs Act. 
Here too Hertzog was still prepared to stress the role of the educated ' detr ibalised' 
African as leader, os we con see from the relotively few nominated places on the 
Council in the draft Union Council Bill. 
Hertzog also accepted the need for consul tation, in his original plan. 
As Prime Minister he even took the unprecedented step of calling and personally 
addressing a Native Conference barely a month after his first public statement of 
'native policy' in 1925. 
It seems thot Hertzog was prepared to go quite far at first in meeting 
African demands for a bigger say in their own local administration. He olso 
accepted his predecessors formula, which was a move away trom segregation.60 
But between 1927 and 1933, those contemplated powers were also 
eroded at both notional and local level. We have alreody seen how the Union 
59 Ibid, P 5 
60 For substantiation of this view see chap 3. 
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Council Bill was replaced by the NRC during the time ot the Joint Select Commit-
tee. But even before this Committee began, there were signs of preference for a 
purely consultative Council. At the 1925 Native Conference on the Smithfield 
proposals, He rtzog promised to make the Native Conference an onnual feature as 
a forerunner of the future Union Council.6 Yet when Africans rejected his 'Four 
Bills', Hertzog reneged on his promise by not summoning a Native Conference for 
the yeors 1928-1930 and so showed that African criticism of government policy was 
not acceptable . 
At the local level, two Amendments to the original Native Affairs Act 
in 1926 and 1927 reduced even the meagre powers of the local councils to nothing. 62 
The changes favoured the Natal system of giving greater authority to the chiefs, 
thus devaluing the role the educated Africans were expected to play. Nomination 
was favoured rather than election of leaders, and plenary powers granted to the 
local councils in 1920 were deleted in the 1926 Amendment. Iv\acmillan told the 
NEC why the Amendments cut down the responsibil ity of the local councils. 63 He 
showed how the governmen t had begun to look backwards administratively about 
1927 when the Native Administration Act officially sanctioned the policy of 
retribalisation. 64 He discussed the success in the Transkei with Africans given the 
responsibility ta undertake projects there, and then questioned the government's 
wisdom in denying the same freedom to Africans elsewhere in the Union. This was 
news to Dr A W Roberts, a member of the statutory Native Affairs Commission 
(NAC): 
Roberts I want it made a I ittle clearer, if Professor Iv\acmillan will 
do so. I think the impression that Professor Iv\acmillan has left is 
that the Government has been against councils having full adminis-
trative authority. I would like to know if that is Professor Macmil-
an's view? 
Macmillan I had in mind the perfectly definite case of the position 
in the Ciskei, about Kingwilliamstown .... I do know that for yeors 
on end they were holding up the formation of the Ciskeian or King-
williamstown Council on the express ground that they were afraid to 
61 Minutes of Conference summoned under Act 23 of 1920, 3-5 December 1925, 
Prime Minister's address, NAC report 1925-1926, UG 17-27, pp 15-16 
62 For further discussion see E H Brookes, The colour problems of South Africa, 
pp 7, 13 and 92. 
63 Native Economic Commission (NEC) 1930-1932, oral evidence of W M 
Macmillan, 7 May 1931. For composition of the commission and its terms 
of reference see below n 2.3. 
64 See below, chap 3, pp 121-123. 
apply the Act of 1920; afraid to allow them as much financial respon-
sib ility as they hod contemp lated .•. the Native Administration Act, 
if I remembe r rightly, modified the financial provisions of the Act of 
1920. I would suggest that they modify it again. 
Roberts So that really there was at one time a distinct idea of giving 
them full plenary powers? 
Macmillan Apparently. 65 
It is noteworthy that Dr Roberts, a founder member of the NAC, should 
have been so vogue about the government's intentions. His bewildenment - for 
lock of infonmation - suggests another form of government repression, by stifl ing 
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a body designed for African consultation and advice. 66 There is little doubt that 
initially the NAC enjoyed the confidence of African leaders, but when their 
express recommendations were continually overruled by Pori iament or never brought 
to the attention of those concerned, Africans naturally become sceptical of the 
NAC's role. The NAC itself was in on invidious position. Their championing the 
Africans' couse - or at best, their attempts to relieve the harshness ot some of the 
government·s restrictive measures - was seen as a threat in government circles, 
and their status suffe red accordingly. The NAC were possibly out ot tune with the 
NAD administrators, 67 which again would account tor Roberts' vagueness. What-
ever the reason, the NAC seemed unable to please or keep in touch with anybody, 
and were stultified between 1927 and 1933. 
Year after year African opinion was disregarded or ignored. In turn, 
white-acclaimed African submissiveness gave way to a more strident tone in African 
po litical debate, and the radical faction of the African Notional Congress (ANC) 
was voted into office in 1927. 68 Instead of increas·ing ways to redress African 
grievances, the government reduced them. By 1930 under the Amended Riotous 
Assembl ies Act even the Rule of Law hod been obrogated so that the government 
Id b"'1 Af . "" 69 cou or Itran y suppress ncan opposition. 
65 NEC 1930-1932, oral ev idence ofW M Macmillan, 7 May 1931 
66 Hertzog certa in ly did not use or rely on the NAC as his predecessors did. 
This pOint is considered more fully in chap 3. 
67 E E BOirett, a former Secretary for Native Affairs , had been retired under the 
Smuts ministry for tollowing the Cape line. By 1926 key men in the NAD hod 
been dropped, and the 1927 Native Administration Act mode it possible ta 
restructure and reorganise the department. See chop 3 below, n 3.43 tor 
detai ls. See also chop 5, pp 195-196: a lette r from the NAC to the NEC 
suggests that under Jansen the NAC by 1931 were being ignored. 
68 Fo ll owing the 1926 Conference and the outrig~,t rejection of Hertzog's fran-
ch ise proposals, no furthe r government Conference was called until 1931, 
a rid in fact this was the last ever held. For official expanation see NAC 
report 1932-1933, UG 3-34, P 8. On the stiffening of African opinion and 
radical takeover of the ANC, see chop 8 below, pp 306-310. 
69 See chop 8 below, p 307. 
There are various explanat ions for this post-1927 conservatism in 'native 
pol icy'. It may have been that under E G Jansen, the new Min ister of Native 
Affairs from segregationist Vryheid, the laissez faire Cape influence which had 
permeated the NAD before 1924 had finally been stopped. 70 The white backlash 
that cu lminated in the 1929 'swart gevaar' elect ion was perhaps a sign that many 
diehard Nationalists, including Hertzog, detested both the 'liberal concessions' 
and the new African resolve. So the retrogressive changes could have been a 
response to white intransigence and African outspokenness. But answers such as 
these skirt the real issue of why Hertzog determined in 1925 to abolish the Cape 
African franchise - and this was undoubtedly the key point of his whole political 
segregation strategy. 
White fears and the franchise question 
Why was Hertzog almost totally preoccupied with the franchise issue 
between 1924 and 1929? A reason most often cited is that he had an overriding 
fear that Africans getting equal rights with white people became a 'danger' to 
white civilisation. Tatz says this, and even attributes the idea to Hertzog: 
As he [Hertzog] saw it, th,e solution lay in legislation by Parliament 
to define the rights and status of Africans. On the question of African 
status, he regarded all ideas of equality as 'sentimental cant'; status 
to him meant segregation and separation, by degrees and with justice. 
Segregation was imperative because the African was a danger to white 
civilisation. 71 
Tatz goes on: 
Hertzog pursued this 'danger' complex with such determined consis-
tency throughout his pol itical career that one cannot doubt his 
sincerity. 72 
Accord ing ta this interpretation, to ensure white supremacy the Cape African 
vote had ta go: 
The keynote in Hertzog's advocacy certainly was fear: 
70 UG 14-26, p 1 where staff changes are detailed in the NAD report. The 
reorganisation of the NAD and its significance is discussed below in chap 3, 
pp1l3-114. 
71 Tatz, p 21 
72 Ibid 
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If there are two things which have always made the white population 
of South Africa very anxious . .. they are , first ly, the danger that 
there was of intermingl ing of blood, and secondly, the danger there 
was of being dominated. 73 
Hertzog comforted the white conscience: 
No legislation had ever been passed by any Pari iament that did not 
deprive someone of his rights. The white man had the fullest right 
to ensure his continued existence in South Africa. (cheers). 74 
Such arguments, alongside events in the last few years under Smuts, 75 
swayed many a white audience into thinking their future was at risk. One of the 
most effective rallying cries in the 1924 and 1929 elections was 'white civilisat ion 
in danger,?6 Events were to show how easy, and as others would claim, how 
necessary it was for the party to exploit the 'swart gevaar' as a sure way to win 
votes. 
There were many arguments levelled against the Cape African franchise. 
Hertzog took the lead. At Smithfield in 1925 he recalled the warnings implicit in 
the 1921 census report: 
According to expert judgement it will not be long, say 50 years or 
so, before the number of enfranch ised No ti yes in the Cape exceeds 
the number of white voters. This contention may appear exciting to 
more than one of you, but there is no single ground for contesting 
it. Everything pOints to this being a correct deduction from facts 
and figures. 77 
73 South African Outlook, 1 /llr:Jy 1936, p 103. See also Hertzog's speech at 
Calvinia reported in The Star, 10 /llr:Jy 1924, and election campaign speech, 
Smithfield, 18 April 1929 reported in The Star, 19 April 1929; P J Nienaber 
(ed), Gedenkboek: Generaal Hertzog, pp 178 and 187. The keynote in all 
these addresses is fear. 
74 South African Outlook, 1 /llr:Jy 1936, p 103. An interesting comparison is 
Brookes's statement in 1927that the conditioned ' fear complex' of most 
whites stems from the numerical superiority of Africans, The political future 
of South Africa, p 40, and his revised prognosis and condemnation of politi-
cians who explQit this fear complex, p 10 above. In his autobiography, A 
South Afr ican pilgrimage, he reassesses his early political conclusions drawn 
from his major work, The hi story of native policy in South Africa from 1830 
to the present day, and comments: 'they were largely untenable and I could 
not defend most of them today' (pp 20-23). 
75 See Introduction. 
76 The 1924 and 1929 elections are discussed in the Introduc ti on and Conclusion. 
77 Smithfield address, Cape Times, 14 November 1925 
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The 'expert judgement' Hertzog relied on to justi fy his attock on the franchise was 
the Director of Census' commentary on the 1921 population coun?8 which showed 
Africans were becoming urbanised faster than wh ites. 
The indisputable 'facts and figures' were scrutinised and challenged by 
his opponents. Their arguments show that Hertzog's figures were less thon rei iable 
and his allegations mostly unfounded. DDT Jabavu also studied official figures 
and painted out that in 1910 there were 6 633 African voters to 121 346 whites. 
The ratio of African to white was then 1 to 18. Sixteen years later African voters 
comprised 14 182 out of 156 531, or 1 to 11 - a comparatively slow growth in the 
African electorate, he no.ted. 79 
The Jo int Council's painstaking analysis of official data also gave a 
picture very different from Hertzog's. They showed that official figures could 
just as easily disprove Hertzog's swamping theory about the Cape vote. White 
registered voters had increased seven times more than Africans (excluding coloured 
and Indian), trey said, and between Decembe r 1903 and December 1926, whites 
averaged an increase of 2 081 a year compared with 295 for Africans. 80 
34 
On Hertzog's 50-year swamping theory they pointed out that even without 
the enfranchisement of all whites in the Cape, and accepting that the state could 
use its power to keep (or even raise) the qualified African franchise, an extra 
5000 African voters would have to register each year to overtake the whites 50 
years hence. But, since the rate of new African registrations had averaged only 
295 a year since 1903, and the prevailing Cape African voting restrictions were to 
remain, the likel ihood of a jump from 295 to 5 000 new voters a year seemed very 
remote indeed . 
In a detailed demographic study of population trends, A W Roberts showed 
that the 1921 census statistics were unreliable. Taking just one example, that of 
78 Third census, UG 40-24, part 8, p vi . For commentary see A W Roberts, 
'A statistica l inquiry into the population problem at South Africa', Transac-
tions of the Royal Society ot South Afr ica, v 13, pp 201-240; and Johannes-
burg Joint Counci l, Memorandum 4 : In defence of the Cape franchise. 
79 Quoted in Kle in, p 78 
80 Johannesburg Joint Council, Memorondum4, p 6. See also L M Thompson, 
The Cape coloured franchise, SA IRR New Africa pamphlet, p 55; and 
figures quoted in Union Year Book 23, 1946, chap 2, pp 47-48. 
the relative increase in the Afr ican and white populations of the Cape, he could 
show that the fear of Africans increasing faster than whites was unfounded. His 
statistics gave the following results: 
Table 1.1 POPULATION CHANGES IN THE CAPE 1856-1921 81 
Period Wh ite Change Rate 
I 
African I Change Rate 
1856-1865 119000 73000 6. 90 220000 I 93000 I 4.70 
1865-1875 192 000 48000 2.50 313000 122 000 3.90 
1875-1891 240000 140000 3.65 435000 100000 1.44 
1891-1904 380000 200000 4.05 535000 72 000 1.04 
1904-1911 580000 2000 0.37 607000 33000 0.78 
1911-1921 I 582000 68000 1. 17 640000 61 000 0.95 
1921- I 650000 . . . . 701 000 .. . . 
Without challenging the reliability of the Prime Minister's facts and 
figures, Selope Thema attacked his logic. He said, 
The danger is in about 50 yea rs time~ So in order to prevent that, 
the Prime Min ister says the vote must be taken away! The Conference 
was asked ta agree to the Cape vote being abolished. The Prime 
Minister has said he would substitute something - not because he 
wanted to gIve the Native something but because he wanted to toke 
the Cape vote . If it were true that the Natives in the Transvaa l 
would get the Native vote in 50 years then the Natives in the North 
were prepared to wnit that length of time.. .• 82 
I 
! 
i 
Thema insisted that the government's idea 'was to drive Natives back to tribal 
conditions. They were being asked to assist the government to vio late the consti-
tution .... In this particular case they were not going to concur! ,83 
Thema had a point. At Malmesbury Hertzog asserted, 
When we consider the fact that the census of 1922 showed that there 
were at the time 235 000 Native children in the schoo ls in the Cape 
Province and only 137000 white children, we must realise at once 
what that awakening must mean to the country, namely, the handing 
over of white civilisation to the tender mercies of ba rbarism. 84 
81 From Roberts, p 234 
82 Minutes of Native Conference, Pretoria, 2-5 November 1926, NAC report, 
UG 17-27, pp 57-58 
83 Ibid 
84 Malmesbury speec h, May 1926, quoted in J B M Hertzog, The segregation 
problem. Hertzog's deductions were based on figures in the Union Year Book 
~ of 1922, P 976. On Hertzog's' incontestable' statistics, Col in Tatz notes 
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How could the educated African be a 'danger to European civilisation', 
Jabavu countered, because no African cou ld become a voter until he had 
attained 'the standard set for all civilised men'. This in itself meant that 
Africans had renounced 'barbarism' and had adopted political aspirations 
that suited western cui ture and progress. 85 If African voters 'five centuries 
hereafter' were numerous enough to swamp the whites, they would 'ipso facto 
be civi lised enough to rule'. 86 Besides, he said, he had facts and figures to 
show that the government' s education policy deliberately discriminated 
against Africans to impede their progress . If they carried on this course, 
there would be no ground for white fears. For proof he said that 
the education of Europeans, Indians and Coloureds is 
financed on the per capita basis, of which the figures in 
1924 were £17-18-6 for Europeans and £5 for Coloureds 
and Indians, while the Natives were given a globular 
sum that worked out at £2-8-5 in the Cape, £2-1-0 in 
Natal, £1-12-10 in the Transvaa l, and 18/5 in the Orange 
Free Sta te . Even allowing for the more expensive buildings 
and plan t involved in white schools, yet the proportion is 
unreasonab ly low for the Bantu. Th is was noted and dilated 
upon by the 1923 Commission on the Finances of Provincial 
Education which all but asserted that the Natives were actu-
ally paying for European education. That this Commission 
was not for out may be proved from the present position in 
the Cape where up to 1925 the Union Government used to 
(p 44) : 'the 1922 Census showed that 235000 African children and 
only 137 000 White children were at school in the Cape that year.' 
W G Bennie, Chief Inspector of Native Education, Cape Province, 
in his presidential address to the South African Association for the 
Advancement of Sc ience, refutes these figures. Instead he cites 
the follow ing figures on Cape African education and pupil enrolment 
for the last quarter of 1923: 'the number of schools was 1,611, of 
pupils enralled 119,976, and of teachers 3,373, of whom 79 per 
cent. were fully certified ..•. The number of students in training 
was 1,777.' W G Benn ie, 'The education of the native', SA Journal 
of Science, v 22, July 1924, p 113. Subsequent official reports 
show that the 1922 census figures were e rroneous. See UG 40-24 
and UG 37-24 for education statistics; also the annual reports of 
the Director of Education 1919-1923, and the Johannesburg Joint 
Council, Memorandum 4, In defence of the Cape franchise, p 6. 
85 Quoted in Klein, p 78 
86 Ibid 
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subsidise all Cape education an the pound for pound principle. When 
the Poll tax was appl ied fo r ofter 1925 this Province took advantage 
of the Poll tax allocation by a discontinuation of its old grants ta 
Native education, applying some of thi s Native money to increased 
grants for European education. All the while the Notives continue 
to contribute indirectly and indistinguishably from Europeans towards 
the Cape Prov ince finances under the heads of the Compan ies Tax, 
Entertainments Tax, Immovable Property Tax, Motor Tax and Transfer 
Duty. 87 
The Joint Council was even less impressed with the statistics and the 
'incontestable facts' given in the 1922 census on African education which led 
Hertzog to deduce that education would increase the Cape African voters in the 
future more rapidly than before. After studying and refuting his data they conclu-
ded, 
indeed, we may go further and state that the figures upon which the 
Prime Minister's reasoning is based in regard to the effect of native 
education on the Voters' roll are so en tirely at variance with the 
official figures that it is impossib le to attach serious weight to his 
reasoning. 88 
Professional po li ticians would have had reason ta attach serious weight 
to Hertzog's thesis, however - even more so to his c laim that Africans would 
eventually get the upper hand at the ballot box. At Smithfield he warned that 
today the Cape has 51 out of 135 members. Out of that number even 
taday the election of 12 is controlled by the Native vote and I do 
not know that there is a single constituency where Native votes are 
not polled. Consequently, the great bulk of Cape members, when 
it comes to matters touching the Native ... will only too often be 
ready to adopt a line that they would otherwise not have been pre-
pared to adopt. The deciding factor in their attitude is not what is 
really in the country's interests but how they can either keep or catch 
the Native vote. 89 
This may have been an 'exciting prospect' for the SAP, he averred. But under-
standably it did not augu r well for the NP's pol iti cal future, since the Cape 
Africans traditionally voted for Hertzog's opponents. So Nationalists believed 
87 For deta iled discussion on the amount spent on African education see NAC 
report 1931, UG 26-32, appendix C, pp 9-12. See also Johannesburg Joint 
Counc il, Memorandum 2: General Hertzog's so lution to the native question; 
and 7 : Summary of native disabil ities (published in 1927 and 1930 respective-
ly). Also Bennie; E H Brookes, Native education in South Africa; E G Mal-
herbe, 'Education of the African native', Union of SA Year Book of Education, 
1933, pp 601-624; Roberts. 
88 Johannesburg Joint Council, Memorandum 2, p 6 
89 Smithfield address, Cape Times , 14 November 1925, and Tatz, p 39 
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that to be sure of elec tions, a potentially p'owerful opponent would have to be 
el iminated. 
38 
So from a party political point of view, the NP fears were real. Yet 
even when the danger of the opposition gaining by the 'native vote' was removed 
in 1933 when the NP and SAP entered into on election coalition, the bogey of 
the African vote was stil l used - only the reason for getting rid of the African 
vote had changed. Hertzog then argued that 
Every time that the Natives took a step forward on the road of c ivi li-
sation it was felt to be making the threat worse that he eventually 
would overwhelm us with his numbers. We were never honest towards 
the Natives; not del iberately, but because we were compelled to act 
in that way, we could not help ourselves as lang as the sword was 
hanging over our heads. 90 
Nicholls' variation on this theme shows a striking shift of ground from the former 
oppos ition in the post-coalition era. He now openly declared that the 'Cape 
Native vote' was 
a sham and a fraud, and that it has held back the progress of the 
Native people of this country, that it has dogged the ir footsteps by 
preventing them from getting the very qualifications of civilisation 
they need to enable them to be voters .... 
He continued : 
I believe, insensibly, that the fear of this Native vote lies behind 
the minds of most Europeans in this country, and until we can get rid 
of that fear, Native development will never get that chance that it 
ought to have. 91 
In 1926 the electorate were told that the Cape franchise must be abolished because 
the African voters in the Cape held the balance of power, and the franchise was 
therefore a menace to white South Africa: 
On the Cape basis it must therefore be patent to all of you [Hertzog 
challenged] that the Cape Native franchise must be fundamentally 
altered unless we want to see either civil war or the White /VIan's 
ruin and that of European civilisation in South Africa. 92 
In 1936 the official apologia for the Bills was that the Cape franchise was to be 
abol ished because under the a ltered conditions of the day, the vote was impotent 
and Africons 'were unable to ra ise a matter of purely Native interest in the House. ,93 
90 Joint sitting of bo th Houses of Parliament, Representation of Natives Bill, 
13 February - 7 April 1936, JS 1-36, cols 147-154 
91 Ib id, cols 19-21 quoted by Tatz, p 75 
92 Smithfield address, and Tatz, p 40 
93 This was a common plea by several speakers, including Hertzog during the 
1936 second reading debate. 
Because of this, exponents of political segregation claimed, 'honest difference of 
opinion on great questions will give place to 0 division on colour and race lines 
to the neglect of everything else.' Jabavu felt this was the strongest of all argu-
ments ever advanced against the African franchise, writes Vivien Klein. Analys-
ing Jabavu's response further, she says that 
it presupposed two conditions which he and other pol iticol leaders 
could not accept (a) that the white man had an ' incorrigible hatred' 
for the black man (b) that black and white in South Africa were 
'irreconcilable enemies'. 94 
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Even the expectation of political division along rac ial lines was without historical 
foundation, Jabavu pointed out. For these reasons he re jected Hertzog 's claims. 95 
Besides, others argued, the Union Pari iament had the power to control 
the African vote by framing more stringent franchise laws. Schreiner and Rams-
bottom spelt this out in saying 
It is only the ignorance of the majority of the voters of the actual 
figures that enables the more careless type of politician to put forward 
with such confidence the bogey of black domination. Were the facts 
ever to become such as to justify the view that the Native or non-
European vote was I ikely to swamp the European, it would always be 
open to the still dominant Europeans to raise the qualifications for the 
franchise and so strengthen their position at the polls. This was done 
at the Cape in 1887 and again in 1892. It is certainly for and away 
the least unsatisfactory method of retaining power, should such power 
ever be jeopardised. 96 
This was a good basis for questioning the 'swart gevaar', for the Cape 
precedent had shown how it was possible to disenfranchise Africans or devalue the 
Af . . h b .. I d d ... 97 Th H ncan vote, e.t er y const.tut.ona an a mln.strat.ve means . e ertzog 
ministry was not slow to leam from past experience in disenfranchising the Africans 
- they even used new methods not employed by their predecessors. 
94 Klein, p 79 
95 Ibid 
96 0 D Schreiner & W H Ramsbottom, 'The franchise' in E H Brookes et 01, 
Coming of age, p 124. See above, p 19 . F S Malan and J H Hofmeyr 
both suggested methods that would restrict the Afri can franchise without 
tampering with the entrenched clauses. See JSC 1-35, pp 15-18. 
97 See discussion above on the Pari iamentary Voters' Registration Ac t, the 
Franchise and Ballot Act, and the Glen Grey Act, pp 16-18. 
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The final attack on the Cape franchise 
Between 1929 and 1933 Hertzog sidestepped Parliament by using govern-
ment powers to weaken the African vote. The analysis below tells the story, and 
also shows that he knew the Cape African vote could be contained without 
appealing ta Parliament. Archibald Linton, a former member of the Cape Provin-
cial Council, told in an article how this was done: 
The Cape principle of granting the franchise without regard to 
colour or race, which was supposed to be enshrined and protected 
in the Act of Union, has already been infringed, and those members 
of the Pari iamentary Committee who are bel ieved to be fighting for 
'equal rights for all civilised men' have largely lost the battle. 98 
Three methods were used, Linton said, to reduce the value of the Cape 
African franchise. Granting universal suffrage for whites was one. The second 
was administrathe disqualification of registered voters. And the third (rare ly 
mentioned) method was through the Electoral Laws Amendmen t Act 35 of 1931. 
This Act, introduced only after whites had got universal suffrage, made new on d 
onerous registration regulations which of course were only applicable to Africans. 
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Granting universal suffrage to wh ites only, Linton said, was a 'mere 
political manoeuvre'. The Cape African vote was cut from a proportion of 7~ per 
cent in 1929 to little more than 3 per cent in 1931 by the Women's Enfranchisement 
Act 18 of 1930. 99 A year later the Franchise Laws Amendment Act 41 of 1931 
extended adult male suffrage to all white men in the Cape. Linton explained that 
as Native and Coloured men had still to qual ify under the old condi-
tions, and Native and Coloured women were definitely excluded from 
the scope of these new Acts, the result has been to double the number 
of Europeans on the register, much of the increase among males being, 
of course, initerote. 100 
98 A Linton, 'The native and coloured franchise', Presbyterian Churchman, 
November 1933, p 236. Linton was a Port EI izabeth company director and 
had also been a member of the Cape Provincial Council. He had been 
'engaged for the last thirty years in pol itics - including registration work -
in the constituency which contained the largest number of native voters in 
the country.' These bona fides are verified in a letter written by Linton 
after the Minister of the Interior, J H Hofmeyr, had investigated and repl ied 
to the various charges in Linton's article. The fact that the Minister took 
up the matter in the first place suggests that he was sufficiently perturbed 
by Linton's allegations. See letter below, n 2.1 13. 
99 For further comment see below p 42. 
100 Linton, p 257. In February 1931 D F Malan, then Min ister of the Interior, 
stated that under Act 41 of 1931 approximately 10 000 male voters wou ld 
be put on the roll. House of Assembly Debates, 19 February 1931, col 599. 
See also Tatz, p 65. 
To understond the success achieved in African disenfranchisement, we 
need to consider both the volue of the African vote in relation to that of the 
whites, and the actual number disenfranchised. Tatz, in careful detoil, analyses 
African and white registration stotistics before and after the Women's Enfranchise-
ment Act of 1930. He concludes that 
the motive and opportunity was clear: this was a chance of minimis-
ing the 'feared' Block vote by doubl ing the White vote. 101 
This Act's effect on the electorate figures Tatz shows in the following table: 
Table 1.2 VOTING STRENGTHS 1929 & 1931 102 
CA PE 
Total inel 
White White African African other non-
moles females moles females white voters 
1929 Before the Women's Enfranchisement Act 18 of 1930 
Voters 167 184 - 15780 - 208582 
% of total 80.1 
-
7.5 -
1931 After Act 18 of 1930 
Voters 176449 176209 12 271 - 391 307 
% of total 45.1 45.0 3.1 -
UNION 
1929 Before Act 18 of 1930 
Voters 410728 
-
15780 - 452472 
% of totol 90.7 - 3.5 -
1931 After Act 18 of 1930 
Voters 435 177 415 005 12271 - 889 173 
% of total 48.8 46.7 1.4 
-
101 Tatz, p65 
102 Ibid, P 64. Table compiled by Tatz from figures quoted in the Union Year 
Book, 13, 1930-1931, pp 70-72. See also figures from Gazette, 3 
January 1936 in appendixA.3 below. 
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Table 1.3 DEVALUATION OF THE CAPE AFRICAN VOTE 1929 & 1933 103 
1929 1933 
Wh i te (167184) Wh i te (369 182) 
African (15780) D African (10776) 
Linton's figures correspond with those given by Tatz. Thus by a 'mere 
political manoeuvre', as Linton said, the value of the African franchise dropped 
from 3.1 per cent to 1.4 per cent in the Union as a whole after the enfranchise-
ment of 414005 women. In contrast, Linton noted, the coloured vote rose from 
23881 in 1929 to 24 698 in 1931. But Linton contended that despite this increase, 
coloured people also suffered from the enfranchisement of white women. He wrote: 
Mr Reogan, one of the two able ooloured men in the Provincial 
Council un til this year, lost his seat, principally, he alleges, 
through the European female vote. 104 
103 Data taken from Thompson, The Cope coloured franchise, p 55 and Union 
Year Book 23, 1946, pp 47-48. 
104 Linton, p 258. 5 Reogan lost his Cope Flats seat in the 1933 Provincial 
elections. 
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The val idity of this claim is hard to assess . Nor can one say whe ther the number 
of voters in Reagan's constituency wou ld have grown if the new stringent measures 
had not been introduced. But certain ly the enfranchisemen t of women and the 
corresponding deva luation of the African vo te must have swung the vote in favour 
of Reogan' s wh i te opponen t. 
The automatic enfranchisement of about 10000 whi te males unde r Act 
41 of 1931 would have had the same effect, and even more so in Eas tern Cape 
constituencies where, accordin·g to Macmi llan, 'the problem of poverty was mos t 
105 
acute' . 
However, the actual numerical reduction of African voters was Lint,on 's 
ma in concern. He cites the following figures . In 1929 the number of reg istered 
African voters stood at 15780. Two years later th is number had been reduced by 
3509 and stood at 12271. By 1933 this had been reduced by a further 1 495 
African voters, so that the total number of Africans on the voters' rol l was 10776. 106 
Hence, between 1929 and 1933 just over 5000 African registered vo ters - or one-
third of their tatal - had been struck off the voters' roll . More precisely, there 
were 3509 Africans disenfranchised between 1931 and 1933. This reduction in 
105 10000 was the rough figure given by D F Malan. See House of Assemb ly 
Debates, 19 February 1931, col 599, and W M Macmi ll an, Comp lex South 
Africa, p 57. Macmillan undertook extensive researches on the poor 
white problem. His findings show that it was acute in the districts stre tch-
ing north and north- west towards Oudtshoorn and Graaff-Reinet, in the 
centre towards Prieska, and eastwards towards Ui tenhage and most of the 
Eastern Province. D F tvlalan stated : ' I assure members that there are 
qui te a number of const ituencies in the Cape Province where the number 
of women with the franchise far exceeds the number of white male vo ters . 
In some cases the number even exceeds the number of European and non-
Europeans toge ther on the voters' roll', [sic] the impl ication be ing that 
once men were enfranchised in the Eastern Cape the position would be 
rectified. 
106 Linton, p 258. See also Union Year Book 23, 1946, pp 47-48. 
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Table 1.4 INCREASE AND DECREASE 
OF CAPE AFRICAN VOTERS 1903 - 1933 107 
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actual numbers occurred partly through the second method adopted by Hertzog's 
second ministry. 
This second method Linton ca ll ed as 'mean a piece of administrative 
chicanery as could well be devised': 
The native and coloured man was still sub ject to the qual ifications 
entitl ing him to the franchise in the Cope Colony which, until the 
passing of the above Acts, hod operotedalike for block and white 
for nearly 80 year.; . It was now discovered, in some mysterious 
107 Report of the Select Committee on the Representation of Natives in 
Parliamen t Bill, SC 10-27, append ix B, and Union Year Book 23, 1946, 
pp 47-48 
. , 
. , 
manner, knawn anly to the Minister and his minions, that the way 
in which the Cape of Good Hope Constitution Ordinance of 1852, 
amended and confirmed by Order in Council (presided over by Queen 
Victorio) of 11th March, 1853, had been administered, was illegal. 
No statute of limitation in this cose. 108 
Quoting the operating clause of the Order in Council and the 1892 Amendment 
both dealing with the qualifications for the vote, 109 he went on to say that 
for nearly 80 years it was taken for granted and acted upon that any 
male person in the Cape who earned £50 in a year, and possessed 
this meagre educational qualification [sic], was entitled to be regis-
tered as a voter. But synchronising with the introduction of European 
adult suffrage, it was discovered, and decreed, by the Administration, 
that the legal meaning of 'for the space of twelve months' wos that 
the native and coloured voter must produce evidence that he has 
worked 'for the space of twelve months aforesaid'. 110 
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This innovation was introduced in 1931. Linton showed its effect was to disenfran-
chise Africans who had earned '£100 or even £200', in a personal capacity, in the 
previous twelve months but could only show they had been employed 1 o~ months of 
that time. Under the new scheme, he alleged, every African and coloured man 
108 Linton, p 257 
109 The operating clause of the Order in Council reads: 'Every male person ... 
who shall have been, for the spoce of twelve months aforesaid, really and 
bona fide in the receipt of salary or wages at and after the rate of not less 
than fifty pounds by the year, shall be entitled to be registered as a voter .•. 
provided that no person claiming to be regi stered from salary or wages shall 
be prevented from being so registered by reason that, during the space of 
twelve months oforesaid, he may have been employed by different employers, 
in case no interval greater than onemonth shall have occurred between the 
time of his quitting one employer and the time of his taking employment with 
or under another employer', clause 87, Order in Council, 1853, quoted in 
a letter by private secretary, Minister of Interior to J D Rheinallt-Jones, 
15 December 1933, Rheinallt-Jones papers, 100(0)2. Commenting on the 
interpretation of this clause, Linton stated: 'A break of one month will be 
allowed by the Registration Officer presumably in view of the fact that the 
Revising Court sits at a date later than registration. But the ruling and 
practices to-day [post-1931], is that no native or coloured man who has 
earned £10q or even £200 in the course of the previous twelve months can 
claim a vote on the wages or salary qualification, if he has only worked 
1~ months during the preceding year.' Linton, p 256 
110 See discussion on Sprigg's 1887 Parliamentary Registration Act above which 
also effected the administrative disenfranchisement of Africans - but I have 
found no evidence to show that employment for less than eleven months 
prior to registration disquolified 0 voter. Nor did this appeor to be a 
criterion with the passing of the Franchise and Ballot Act in 1892. See 
above pp 15-16. 
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must bring a certificate from an employer or employers that he has been in work 
for at least eleven out of the preceding twelve months, and this he must do every 
biennial registration. Those unable to comply were automatically disenfranchised. 
Lintan's allegations were taken up by the South African Institute of Race 
Relations (SAIRR). His facts and figures were verified. In addition Rheinallt-
Jones forwarded Linton's article to J H Hofmeyr, the Minister of the Interior in 
1933. In a covering letter he asked for information 'upon the extracts and parti-
cularly information as to the accuracy or otherwise of Linton's statements, and 
motivated his request by saying that 
Natives in the Cape Province frequently complain that the electoral 
officers are making every effort to el iminate Natives from the Voters' 
Roll and it would be useful if an authoritative statement could be 
made on the matter. 111 
In reply, Hofmeyr claimed he was merely giving effect 'administratively to the 
provisions of the Order in Council of 1853' .112 
Linton rejected this explanation. He remarked on the fact that Hofmeyr, 
as the new coalition Minister of the Interior, was prepared to justify the s ins of 
his predecessor, but felt that Hofmeyr had evaded the crucial point in his article. 
As Linton said: 
The facts and figures in my article are admitted. One other fact is 
adduced, namely, that the gap 'of one month in employment' consti-
tuting a disqua I ifica tion, is i nheren t in the provis ion of the 1853 
Order in Council, and 'all that is being done is to give administra-
tively to the provision', and that the present procedure 'has been 
in force for some time'. It would be interesting to learn when this 
'some time' started. I have engaged for the last thirty years in 
pol itics (including registration work) in the constituency which 
contained the largest number of native voters in the country, and 
never until compilation of the 1931 roll was the quest ion of continuity 
of employment asked of anyone - white, coloured or native - so 
long as the registration officer was satisfied that the appl icant had 
earned £50 during the preceding twelve months. The law (and I 
believe it is doubtful law) had been a dead letter for nearly 80 years. 113 
111 J D Rheinallt-Jones to J H Hofmeyr, 29 November 1933, Rheinallt-Jones 
papers, 100 (a)2, carbon copy 
112 Private sec retary, Minister of the Interior, Education and Public Health 
to J D Rheinallt-Jones, 15 December 1933, Rheinallt- Jones papers, 100(a)2; 
and A Linton to J D Rheinallt-Jones, 23 January 1934. For wording of the 
Order in Council see above, n 1.109. 
113 Linton to Rheinallt-Jones, 23 January 1934, p 1. It is suggested that the 
reaction of J H Hofmeyr, who succeeded D F Malan as Minister of the 
Interior in 1933, shows he was sufficiently perturbed by Linton' s allegations 
to initiate an investigation . The facts and figures, as Linton noted, were 
not challenged. 
--
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'Legal subtlety and adminis trative pressure' was how Linton characterised 
a third method used to disenfranchise large numbers of African voters . Under the 
Electoral Laws Amendment Act 35 of 1931 - a measure e nti rely ciistinct from the 
Acts enfranch ising men and women - the powers of people objecting to names on 
the prov isional voters' I ist had been extended. This made for a considerable 
reduction in the numbers of Africans formerly registered. Linton contended that 
'since whites required no other qualification than their white skin and to be 21 
years old', these extended powers were 'aimed specifically at the coloured and 
native'. Three innovations he objected to particularly. First, that 'costs may be 
given against the claimant if the "objection is, in his (the magistrate's) opinion, 
well-founded'''. Second, that 'costs may be given against the objector if the 
objection is regarded as "frivolous' . And third, that' if the objection is on educa-
tional grounds, then the cla imant must appear persona ll y before the court' .114 
Linton as an active registration officer cou ld prove his claim empirically: 
Why was it revived adm inistra tively if for no other purpose than to 
diminish native and coloured representation, and particularly in 
constituencies where it exercised some influence? Were Registration 
Officers in their' Instructions and Time- Ta ble' not advised that a 
considerabl e number of persons were enrolled who were not qualified 
for registration? Did not M:Jlan, who was at the head of the Depart-
ment in 1931, indicate his intentions when speaking on the second 
reading of the Electoral Laws Amendment Act, in 1931? 115 
On that occasion M:Jlan had said that 
there are now large and increasing locations in the neighbourhood 
of all big towns, while natives who are looking for work on the 
countryside are also increasing. All are potential voters, and many 
have actually obtained the franchise. 116 
Such evidence abounds. Linton was certainly correct when he said there had been 
a concerted attack on the Cape African franchise. What is even more notable is 
how successful this attack in fact was. 
Linton's research into the disenfranchised in the larger constituencies 
gives an authentic picture, for example in the Poarl constituency whe re 394 
objections were lodged. The five sittings in the Paarl magistrate's court were 
114 Linton, p 257. These innovations should be compared with the objections 
raised in the Alice Times, 1 April 1887, cited earl ier, p 17. Then the 
safeguard was that the objector was I iabl e for costs. This the whites found 
unacceptable because the 'worry and cost' deterred many from lodging 
objections. 
115 Linton to Rheinallt-Jones, 23 January 1934, p 3 
116 House of Assemb ly Debates, 2 M:Jrch 1931, col 986 
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held over a period of two to three weeks, occording to Linton, ond he exploined 
how 285 Africons were struck off the roll in this constituency: 
On the first doy over 250 of the objected-to oppeared, over 60 of 
whom were from Fransch Hoek 17 miles away, whose cases were not 
called. Most of the objections were dismissed. The Court adjourned 
until later on in the week. On the second day obout 100 turned up. 
but few appea red. 117 
Reports from several other constituencies began to show on alarming 
decrease. Comments appeared in the African press as early as December 1931. 
Umteteli Wa Bantu wrote of the 'farcical revision courts' the government was using 
to reduce the African vote. 118 Imvo reported on incident where in one constitu-
ency objections were raised against 423 names and although only 12 were disquali-
fied, the whole process involved Africans in travell ing expenses, legal fees and 
the risk of losing their jobs while out defending their vote. 119 
In foct such a state of affairs hod been pred icted when the Electoral 
Lows Amendment Bill was under discussion. R W Bowen (Cape Town (Central)), 
one of many MPs who dwel t on the point, challenged that 
I think it is horribly unfair to allow the who le of the non-European 
vote to be objected to. Do we want to mul tip ly instances of the 
kind given by the han. member for Aliwal North (Mr Sephton), who 
has told us how 480 odd voters were challenged by the Nationalist 
party, only eight of which were disqualified? These people can't 
offord to sacrifice one or two or three days' wages for the purpose 
of appearing at these electoral courts to maintain their right to be 
on the roll. The result will be that their names will be removed 
owing to their non appearance. I say that this is a shame, and I 
ask the Min ister to reconsider placing the responsibi I ity upon these 
people of appearing before the court if they wish to retain their 
votes. 120 
Leslie Blackwell (Bezuidenhout), a member of the Select Committee appointed to 
revise the electoral laws, focussed on the dangers inherent in the proposed Amend-
ment: 
Here is the syllogism : only native or coloured would-be voters must 
possess these qual ifications; anybody who must possess these qual ifi-
cations and against whom objection is token must, once objection is 
taken, appear personally and prove he has the qualifications; 
117 Linton to Rheinallt-Jones, 23 January 1934, p 3 
118 Umteteli Wa Bantu, 26 December 1931 
119 Imvo Zabantsundu, 26 December 1931 
120 R W Bowen (SAP), debate on the Electoral Laws Amendment Bill, House of 
Assembly Debates, 21 Moy 1931, col 4128 
therefore the onus is cast on them, and only on them; and there can 
be no escape from the way I have put it. I ask the Minister of the 
In terior whe ther he has never heard of en bloc ob jec tions be ing taken 
in particular constituencies to the whole body of native and coloured 
vo ters. If he had not heard of that being done, I will te ll him that 
it has been done, and he is opening the flood-gates wide for party 
agen ts in the future to pick out every coloured and native vater on 
the I ists, and to object to the lot. ... Now the Min ister has made 
the mistake of water ing down his costs clause by inserting in section 
19 that costs will only be given where the objection is found to be 
frivolous. That means that costs will never be given. We object 
most strongly to the inse rt ion of this word 'frivolous' . If there were 
a penalty as regards costs, then there might be some protection, but 
I poin t ou t to the Minister that in hi s Bill, as drafted, he puts a pre-
mium on the wholesale objections by anybody and everybody, and he 
does his best to remove any safeguard on behalf of the person concern-
ed. 121 
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Hofmeyr refused to accept that the reductions had followed the implemen-
tation of the more stringent e lectoral laws. According to him there were two main 
reasons for this decl ine: the urban Africans' loss 'of fnte rest in the franchise with 
the disappearance of the privilege of purchasing liquor which native voters formerly 
enjoyed'; and he saw the depression and the government's 'civilised lobour policy' 
as principa l causes for thousands of Africans failing to qualify. 122 
Hofmeyr's reply evoked comment again from Linton. On the liquor 
allegation he wrote thot 
this will not hold water. The Bill was first published early in 1926. 
It was promulgated in July, 1928 . Total prohibition came into force 
on 1st January, 1929. Natives on the roll at 1st August, 1929,num-
bered 15870, which number increased to 16 177 at 28th February, 
1930, - fourteen months after the Act had been in force. Such an 
attempt to explain a reduction to 12271 in 1931 is futile. 123 
On the second count, Linton's focts and figures showed up just how weak 
Hofmeyr's argument was. To take just one example: 
I will deol with Port Elizabeth, which I know. The corrected and 
carefully correloted figures of the Munic ipal Health Dept. show 
tha t there were more aboriginal natives res ident in the district in 
1931. The numbe r employed regularly by the Municipality was 
larger, and thei r wages had not been reduced. There was no gene-
ral reduction of woges by bus iness houses until after 1931. It is 
true that the Government's white labour pol icy did affect emp loy-
ment on the Railways. But giving fullest credit for this, does 
121 LBlackwel1 (SAP), ibid, col4115 
122 Private secretary, Minister of the Inter ior to Rheinall t-Jones, 15 December 
1933, p 2 
123 Linton to Rheinallt-Jones, 23 January 1934, p 4 
anyane bel ieve it accounts for more than a fraction on the reduction 
of over 60% - from 2 085 to 814 in Port EI izabeth (North), and over 
50% - from 1 109 to 529 - in East London (North)? 124 
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Again the validity af Hofmeyr's argument is suspect: far the depression must surely 
have depressed the incames of coloured and white ma le voters as well . In 1931 
cal au reds and whites were still subject to the same income and property qua I ifica-
tions as Africans. Since they were not immune from the depression the figures for 
h h Id I h d d h· d'd h 125 t ese two groups s au a so ave ecrease, yet t IS I not appen. 
Hence many af the problems Linton described were foreseen and debated 
at length before the voting laws were revised. As predicted, thousands of Africans 
lost their vote by default. In the faur constituencies with the largest number of 
registered voters - East London, Port Elizabeth, Tembuland and King William's 
Town - a total of 2239 Africans were disenfranchised between 1931 and 1933. 
The other 1 270 out of the combined total of 3 509 Africans whose names were 
struck off the roll during the same period were spread out over the remaining 54 
constituencies in the Cape. 126 On this evidence alane one could say that the 
government was deliberate Iy working at a selective disenfranchisement. 
These methods - coupled with the restrictions introduced to prevent 
Africans advancing materially and getting better jabs - controlled the increase 
in Africans qualifying to vote. The gavernment could have staved off wide 
African enfranchisement even longer than the 50 years Hertzog specified in his 
Smithfield address. 
By selective disenfranchisement the balance af power in favour of the 
SAP could also have been corrected. The move to deny Africans freehold property 
rights in Cape municipal elections would have done the same. As Bowen predicted, 
the NP would stop at nothing to get rid of the African vote. He interpreted their 
motives thus: 
124 Ibid 
125 The white vote actually decreased between 1927 and 1929 from 173 291 to 
167184. Then women in the Cape swelled the white total to 352 658 in 
1931, and 70 000 men were added to this figure in 1933. In the same 
period the colaured people's vate rose from 23 881 in 1929 to 24 698 in 
1931 - see above, p 28. The question af pol ice harassment of the ANC 
at this time cauld also have accounted for voter apathy, but not to the 
extent of a 5704 vater drop from the peak figure of 16 481 in 1927 to the 
lowest since 1919 when there had been a m.ere 9 803 voters. For further 
details on voting figures, see appendix A. 1 below. 
126 Linton to Rheinallt-Jones, 23 January 1934, p 5 
I feel that the Minister has assumed that the colour of a man's skin 
is on indication of the manner in which he will in all subsequent 
elections exercise his vote. I feel that the Minister and the party 
behind him have come to the opinion that the non-European vote is 
o foctor which in all future circumstances, will weigh against his 
party and he has allowed his prejudices and his zeal of sincerity to 
do all that he possibly can to eliminate the coloured vote. 127 
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By 1932 Hertzog hod certainly succeeded in preventing the feored 
'hordes of Africon voters' from swamping the whites. The success ond significance 
of this wos summed up by a former Minister of Native Affairs, H Burton, in his 
remark that while the Joint Select Committee was stilf deliberating the form of 
the future Africon fronchise, 'the Prime Minister has been allowed to seize the 
128 
whole fortress by a flank attock'. 
This is just whot happened. Meanwhile the Joint Select Committee hod 
been given a choice of ways to reduce the real value of the Cope African vote. 
As Hofmeyr must have argued when he suggested that the African vote be pegged 
ot 10 per cent, 129 the power to determine the Africons' right to vote rested 
entirely in the hands of an all-white Pari iament. Just as long as the complete 
obolition of the franchise was not contemplated, the government hod no need to 
resort to a legal way out of their difficulty. 
Hertzog's uncompromising stand and the hopelessness of the Africons' 
cause was clear to Duma Gude. Not bl inded as many I iberals were, he appraised 
the situotion thus: 
The first Bill is called 'The Natives Parliamentary Representation' 
Bill. 
Is this ironical? The moin object of the Bill is to deprive the 
Natives forever of any representation in the House of Assembly and 
to give them a mere ghost of representation in the Senate. 
In the Joint Committee on the subject the Prime Minister moved 
'That the Committee disapproves of the principle of common repre-
sentation in Parliament for Europeons and Natives' • 
... in future 'no native . .. sholl be enrolled on ony list or roll of 
pori iamentary voters' and so the words 'Abandon Hope. Ye may not 
enter here' is to be written for the Notive on the gates of Pori iament. 
127 House of Assembly Debates, 21 May 1931, col 4128 
128 H Burton, Non-Racial Franchise Association address, 28 Jonuary 
1932 quoted by D Molteno, The betrayal of 'natives' representation', 
SAIRR pamphlet, p 7 
129 Supplernent JSC 1- 35, 9 May 1930, P 19 
This will of course not be occepted without 0 long and bitter struggle 
by Native and European supporters till finally, if it be a hundred 
years hence, the inscription is removed. 130 
An assessment and unanswered questions 
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Hertzog may have been prepared to compromise at the time of Union, but 
certainly not by 1924. Why did he alienate the Africans for the sake of 10 000 
votes? It could not have been simply the fear that Africans 50 years hence could 
demand the vote in the northern provinces; it could not have been the extra 
voting strength it gave the opposition, since the parties had united by 1933; it 
could not have been the fear of being 'swamped'. All this was known at the time, 
as can be seen from how the apologists for the Franchise Bill changed their argu-
ments. By 1933 the Bills were justified as 'being helpful to the native' rather than 
saving whites from menace. But if the franchise was so innocuous, the Africans 
challenged, why did the government wish to abolish it? 
The statements made by Africans - who after all stood to lose by Hertzog's 
policy - enable us to re-evaluate Hertzog's fears, and those of whites generally, 
from an entirely different angle. The position of the poor whites vis-~-vis their 
more progressive educated African counterparts appears to have frightened many 
whites. As Dr A B Xuma challenged: 
What are these Bills for? 'To solve the Native problem once and 
for all', we are told. How? By taking away the Cape franchise .... 
Why is this necessary? Has the African ever abused the privilege? 
No, that is just the reason, he uses it so intelligently that he becomes 
a factor to be reckoned with in those constituencies where he exercises 
the right ...• 
The Union Parliament would have a clear coast to establish a 'White 
South Africa' if they could remove this last stumbl ing block, the 
'Cape Franchise', and thus consummate their unparalleled and un-
excelled series of colour bars. .. . 131 
Or as Sakwe, a registered Cape voter, wrote: 
It would take too long to recapitulate the privileges due to the fran-
chise. Their progress was largely due to this. They told their chil-
dren to learn, to build better houses and to be thrifty, all with the 
object of getting the vote so as to escape the curfew regulations, be 
able to walk on pavements, and gain the respect of others. 132 
130 Gude 
131 Xuma, p 224. Dr Xuma, a physician, became President-General of the 
ANC from 1940 to 1949. 
132 Minutes of Native Conference, November 1926, UG 17-27, p 55 
Contrast this with a statement by R H Brand, whom Xuma quotes to show the 
injustice of the approved policy and practice of universal manhood suffrage. 
Brand wrote: 
One may freely admit that a great 'deal of our South African opinion 
is ignorant, unintell igent, and crude . The man in the street and the 
man on the veld seldom real ise even the elements of the stupendous 
problem with which they are faced. The policy which attracts them 
is often one of simple repression . 133 
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'This simple creed of the average white mon' was translated into repressive legisla-
tion, which Xuma characterised thus : 
Toke away • .. from the Native the land which he possesses, and 
there will be more compulsion for him to work for the White man 
(hence the Land Act of 1913). Do not educate him, . or else he will 
become 'too independent (hence no adequate budget for Native 
education). Keep him in his place. 134 
The white e lectorate was ignorant and hence susceptible to fear-monger-
ing. But as Xuma suggested here, there were other pressures that would predispose 
them to bel ieve what they were told. There is I ittle doubt that it was anathema 
to Hertzog and his supporters that Africans in the Cope could vote; that this 
right to vote conferred special privileges on the Cape Africans exclusively and in 
so doing threatened to undermine the traditional master-servant relationship . Most 
whites would have been extremely rei ieved to see the Cape franchise go. 
But for others not so threatened, they were prepared to let the pol iticions 
cultivate the fears that suited them. This was partly because it was in their 
interests to keep Africans 'at the mercy of those who alone exercised' the right to 
vote, as Xuma put it, for then 
a class excluded from all share in political power is condemned to 
permanent subordination . It becomes a servant of the interests of 
others, having no shore or partnership in a common life. 135 
These few selected statements ra ise other questions, in particular the 
issues of land, labour and the poor whites. The next chapters examine how and 
to what extent these issues were I inked to the franchise ques t ion and the 'danger 
complex'. At the same time we shall be assessing how the segregation pol icy was 
on attempt to meet sectional demands. 
133 R H Brand, The Union of South Africa quoted by A B Xuma, 'Bridging the 
gap •. . ', p 224 
134 Ibid 
135 Ibid 
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2 THE SEGREGATION FA LLACY 
The origins of the segregation follacy 
Segregation and the Cape tradition 
Segregation and the Free State tradition 
Hertzog's land Bills: segregation abandoned 
Cutting down the promised land 
Development or underdevelopment of the reserves? 
Hertzog's land pol icy objectives reassessed 
The origins of the segregation fallacy 
There were several attempts to formulate a land policy after Union. 
How did these originate? 
It hos been traditionally accepted thot both the 1913 Natives' Land 
Act and Hertzog's supplementary land Bills, included as port of the 1926 'f\kJtive 
policy' package deal, began with SANAC in 1905 because their report recom-
mended 
that the time has arrived when the lands dedicated and set apart, 
as locations, reserves or otherwise, should be defined, delimited, 
and reserved for f\kJtives by legislative enactment •.•. 
A detailed examination of their land proposals, which includes squatting, 
segregated reserves and land tenure, reveals that the Lagden commissioners were 
biased in favour of the extant Cope practice. Their final proposals reflect this. 
The Natives' Land Act of 1913 in its final form was piloted thraugh Parliament by 
an acknowledged champion of the 'Cape Liberal 'tradition , J W Sauer. This Act 
in its tum was also a Cope praduct. But the origins of Hertzog's Natives' Land 
Act (1913) Amendment Bil l are different. In it Boer republican traditions are 
dominant. These differences are clear to see when the pol icy of territorial 
•• . d' d t '1 2 segregation IS examine In e al . 
When Africans and whites first met in the late eighteenth century, the 
authorities tried to impose complete segregation in the interests of peace . At the 
time, before either race hod developed on economic dependence on the other 
and while Africans, like whites, still hod on independent territorial bose, a 
policy of seporation might have hod a chance of succeeding . A boundary might 
have been fixed between them that neither would cross save by special permission. 
The relationship might have been that of two mutually independent states. 
But by the middle of the nineteenth century, it was too late. The 
colon ial government had either conn ived at breaches of its own regulations or 
it had rescinded its legislation to allow Africans to meet the labour demands of 
the white settlers. Hand in hand with economic expansion and absorption went, 
portly as cause, partly as result, a territorial absorption of block by white . 
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SANAC report 1903-1905, v 4, pa ra 191 quoted by C Tatz, Shadow and substance 
in South Africa, p 10. See also T R H Davenport & K SHunt, The right to the 
land, dac 66. 
2 For different pol icies to solve the squatting problem see chaps 4 and 5 . 
After the middle of the century, olthough white exponsion hod not reoched its 
limits, the policy of segregation was abandoned in theory, as it had long been 
in proctice. Margaret Ballinger writes on th:is phose: 
while one party would not, the other could not live within the 
confines imposed upon it, and while eoch pressed upon the 
boundary, the stronger overrode it, not merely because of its 
superior physical strength but because the weaker party early 
declared its willingness to find new means of existence among 
the newcomers, and so to accommodate itself to the conditions 
of a new society. 3 
Colin Bundy supports this view. He argues 'that African cu ltivators responded 
to economic stimuli and pressures' to a considerobly greoter extent than hos 
hitherto been reolised.' At one level the African response 'equalled or excelled 
that of the white cultivators', 4 while at a second 'the response was nowhere 
maintained or consolidated'. On the controry, Bundy asserts, 'peasant progress 
gave way to privation, shortfall, and failure'. 5 In other words, while the whites 
pressed forward into the territory of the Africans, the Africans pressed forward 
into the economic life of the whites. But while one group extended their 
sovereignty, the other lost the ir independence. 
The process of ' growth and decay' in peasant communities is fully 
explained by Bundy and others. Their researches show that decay set in as the 
African reserves became progressively impoverished and the Africans more and 
3 Native Economic Commission (NEC) 1930-1932, typescript evidence of 
Margaret Hodgson (later Margaret Ball inger). In 1930 Pari iament approved 
the first major commission since Union to investigate the whole socio-
economic position of Africans. The evidence and findings of this commission 
have been used extensively in this dissertation. The University of South 
Africa (UNISA) houses the unpublished typescript and orol evidence, the 
latter recorded verbatim, and I was fortunate in having had access to these 
records. The oral evidence numbers 9224 pages, from 116 public sessions 
held throughout the country over a two-year period 1930-1931. Members 
of the commission: J E Holloway (chairman), R W Anderson, H C M Fourie, 
A M Mostert, A W Roberts, P W Ie R van Niekerk and FA W Lucas. All 
members signed the majority report. Lucas however signed subject to 
additions and reservations contained in a lengthy addendum ta the report, 
paros A l-A358, pp 173-228. (Since not all pages of the typescr ipt of 
evidence were numbered in the records lodged with UNISA, page references 
have been omitted here. The date of the sitting has been used when referring 
to the orol evidence.) 
4 Colin Bundy, 'The response of African peasants in the Cape to economic 
changes, 1870-1910: A study in growth and decay', unpub ICS seminar paper, 
v3,16,pl 
5 Ibid 
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more dependent on the developed white sector economy. 6 The last decade of 
the nineteenth century marks a high water mark in this process, for, as the 
7 discussion will show, from this time until 1936 a policy of underdevelopment 
in the reserves wes supported by the majority of whites. 
In the early 1890s the demand for labour began to outs trip the supply. 
The mines' demand for labour increased with the proving of the deep levels and 
the discovery of the cyanide process for gold-refining. Farmers found that, as 
their markets expanded, so did their need for labour. Public service demands 
for road, ra i1way and horbour construction added to the pressure. In consequence 
the Africans enjoyed a strong bargain ing pos ition in the lobour market. It was 
not fortuitous, therefore, that a spate of legislation and innovations hit the four 
stotes between 1894 and 1910. All were explicitly designed to swell and 
redistribute the labour supply while keeping wages down as far as possible. The 
different govemments revealed their attitude to the Africans by legislation 
designed to force them to serve the interests of the ir new masters. 
6 Colin Bundy, 'Passing through a period of stress', unpub seminar paper, 
Oxford, 1974; W Beinart, 'Economic change in Pondoland in the 19th 
century', unpub ICS seminar paper, v 7, 21; M Legassick, 
'Development and underdevelopment in South Africa', unpub seminar 
paper, London, 1970; G Arrighi, 'Labour supplies in historical 
perspective . . . ' in G Arrighi & J S Saul, Essays on the political economy 
of Africa; E A Brett, Colonialism and underdevelopment in East Africa . 
See also n 2.101. 
7 On the concept of 'undf.rdevelopment' Brett stotes: 'it is important that 
we do not confuse the idea of "undevelopment" with that of "under-
development". The former describes the stote of 0 country or people who 
are living in a subsistence economy cut off from significant trade with 
the outside world. "Underdevelopment" is a state of poverty and reliance 
engendered by the unequal relations between a Capito list "developed" 
and an "underdeveloped" economy. What marks the latter off from the 
former is that the surplus product is not be ing used to the benefit of the 
local people, but being drawn off for the benefit of the "developed 
sector" . The resul t of "underdevelopment" then is an increasing and ever 
worsening stote of dependency and poverty . ' This is how the concept of 
'underdevelopment' is being used he re . Brett , p 18. For furthe r discussion 
see pp 90-91. 
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Segregation and the Cope tradition 
The Cope Glen Grey Act of 1894, with its division of the land of 
that district into surveyed private holdings, was intended to I imit the numbers 
the land could corry and thus indirectly to force the surplus into the capitalist 
sector. A 10/- labour tax on men who could not prove they hod been in bono 
fide wage employment for at least three months in the year speaks for itself. 
The imposition of a £2 labour tax in the Transvaa l in the following year, coupled 
with earl ier attempts on the part of the republican authorities to prevent labour 
leaving the republic for other centres were also measures designed to increase 
the labour supply. In each state revised squatter lows and master and servant 
8 lows appeared on the statute book. The value of the labourer hod increased 
with the increasing economic development of the country and the white colonist 
was determined that that value should be real ised, 'if not by persuasion, then 
9 by force'. 
Of all the various methods used, the Gien Grey system proved the most 
efficient. The success of Rhodes's system was that it increased the govemment's 
control over Africans in Glen Grey and other districts surveyed under the Act. 
This control was strengthened by ensuring thot 'headmen in the pay of the Govem-
ment' would serve on councils created under the some Act. The headmen would 
be responsible not only for levying taxes for local development, but also for 
collecting government ones. Secondly, the survey and distribution of four morgen 
allotments under individual title 'was hardly sufficient for on economic peasant 
h Id ' b II h' . . • ,1 0 Th a lng, ut sma enoug to Impose severe restroctlons on squattong . e 
precise rules of hereditary succession on the basis of primogeniture and prohibitions 
imposed on the alienation of land without special permission hod two results. 
Rhodes ensured on ever-increasing labour force, for in each generation all but 
one member of the family would be mode landless; and by declaring the surveyed 
lands inalienable, Rhodes 'cut right across the aims of the Bond ... [but] incor-
porated the views of the Opposition regarding "the desirability of retaining the 
8 See Davenport & Hunt, p 33 and documents 90 and 95; Shula Marks, 
Reluctant rebel I ion, chop 5; A M Keppel-Jones, 'Land and agriculture 
outside the reserves', Handbook. pp 192-198; Colin Bundy, 'The 
abolition of the Master3 and ServanbAct', SA Labour Bulletin, v 2, I, 
May-June 1<975, pp 37-46; and chop 4 below for discussion on squatters 
and labour taxes. 
9 NEe 1930-1932, typescript evidence of Margaret Hodgson 
10 T R H Davenport, 'The Afrikaner Bond', unpub PhD thesis, University of 
Cape Town (UCT), 1960, P 330 
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< N . . ",11 Th d h· f reserves for ohve occupatJon . e process tower s t e re Instatement 0 
the segregation princip le had begun. 
In short, the principle of segregating Africans in restricted demarcoted 
reserves, with the added proviso of uneconomic individual allotments, began to 
take shape under the Rhodes ministry - a decade before SANAC published its 
recommendations. The revised Private locations Act of 1899, also a Cape 
measure, dealt with the problem of squatting and was used as a model by this 
same commission. 12 Even the first link between the segregation of Africans in 
their own areas with the removal of Africans from the white pol itical system was 
forged at this time, since to destroy tribal landho lding, tribal govemment also 
had to be destroyed. Part 3 of the Glen Grey Act moreover included provisions 
that R W Rose-Innes, a King Will iam's Town lowyer, described as a 'purge of 
the voters' roll'. 13 For land allotted in individual tenure under the provisions 
of the Act was to be deemed, for the purpose of pari iamentary registration, to 
be held under communal tenure, and its owners thus disqualified from being able 
to fulfil the proprietary conditions for the franc hise. Commenting on the 
simul toneous opportunity given the G len G rey Africa ns to operate local self-
government at the divisional council level, Davenport notes : 
This was some compensation for the I imitotion on their franchise 
rights imposed in Part 111, and it offered something very different 
from the notion of a separate roll for Africans .. • and the idea 
of a completely separate naturellenraad for the Transkei and the 
Colony, which had received the approval of the Bond congress in 
1886. 14 
In an address in 1903 on the Glen Grey Act and the native question, R W Rose-
Innes discussed the segregation of the races, the pol icy of the future, and the 
franchise and party politics. On these two aspects - segregation and the 
franchise - he had this to say: 
The principles of the Act necessari ly involve the creation of purely 
Na tive reserves or areas from which Europeans are excluded by 
purchase or othe rwise. This principle must be maintained against 
every species of opposit ion. That it will be ossailed is certain, 
and the supporters of it will have to mainta in it in its integrity in 
many a fight yet to come. We sholl in time be compelled to 
create more of such areas (as those c reated in Glen Grey and the 
11 Ibid 
12 See chap 4. 
13 Davenport. 'The Afrikaner Bond', p 330 . On the fran chise provisions and 
the Glen Grey Act see above p 18. 
14 Ibid 
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surveyed districts of the Transkei) as 'reservoirs of labour' and 
homes for these people into which the Native will be free ta 
came and go. He requires this for his sake and we require it 
for our own . 
The segregation of the races within certain limits and under 
safeguards, but without compulsion, is the pol icy to aim at 
for the future. The Native must have land, and it must be in 
larger pieces than the small plots allotted to him, and upon 
which he builds his hu t in a Town Location •.. . These [large 
Native Reservations] should grow into great Native states or 
colonies under the direction of British Officials but with la rge 
powers of self-government and with rep resentation in due time 
in the Federal Pari iament of the confederated states of South 
Africa. 15 
These were not the words of a conserva tive, but the cons idered opinion of an 
acknowledged champion of African dghts and the 'Cape Liberal'tradition. 
Rose-Innes was speaking a full eight years after the Glen Grey Act was passed, 
and he vo lunteered: 
The Act has been tested by the experience of eight years and 
has more tha n justified every hope concern ing it in the interests 
of the Natives. C. J. Rhodes has done much for South Africa, 
but it may be found that one of the greatest benefits he conferred 
upon this land of mixed peoples and race was his conception, 
initiation and application of the G len Grey enactment. 16 
Rose:-Innes's paper was supplied to SANAC in 1903. The SANAC 
report is strikingly like his paper in ideas and even in language at times. It 
seems they were influenced by the positive attitude of Rose-Innes and other'Cape 
Liberals' to the Glen Grey system. Then, Glen Grey influenced J W Sauer in 
his drafting of the Natives' Land Act of 1913. Later F S IvIalan, another eminent 
Cape leader, helped design a system of local councils based on the Glen Grey 
Act. These councils were first incorporated by General Botha in the ill-fated 
Native Administration Bill of 1917. Even though all the other provisions under 
the 1917 Bill were shelved, the council system became accepted policy under 
15 R W Rose-Innes, The Glen Grey Act and the native question, pp 33-35. 
The frontispiece identifies the work as 'A paper read before the King 
William 's Town Debating Society and later at Queenstown and at East 
London, copies whereof were supp lied to the inter-South African Commission 
on Native Affairs, now sitting and del iberating on the Native Question, 
1903.' The Daily Dispatch, 27 October 1936, records that this pamphlet 
was republ ished in 1936 'in response to many requests'. In the preface to 
the republished edition Rose-Innes noted: ' the interest and value of the 
pamphlet is due to the accuracy of its forecasts.' The forecasts reiate to 
the trusteeship policy as formulated in 1936. 
16 Ibid, pp 13-14 
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Smuts's Native Affairs Act in 1920. 17 
The Cape connection on this evidence cannot be ignored in an analysis 
of post-Union land policy, but then neither can land measures in the republican 
tradition. This latter contention is especially true of Hertzog's land pol icy 
objectives. 
Segregation and the Free State tradition 
Hertzog, it appears, worked to get a uniform' native policy' along 
Free State I ines. The most voc iferous exponent of this idea was Sol Plaatje. 
Plaatje, a founder member of the SA Native National Congress (SANNC), 
was raised and experienced in Free State law and tradition. Soon after the 
Natives' Land Act in 1913 he predic ted the future course of the government's 
race pol icy by arguing that the ex-republ icons feared the spread of the Cape 
Libera l tradition and would do all they cou ld towa rds entrenching the Northern 
tradition. He also argued t~t Hertzog would not be content ta limit group areas 
to the rural sector alone; and that he would not be satisfied until the "'Free" 
State Law' ruled the Union and applied eventually to the urban Africans as well. 
A decade before any urban legislation Plaatje wrote: 
today we have, extended throughout the Union of South Africa, 
a 'Free' State law, which makes it illegal for Natives to live on 
farms except as servants in the employ of Europeans. There is 
another' Free' State law, under which no Native may live in a 
municipal area or own property in urban localities. He can only 
live in the town as a servant in the employ of a European. And 
if the followers of General Hertzog are permitted to dragoon the 
Union Government into enforcing 'Free' State ideals against the 
Natives of the Union, as they have successfully done under the 
Natives' Land Act, it will only be a matter of time before we 
have a Natives' Urban Act enforced throughout South Africa. 18 
Free Staters had always opposed the idea of extending the reserves. 
Brotz argues: 'White farmers were antagonistic to the idea of segregated reserves, 
17 The question of local representation is discussed in chaps 1 and 3. For the 
influence of F S Malan on the formulation of the Union's 'native pol icy ' , see 
P Kallaway, 'F S Iv'oalan, the Cape Liberal tradition and South African politics 
1908-1924', Journal of African History, v 15, 1, 1974, pp 113-124. 
18 S Plaa tj e, Native li fe in South Africa, pp 25-27. For origins of urban segrega-
tion see T R H Davenport, 'The beginnings of urban segregation in South Africa', 
The Natives' (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 and its background, Institute for Social 
and Economic Research (ISER), Rhodes University, occasional paper 15, 1971; 
and chap 8 below . 
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except as places to locate Africans who were surplus to their labour requirements.' 19 
He quotes Reitz who 'attocked the reserves as "the prop of despotic chieftoinship"! 
and a social system which permitted the enslavement of women by men who were 
too proud to work but not too proud to steal. ,20 Webb, on Reitz's views of 
, Native policy', writes: 
It is arguable indeed that the case presented by Reitz was a 
genertll isation based upon limited experience, and thar the white 
supremacist but non-segregationist system he advocated was 
simply that in opertltion in the Free Stote, where a small African 
population was held in subordination as a thinly scattered labour 
force spread over hundreds of white farms. 21 
This white supremacist, non-segregationist attitude persisted and continued to 
colour and shape Free Stote views. Africans in their thousands were to be drtlwn 
into the agriculturtll (ife of whites, but as servants only, and the simpl est way to 
do this in Free Stote terms, writes Welsh, 'was to cause the destruction of African 
d•• I' , 22 tra .t.ona .sm . 
The Free Stoters could afford to be non-segregationist because the 
farmers had a conven ient labour pool in the adjacent Basutoland protectorate 
(Lesotho, as it is known today). In these c ircumstonces they vehemently opposed 
the provisions under the 1913 Land Act which contemplated the release of land 
in each province sufficient for Africans' needs and proceeded to express this 
objection by rejecting a considertlble part of the 1916 Beaumont recommendations. 
The existence of this convenient labour pool and the subsequent reduction of the 
Free Stote land quota was commented an by Herbst in his NAD report for 1926: 
This would explain the comparotively small area of 74291 morgen 
consisting of the three native reserves, scheduled under the Natives' 
Land Act. The Bill proposed an addition of 148 316 morgen as 
native areas, whilst the recommendations of the Free Stote Local 
Committee proposed 79 343 morgen of supplementory land wh ich 
is already exclusively occupied by natives. 23 
The fact that even the reduced 79343 morgen was already 'exclusively occupied 
by natives', dispelled any illusion that the Free Stoters were surrendering land 
for either the resettlement of evicted squatters or the rei ief of Africans settled 
19 Quoted by H Brotz, The politics of South Africa, p 57 
20 Ibid 
21 C de B Webb (ed), 'Reitz-Shepstone correspondence 1891-1892', Natolia, 
2, September 1972, p 8 
22 D Welsh, 'The culturtll dimension of apartheid', African Affairs, v 71, 
282, January 1972, p 37 
23 UG 14-27, p 6. For discussion on areas to be re lease.J under the 1917 
Bill see pp 73-83, and see toble 2.1 and appendix B.4(a). 
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in the congested reserves of Witzieshoek ond Thoba 'Nchu. 
If Hertzog identified with the majority of Free Staters in their 
opposition to the establ ishment of large segregated reserves, then controry to 
whot he I iked people to believe, he was merely paying I ip service to the 
segregat ion ideal . An examination of Hertzog's 1926 land proposals suggests 
that this was in fact the case. 
Hertzog's land Bills: segrega tion abandoned 
A comparison of the Natives' Land Act (1913) Amendment Bill 1927, 
and the Natives' Land (Amendment) Bill 1929, with the Principal Act, the 
Natives' Land Act 27 of 1913, shows Hertzog hod in fact abandoned the 
principle of territorial segregation. In the first place the two Amendment Bills 
repealed clouse 1.1. (0) of the 1913 Act. This clouse hod prevented Africans 
from hiring, leasing or purchasing land outs ide the 10;} million morgen scheduled 
as reserves in 1913. Despite the lifting of these restrictions the Africans' 
position was not improved: if anything, it deteriorated . The areas scheduled 
for release in 1926 were potentially mixed areas, which meant that Africans 
were left exposed to white competit ion in the released areas without being 
granted any right to buy land elsewhere. In 1913 it hod been laid down thot 
the areas to be released would be reserved exclusively for Afrieons. In 1926 
this was no longer so . Hertzog confirmed this chonge in policy at a formers' 
conference in Pretoria on 18 August 1926 when he said: 
In 1913 the ideo hod been scouted [accepted?] of declaring 
certain large areas as Native areas, but it would retard Native 
development if the area were purely block . 24 
Secondly, both the released areas and the existing reserves were 
already congested. In his 1926 report the Secretory for Na tive Affairs analysed 
the areas to be released and commented: 
It is perhaps superfluous to remark that the native rese rves 
supplemented by the proposed released areas could not absorb 
and maintain the native population resident in European areas, 
nor is any such translocation intended. 25 
Discuss ing the country's labour difficulties, Herbst adm its that the government 
24 UG 14-27, p 6, and Johannesburg Joint Council, Memorandum 1, Natives' 
Land Act, 1913, Amendment Bill 1927, p 5; and Cope Times, 10 November 
1926 
25 UG 14-27, p 7 . For further detail on inadequacy of the reserves see pp 84-94. 
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had no intention of providing enough land for londless Africons for the resettlement 
of either African squa tters or redundant workers from the urban areas. White 
economic interests precluded such a solution. He rational ised: 
It is impossibl e for the native population of the country to maintain 
itse lf so lely by cultivation of the soil, and indeed there is no land 
available anywhere in South Africa to allow of an effective and 
comprehens ive pol icy of "back to the land". If the mines of the 
Witwatersrand were closed down thousands of native families would 
cal l upon the Government for food. In the circumstances of the 
present t ime it is absolutely necessary that the na ti ves be allowed 
admission to the fields of industrial employment in European areas. 26 
Thirdly, even in areas where Africans were pemritted to buy, this right 
was limited. For example, large-scale purchase of land by Africans was not 
envisaged as new restrictions were introduced to prevent this. As had been 
proposed under the Native Administration Bill in 1917, land could be bought 
only in areas contiguous to the existing reserves. This was ostensibly to preserve 
the principle of territorial segregation, but it is clear from the evidence that white 
farmers were fearful that their land would depreciate in value if Africans were 
perm itted to buy land amongst them. 27 It was thi s rather than any belief that 
total segrega tion shou ld be aimed at, that led to the inclusion of this clause. 28 
Land options open to Africans in these contiguous areas already carried a large 
African population - this )Yould be another limiting factor . The Bills furthermore 
prohibited any 'association or aggregation of natives, other than a recognised 
tribe' from buying in co-operation. In this way detribalised Africans were to 
be barred from purchasing land in groups larger than ten. 29 The latter would 
then still have to put their case to the Governor-General if they wished ta get 
land for a group of Africans on land outside their tribal area. 
Fourthly, land was to be sold, not given. Hertzog was unequivocal on 
this point: 
26 UG 14-27, p 18 
27 For farmers' attitudes on land purchase by Africans seepp 81-83 and chap 5. 
28 The measures also contained 'prohibitions against the acquisition of isolated 
land in released areas' by whites so that consolidated bases of African land 
could expand by absorbing adjacent white-owned land to become continuous 
'n ative areas' . To this extent competitive buying was restricted and the 
pr in cip le of consolidation conceded. See cI 1.1.3 of 1927 and 1929 Bill s. 
29 See H Rogers, Native administration in the Union of South Africa, pp 145 
and 148. CI 1.3 of the 1927 and 1929 Bills prohibited any 'association or 
aggregation of natives, other than a recognised tribe ' from buying land in 
co-operation . 
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I have mentioned 'purchase' and 'lease' because the Native must 
clearly understand that no land is to be given by the State. But 
that the opportunity will be given to him by means of purchase or 
lease to enable him to acquire a reasonable extent of land in 
addition to what has been reserved to him. 
I wish here to emphasise that it is clear to me that there is a 
misapprehension about this matter. There are Natives as well os 
Europeans who seem to think that the Act of 1913 intended to 
make a free gift to the Natives of the land described by the 
Beaumont Commission. That was never the intention, nor is it 
the present intention. 30 
At the some time facilities for whites such as subs idies, bonk loons, and the right 
to mortgage property were to be den ied Africans because - as the Prime Minister 
rationa lised when challenged on th is point - 'the Bank wonted security which the 
Natives were unable to give'. 31 Although a Native Land Purchases ond Advances 
Fund was to be establ ished under the Amendment Bills, it was obviously a minor 
feature of them. Mainly because as the poor whites got poorer, there was more 
oppos ition to money being allocated to Africans. 32 The fund should have been 
used to relieve congestion in the reserves, but with its meagre resources it could 
only be made available to assist African tribes who, after purchasing land, found 
themselves in financial difficulties. 33 
The 1913 Land Act in its final form did not call for a fund for buying 
land. In this the Prime Minister was correct. 34 But it was not hedged around 
30 Prime Minister's address, proceeding and resolutions of the Governor-General's 
Native Conference, 3 December 1925, NAC report 1925, UG 17-27, p 16 
31 Karis & Corter, 'Proceedings and resolutions of the Governor-General's Native 
Conference 1925', v 1, doc 39c, p 178; also UG17-27 
32 On provisions mode for landless poor whites see chap 7 and appendix B. 10. 
33 Departmental policy according to P von Biljon was to give financial aid to 
Africans who themselves raised half the necessary sum, the remainder to be 
repaid by tribal levy. P von Biljon, Grensbakens tussen blank en swort in 
Suid Afrika, p 455 
34 Provision was mode for the expropriation and purchase of land by Africans 
under Sauer's original draft 1913 Land Bill according to T L Schreiner who 
recalled: 'I know under the Bill introduced by Mr Sauer, what mode many 
approve of it was that there was a whole chapter about expropriation, and not 
only how the land should be expropriated but how the money was to be repaid 
by the Natives. There was to be 0 tax on Natives of £1 per head for a number 
of years (15), and it even specified as to the manner in which the money hod 
to be paid, but before We went into Committee the chapter as a whole had 
disappeared, and there was very I ittle left about expropriation or anything of 
that sort.' In reply to a member of the committee, Schreiner also confirmed 
he had 'a very precious copy' of the draft Bill. Report of the Select Committee 
on the Native Administration Bill, SC 6a-17, paras 3556-7. (At the time 
of writing I have not been able to consult a copy of this original draft.) 
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with all the restrictions of the Amendment Bills. The released areas of 1913 were 
not to be competed for on the open market, nor did whites have the advantage 
in bargaining, since at that time Africans could raise loans and mortgage bonds. 35 
A SA IRR pamphlet pointed to another difficul ty: 
the Bill before us does not prevent sales and purchases between 
Europeans in "released areas". This relaxation will tend to keep 
up the price of land in these released areas and in this way 
handicap Native purchasers. 36 
'Incidentally,' the writer continued, 'it will also prove an obstacle to segregation, 
often proclaimed as the guiding principle of the Prime Minister's policy. ,37 
There does not seem to be anything incidental about this policy at all. 
These new restrictions demonstrated that Hertzog had no intention of carrying out 
the policy of segregating Africans and whites territorially. Smuts, it should be 
noted, originally rejected Hertzog's land Amendment Bills for this very reason. 
In a memorandum on the 'Four Bills' he made several points. The scheme reversed 
Botha's segregation policy in permitting competitive buying between Africans and 
whites in the released areas. It did not substantially relieve the acute land 
shortage. The released areas were those recommended ten years previously and 
were no longer practicoble. The Bill did nothing to encourage agricultural 
development. And the I icensing provisions on squattersand labour tenants were 
d . 38 too rastlc. 
Cutting down the promised land 
The idea of segregating Africans and whites territorially had, it appears, 
been abandoned. If in addition to this the land grants also proved inadequate, 
then the Cape franchise was lost for less than nothing. This was the view adopted 
by most Africans. 
35 After the Supreme Court decisian (Tsewu v Registrar of Deeds 1905) Africans 
in the Transvaal were allowed ta receive transfer direct and own their land 
personally. This applied in practice only to new transfers. Even trust land 
in the Transvaal, unlike Natal, was often held in full ownership - under 
these forms of tit le it was possible for Africans to mortgage their lond or 
raise loons and bonds. The same app l ied to ind ividual freehold tenure in 
Natal (as opposed ta Natal trust land), Thaba 'Nchu in the OFS, and 
throughout the Cape and T ranske i. 
36 Joint Council, Memorandum I, p 6 
37 Ibid 
38 Hancock & Van der Poel, v 5, p 323 
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Sol Plaatje took the trouble to compare maps with the revised schedule 
in the 1926 Land Bill. These he compared with the schedule to the 1913 Land 
Act. From these comparisons he concluded that' he did not place much rei iance 
on the maps' and that the 'Bill reminded him of a jackal trap - a nice piece of 
meat with poi san inside'. 39 Even a convention of chiefs held under the auspices 
of the ANC in 1927 rejected the Bill for offering totally inadequate areas. 40 
A second major objection was Hertzog's insistence that the Bills be 
passed in tandem with the released areas compensating in part for the removal of 
Africans from the Cape common roll. Such a deal was rejected by both Africans 
and whites. As Walshe records: 
this, in the judgement of the Johannesburg Joint Council; was a 
matter for the conscience of white South Africa, an iniquitous 
bargain, "by which a cherished right is to be wrested from an 
unwilling people in return for the discharge of a moral and legal 
debt which - to the shame of white South Africa - had been 
outstanding for nearly a quarter of a century.n 41 
The interdependence of Hertzog's Bills was a source of bitter frustration and 
resentment for Africans. Councillor Xabanisa of the Transkeian Bunga pointed 
out there was no basis for Hertzog's claim that the 1926 Land Bill and its counter-
part the 1926 Union Council Bill were an honest bargain: 
39 UG 17-27, p 70. Plaatje was possibly referring to the radical reduction in 
the area to be allocated or else to the discrepancy in the published figures. 
For the researcher the latter still causes confusion. See table 2.1 for details. 
40 Karis & Carter, 'Resolutions of the Convention of Bantu Chiefs, held under 
the auspices of the African National Congress', 15 April 1927, v 1, doc 48e, 
p 304 
41 P Walshe, The rise of African nationalism in South Africa, p 191. For 
detailed analysis of African reaction to Hertzog's segregation Bills see Walshe, 
chap 6; T R H Davenport, South Africa : A modern history, chap 11; M Benson, 
South Africa: The struggle for a birthright, chapters 3 and 4; 5 Plaatje, op cit, 
published in 1913, which deals specifically with the 1913 Natives' land Act 
and its consequences; DDT Jabavu, The black problem and The segregation 
fallacy; S M Molema, Bantu past ond present; R V 5 Thema, The Un ion's 
native policy; S Trapido, 'A preliminary study of African political opinion 
in South Africa 1884-1955', unpub BA (Hans) thesis, Un iversity of the 
Witwatersrand, 1959; 5 M Lekhela, 'An historical survey of native land 
settlement in South Africa from 1902 to the pass ing of the Native Trust and 
land Act 1936', unpub MA thesis, UNISA, 1967; and Vivien Klein, 'African 
responses in the Eastern Cape to Hertzog's Representation of Natives in 
Parliament Bill 1926-1936', unpub BA (Hans) thesis, UCT, 1978. 
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To say it [the vote] is being exchanged for someth ing else is not 
true , because we have been given nothing. This Council that we 
have been promised is already in existence unde r Act 23 of 1920, 
where it is stated that Councils would be introduced in all the 
provinces in South Africa. All that we were expecting was offered 
when that law was to be appl ied. We are surprised that the 
Government should suggest an exchange or purchase price because 
we already had what was proposed. What sort of a man would he 
be who came to buy an ox and gave yau in payment a horse that 
was already yours? Again, this vote is sought to be purchased 
with land. We already have a low about land - the 1913 Act. ..• 
The Government must know our natural right in the land as being 
the Native people of thi s country, and that is why we say that an 
Act for the division of land is olready in existence. How con it be 
proposed to pay us with that for our vote? 42 
R V Selope Thema argued cogently to the NEC that extra land should be given 
to Africans. The point he emphasised was that the scheduled reserves as constituted 
in 1913 were already totally inadequate. On the government's failure to lift the 
1913 restrictions Thema submitted: 
the result was that the operation of the l and Act, rendered 
thousands of Natives landless and homeless, disturbed the working 
and I iving condit ions of the Native reserves with the result that 
thousands of Natives migrated to the towns. 43 
Maiority white opinion, as wi ll be shown later, reiected such a suggestion out of 
hand, despite the fact that there was a great deal of evidence to support Thema's 
view. 
Numerous public commissions and parliamentary committees had sat over 
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the years taking evidence on land and its distribution between Africans and whites. 44 
42 Karis & Carter, 'News report and resolution of the United Transkeian 
Territories Genera l Council', 30 March 1936, v 2, doc 8, p 30 
43 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of Richard Victor Selope Thema, 
member of the AN·C executive and Joint Counc il movement. Thema was 
originally subeditor of the ANC newspape r Abantu-Batho and in 1932 
became editor of the newly esta bl ished Bantu World. He was a 'maior 
spokesman for moderate African opin ion' . See Karis & Carter, v 4, p 155 
for further detoils. 
44 Official sources ovailable on the economic conditions of Africans in the 
reserves : Report of the Economic Commission, 1914, UG 12-14; Report of 
the Economic and Wage Commiss ion, 1925, UG 14-26; Report, with 
evidence, of the Natives land Commission, UG 19-16; UG 22-16 
(Beaumont Commission); Select Commi ttee reports on native offairs:6a-17 
and 10-27; in addition to the NAD annual reports and those of the NAC 
1921-. W M Macmillan's researches had been undertoken on behalf of 
the Department of Census and Statistics. His find ings were first published 
in the Cape Times, 12 April 1926 and then in book form, Compl ex South 
Africain February 1930. 
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Table 2.1 COMPARATIVE CKART SHOWING REDUCTION IN LAND SCHEDULEfl FOR RFLEAS E 1916 - 1936 
Percentage Released 
of area of Revised areas Toto I ro be 
Province province Scheduled scheduled Beaumont Released Released short in released 
scheduled areas areas areas areas areas schedule (quoto) 
1913 1913 1926 1916 1927 1936 1936 1936 
A 8 C D E F G 
Cape 8.47 7115561 6044 000 1 133055 1 494 200 1 607 800 8200 1 M6 000 
Notol 22.83 2897 120 2755000 1 861 680 433600 288718 237 282 526000 
T rcnsvool 3.22 1077513 1 065700 5042693 5007800 4758 991 269009 S 02R 000 
OF S 0.48 74290 74290 148 316 79400 79342 658 80000 
Union 7.13 11 164 484 9958990 8365744 7014400 6734 851 515149 7250000 
1 2 3 2 4 4 5 
1916 Beaumont Commission 11 164 484 
1927 Natives' land Amendment Bill 9958902 
1935 Joint Select Committee 10410290 
1936 House of Assembl~ Debates, 30 April 1936 10422935 
1956 Tomlinson Commission 10729 430 
2 SC 10-27, p 15 
3 UG 19-16, p 44 
4 See Edith Rheinollt-Jones's articfe, Race Relations, August 1938. 
5 House of Assembly Debates, 30 April 1936, col 2747 
SUMMARY OF CHANGING TOTALS 1916-1936 
Schedule 
& Dote Taro I Chonge 
release 
A+C 1916 19530228 
8 + D 1926 16973390 - 2 556 838 
5 G+B 1936 18623417 + 1 650027 
All figures quoted in morgen (1 morgen = 0.857 hectoN) 
Some of their views and findings were summarised by the Secretary for Native 
Affairs in his report of 1926. In it he showed that the numbers of Africans in 
the reserves had increased dramatically since the first land commission reported. 
From these figures he argued: 
Now in 1927 it was impossible to get the land they could have got 
in 1917. This was due to many causes, which it was unnecessary 
to state. But speaking from inside knowledge he knew it was 
impossible and he thought every friend of the Native regretted 
that the Bill of 1917 did nat pass. 45 
After describing the various categories of lond which the government proposed 
to release under its 1926 Land Amendment Bill, he concluded: 
even when supplemented by the proposed released areas they would 
not absorb and maintain the native population resident in European 
areas, nor is any such translocation intended. 46 
One of the examples Herbst hod in mind was this: 
Toke the Crown land - there was still some in the Transvaal -
nothing in the Cope - very I ittle in Natal - none in the Orange 
Free State - while in 1917 there were thousands of morgen 
available. They hod disappeared and Europeans were in 
occu~t~. C 
Segregation under the revised Land Bill was not envisaged, Herbst claimed, it 
had been abandoned because the areas set aside were totally inadequate. A 
review of the recommended land apportionment proposals substantiates Herbst's 
view. 
In 1927 the Select Committee that took evidence on the Natives' Land 
Amendment Bill estimated that the scheduled reserves totalled only9 958990 
morgen. 48 A few years later in 1932 the report of the NEC stark ly depicted 
45 UG 17-27, pp 69-70 
46 UG 14-27, P 7. For details and descriptions of the various classes 
of land see oppendices B. 2 (0) ond B. 3 (a) ond occompanying noIes. 
47 UG 17-27, p 70. Herbst referred to the land classed as 'Crown la nd not 
reserved for any special purpose', which when Beaumont reported in 1916 
amounted to 9 156644 morgen. Despite the fact that a great deal of this 
crown land hod been recommended for release by Beaumont, between 1918 
and 1928 it fell in to white hands. How this happened is fully discussed 
be low. For details see UG 19-16, appendix III, col 8 or appendices B.2(a), 
col 8 and BA(c) below . 
48 SC 10-27. The Select Committee total is used in this discussion, for it was 
obviously what officials rei ied on at the time. 9 958 990 morgen was 
given in the 1926 schedule (misquoted as 9 959 000 because of on error 
in the total for the 0 F S: 74 300 instead of the correct 74290). But 
the scheduled areas recorded in each province add up to 9 958 990. 
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the poverty and underdevelopment of these areas. It wamed that the land could 
become a desert, and stressed generally : 
We have now throughout the reserves a state of affairs in which, 
with few exceptions, the carry ing capacity of the soil for both 
human beings and onima ls is definitely on the downgrade; a 
state of affairs which unless soon remedied, will within one or 
at the outside two decades create in the Union an appalling 
problem of Native poverty. 49 
Well within the decade, D L Smit, the Secretary for Native Affairs, tabled a 
White Paper in which he endorsed these remarks. In 1936 he wrote: 
Speaking generally, it is notorious that the existing Native 
Locations and Reserves are congested, denuded, overstocked, 
eroded and, for the most part in a dep lorable condition. . . . 50 
Seven million morgen51 of extra land was to be released ostensibly to relieve 
the position. But, as has already been said, these new areas were not to be kept 
exclusively for Africans. Further, in computing the land actually to be released, 
the final amoun t would be considerably less than this q~ota. Firstly black islands 
in the 'non-native' areas were to be excised. These islands were African-owned 
areas surrounded by white farms, about 305 052 margen as Edith Rheinallt-Jones 
estimated at the time . 52 The 1926 Land Bill called for the expropriation of these 
49 UG 22-32, para 69 
50 D L Smit, Statement of policy under Native Trust and Land Act 1936 , 
Parliamentary White Paper, 23 February 1937, An 401-1937, p 3 
51 7014400 was the exact figure given. See table 2. 1, col D. 
52 Edith Rheinallt-Jones, ' Some considerations which arise from the administra-
tion of the Native Trust and Land Act', Race R.elations, v 5, 3, August 1938, 
p 5. Beaumont's figure for African owned farms is 1 002 039, but he included 
in this estimate all African owned land and not just the so-called 'black 
islands' (or black spots as they are better known today). See appendix B.2 (a), 
col 3, and p 79 below. Also Tomlinson gives 1 800 140 as African owned 
land in both scheduled and released areas in 1956, and 188660 as black 
spots . These were African owned outs ide the scheduled and re leased areas, 
but at the time the Tomlinson report was compiled the expropriation of 'black 
islands' had a lready begun. Former African residents in these areas had 
either been bought out or they had been given compensatory land in the 
reserves. An analysis of land transactions between 1936 and 1956 suggests 
that the figure of 300 000 morgen estimated by Rheinallt-Janes was even on 
the conservative side. See Summary of the Report of the COmm ission for Socio-
economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa 
(Tomlinson report), UG 61-55, pp 44-46; and for details of land transactions, 
see append ix B.5 (1919-1928) and NAC annual reports 1936-1953. 
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areas, but there is no sign that Hertzog in 1926 contemp lated adding the morgenage 
lost in this way ta the quota of 7014400 to be released . 53 Secondly, Africans 
already owned a further 696 987 morgen in the areas proposed for release. 54 This 
amount was also not included in the final calculation. If these two amounts are 
deducted from the 7 014 400 scheduled for release in 1926, only on estimated 
6011 961 morgen would have been available for purchase by either Africans or 
whites in the released areas. 
Ten years earl ier Beaumont hod recommended that 8 365 744 morgen be 
added to the existing reserves. 55 Between 1916 and 1926 therefore, the extra 
land recommended for release hod been reduced by 1 351 300 morgen, or 
2353339 if African owned land which was not to be added to the final quota 
is also deducted. 56 This reduction belies Hertzog's protestations that his govern-
ment wonted to set aside enough land so that Africans 'could develop along their 
own lines'. 
This claim can be substan tiated further by describing the remain ing areas 
to be released - that is, excluding the African owned land just dealt with . 
Firstly, there was crown land, which Beaumont estimated at 942280. 57 Of it 
the Secretory for Native Affairs said: 
It must be allphasised that much of the particular class of Trust 
land [as crown land later become known] [58J already carries 
53 According to the Native Trust and Land Act 18/1936, 13 (5), 'land of equal 
postoral and agricultural value' was to be swapped for block islands excised 
or expropriated. This amount was ta be in addition to the 7 250 000 morgen 
released in 1936. Therefore in 1936 a clear change of policy was indicated. 
54 This figure plus the 305 052 morgen outside the scheduled and released areas 
gives the total 1 002 039 estimated by Beaumont as already owned by Africans. 
See n 2.52 above. 
55 See table 2.1, col C, and appendix B.4(a). 
56 See table 2.1. The context here is: had Hertzog decided to make African 
owned land outside the reserves addit ional to the quota, it would have been 
specified as it was in 1936. See n 2 . 53. 
57 See appendix B.2 (0 ), col 4. 
58 Under the 1936 Act crown land in the released and scheduled areas was vested 
in the South African Na tive Trust . According to the 1926 estimate, Africans 
actually occupied 2557 747 morgen of crown land. In 19361 056415 
morgen of crown land fell within the defined 'na t ive areas' and was vested in 
the trust. One can either assume that the crown land occupied by Africans in 
1926 was not all scheduled for release, or tha t it was excluded from the 1936 
schedules having been bought in the inte rim by whites . See also Social and 
Economic Planning Council report 9, UG 32-46, annexure 11; and appendix 
B.4(a) for 1926 estimates; also B. 2(c), B.4(b) and B.4(c). 
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a sufficiently large number of Natives, and thus, speaking 
generally, cannot be regarded as availabl e for th,e accommo-
dation of landless Natives or of the SUrPlus popula tion from 
congested areas. 59 
As was pointed out, much crawn land that could have accommodated newcomers 
had been lost forever to the Africans between 1918 and 1926. 
Nor did the remain ing 4 156 329 morgen to be released offer hope of 
much African resettlement . Many of the farms in this area scheduled for 
release were owned by absentee landlords and land company owners who, in the 
derogatory phrase of the day, were accused of 'farming ka ffirs , . Owners of 
this type of farm either made money by hiring Or leasing small plots of land to 
African peasants, or they allowed Africans to squat on the ir unoccupied land 
as rack-renters or labour tenants. The evidence suggests that in many instances 
these areas were chosen because they 01 ready accommodated tens of thousands 
of Africans. Hence landless Africans could not be catered for in these areas 
either. This too was no ted in smit's White Paper: 
Many of this class of farm already carries a large complement 
of Natives, and, accordingly, un less special measures a re 
adopted to increase their carrying capacity, e.g . by developing 
the water supply, they will not prove of any great assis tance in 
the matter of settling disposed and landless Natives. 60 
The Transvaal Land Owners' Association (TlOA) for instance owned 
10 000 000 acres (roughly 4.5 million morgen) accommodating 100000 souls. 
Of this amount 793 607 morgen was scheduled for release. 61 These comprised 
the following: 62 
59 5 mit, p 6 
60 Ibid, p7. See appendices B.4 (d) and B. 4{e) below. Itshould 
also be noted that not all this la nd was actua ll y schedu led for 
release, but represented the areas exclusively occupied by 
Africans at these d ifferen t dates . For example, see table 2.2 
where statistics of land company land included in the schedule 
are given, p 74 and append ix BA {O. 
61 Here again amounts vary. The official estimate is given as 5 000 000 
morgen. See SC 60-17, para 3527. 
62 Ibid, appendix D, p xxi, evidence submitted by H A Baily. For 
details of areas listed in table , see Report of Natives' Land Commission, 
UG 6-16, p 45. 
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Table 2.2 LAND OWNED BY MEMBERS/AFFILIATES OF T LOA 
IN EACH 'NA TIVE AREA' IN THE TRANSVAAL 
Area 
2 
4 
5 
7 
8, 9, 13, 14, & 15 
16 
17 
Morgen 
41 359 
352 984 
838 
17604 
265242 
93 430 
5970 
16 180 
793607 
In the areas scheduled, popu lation and lives tock, they indicated, had 
a I ready reached sa tura tion point nearly everywhe re. In addi tion the TLOA 
maintained that the few areas still sparse ly populated, but in cluded in the 
schedu le, were unfit for human ha bi tation. Describing iust one of these sparsely 
populated areas the TLOA had this ta say: 
Deal ing with the position in the Zoutpansberg District alone, 
some 4,000 to 5,000 square miles, being the whole of the 
eastern part of the district, has been recommended by the 
Commission as Native Area. This in its actual size may appear 
to be a very I iberal grant; but when one comes to consider 
that only a very small proportion, genera lly the mountainous 
parts in the west cen tral portion of the area, and along Levubu 
River valley as fa r as T'sukundu is at all habitable or capable 
of sustaining even Natives, and for the rest is by general 
admission known to be a waterless, sterile tract of country, 
alkaline in the fla ts and sheer rock and gravel in the more 
northerly hilly portion, incapable of producing anything in 
the way of crops, it will be seen that the grant does not amount 
to much, in fact the extent of its habitable capab il ities may 
righ tl y be gauged by the extent to which it is presently 
occup ied by Natives for the reason that here the Natives have 
had every freedom for generations past to settle, a nd yet they 
have not done so, preferring the harder conditions of I iving on 
farms as rent-payers or labourers. It should be borne in mind 
that a great portion of this area is made up of the Singwedse 
Game Reserve, the unfitness of which for agricul ture has long 
been recognised. The suitable parts mentioned above are 
a lready densely occup ied by Natives. Of the whole, I wou ld 
estima te that not more than 1/12 th of the total area is capable 
of carrying Natives. 63 
63 Ibid, para 2383. Evidence of Henry Alfred Baily, secretary of the TLOA. 
Compare wi th description given by Fil ipus Bopape and Col E M Greene, 
p 175 and n 5 . 9 below. 
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Yet, 'white opinion was shocked by what it called "generous"allocations .' 
This was especially the case in Natal, H M Robertson notes. 64 There people 
objected that if the Beaumont recommendations were passed, Africans in Notal 
- which included Zululand - would own 43.1 per cent of the whole area. Protest 
in Natal and the Free State was so effective that the 1926 schedule reduced the 
quota for Natal from 1 861 680 morgen recommended by Beaumont to 433 600 
morgen, and for the Free State the Beaumont recommendations were reduced from 
148 300 to.79 400. 65 There were only three reserves set aside for Africans in the 
OFS - Witzieshoek, Thaba 'Nchu and Seliba. Together these totalled 74290 
morgen. 
On conditions in Thabo 'Nchu, the NEC reported: 
there are no resident Natives; those that work there go in from 
outside. The Natives in this district have lost hope and they 
live in fear of being deprived of the little land they have got. 
They bel ieve that it is not the intention of the Government to 
help the Natives in any way, and the land is passing out of the 
hands of the Natives into those of. Europeans. 
Thaba 'Nchu Natives wont to live in Thaba 'Nchu, not in 
Notal. The number of landless Natives in the district is 
alarming and the land would be inadequate even if the produc-
tion were increased. Twenty years ago the Natives asked for 
on agricultural college, but it was given ta the whites instead. 66 
On the reduction in the Notal quota, Maurice Evans wrote: 
Yet even th is wi II mean on average of 156 acres per head of 
European population, and 6.8 acres for every native, while, 
'the land which will fall within the European areas is infinitely 
healthier, more fertile, and altogether more desirable, than 
either the present locations or the areas recommended by the 
Beaumont Commission'. 67 
There are countless references to good quality land which whites insisted should 
be deleted from the schedule. Here are just two typical examples. Colonel 
E M Greene, representing the Natal Formers' Association, disputed the proposed 
release of land in the Tugela location at the source of the Tugela River. He 
con tended: 
64 ' Report by Maurice Evans on the native areas in Notal recommended by the 
Natives' Land Commiss ion, UG 41-18, p 3 quoted in H M Robertson, 'The 
economic condition of the rural native', in I Schapero (ed), Western civ ili sa-
tion and the natives, p 145 
65 UG 14-27, p 6. See table 2. 1 above. 
66 UG 22-32, addendum paras 47-49. For further details on the OFS see paras 
318-216. For Natal objections to evicted Africans finding refuge in Notal 
see SC 60-17, paras 175 and 198-201. 
67 Quoted by H M Robertson. The reports of the local committees show the 
tremendous practical difficulties for any final scheme to demarcate areas for 
release . 
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the native, being what he is, can nat make a living an certain 
lands fram which a European cauld abt"in a living, but on the 
ather hand he cauld make a living an land an which no Eurapean 
cauld make a living. The land I have referred ta is suitable far 
Native accupatian . It is paar, but su itable far that purpase. 
In Area 13 the land is paor in this respect, that it is in capable 
of cultivation, but exceedingly valuable for grazing purpases in 
the spring and early summer; in other words, it is valuable for 
a person who can afford to keep several classes of grazing for 
his cattle, and if you put it that way it is absolutely useless for 
Native settlemen t purposes •• • the remainder of the land in 
Area 13 ... is in deep gorges and the character of the cauntry 
is that which the Natives love.... 68 
Another associatian member hod this to say on Area 17 in the districts of Ixopo, 
Alexandra and Alfred in Natal: 
Before Union we built a railway up to Paddock, and the Unian 
Government extended it to Harding, and 'I cannot understand 
this recommendatian of the Commission at all. The building of 
that railway was authorized after full enquiry. Wattle plantations 
have been laid aut and the district was being well developed. 
The railway runs up to Paddock and fram there to Harding and from 
there the road leads up to Kakstad. It is a very fine area and 
there are a large number of Europeans living on it. The Commission 
has praposed ta leave two miles on each side of the railway for 
the use of Europeans, and the rest of the area they are leaving to 
Natives .•.. I feel certain that if this area was thoraughly 
inspected such a recommendation would never have been made. ·69 
The reports of the local committees show they encountered tremendous 
practical difficulties in finalising the apportionment of land between Africans 
and whites. Brookes wrote: 
everywhere vested interests are aroused . European farmers whose 
forms became islands in the projected Beaumant Native Areas 
and could only have been sold to Natives, had the Bill of 1917 
gane through, complained of depreciation in the value of their 
land. 70 
In the areas where white and African interests clashed, white objections were 
upheld. Many of the areas disputed each time land release was discussed, were 
68 Colonel E M Greene, Colonel Bede Cromptan, and Messrs D Roux 
Bester and George Herbert Hulett, representing the Notal 
Agricultural Union, SC 6a-17, para 180 
69 Ibid, para 133 
70 E Brookes, History of native pol icy in South Africa from 1830 to the present 
day, p 333 
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later deleted from the schedules. 'Perhaps the most seriaus indictment of 
the present del imitations', J D Rheinall t-Jones wrote, 'is that areas on good 
leases suitable for irrigation have been cut out for European settlement schemes.' 
'The reason (or excuse) given', he continued, 'is that such areas are not suitable 
for Native cultivation and that Natives would only waste or spoil them.' It was 
not that he disputed this fact, he asserted, but it certainly would be disputed 
by 'the type of European who is being sett led in such areas if all sorts of help 
d . . .,72 an training were not given. 
These examples reveal that vested and future white interests were the 
first consideration when choos ing ground. Of the 2 000 000 morgen dropped 
from the schedules between 1916 and 1926, the best crown land, it was noted, 
was taken up by whites. In other areas either the land was considered 'too good 
for wasteful kaffir farming', or farmers found through loons, irrigation schemes 
and the exten;ion of roilway services that their formerly undeveloped, unoccupied 
land had become economically viable. 
The position regarding the adequacy of the proposed released areas can 
be summed up as follows. In 1926 Africans were already in exclusive occupation 
of over 21 million morgen. According to official estimates this was divided up 
thus: 
71 See J D Rheinallt-Jones, The land question in South Africa, in which 
disputed lands are discussed. These lands were excised under an Act 
in 1939 amending the Native Trust and Land Act 18/1936which empowered 
the government to expropriate even those areas that had been safeguarded 
in perpetuity under the schedule to the Natives' Land Act 27/1913. For 
an accurate assessment the 1916 and 1918 Land Commission and Committee 
reports should be read together with the report of the Select Committee on 
Native Bills, SC 10-27, which took evidence on the revised schedule; 
also the Debates in the House, 1917, 1926, 1929 and 1936. At these 
times MPs invariably brought their constituents' objections to the notice 
of the Minister of Native Affairs. African objections were well documented 
by Mr and Mrs R J Rheinallt-Jones, Rheinallt-Jones papers, Institute 
archives, University of the Witwatersrand; and the Margaret Ballinger 
papers, both University of the Witwatersrand and UCT collections. An 
invaluable source would have been Edgar Brookes's private papers, but 
appa rently these no longer exist. 
72 J D Rheinallt-Jones ta D Molteno, 8 July 1940, Rheinallt-Jones papers, 
B (100) e 
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Table 2.3 
Province 
Cape 
Transvaal 
Notal 
OFS 
LAND OCCUPIED BY AFRICANS 
(1926 N.A.D. ESTIMATE) 
Rural African Crown 
locations land land 
11 743779 250748 152 185 
710455 510176 1 598429 
2633210 131 612 807 133 
74290 93542 
-
15161734 986078 2557747 
Estimated 
rural Morgen 
73 
Mission White land 
land unocc. 
64 514 55754 
79605 1 640166 
146168 290256 
9 100 114793 
299387 2 100969 
Province population occupied 
Areas quoted in morgen 
Cope i 528616 12266980 (1 morgen = 0.857 hectare) 
Transvaal 1 320200 4538 831 
Natal 1 149980 4008379 
OFS 71 700 291 725 
4401 796 21 105915 
From these and earlier calculations we see: 
Land scheduled as 'native areas' in the Natives' 
Land Act 1913 as amended in 1926 
(see table 2. I, col B) 
Land outside scheduled 'native areas' (see table 
2.4) owned by African tribes, syndicates of 
Africans, and individual Africans 
in released areas 696987 
in 'white' areas ('block islands') 305052 
1 002039 
Land released or to be released for ownership 
by the Natives' Land Amendment Bill, 1927 
73 UG 14-27, appendix B, and appendix B.4 below 
Morgen 
9958990 
1 002 039 
7014400 
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From this analysis we can deduce the following final estimates and 
reductions between 1916 when Beaumont recommended certain areas and 1926 
when the supplementary Natives' Land Bill was tabled: 
Table 2.4 TOTAL MORGENAGE AVAILABLE FOR 
AFRICAN OCCUPATION IN UNION 1916 & 1926 
1916 
1913 schedule : as amended 1927 10 422 935 
Scheduled for release 8 365 700 
TOTAL 18788 635 
LESS LAND OWNED BY AFRICANS 
--
within released areas: if retained, 
to be deducted from morgenage 
named in Bill a 
in white areas : 'b lack islands'. b 1 002 039 No provis ion was made for 
compensating land to be given.- c 
FINAL TOTAL FOR RELEASE 17786 596* 
* to be purchased by Africans only 
** for purchase by either Africans ar whites 
except in the case of 'black and white islands' 
1926 
9 958 990 
7 014 400 
16 973 390 
696987 
305052 
15 971 351 ** 
a the Beaumont figure, less the 'black islands'. Beaumont had not 
distinguished between the two categories. See n 2.52. 
b Beaumont: see UG 22-16 Or appendix B.2 (a), col 3 belaw . 
c E Rheinallt-Jones, p 5. On lack of campensation see n 2.53 above . 
Here we can compare the total morgenages for 1926 as they appear on 
tables 2.3 and 2.4: 
the land said to be actually occupied 
by Africans outside the reserves (2.3) 
the totol recommended for release (2.4) 
21 105915 
15 971 351 
Evidently the area recommended for release was a mere three-quarters of what 
the Africans already occupied at the time. 
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Not only is the land exclusively owned by Africans important in this 
context, but also the distribution of Africans I iving within and outside the scheduled 
reserves. This was as follows: 
Table 2.5 RURAL AFRICAN DISTRIBUTION (1927 EST I Iv\.A TE) 74 
Total non-
Province Scheduled Released Other scheduled Total 
areas areas rural areas rural areas 
Cape 1 500 000 70000 190000 260 000 1 760 000 
Transvaal 390 000 250 000 560 000 810 000 1 200 000 
Natal 620 000 50000 530 000 580 000 1 200 000 
OF S 17 000 5 000 338 000 343000 360 000 
* Total 2 527 000 375 000 1 618 000 1 993 000 4 520 000 
* Thus nearly two mill ion rura l Africans I ived outs ide the areas scheduled for 
African occupation. To resettle them, double the number of Africans would 
have to be accommodated in the reserves, which would eventually comprise 
15 970 961 morgen, assuming, that is, that the land scheduled for release would 
pass into African hands. Can it be said that this was Hertzog's aim in 1926? 
Administrative dispensations hod relieved the congestion in some of the 
very worst areas. In 1926 the policy of allocating monies annually 'for the 
purchase of land by the Govemment' in distressed areas, which had been initiated 
by Botha in 1918 and endorsed by Smuts in 1923/5continued in operation. 
Between 1918 and 1927 the govemment provided loons total I ing only £228 821. 76 
74 SC 10-27, para 3. For distribution on various classes of land in 1916 see 
appendix B.2 (0). 
75 For General Botha's policy see UG 14-27, p 5; and for General Smuts's, 
Davenport & Hunt, doc 69. For details of authorised administrative excisions 
and additions to the 1913 schedule see amending Acts 28/1925; 34/1927; 
36/1931; and 27/1935 . It should be noted that the latter did not need 
parliamentary authorisation once the land acquired fell within the 'committee 
areas' . See appendix B. 5. 
76 Compared to what the white agricu ltural sector got, this was infinitesimal. 
According to S H Frankel, Capita l investment in South Africa, p 199ff, 
'in 1936 there were 700000 whites in the rural areas. Between 1910 and 
1936 the State devoted over £71 000000 of loan funds to agriculture , and 
over £41 000 000 of the revenue money to subsidise individual formers. 
Of the loaned funds £6 750 000 were written off, and £13 712 000 was 
classed as "non-recoverable". Also the State mode grants of £80 000 000 
and net loons of £30 000 000 - £110 000 000 in all - to help whites. 
During the some period less than £750 000 was spent on the agricultural 
needs of the 3 000 000 people in the Reserves. ' 
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This amount bought approximately 90 000 morgen and catered moinly for Africans 
in Piet Retief, Glen Grey, Pietersburg, King Will iam's Town, Peddie and 
Lichtenburg. But otherwise nothing was done. In 1925 Hertzog revised the 
method of financing these purchases. 77 Instead of loans being made to Africans 
from the generol revenue accoun t, African tribes were to purchase land by tribal 
levies which when duly authorised were - under section 15 of the Na tives' 
Taxation and Development Act 41/1925 as amended by section 9 of Act 37/1931 -
recoverable as taxes under that Act . 78 Between 1926 and 1932, eighty-six such 
h A d• R 79 tribal levies were imposed under t e ct, accor 'ng to ogers. 
Like his predecessors, Hertzog hod no intention of giving parliamentary 
authorisation to the administrative pol icy launched by General Botha. Magistrates 
and NCs were asked by the NEC in 1930 to report on land transactions in their 
area. The evidence reveals that when approached the formers' associations in 
. . 80 
each province invariably refused to permit administrative purchase ,n the,r areos. 
The following responses from departmental officials suggest why. 
The NC for Ixopo in Notal, H B Wallace, praised the system of individual 
purchase and syndicate buying that had been the practice in his area prior to 1913. 
He insisted that 'the owners of land undoubtedly make better use of their holdings 
than do squatters, labour tenants or natives in native areos.' To substantiate thi s 
he continued: 'Many of the native farmers in this district fertilise largely and 
raise good crops of mealies and they also plant fruit ond vegetables which they 
sell to Europeans.' The present land shortage would however have on adverse 
effect on African progress in the area. He noted that 'a chief living in Ixopo 
District desired to purchase a portion of Crown land in addition to a farm he is at 
present purchasing on the instalment system for his tribe', but the 
Ixopo Farmers' Associations were consulted with regord to the 
proposed purchase by Natives of land and they were opposed 
to the acquisition of land by Natives where the land was 
situated in or near any area occupied by Europeans with the 
result that the matter was dropped . 81 
77 After 1930 the policy of administrative purchases was quietly dropped. 
See chop 5, p 207. 
78 Rogers, p 148 
79 Ibid 
80 UG 22-32, annexure 7, questionnaire 57/2: '2(a) Have European individuals 
or Associo t ions been consulted about the proposed purchase by Natives of land 
in your Distric t, or are they consulted? If so, (b) what has been their 
attitude; and (c) its effect upon the proposed purchases?' 
81 NEC 57/2, typescript evidence, H B Wallace, NC Ixopo, Natal, 21 January 
1931 
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The magistrate at Estcourt reported : 
As regards this District I may state that recently an application 
was received from a Chief and his tribe to purchase 0 European 
owned farm abutting a released area No. 28, as described in 
Port 1 of the first Schedule to the Native Land Act Amendment 
Bill published in Gazette Extraordinary dated 4 Iv'orch 1929. 
The motter was referred to the Farmers Association which body 
strongly objected to the sale of the farm to Natives on general 
grounds and particularly the sale of any land to Natives unless 
such land abuts on existing location . 
My predecessor just as strongly recommended that the tribe be 
allowed to purchase the farm as it abuts on a released area and 
that is what the natives have been told, and when they found a 
farm which complies with the conditions laid down by the 
Government (Identical Minute of the Secretory of Native 
Affa irs 1/4/1929) they are met with an adverse report from 
interested persons, which if allowed to prevail makes a nullity 
of the offer made by the Government and thus gives the na tive 
another ground for doubting bono fides of the Government. 
If the final decision is to remain with the former, then I fear so 
for as this District is concerned, the Native will have no hope 
of ocquiring property. 82 
Similar reports were mode by other departmental officials . In Bergville, where 
occording to the 1921 census there were 927 whites and 18903 Africans living 
in a predominantly African area, the magistrate reported thot should land be 
offered to Africans in Bergville, there would be protests from 'individual farmers 
and from the local Formers' Association, especially as the Location and Native-
owned forms already form the greater port of this District. ,83 And yet Thos 
MacDonald, a farmer in the area, reported 
a continuous stream of evictions from European owned forms, 
either because of unsatisfactory labour relations or by virtue of 
the fact that the African acquires an excess in the number of 
cattle allowed. 84 
The land shortage forced men evicted to seek emp loymen t on neighbouring forms, 
hence the re luctance of farmers in the area to sanction the purchase of additional 
land in the area for Africans. In Camperdown, 'European associations have been 
82 Ibid, typescript evidence, [ signature illegible], Estcourt, Notal, February 
1931. The area referred to in the text adjoins the farm A of Droycott, 5191. 
83 Ibid, typescript evidence, [signature illegible], Bergviile district, 1 April 
1931 
84 Ibid, typescript evidence, Thos Iv'ocDonald, Notal, 1931. 
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consulted' ; they were 'agreeable to Natives acquiring land which was unsuitable 
85 for Europeans.' Over the years, as the material rewards reaped from more 
profitable farming ventures increased, so did farmer intransigence. Landlessness 
amongst Africans assured a corresponding increase in the available labour supply. 
If the evidence to the NEC is anything to go by, this should be seen as the 
primary reason for the govemment failing in its administrative policy for the 
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release of further lands. 
The numerous restrictions on the purchase of land by Africans, the 
reduction in the quota of released land, and the virtual abondonment of the 
residential segregation of Africans and whites, was thus deliberate. It was all 
done essentially to meet the farmers' demands. 
Here we should note that no provision was to be made for resettling 
evicted squatters under the revised land Bill of 1926. This signifies a radical 
departure from the policy laid dawn in 1913, and it is dea lt with fully in chapters 4 
and 5 below . If the harsh restr ictions included in the 1926 Bill were implemented, 
an estimated 375 000 fam ilies living in the released areas would be liable for 
evict ion. This wou ld mean that these families, comprising roughly one million 
souls, would either have to accept employment on the farms as labour tenants or 
full-time servants - the latter if a farmer already had his full complement of 
five labour tenants. Altematively, they would have to seek refuge in the reserves. 
The questions which must now be asked are: Could the land reserved 
under the 1913 schedule accommodate this additional number? What of the 
estimated 2 527 000 Africans already residing in these areas - was the land 
sufficient for their needs? The answers to these questions will show whether 
there is any foundation to the argument that Hertzog was intent on setting aside 
areas where Africans could be 'free to develop along their own lines': in Tatz's 
terms, pursuing the 'Bantuston concept'. 87 
85 Ibid, typescript evidence, tv\agistrate, Camperdown district, 13 February 
1931 
86 For further substantiation see reports of NCs and mag istrates in all provinces. 
87 Tatz, p 48. For further discussion see below pp 101-102 and chap 3, pp 
133-138. 
83 
Development or underdevelopment of the reserves? 
Accord ing to the Select G:>mmittee report in 1927, the reserves as 
88 
scheduled under the 1913 Act were made up as foll ows: 
Cape 
Transvaal 
Natal 
OF S 
6 044 000 
1 065 700 
2 755 000 
74290 
9 958 990 
Most of this land, it was generally conceded, was situated in the most fertile 
areas of the Union. J D Rheinallt-Jones wrote: 
A good deal of the Native land falls in good ra in fa II areas. 
Much of that on the eastern side of the Drokensberg and the 
Transvaal northern and eastern areas too, has a tropical or 
sub-tropical climate. That this conjunction at present has 
the disadvantage of endemic Malaria and bilharzia is true. 89 
Without fail, Hertzog's supporters pointed to the large Transkei and Zululond 
reserves, insisting that Africans had more land than they needed for their 
subsistence needs. But were the reserves adequate even for subsistence farming? 
The land in the scheduled reserves worked out at roughly 4.4 morgen 
per head, according to Beaumont. Taking the average family as five persons, 
the scheduled area would yield about 22 morgen per family. For subsistence, 
each family of five needed 18;\: morgen (4 morgen arable and 14;\:posturage), 
according to Major Stubbs who used this as a formula in the Eastern Transvaal 
land committee's report in 1918. The formula, it should be noted, assumed 
good average loamy soil with regular rainfall, and assumed also that the adult 
males went out to work in European areas. 90 On this basis, in 1926 the land 
88 SC 10-27 and table 2.1 an p 69 for details; and n 2.48 on the OFS error 
89 Rheinallt-Jones to Malteno, 8 July 1940, Rheinallt-Jones papers, B (100)e 
90 Eastern Transvaal Local Land Committee, UG 31-18, quoted in Race 
Relations, 30, 1936, p 9. Prior to 1932 no in-depth assessment of the forming 
possibilities of the reserves had been undertaken, nOr perhaps considered 
necessary. Hence the statistics of the local land cammittee must stand as 
the figures relied upon at the time by policymakers. For comparison, a chart 
of farming possibility estimates drown up by the Social and Economic Planning 
Council has been included: appendix B.6; and see UG 32-46, pp 51-52 
for commentary. This could be compa red with Tomlinson's estimates [sic] which 
calculated 24 per cent was fit for stock farming only; 67 per cen t mainly for 
stock farming; and 20 per cent for mixed farming. Tomlinson report, p 152. 
A Iso D Hobart Houghton, The economy of a reserve, pp 33-35 and 115-117. 
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in the reserves looked adequate - if one accepted these figures based, I ike all 
judgements of the earlier commissioners, on the ~facto population in the reserves 
in 1916. Moe millon, frustrated in his own research by the tentative and imperfect 
enumeration and non-existent stotistics, hod good couse to write in 1929: 
Tempting and inevitable as specu lation about the country's future 
may be, Europeans will do well to devote good concrete thinking 
to bettering the present, since in truth, our statistics are too imperfec t 
to offord a sure bas is for prophecy, any more than for panic alarm. 91 
Dr Xu rna also showed how unrel iable the official view was : 
Some of the so co lied Native terril"ories are overcrowded. In them 
the land question is acute. To i-liustrate, for many years in the 
Transkei, several young men who were either too young or absent 
when land surveying took place are without land . In my own family, 
there are two who did not and cannot get land. My brother was too 
young and I was away at school. 
There are similar cases in many families. Young men are coming of 
age in these territories every year but there is no land to be allotted 
to them. Most of these landless you ths marry and have to squat on 
their fathers' four morgen plots and under the present conditions of 
agricul ture with repeated droughts, these plots hardly yield enough 
for the needs of one family . These people become poverty-stricken 
and destitute. What must they do? Where must they go? Naturally 
to the industrial centres. 92 
85 
Xuma's story was by no means on isolated one. Land was urgently needed to accom-
modate the many thousands rendered landless as a result of the land restrictions 
imposed in 1913. 
If the reserves hod been planned as areas for intensive forming, they would 
have hod to have funds to develop and rehabil itate them from the very start. This, 
it has been shown, was not envisaged under Hertzog's 1926 Bill. In addition, with 
less and less land being mode available, plots were mode so small that even the 
original 4 morgen plot was non-existent in either the surveyed or communal areas. 
Congestion even more than landlessness was seen by others as a prima ry 
couse for the low yie ld in the African areas . Even the introduction of better forming 
methods, the NEC wrote, would be 'hampered in many ports by the congest ion now 
existing, and it will be necessary to relieve the congestion first. ,93 Their assertion 
is borne out by the population density figures in certain areas in the reserv3S: 
91 Macm ilion, p 281 
92 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of A B Xuma. For further detail s on 
landlessness see UG 22-32, paras 139-141. 
93 Ibid, para 174 
Table 2.6 ESTIMA TED LAND AND POPULA nON 
OF AFRICAN AREAS (1936 CENSUS) 94 
Area Population 
Areas (sq miles) Papulation density 
CAPE 
North-western 5988 89 200 14.9 
Herschel 682 36 300 I 53.2 Glen Grey Queenstown 1 188 73 600 62.0 
Ciske i 1 259 120 200 I 95.4 
Transkei Highlands 3 717 243 100 65.4 
Midlands 6 060 484 100 79.8 
Coasta l 4 139 379 900 91.8 
NATAL 
Highlands 1 202 100 600 83.3 
Midlands 2 623 309 500 117.7 
Coastal 819 160 800 196.0 
ZULULAND 
North 3486 80 600 23.1 
Inland 3 558 193 200 54.3 
Coastal 617 44 500 72.0 
TRANSVAAL 
Central 1 781 114 900 64 . 5 
Western 856 37 700 44.0 
North and East 6 847 439 300 64 . 2 
OF S 397 18 600 46 .8 
Other areas nat inc I uded 6 570 36400 
-
TOTAL IN UNION 51 800 2 962 400 57.2 
94 Condensed version of the table compiled for the Social and Economic 
Planning Council report 9, UG 32-46, quoted in SAIRR, Our native 
reserves, Donaldson Blueprint series 4, p 7. No exact figures are 
available for 1926. This table gives the 1936 census figures and 
should therefore be compared with the table xii included here in 
appendix B.7 below although the term 'overpopulation' is relative 
to such factors as climate, natural resources, capi tal available and 
so on, and these must necessarily be considered when comparing 
density figures. The comparative chart is revealing in that it shows 
changes in human and livestock densities of population. Finally the 
'cattle unit' density in the reserves and a number of adjoining white 
farming areas are compared, showing a markedly higher density in 
the reserves. For an accurate assessment of the changes between 
1916 and 1926, this chart should be compared with the 1911 census 
statistics used by Macmi llan for compiling his density tables . 
Mac millan, p 281 ff. and UG 32-46, tab l e I, pp 8-9. 
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This argument was countered by those who insisted that Africans had enaugh 
land, but the yield per morgen would only improve when overstocking stopped. 
An agricultural office r who supported this view said: 
In the native areas .• , occording to the Census figures, there 
are 3895 head of large stock and 7 448319 of small stock -
or reduced to a small stock basis 26 926 374 head of stock, 
which gives 2.42 head per morgen. This is more than double 
the number that the Native areas can corry, without courting 
starvation, deterioration, degeneration and annual loss both 
direct and indirect through starvation. 95 
In contrast, Macmillan in his sample survey of the Herschel district concluded: 
It rema ins that the common grazing-lands, most of them little 
adaptab le to any other purposes, will still have to be used for 
animals and for 'animal husbandry' of some sort - as between 
cottle, sheep, goats, pigs, and poultry, will be for experts to 
decide. Even now overstocking is a relative term. As we sow 
in Herschel , where this postoral people has barely one beast 
per head of population, the over-crowding is in truth of people 
rather than of cattle, and the cottle problem itself is chiefly 
a variant of the more general problem of poverty. 96 
Besides, in most areas the commonage was already being encroached upon since 
land was so short. This aggravated the overgrazing and led to soil erosion, dongas 
and denudation of the soil. If the government were really so perturbed about the 
problem of overstocking, their decis ion to support the legal sanctioning of the 
lobola custom under the Native Administration Act of 1927 seems strange. Far 
from reducing stock, this policy would tend to increase it. Was it done because 
young men were driven into the labour market to acquire funds for lobola before 
they could marry? Or did the Africans themselves demand that their custom be 
legalised, as others claimed? 97 Whatever the view, the evidence shows that 
stock limitation was resisted not only on traditional grounds. The more progressive 
former in particular showed he preferred quality cattle to scrub cottle in quantity; 
sheep farming and cash-cropping had been more profitable in other areas, and 
95 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of Deportment of Agriculture and 
Economic Development, memorandum: 'Denudation, depopulation and 
destruction of native areas'. See also appendix B.7 below for an 
accurate assessment of 'cottle unit' density in African areas, and com-
parison of African and ad jacent white forming areas . 
96 Macmi ll an, p209 
97 For the traditional significance of cattle see J D Il. E J Krige, The realm of the 
rain queen; M Hunter, Reaction to conques t; and P & I Mayer, Tribesmen 
or townsmen. The evidence of J D Rheinallt-Jones and Prof R FA Hoemle 
to the NEC, 11 and 13 May 1931, is instructive on this point. 
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if cattle were kept in these areas, it was for the families' dairy needs only.98 
The premise here is not that cattle did not continue to have an over-
riding socio-economic and reI igious significance, but that whites had aFl equally 
selfish motive for perpetuating this tradition. The evidence of Fr Huss is 
particularly instructive on this since he was engaged in trying to start African 
farming co-operatives. Despite the success he achieved in No to I and the Transkei, 
the fear of interracial economic competition and persistent comp laints by farmers 
stymied the whole movement. 99 Even plans for food processing and leather goods 
were mooted, but came to nothing for the same reason. In this instance it was 
the manufacture rs who objected because labour in the reserves was cheaper and 
goods praduced thraugh African industry there would be sold at a bigger profit. 100 
Overstocking, overgrazing, or overpopulation and congestion - which 
was the greatest cause of deteriora tion in the reserves? The controversy is of 
prime concern to agricultural extension officers even today . But whatever the 
argument, the fact remains that despite growing numbers of people and stock, the 
land available to them was not increased at remotely the same rate. This is clear 
from the figures of population density in the reserves. The African population of 
the Union rose from over four million in 1911 to six and a half million in 1936. 
Of the total population, 49 per cent were de facto residents in the reserves in 
1916, according to the Beaumont estimates, and 44 per cent in 1936. 101 
This declining ratio of Africans in the reserves shows they were moving 
to white farms and urban areas . Yet despite this exodus the population density 
98 See NEC typescript evidence of Fr Huss and oral evidence of Marianhill 
mission and the Catholic African Union (D L Dopela, A F Matibela, SA F 
Oellerman and D Ntombela) 7 April 1931. Until further anthropological 
research on this aspect is available, this inference is necessarily tentative. 
99 See especially NEC typescript and oral evidence, E L Harries, Magistrate 
of Lady Frere, 23 January 1931, and typescript evidence of Fr Huss on the 
Marianhill people's bank; African farmers' associations such as Marianhi ll, 
Mariazell, Polela, Lourdes branch; co-operative societies such as Aliwal 
North, Qumbu, Kroonstad, Bethlehem; women's se lf-improvement associa-
tions. See also the agricultural textbook written by Fr Huss, Longmans, 
London, 1921, where he sets out his scheme for the organisation of co-
operatives. 
100 This was discussed at length by the Industrial Legislation Commission. 
See their report UG 37-35. 
101 See appendix B.7, and UG 32-4.6, pp 35 and 273. 
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in the reserves stood at 50.3 per square mile (2 269 000 souls) in 1916, and 57.2 
per square mile (2 962 400) in 1936 - an increase of no less than 14 per cent in 
20 years. This increase was even larger in Natal where the numbers in many 
102 
areas almost doubled. 
The reserves had an early saturation point too. Given that Beaumont's 
estimates in 1916 were calculated on the 1911 census returns, allowing for the 
natural increase of 2 per cent (the rate that Cousins set for whites in his report, 
which allegedly was much less than the increase among Africans), the saturotion 
point in the reserves would have been reached in just over 10 years - in 1921. 
Unfortuna te ly, for the sake of a last-minute economy, the govemment 
abandoned its projected 1931 African census and so there were no exact figures 
to expose the government's fallacy that the reserves as const ituted could meet 
the needs of Africans already settled there. 
The policymaker.; for the reserves had set themselves an impossib le task, 
it seems. tvladavo wrote: 
The demarcation of the Reserves, the ir extent and geographical 
position, came about independen tly of economic considerations, 
i. e. the size of the African population and its I ikel y growth, 
suitability of areas reserved for cropping and grazing. It was a 
historical and more pertinently, a political division whose 
arbiter.; were legally sheltered from interest group pressures. 103 
Other.; argued that it was misleading to compare the land qualitatively, especially 
as the African reserves fell in some of the best land in the country. Terms such as 
overpopulation or over.;tocking should not therefore be used in any absolute sense. 
Such terms, others countered, can only have meaning in relation to productivity 
of a particular people at a particular time. By the same taken, Hertzog's 
defenders said: other peaple could I ive well in the reserves at another time, with 
a different standard of living, using better agricultural methods. Those 17 million 
morgen could support 3 million people after all - especially if they just catered 
for their most basic needs. 
102 Union Year Book 22, p 986 analyses the annual average percentage increase 
in the Union's African population. Despite the rurol- urban migration, they 
show the population in the reserves ta have increased from 2.3 million in 
19 16 to 3 mill ion in 1936 - an average a nnual increase of 1.3 per cent. 
According to population census figures the total African population increased 
by 2.3 per cent a year between 1921 and 1936. See appendices B.8andB.l0. 
103 C E Madavo, 'Dualism in the South African economy ', unpub PhD thesis, 
Univer.;ity of Notre Dame, 1969, p 105. See also D Hobart Houghton, Some 
economic problems of the Bantu in South Africa, p 23ff. 
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This line of specula tion had little to do with the rural Africans in the 
Union in 1926. As Keyter argued, in the Southern Rhodesian context: 
the forces of expropriation and coercion form part of a genera I 
ensemble of direct and indirect pressures wh ich altered traditional 
agricultural practices and weakened the peasantry's subsistence 
base through a process of dissolution. 104 
He describes the dissolution that characterised African reserves as follows. 
Firstly, the disso lving impact of European crop production resulted in time in 
the Africans being unable to compete. Second, land shortage meant that 
farming had to be intensive; and wi thout capital intensive farming was impossible. 
Last, overstocking and overgraz ing undermined the qual ity of the stack and led 
in turn to a dec line in the number of stock held, even though in some places the 
b h . d • d 105 num ers may ave remarne constant or even rncrease • 
The process of dissolution made a vicious circle. Decl ining yields, 
overstacking, low prices, and overcrawding in some reserves - these produced 
a rising spiral of rural poverty which,in turn, led to Africans pledging their 
future crops and cattle to traders. This made for rising indebtedness which 
simply aggravated that poverty, and put pressure on the peasantry to offer their 
services as labourers. 106 Hence the labour migration for Africon men, os the 
only practicable way in which they could meet their cash needs. 
Th is movement of labour between the reserve economy and the modem 
economy became circulatory in nature and was referred to as migratory. 'This 
term takes its metaphor from birds in their seasonal exodus in search of the means 
of I ife.' Thus instead of migrating permanently to the modem economy, Africans 
from the reserves went there to work for several months, returning home for 
ploughing - hence Hobart Houghton's term 'men of two worlds'. 1 (JJ 
104 C F Keyter, '" Underdevelopment" and cheap labour suppl ies in Southern 
Rhodesia 1923- 1953' , African studies sem inar (University of the Witwaters-
rand, 4 July 1977) unpub paper, pp 7-11 
105 Ibid. Keyter' s remarks fit the pattern of dissolution in the Un ion reserves 
in the period prior to 1936. 
106 See also Arrighi; C Bundy, 'Emergence and decline of a South African 
peasan try', African Affairs, v 71, 285, October 1972, pp 369-388; 
Legassick; H Slater, 'The changing pattern of economic relations in rural 
Natal 1838-1914' in collected ICS papers on The societies of Southern 
Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries, v 3, pp 38-52. 
1(JJ D Hobart Houghton, 'Men of two worlds', SA Journal of Economics 28, 
September 1960, p 178. See also N Gordimer, 'The Witwatersrand: A 
time and tailings', Optima, March 1968, p 23, and Maclavo, p 103. 
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On the development and persistence of this migratory labour system 
Madavo wrote: 
Push and pull factors did develop. The marginal productivity of 
African labour was much higher in the context of rapid capitol 
formation and the availability of skilled white labour and 
enterprises in the modem economy . On the other hand the low 
productivity of labour in the reserves fell even further as antiquated 
techniques persisted in a situation of population pressures and soil 
erosion. While the centre of economic gravity had thus estoblished 
itself in the modem economy, that of the changing Africal social 
structure remained in the reserves. There were thus two networks 
of centrifuga l and centripetal forces. In add ition, the migratory 
labour system began to acquire a life style of its own with the 
passage of time . It become the expec ted behav iour on the part 
of the employers, employees and the govemment. In short, it 
became institutional ized. 108 
The institutionalisation of migratory labour was gradual. Its period of 
entrenchment in the mining sector can be traced to the accession to power of 
Hertzog's Poct government and their enactment in 1926 of the Mines and Works 
Act. After this date the mines shelved any further attempt to break the institutional 
constraints that kept Africans unskilled and wholly migrant. 109 From this time 
onwards they began to actively co-operate with the state in maintaining the migrant 
labour system which, they then insisted, was vital for sustained economic growth 
and development. 
The positive effects of the migrant labour system were always stressed. 
It saved the African from starvation. It relieved population pressure on the land. 
It enabled the African to maximise his income. And furthermore, it cushioned 
the impact of western civilisation by enabling the tribal African to preserve his 
traditional way of life. It also guaranteed maximum profitability in the mining 
108 Maclavo, p 105. On migrant labour see also R T Bell, 'Migrant labour 
theory and pol icy', SA Journal of Economics, March 1972; H Walpe, 
'Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: From segregation 
to apartheid', Economy and Society, v 1,4, November 1972, pp 425-456; 
Madava, pp 115-136; S T von der Horst, Native labour in South Africa, 
p 110ff; M Ballinger, 'The historical background to the migratory labour 
system in South Africa', Black Sash, June/July 1964. On mining contract 
crises over production costs and labour see F Wi Ison, Labour in the South 
African gold mines, and deta iled discussion below, chop 6. 
109 The mines mode their first attempt to bridge the gap between skilled and 
unskilled African labour just prior to the 1922 strike. The second major 
attempt was in 1946 when the Anglo-American Company tried j"a stabilise 
at least 10 per cent of the African labour force in the Free Stote mines. 
This move was foiled by the Notional party. See Madavo, p 107, and T 
Gregory, Ernest Oppenheimer and the economic development of Southern 
Africa, p 574 for detoils on why H F Verwoerd blocked this effort by Anglo-
American to stabili se its labour force. 
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sector, hence the toto I economy benefited. Th is was open ly acknowledged: 
The gold mining industry of the Witwatersrand has indeed been 
fortunate in hav ing secured for its unsk illed labour native peasants 
who have been prepared to come to the Witwa tersrand for periods 
of labour at compara t ively low rates of wages. Bu t for this fortunate 
circumstonce the indust ry cou ld not have reached its present stoge 
of development • • •• the results accruing from this cheap native 
labour supply have had a profoundly beneficia l influence upon the 
general economic deve lopment of the Union. 110 
The adequacy of African land and the interests of the white economy were 
closely linked. The a tt itude of capito l towa rds the stote's la nd policy was inter-
preted by Hobart Houghton in 1938 thus: 
The effort to praduce a plenti ful supply of cheap labour from the 
reserves for White capito lists is one which requires very nice 
judgement • • •• 
If the Reserves are too prosperous the supp ly wi i I not be forthcoming, 
if on the other hand, the economic screw has been tightened too 
much, the poverty in the Reserves wi ll •• • create a real problem 
for an influx of Natives whose efficiency is low and whose health 
is impaired by malnutrition will be an inevitoble burden on the 
European communi ty. 111 
Evidently in 1926 most whites mus t have felt that the economic screw needed 
tightening, to judge by the plans for whittling down on land for Africans. 
t-.Aoreover migrant labour was bad for land use and productivity in the 
reserves. But as with the questions of overstocking and congestion, once the 
reserves were seen as mere subsistence bases for the families of migrant worke rs, 
all matters of low or high yields lost their urgency. 
Figures of production per head collated by both Iv'ocm ilion 112 and 
the NEC 113 show that in practically no area in the reserves were the inhabitonts 
a s a whole able to produce enough food for the most elementory requirements 
of hea lth. The Mine Wage Commission's min imum requirement of 2.75 bags per 
110 Report of the Wi twa tersrand Mine Natives' Wage Commission 1943, 
UG 21-44, pp 70-71 
111 Hobart Houghton, p 14 
112 t-.Aocm ilion, pp 157- 161. In his sample survey of the Herschel district he 
compares the agricu ltura l census returns for 1918-1925 with the results of 
his fie ldwork in 1924 and 1925. On the basis of his research he is able 
to prove the census returns as 'wholly unrel iab le' for Herschel and by 
implication for the rest of the reserves . 
11 3 UG 22-32, annexure 1-14 
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annum (2 460 calories per head per day)114 was wel l above the averoge 
produced 15 years earl ier. The estimates of R W Thomton, Director of 
Agriculture to the NEC, allow only for mealie meal or kaffir com meal, and 
very little milk or meat. Lucas's comment on these estimates points to their 
effect: 
It is not surprising •.. that when a Native goes from the Reserves 
to work in Eurapean areas he is frequently nat adequately nourished 
to perform hard work and must be kept at light tasks and be well 
fed far some days ar even weeks before he can, without risking an 
outbreak of scurvy, be put to heavy work. It is also not surprising 
that the evidence showed that most Natives in the Reserves are in 
debt. 115 
This sart of evidence completely controdicted the argument af most 
whites that the rurol African with his 'primitive needs' could live comfortobly an 
whot the migrant remitted of his wages, together with whatever the land produced. 
But as Macmillan noted in 1930: 
in South Africa at the time there was a generol conscience-
comforting idee fixe that the Native is a lucky being, able to 
live on very little, working only when it su its him - passing 
I ightly between town house and country seat. 116 
It needed for more thon startling reports of a high incidence of infant mortality 
and malnutrition amongst Africans in the reserves to transcend white e'conomic 
interests. 
Macmillon set out to revise this view. Thus he showed that 'locations 
in Natal were heavily overpopulated, utterly dependent on wage-eaming outside, 
and grossly neglected'. This was probably true of most reserves acrass the 
country, with their lack of transport facilities, roads and bridges; their erosion 
as the soil was stripped of vegetation, and manure burnt as fuel; the primitive 
pastoral methods, which could nat possibly even feed the huge populations these 
lands had to bear; and lastly the lack of white interest sh own in them, so optly 
charoc terised by the fact that 'their position may be roughly gauged by a glance 
114 UG 21-44, p 11. See also UG 32-46, p 49 and table v. According to 
the chief magistrote of Umtata, 124 230 bags af maize were imported into 
the Tronskei in 1932 by roil; while the Mine Wage Commission 
estimated that at least 100 000 bags per annum were imported by road 
(quoted in UG 32-46, annexure xi, p 75). The Tronskei was described 
as the most fertile overall of all the reserves. 
115 UG 22-32, paro A59 
116 Macm illan, p 118 
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at a railway map which will show what areas the railways avoid. ,117 
Further, the net annual product of African agricul ture in the reserves 
118 in 1923 was put at about £7 500 000 by the EWe. On that basis SHerbert 
Frankel submitted : 
Assuming that the number of Natives between the ages of. 15 
and 50 occupied in agriculture was 1 500 000, it appears 
that the average income per occupied Native in these areas 
was about £5. This result is not as surprising as it seems when 
it is borne in mind that Professor Iv'ocm illan estimated the 
average size of an agricultural holding in the unsurveyed 
Native areas to be one morgen, and the consuming power per 
head of the papulation in the Reserves to be not mare than £3 
per annum; this amount including what was sent home in 
wages. 119 
The sign ificance of this low productivity is clearer 
when it is pointed out that the Na tive population in the reserves, 
and those who are merely be ing tied to wasteful farm service for 
part of the year outside the reserves, amounting to not less than 
3 000 000 people, are and have for years been just able to exist 
on what is avowedly an undernourished standard of I ife, having 
saved nothing and built up nothing, but on the contrary have 
denuded the soil. 120 
The very low production per head in 1930 was hardly a bulwark against 
anything but starvation. Land shortage was becoming more critical with each 
year of delay. With all that, the mass of African people had no defence against 
grave economic exploitation. 
117 Ibid, p 135. In contrast the '2NC reported : 'Since the date of the 
Report [T ransvaa I Indgeno/ R<lpat 1908], there has been a very cons ider-
able extension of railways in the country districts. In 1910 the open 
mileage of railway in the Union was 7 586 and at the end of March, 
1925, the mileage of Government-owned lines aggregated 11 528. 
There has been a further increase since then and the extension of railway 
facilities, together with the remarkable development in motor transport 
which has taken place since 1910, has had a great effect in removing 
some of the causes of (white) Nral backwardness.' 
118 Report of '2NC, UG 14-26; S H Frankel & E Brookes, 'Problems of 
economic inequality', in E Brookes et 01, Coming of age, p 159 
119 Ibid 
120 Ibid 
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Hertzog's land pol icy objectives reassessed 
So the evidence suggests that the Hertzog govemment was less concemed 
with land itself than with augmenting the labour supply through land legislation. 
The link between land and labour legislation is not a new idea. As Macmillan 
said at the time: 
'Many or most of the Bantu people are economically little more 
advanced than 100 years ago •... Yet, with little help from us, 
the Bantu millions have been called upon in the space of three 
generations or less to adapt themselves somehow or other to live 
on what may be put at a rough estimate as about one-fifth of 
the land they lately held, albeit in their own promiscuous woy.' 
In the face of this changed situation the one thoroughly consistent 
pol icy that he finds is 'to induce or indeed to put pressure on 
the Native population to supply labour for forms, mines and 
general industries'. 121 
He goes on to show haw successfu l this pol icy had been, and that' Natives come 
to look for work in towns not because they have come to like and choose it, but 
far more from sheer necessity, to avoid storvation on the land.'122 Bundy and 
various underdevelopment theorists have shown that early land legislation under-
mined the economic base and independence of the African peasantry. The 
findings of the NEC confi rm this. 123 The commission also showed conclusively 
thatearlier land laws forced Africans into the woge economy far more successfully 
than their planners had hoped. These land measures so restricted the economic 
development in the reserves that each year an increasing number of people were 
made landless, or so impoverished that they had to move into the urban areas and 
industrial and farming sectors to avoid 'starvation on the land'. This ever 
increasing influx of Africans from the reserves produced its own difficulties, 
leading to the view championed by Colonel Stallard that the urban areas were 
the creation of the white man, and 'surplus' or 'redundant' Africans from these. 
areas should be repatriated to the reserves, to be redirected to meet the labour 
d d · h' 124 eman s In t e primary sec tars. 
121 F Wilson & D Perrot, 'Land and poverty' (editorial), Outlook on a century, 
March 1925, p 286 
122 Ibid. See also Mac millan, chap 14. 
123 For references and explanation of concept see n 2.7 and Keyter, n 2.104-106. 
124 In a general questionnaire NEC 57/1, 'native migration' was thoroughly 
investigated under questions 17-19 (UG 22-32, annexure 6, p 252). 
Respondents who answered these questions almost always linked the 
existing land restrictions with the increased flow of labour from these 
areas. See also addendum paras 214-216, where the main points of 
these replies are summarised; chap 8 below; and appendix B.9. 
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In the 1920s, however, this was a minority view. Rodney Davenport 
writes: 
'Segregation', as a slogan, did not in itself define urban policy, 
for it left two courses of action open: either the strict implemen-
tation of the Stallard doctrine that in urban areas white men hod 
rights and block men hod none, or the partition of urban areos 
into parcels in which block men and white men hod separate 
rights. 125 
The second course was adopted. Local govemments could only deport Africans 
from the urbon areas 'who were habitually unemployed, those who hod no 
, 126 
honest livelihood, and those who were idle, dissolute, or disorderly'. In the 
remarks quoted earl ier Hertzog and Herbst were seen to have no intention of 
deviating from this course. The removal of Africans from the urPan areas to the 
reserves was not thought practicable at this time. 
This, however, did not apply to squatters in the so-called white rural 
areas. Hertzog was determined to solve the squatting problem once and for all. 
Here several factors are important. First, despite attempts to segregate Africans 
and stop squatting, especially on unoccupied white owned land, there were 
nearly two mill ion Africans I iving outside the areas scheduled for African occupa-
.tion in 1926. 127 The number of illegal squatters in these areas hod showed a 
steady increase over the years and continued to grow. This mode a mockery of 
the principle of territorial segregation. A comparison of the census figures for 
1911 and 1921 by Robertson shows the fallacy of segregation: 
This comparison shows no displacement of natives from European 
form lands, even in the provinces most affected by the 1913 Act; 
in fact, despite the exodus of natives owning stock which c'ould 
no longer be accommodated on the forms after 1913, so graphically 
and painfully described by the late Sol. T. Plaatje in his Native 
Life in South Africa despite the ravages of the influenza epidemic 
in 1918, the native population of the Free State increased from 
325 824 to 421 978 between the two censuses, and it was 
estimated at 528 400 in 1931. 128 
A comparison of Robertson's estimates with the 1936 census shows that more than 
50 per cent of the African population resided in the 'white areas'. There were 
in foct 635 000 in the 'white' rural and urban centres, as against 2 962 000 in 
125 T R H Davenport, 'African Townsmen? South African native (urban areas) 
legislotion through the years', African Affairs, v 68, 271, 1969, P 98 
126 Ibid, P 99 
127 For deto iled analysis of squatting see chops 4 ond 5. 
128 H M Robertson, p 151 
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the reserves as the following table shows: 129 
Table 2.7 RURAL AND URBAN AFRICAN POPULATION 1936 
RURAL 
African Outside Total URBAN Total 
areas African rural population 
areas 
Cape 1 446 000 380 000 1 826 000 219 000 2 045 000 
Transvaal 592 000 1 162 000 1 754 000 691 000 2 445 000 
Natal 904 000 522 000 1 426 000 128 000 1 554 000 
OF 5 20 000 429 000 449 000 104 000 553 000 
Un ion totol 2 962 000 2 493 000 5 455 000 1 142 000 6 597 000 
Margaret Ballinger interpreted the pol icy of underdevelopment in the 
reserves and the corresponding increase of Africans in the white sector thus: 
In spite of skilful window dressing propaganda, designed to 
justify the pol icy as an essential condition of the survival of 
white civilization, this was, and is, in effect, a cheap 
labour policy by which it was proposed to meet the demand 
for labour by the increase in the supply on conditions which 
would prevent any serious rise in the cost to the employer. 
In other words, by cutting the potential labourer off from 
ownership of or tenancy on land other than in areas too 
restricted to accommodate more than a fraction of the popu-
lation it sought to deprive him of any alternative means of 
I ivel ihood and thus to increase his dependence on employment 
in the labour market and his inability to bargain as to its 
terms. 130 
The idea that the ariginal land legislation was designed to solve the labour 
shortage was a recurring theme in African protest. For example, in 1928 
DDT Jabavu wrote: 
The secret but unmentioned purpose of the 1913 Land Act is 
to confine the black man within such circumscribed limits 
that he should never be territorially independent, but be 
compelled by intolerable congestion to go out of his habitat 
and seek labour with whites and thus constitute a never-
dying reservoir of cheap unskilled labour, especially for 
the farmers . 131 
129 UG 32-46 quoted in SA IRR, Our native reserves , p 1 
130 M Ballinger, 'Problems of farm labour shortage', unpub MS D70/80/1 3(j), 
Margoret Ballinger papers, UCT, p 4 
131 Jabavu, The segrega tion fallacy, p 41. For reosons why an urgent solution 
to the .Iabour problem was deemed necessary, see chap 5 below. 
The SANNC more than 10 years earl ier passed a resolution in similar vein: 
the ulterior object of the Government os well os the real desire 
of the white population of the country is:-
to deprive the Natives as a people of their freedom to acquire 
more lond in their own right. To restric t or I imit their right to 
barga in mutually on even terms for the occupation or settlement 
on land. To reduce by gradual process and by artificial means 
the Bantu people as a race to a status of permanent labourers or 
subordinates for all purposes and for all times with little or no 
freedom to sell their labour by bargaining on even terms wi th 
employers in the open market of labour either in the agricultural 
or industrial cen tres. 132 
If these assessments were correct, Hertzog, through his land pol icy, aimed to 
deprive the Africans of their land so as to force them onto the labour market as 
cheap labour. If, moreover, only a fraction of the tota l number af Africans were 
ta be accommodated in the reserves, the inference that can be drawn is that 
Hertzog's land pol icy was biased in favour of the forms and not the mines . A 
pol icy in the inte rests of the mines would have aimed at providing enough land 
in the reserves for African subsistence. The perpetuation of the migrant labour 
system would thus have been assured. The 1926 land proposals , with their 
reduced land allocation, restrictions and conditions, appear therefore to have 
favoured the farmers. 
In his 1926 report where the Secretary for Native Affa irs discussed the 
farm labour shortage, his comments add weight to this view. He adopted a 
placatory tone, quite unlike his warning to African dissidents,that the department 
would find it hard to keep even these lands scheduled for release. Judging by 
what was reportedly said at a conference convened for representatives of the 
farming industry, Herbst's warning was based on foct, for at that conference 27 
farming representatives had been called together 'with a view to the discussion 
of the preliminary draft of the Natives' Land Amendment Bill. The formers' 
objections were noted' - and Herbst went on to disclose 'that modifications have 
been effected in the draft in the I ight of the helpful criticism obtained from 
. ,133 
varying quarters. 
132 Karis & Carter, 'Resolu tion against the Natives' Land Act 1913 and the 
report of the Natives' Land Commission, by the South African Native 
No tional Congress', 2 October 1916, v I, doc 26, P 86 
133 UG 14-27, p 7 and Ca e Times, 28 November 1926. See also cl 6a, 
Natives' Land Act (1913 Amendment Bill. The Bill was drawn up and 
gazetted in 1926 : see Gazette Extraordinary, 23 July 1926. 
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The suggestion here is that in making it difficult, if not impossible, 
for Africans to acqu ire extra land, Hertzog showed he identified with the 
farmers ' fears that the release of that other land would exacerbate the alleged 
labour shortage in two ways: first, it would provide a haven for those squatters 
who refused to wo rk on white farms under the now more restrictive labour tenancy 
conditions; second, it was feared that once resettled in the reserves these farmer 
squatters would be lost to the white farmers as a source of labour. The reserve 
Africans' seasonal period co incided with that of their white counterparts and 
were therefore not available at the busiest time for farming. Reserve Africans 
had up to then served as the mines' main labour supply. 
Macmill an, in a unique study of the poverty and increasing impoverish-
ment of both Africans an d whites, considered Hertzog's segregation policy from 
another ang le . Hertzog's segregation solution, he believed, was an attempt also 
ta solve the poor white problem. Hence the promotion of the idea of Africans 
'developing along the ir own lines'. Considered in this light, Macm ilion claimed 
in 1929, 
nothing abashed by facts, to which, indeed, it turns a bl ind eye, 
and with the confidence of ignorance, a good deal of South African 
opinion takes refuge in ca tchwords and slogans as a substitute for 
hard thinking. Even far a good many high minded altruists 'segrega-
tion ' has an appeal. Natives are to be free ta develop 'on their own 
lines' in the Reserves which, it is sa id, they now so pitiably abuse. 
With the best will in the world many South Africans see only the 
desperate pi ight of the ir own kith and kin, the Poor Whites, and the 
devastating effect of their exposure to competition with poor blacks 
for unskilled employment. In desperation they look to measures 
designed to keep the races apart 'as far as possible' ... they contrive 
to shut their eyes, with the rest of the electorate to the truth even 
about the land, satisfied in their own minds that there is quite enough 
land, 'if it were praperly used', and nothing ta prevent Natives 
I iving their own separate I ives if they would. 134 
The fear of inter-racial competition in the towns was not the main influence on 
Hertzog's land policy. In the 1920, a far more predominant theme was still the 
'back to the land' policy advocated by some Nationalists as the best solution 
to the poor white problem. 135 By evicting squatters, many c laimed, land would 
become available for the resettlement of poor whites and the depopulation of 
the rural areas would thereby be checked. In some respects these views were 
endorsed by the EWC. They may have done so as a counter to the growing 
134 Mac millan, p 131 
135 The 'back to the land' policy and various views on its efficacy are 
discussed in detail in chop 7 below. 
99 
support for the Stallord doctrine ond the 'civilised lobour policy'; or becouse, 
ofter their extensive investigotion of the ploce of poor whites in agriculture, 
they recognised the merit in giving them some security on the land. Whatever 
their motive, they pronounced unequivocally in 1925: 
We wish to record our own conviction that the chief need is to 
check the dra in from the lond at the source, by making it poss ible 
for the ogriculturalists, who become 'Poor Whites ' when they are 
detached from the land, to continue to eam a livelihood in 
agricul ture. 136 
They elaborated on how this could be achieved: 
It is necessary, therefore, to provide for assistance in obtaining 
holdings. The existing scheme of the Department of Lands, which 
enables an intending occupier to obto in an advance for the purchase 
of his form, repayable over a term of years, is capable of extended 
appl ication. In districts I ike the Eastem Free Sta te, distinguished 
by the progress ive character of its agriculture, there is a great 
unsatisfied demand for holdings of their own on the part of the farm 
overseers and bywoners. In one case, the offer of twelve holdings 
by the Land Board attracted over 800 appl icants, the majority of 
whom were the type of appl icant that the scheme is intended to 
assist. In the Free State aga in, the entire funds appropriated to 
assist land purchase during the current financiol year were exhausted 
before half the year hod elapsed. The easier terms introduced in 
the present year, by which initial payment required from the intend-
ing purchaser was reduced from a fifth to a tenth of the purchase 
money and the subsequent annual instalments spread over 40 instead 
of 20 years, appear to have brought purchase of holdings for them-
selves within the reach of practical agriculturalists who could not 
consider it before. It would appear necessary, however, to supple-
ment purchase by provision for tenancy as well as ownership. 137 
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The questionnaire sent out by the Clay Commission in 1925 suggests that 
they were also looking for more land to distribute. The sort of area the government 
had in mind is suggested by the responses elicited from the major land companies, 
for example, that of the SA Land & Exploration Company: 
Native tenants are not desired by my Company, but as it is generally 
understood that the Native Affairs Department is anxious that notives 
should not be evicted, as there is not sufficient accommodation for 
them elsewhere, they have been allowed to remain. 
The Company, however, is always anxious to sell to white men, if 
possible, and it is not influenced in its negotiations by the fact that 
it may be receiving rents from native squatters on any particular 
farm. The land is not formally leased to the natives and my Company 
does not accept service in lieu of rent, or payment in kind. 138 
136 Report of the EWC 1925 (the Clay Commission), UG 14-26, p 113 
137 Ibid 
138 Ibid, P 367. See also their accompanying chart for detai ls of land 
company oreas in the Transvaal leased or purchased by whites, 
appendix B. 10 below. See chap 4, p 155. 
How the objections to the 'generous allocations' of land to Africans 
were met has already been sketched. The areas were changed and reduced. 
The gavernment had shawn itself willing to compromise on the land issue to 
make it more palatable to whites. 
Tatz argues from a very different premise. Central to his thesis is 
the argument that 'to a great extent the Land Bill was to be additional compen-
sation - the granting of the "substance" of land for the '~hadaw" of the vote.' 139 
In his evaluation of the Natives' Land Act (1913) Amendment Bill tabled in 1926, 
Tatz says this was 
first an attempt to further and make final the principle of territorial 
segregation; secondly, it was to be the whole basis of what was 
later called the 'Bantustan' concept: the separate areas for the 
different races in which the parallel institutions of African councils 
would be an indispensable method of providing Africans with some 
outlet for their political ambitions; thirdly, it was to be the major 
inducement to Africans voluntarily to surrender their entrenched 
franchise . 140 
The link in Tatz's interpretation on the land and franchise questions as 
suggested in the title of his book - Shadow and substance - is based presumably 
on Hertzog's rationalisation that 'the "shadow" of the vote, the snare, hypocrisy 
and "Nessus-Shirt", was to be replaced by the solid "substance" of the land, 
forever a burning economic question in African life'; as well as on Hertzog's 
strategy in using the land question as a 'convenient bargaining point: a major 
grant of land rights in exchange for the surrender of the vote.' 141 
Tatz's interpretation is the basis for later analyses of South I>frica's 
race pol icies. 142 Although there have been other interpretations recently, 143 
Tatz's basic view of the land and franchise link remains unchallenged. 
139 Tatz, p 77 
140 Ibid, p 48, and p 85 where these premises are repeated. 
141 Ibid, p 15. Traditionally, South Africa's race policies are seen to be 
evolutionary . Hertzog is acclaimed as being the spiritual father of the 
segregation policy. This evolutionary, lineal trend is the theme running 
throughout Tatz's thesis. 
142 Ibid 
143 The most significant challenge has come from writers who criticise Tatz 
for omitting any reference to the relationship between the land question 
and Hertzog's urban areas pol icy, notably Davenport (see Bibl iography). 
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His thesis however merely under! ines the distortions in Hertzog's 
explorPtion of his own policy, for it is much more likely thot, by linking the 
land and franchise Bills, Hertzog was trying to present as an advantage to 
Africans something he really intended to be of prime benefit to white farmers. 
This argument presupposes that Hertzog's policy stotements are less 
than reliable. Our examination of the actual draft Land Bills tabled in 1926 
and again revised in 1929 revealed: Hertzog had in fact abandoned the idea 
of removing all illegal residents in the white rural areas to the reserves. 
Secondly, the segregation ideal - Tatz's 'Bantustan' concept - hod no validity 
except perhops as a ploy in political rhetoric: whites rejected any suggestion 
that the reserves be developed or conserved. Again, the promise of extra land 
may have been a sop to white opinion. But since Hertzog was not in fact 
offering the Africans an ioto of the 'substonce' promised in 1913, his pol icy 
could not possibly have been even a slight inducement to Africans to surrender 
their entrenched franchise rights voluntarily - let alone a major inducement as 
Tatz suggests Hertzog had hoped it would be. The reduced land grants therefore 
had no value as a bargaining counter. In any event, Hertzog had resorted to 
other means of reducing and devaluing the franchise. In this sense the immediate 
threat to white supremacy had been averted. 
From the Africans' side, Hertzog's pol icy statement welded Africans 
north and south of the Orange River into a vocal and cohesive opposition acting 
solidly together as they had not done previously, not even in 1913 when land 
segregation was first instituted. 
What Hertzog wanted, and what helped shape his segregation pol icy, 
was the sort of scheme found in the ex- Boer republics and implemented contem-
poraneously in the OFS. Why then did he keep up the myth of segregation? 
Several possible motives and contingent confl icting needs of the different groups 
and sectors have been suggested in the course of discussion thus far. These, and 
the solution adopted by Hertzog to accommodate the apparently conflicting 
sectional needs and demands, form the basis of the analysis that follows. 
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3 THE SEGREGATION IDEAL: 
A POLICY OF RETRIBALISATION 
Problems arising out of the Botha/Smuts pol icies 
Hertzog's odministrative solution 
Legislation by executive decree 
Implicotions of Hertzog's resolution 
a For different groups: 
Retribalisation in the interests of whites 
The chiefs and the pol icy of retribal isation 
Africans on the receiving end, and their reaction 
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The administrotive bible - an official view of the 1927 Act 
b Afrikaner national ist ideol ogy 
c Social consequences - African land shortage ond urbanisation 
In redefining the Union's 'na tive policy ' , Hertzog also planned its 
odministration. l Addressing his Malmesbury constituents in 1925 he argued for a 
'difference in treatment of Natives and Europeans' which he explained thus: 
There is a difference in noture, habits, development and civilisation 
and th is will long continue, and in proportion to that difference 
there will necessarily be a difference in requirements, which will 
call for differential treatment - not only as regards legislation but 
a lso in administrotion. 2 
By 1933 Hertzog hod set up a complete parallel administration for 
African affairs. Departmental jobs proliferoted and so did the number of separate 
and discriminatory measures for controlling Africans. The portfolio of Native 
Affairs, fused with that of the Prime Minister since 1914, was separated again in 
1926. With this change the personnel increased and their status and tasks were 
all redefined. These changes herolded a new era in African administration, and 
the department itself was well on the way to becoming the imperium in imperio it 
. do 3 IS to y. 
But possibly the most significant development in .A·frican administration 
during Hertzog's time in office was the Native Administration Act of 1927. 4 
104 
This Act was the first breakthrough towards uniformity in African affairs, something 
Hertzog's predecessors had been unable to achieve . The problems facing the 
Hertzog government after failure of the Botha-Smuts policies will be examined in 
the first section of this chapter. 
Hertzog's administrative solution was important in other ways besides. 
It began to reverse the assimilationist trend of gradually accepting urban .Africans 
into western industrialised society. Uniformity was the keynote in the changes it 
See Brookes, The history of native pol icy •.. and The colour problems of South 
Africa; Brookes et 01; A S Griffiths, 'The development of native policy in the 
Transkei and Glen Grey between 1870 and 1900', unpub W thesis, UNISA, 
1939; Handbook, chaps 3 and 4; W J G Mears, 'A study in native administra-
tion: The Transkeian territories 1894-1943', unpub PhD thesis, UNISA, 1947; 
Rogers; J R Sullivan, The native policy of Sir Theophilus Shepstone; A van 
Lille, The native council system with special reference to the Transvaal local 
councils; F Wolfson, 'Some aspects of native administration in Natal under 
Theophilus Shepstone, Secretary for Native Affairs 1857-1875', unpub MA 
thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1946; E R Garthorne, The appl ication 
of native law in the Transvaal; D Welsh, The roots of segregation 1845-1910 
and 'The cultural dimension ..• ', pp 35-53; and H J Simons, 'The law and its 
administration', Handbook, chap 4, pp 41-108. 
2 J B M Hertzog , The segregation problem, p II 
3 E G Jansen, MP for Vryheid, was appointed Minister of Native Affairs in 1926. 
For staff changes, see NAD report 1922-1926, UG 14-27, pl. For changes 
in stotus of various officials, see Native Administration Act 38/1927, chap I. 
4 Act 38 of 1927, amended by Act 9 of 1929 
made in government, such as in establishing adm inistrative courts and delegating 
wide legislative authority to the executive . It limited the power of the courts to 
intervene and set aside judgements of the Governor-General whose discretionary 
authority over all Africans was greatly extended under the 1927 Act. We shall 
study these and other changes in the second section . 
The 1927 Act and the administrative system it represents can be seen 
from yet another angle . It was the first link in a chain of measures leading to the 
refurbishing of African traditionalism, with the emphasis on ethnic and cultural 
separatism. The impl ications of the Hertzog solu t ion for various groups will be 
studied in the last sec t ian. We shall focus on how the administrative system was 
designed to articulate and reinforce the interests of social classes; how it was 
made so as to preserve the cultural differences and inequal ities in status of the 
African and white groups; and how the system gave the segregationists their 
ideological inspiration. 
In evaluating the Hertzag ministry's administrative policy in these terms, 
the discussion rests a good deal an the government's preoccupation with uniformity 
and their insistence on it in all aspects of African affairs. Why this stress on 
uniformity should have been so great is therefore one of the first questions to be 
answered . 
Problems arising out of the Botha/Smuts policies 
A basic contention here is that the Appeal Court rul ing in the cases of 
Thompson v Kama and Stilwell v Kama,5which declared the 1913 Natives' Land Act 
ultra vires in the Cape, confirmed Hertzog in his decision that the Cape franchise, 
as it then was, had to go . As we shall show, this rul ing had thwarted earl ier plans 
by Botha and Smuts to reform the administrat ion on a uniform basis. 
In 1917 Botha introduced the Na t ive Administration Bill. It was designed 
to turn the principle of segregation, laid down in 1913, in to reality; it defined 
the demarcated areas to be released and added to those scheduled in 1913. 
5 Thompson v Kama and Stilwell v Kama were heard as a single case, 1916 EDL 
319 and 1917 AD. The judgement of Justice Solomon (Chief Justice of South 
Africa) and Justice Juta is also fully reported in the Report of the Select Com-
mittee on the Native Administration Bill 1917, SC 6a-17, append ix C, pp xi-
xxx. 
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In this way the division of the Union into 'native' and 'non-no tive' areas was to 
be finalised. The Bill introduced a separate administrotion system for these 
separate areas, and os Brookes noted, '011 institutionol arrangements of the Bill 
hung on the principle of territorial segregotion . ,6 Overall, it was an ottempt to 
hormonise the various systems of Africon administration inherited by the time of 
Union by introducing a system of administrative uniformity in the rural 'native' 
areas. 
When the 1917 Bill was drafted and tabled there was no reason for the 
government to think that a uniform system in the segregated areas could not be 
achieved. The 1913 Natives' Land Act had been in operation throughout the 
Un ion from the time it was passed. 
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The oppl icabil ity of the land restrictions under section 1 (2) of the 1913 
Ac? had been tested in the Eastern Cape Division, and the court had confirmed 
their general extension to the Cape. This ruling was given shortly before the 1917 
Native Administration Bill was tabled. 
During the debate Morr is Alexander referred to this ruling and pointed 
out that 
the resul t of the measure is going to deprive the Natives of the 
franchise. If this is to be done let it be done straightforwardly and 
not by a side issue. 8 
He based his assertion on the fact that the lower court had shown ' that the saving 
clause 8(2)9 in the Principal Act had failed to protect the voting rights of all Cape ' 
Africans. 
Alexander was correct here . Since Chief Kama was already a registered 
voter, as far as the court was concerned his franchise rights were not being preju-
diced by preventing the land transaction between himself and Thompson and Stilwell 
from taking place. They therefore declared the transaction null and void ab initio 
6 Brookes, The history of native policy ... , p 164 
7 This section mode it illegal for anyone other than an African to acquire land 
or an interest in land in a scheduled 'native' area. 
8 Cope Times, 20 April 1917 
9 Clause 8(2) enacted that' Nothing in this Act contained which imposes restric-
tions upon the acquisition l>y any person of land, or righ ts , thereto, interests 
therein, or servitudes thereover, shall be in force in the Province of the Cape 
of Good Hope, if and for so long as such person would by such restrictions be 
prevented from acquiring , or holding, a qualification whereunder he is or moy 
become entitled to be registered as a voter at Parliamentary elections in any 
electorol division in the said Province.' 
under section 1 (2) of the 1913 Act. This section hod mode it illegol for whites to 
get a vested interest in land scheduled as a 'native' area. The court's construction 
in effect meant that the law would judge each individuol case on its merits where 
there was a dispute over land or interests in land in the Cape between the two 
race groups. 
Kama disputed the ruling that he could not raise a bond on his property, 
and he lodged an appeal against the court's decision. The case was heard by Chief 
Justice Solomon and Justice Juta of the Appellate Divisian, and his appeal was 
upheld . 10 
According to Solomon - and Juta agreed - the exemption clause appl ied 
to all Africans in the Cope, whether they were potential or registered voters. The 
land restrictions diminished the rights of these voters, in his view, and so were 
'contrary to the spirit though not to the letter of section thirty-five of the South 
Africa Act'. 11 He argued that one of the objects the legislature had in inserting 
the exemption clause into the 1913 Act 'must have been to protect the franchise 
rights of the Natives in the Cape Province'. 12 He concluded: 
if the Natives can by such a law as this be deprived of the right of 
acquiring the occupation qual ification, there is no reason why their 
franchise rights should nat be further whittled away by other laws 
passed in disregard of the safeguards laid down in section thirty-five 
of the South Africa Act. 13 
This interpretation of clause 8(2) led Solomon to find that 
until or unless the occupation qualification was repealed it follows 
that the restriction placed by section one(2) upon the acquisition by 
a person other than a native of land in a scheduled area is not in 
force in the Cape Province. 14 
His construction then led to the Natives' Land Act of 1913 being declared ultra 
vires in the Cape in lVIay 1917. 
The court's verdict was announced two weeks after a Select Committee on 
the 1917 Bill had started work. It was only then, therefore, that the Committee 
acknowledged that the court's rul ing might have legal implications for the Bill as 
10 The AD case had been noted but not heard when the Nntive Administration 
Bill passed its second reading and was sent to a Select Committee which 
began its del iberat ions on 24 April 1917. 
11 SC6a-17,pxxiv 
12 Ibid, pxv 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid, p xxiv 
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well. On 25 May 1917, therefore, E L Motthews was called in as law odviser to 
give evidence befare the Select Cammittee. 15 
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Matthews looked at the saving clause 28(2) in the 1917 Bill 16 and decided 
it had precisely the same effect as section 8(2) of the 1913 Act - that is, it noted 
the existence of the voting qual ifications of Cape Africans and saught to protect 
them. He therefore agreed with Solomon and Juta that 
it was the in tention of the Legislature that Natives should not, 
except as prescribed, lose by a law in one form rights which they 
could on ly have lost by a law passed in another form 17 
and a lso with their decision that 
the restrictive provis ions of the Act are to have no operation in the 
Cape so long as the occupation quol ification continued in that 
Province. 18 
Motthews said the only alternative would be for Parliament ta enact 'a new franchise 
law which will allow of their application.' 19 This meant removing the Cape African 
franchise. Does this explain why the 1917 Bill was withdrawn? 
The Minister closest to the Bill, F S Malan, first 'defended the principle 
of territorial segregation as the only possible way of arriving at 0 uniform Native 
. 20 pol,cy'. But, say~ Kallaway, he then supported the Bill's withdrawal 'portly 
15 The full text of E L Motthews' opinion is set out in a memorandum 'on certain 
provisions of the Native Administration Bill', 28 Moy 1917, SC 60-17, 
appendix B, pp iv-xi. 
16 Subsection 28(2) of the Native Administration Bill reads: 'Nothing in this 
Act contained sholl be construed as modifying any provision of section ~­
five of the South Africa Act 1909 .... ' 
17 SC 60-17, p vii. It presents an interesting legal problem, for this interpreta-
tion was obviously ignored in the drafting of other laws. J F Herbst refers to 
this in 1930 in saying 'that legislation prescribing franchise qualifications is 
what is contemplated under the South Africa Act and not any law which does 
not purport to deal with electora l qualifications even if it does happen indirect-
ly to affect individuals in their efforts to qualify for the franchise. To hold 
otherwise would be to pronounce a vast amount of legislation already on the 
statute book as ultra vires: e.g., the South Africa Defence Act, No 13 of 
1912; the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, No 21 of 1923; the Native Adminis-
tration Act, No 38 of 1927.' See 'Memorandum by Secretary for Native 
Affairs on c hapter 3 of the Native Trust and Land Bill' in Reports and proceed-
ings of the Joint Committee on Native and Coloured Persons 1930-1934 
(supplement to Joint Committee 1-35) (JSC 1-35), appendix B, p 121. 
18 SC 60-17, p vii 
19 Ibid 
20 P Kallaway, 'F SMolan, the Cope liberal tradition and South African 
politics 1908-1924', Journal of African History, v 15, 1, 1974, p 118 
because it confl icted with the entrenched clouse in South Africa's constitution, 
the South Africa Act. ,21 Kallawayelaborates: 
Unlike Hertzog however, Malon did not have a 'dual motive' in 
mind when supporting this legislation, ie territorial and political 
segregation. For better or for worse, Molan wishedt;)keep the 
franchise issue separate and sacrosanct. 22 
Tatz says much the some : 
In view of the eno.mous difficulties of which the franchise problem 
wos probobly ()f the greatest influence, the government withdrew 
the Bill complete ly after the Select Committee's Report. 23 
Brookes suggests a second reason for the Bill's withdrawal: the Bill 
'foundered on the rock of its land distribution provisions'. 24 He commented 
perceptively at the time: 
Never was there a more striking illustration of what the South 
African attitude towards segregation really means. Lip-service to 
the principle was occompan ied by a total unwillingness to face the 
sacrifice of detoil involved. Many a man is elected as a segrega-
tionist, who would be rejected with contumely did he fight the 
election on the plank of more land for Natives in his own constitu-
ency. 25 
A perusal of the evidence from whites before the 1917 Select Committee confirms 
Brookes's contention. Their rejection of the Beaumont recommendations led the 
Select Committee to propose the appointment of local committees to revise the 
Beaumont schedule. Even when the local committee recommendations the next 
year reduced the areas to be released by some 2 000 000 morgen, these too were 
found unacceptable~6and the new schedules were rejected by Africans and whites. 
21 Ibid, P 119 
22 Ibid, P 118 
23 Tatz, p 34 
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24 Brookes, The history of native policy. '" p 144. A Smurthwaite, 'The policy 
of the Smuts government towards Africans 1919-1924', unpub MA thesis, 
UNISA, 1975, P 24 suggests that the Notive Affairs Act was directed more 
towards the Cope tradition ' as on attempt to prevent further gains for the 
Notionalists and to maintain Unianist suppart in the post war years'. Kallaway 
argues that it was 'a humane native policy, in keeping with the spirit of 
Versailles'. He sees the South African mandate, the Rhadesian question, and 
the possible inc lusian of the protectorates as further reasans for the more 
'liberal' policy adopted. All these are impartant but do not explain why the 
Native Affairs Act deviated from the policy principle of territorial separation 
which Kallaway concedes F S Malan supported. 
25 Brookes, The colour problems ... , p 58 
26 See chap 2, pp 74-77. 
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The land and franchise questions were thus important reasons for the Bill's 
withdrawal. Yet neither explain why the administrative provisions in the 1917 Bill 
also came to naught. Matthews' interpretation suggests a third reoson: if the 1917 
Bill had been passed without first abolishing the Cape franchise and/or deleting 
the saving clause 28(2), then as well as the restrictive clauses under the 1913 Pet 
becoming inoperative, so would the clauses allow ing the Governor-General-in-
C '1 I . I b I .., ., 27 ounci to egis ate y prac amatlon In native areas. 
Legislation by proclamation was an important e lement of the new adminis-
trative policy under the 1917 Bill, and its inoperation in the Cape would be another 
blow to uniformity. Matthews was explic it on the point . He explained the legal 
impl icotions of extending legislation by proclamation to the Cope in these words: 
the Government might by proclamation in a Native area destroy 
those very rights of persons resident therein which are entrenched 
by section thirty-five of the South ,Africa Pct; and might do this 
by enocting res tric t ive legislation as to the occupat ion of land. 28 
In that case, he said, 
the Government might under the Bill have greater power than 
Parliament, and Parliament might endow the Government with 
powers that Parliament itse lf does not possess. 29 
So, the 1917 Bill might give the government such power that it could whittle away 
the franchise rights from Africans that were entrenched in the South ,Africa ,Act. 30 
With the Bill's provision to empower the government to rule by executive decree, 
there seemed even more reason for withdrawing the 1917 Bill. 
Furthermore, clauses such as those for legislation by proclamation 31 and 
the new judicial system 32 with special African courts presupposed the prior defini-
tion of scheduled reserves. As E E Dower, Secretary for Native Pffairs, explained 
to the Select Committee : 'If the schedule is carried as it stands every native area 
27 SC 60-17, appendix B, p v 
28 Ibid, p ix 
29 Ibid 
30 See Chief Justice Solomon 's interpretation cited above p 107, n 3.1 3. 
31 Section 8 deals with government by proclamation in defin ite 'native' areas. 
See E E Dower's evidence, SC 60-17, paras 30-106 for detailed analysis. 
32 Section 9 deals with the proposed judicial system. See E E Dower 's 
evidence, SC 60-17, poras 106-119. 
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in the country would ipso facto, fall under this law. ,33 He conceded, though, 
that whites in these areas would object and that to have to administer some of the 
smaller scottered 'native ' areas would give rise to complications. These peoples 
and areas could be catered for, he said, by having 'two separate schedules of areas' 
and by amending sections 8 and 9 to suit the change. 34 
By the Committee's response to these suggestions, they were well aware 
of the complications. 35 After the 1917 Bill, the fact thot no area could be 
defined by stotute in the Cape must have finally persuaded the Committee to 
recommend the withdrawal not only of the contentious schedule but the admin is-
trative provisions too. 
So the 1917 ruling that the 1913 Act did not apply to the Cape made a 
Bill of uniformity impossible. At the same time the failure to define the 'native' 
areas in the other three Provinces put paid to introducing some of the administrative 
provisions of the 1917 Bill, the establishment of an advisory body, for example, to 
decide on matters affecting the defined 'native' areas; or the creation of a 
separate judicial system; or legislation by proclamation. The government was 
forced to accept that until African areas had been settled once and for all, the 
administrative provisions would have been hard, if not impossible, to execute. 
Presumably these were also the reasons why only those parts of the 1917 
Bill that did not depend on defined African areas were reintroduced in 1920 under 
the Native Affairs Act. A comparison of the 1917 Bill and the 1920 Act suggests 
this. The NAC constituted under the 1920 Act was to advise on all matters affecting 
Africans, not only on those related to 'native' areas as provided for under the 1917 
Bill. The local councils, although still confined to 'native' areas, were in 1920 
to be complemented by a new provision (clause 16) for summoning a national 
NativesConference. Of these Conferences Brookes said at the time that they 'may 
eventually be evolved into institutions which will represent Natives as a whole 
rather than the inhabitants of Native areas. ,36 Lastly, the administrative arrange-
ments under the 1917 Bill disappear entirely from the Act of 1920. 
33 5C60-17, para 92 
34 Ibid 
35 The evidence of j B Maffat, Chief Magistrate of the Transkei, is also of 
interest. He said that under the extant system of legislation by proclamation 
in the Transkei, proclamations applied to 'the whole of the Transkeian Terri-
tories, and they apply to European areas also'. He added that the system hod 
worked well, 'although occasionally you hear of people grumbl ing.' 5C 60-17, 
para 3639. 
36 Brookes, The history of native policy .•. , p 144, and see pp 142-145. 
In all these respects the 1920 Act shows the govemment's administrative 
pol icy had moved away from a system confined to the segregated areas. Smuts 
was the first to admit thi s and that the earlier policy had failed. Introducing the 
Native Affairs Bill in 1920 he added: 
nine years ago our programme laid down that the Natives should not 
become a party question, that we should secure for the Natives their 
natural and distinct development as opposed to merely Europeanising 
them, and that all grounds for future discord between White and 
Black should be avoided. We have succeeded in the first; we have 
failed lamentabl y in the other two aspects. 37 
In fact, statements during the 1920 debate show that the opposition felt the SAP 
had failed in their first aim as well. 
Smuts's 1920 Native Affairs Act, though welcomed by African leaders 
as a real step away from 'native' areas and hence territorial segregation, 38 was 
denounced by Smuts's opponents. Smuts was accused of betraying the ideal of 
segregat ion. The MP for Waterberg, P W Ie Roux van Niekerk, opposed the 
measure 'omtrent die niet deurgaan van die wet omtrent demarkatie van areas vir 
die Kaffers'. 39 He was supported by A S van Hees, MP for Christiana, 
on the ground that it said not a word about segregation, that it paid 
no regard to the interests of the white man, that its ultimate effect 
would be to extend the franchise to the Native. 40 
The conclusion drawn by many Nationalists was that the Act represented 
the abandonment of the segregation policy. And Hertzog agreed . He criticised 
the Bill because' it did not go far enough. Native areas', he said, 'ought to be 
defined as soon as possible. ,41 To him, a general segregation policy basically 
meant territorial segregation, and this had not been achieved. 
Failure to define the reserves doomed the SAP's administrative policy in 
1917. Under the 1920 Act segregation had been dropped as unworkable, although 
'much lip-loyalty' continued in favour of separation. 
37 Cape Times, 27 May 1920. For a detailed discussion on the Native Affairs 
Act see Smurthwaite, pp 53-74, and Ka II away . 
38 See Jabavu, The black problem, p 23. According to Walshe (pp 101-102), 
the Cape Congress at first opposed the measure strongly, seeing it as a con-
cession to pol itical segregation. Otherwise African reaction was favourab le 
on the whole. 
39 Die Burger, 29 May 1920 quoted by Smurthwaite, p 65 
40 Cape Times, 14 July 1920 
41 Ibid,9Julyl920 
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On balance it can be sa id that it was the saving clause 8(2) af the 1913 
Act and 28(2) of the 1917 Bill that thwarted the SAP's plans to impose a uniform 
policy throughout the Union. Hertzog, described as 'a meticulous and pedantic 
lawyer', 42wos on the 1917 Select Committee . The for-reaching implications of 
Matthews' judgement cou ld not have escaped him. This could be partly why 
Hertzog refused to consider extending the meagre political rights of Cape Africans 
to others up north; also why he decided to despoil the Cape Africans of the few 
rights they still had. Far him and his supporters, abolition of the Cape franchise 
went hand in hand with the introduction of a uniform policy of segregation and 
not least its administrative aspects. 
Hertzog's odministrative solu tion 
The disunity in African administration was a legacy of the past. Each of 
the four pre-Union stotes had a social structure of its own, and in each the adminis-
trations hod evolved to su it the local scene. Thus the Cape had always worked 
towards breaking the tribal system and the chiefs' authority. Originally it was 
done in the nOme of peaceful assimilation on a war-tom frontier. Later it was 
seen as a good way of moving Africans into the labour market. Natol did the very 
opposite. There the tribal structure was kept as far as possible, along with 'native' 
law and custom. Administration depended on the autharity af parents and chiefs, 
and the chiefs were expected to co-operate in getting their people to labour for 
whites. The Transvaal and OFS both had a blatont mas ter-servant system, and the 
admin istration of Africans there was geared to preserve this relationship. 
The new administrative policy under Hertzog in 1927 cut across the 
assimilationist trends of the Cape and was rejected by progressive African leaders. 
The change was basically back to tribalisation - a radical break from the line 
taken by Herbst's predecessor, E E Barrett. Unlike Barrett, Herbst championed 
42 0 Pirow, Hertzog, p 141. T Dunbar Moodie writes (The rise of Afrikanerdom: 
Power, apartheid, and the Afrikaner civil re l igion, pp 122-123): 'Throughout 
his pol itica l career he saw his real vocation as the passage of legisl ation which 
embodied his principles. Where there was doubt in interpretation of a law, 
his most ready response was to draft more legislation'; and' Needless to say, 
Hertzag was remarkably consistent in matters of principle. Indeed, his over-
riding concern was to ensure that his principles be entrenched in legislation . 
Interpretation and practical application of the law interested him little.' 
H Nicholls, South Africa in my time, pp 193-196 endorses this view. While 
the numerous Amending Acts, passed to close legislative loopholes, are ample 
testimony too. 
43 
the idea of uniformity regardless of the Cape. 
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At the 1926 Natives Conference convened to discuss the Native Admin'is-
tration Bill, Herbst declared: 
He was not going to be such a hypocrite as to say that the Bill was a 
palatable measure. The de legates from the Cape Province would say 
that they got a fresh shock every year, but it was in that Province 
that there existed the greatest need for such a measure .. . . 44 
like Hertzog, he held that the Cape system impeded uniformity and he wanted 
major reforms in African administration. 
Besides, an administrative system along tribal lines was beginning to gain 
favour from about the mid-1920s. The government's view is clear from twa reports 
- the NAD report 1922-1926 and the NEC report tabled in 1932. Both reveal a 
departmental bias aga inst grawing detribal isation. NA D men wanted a pol icy to 
stop the tribal system breaking up. As Herbst claimed in 1926: 
With the native people as a whole at their present stage of develop-
ment, the tribal system and native law, under proper administration, 
appears to be the most efficient machinery of government in definitely 
native areas. 45 
So Natal traditionalism outbid the Cape system, described thus: 
The weaken ing of tribal control without correlative advance in 
individual responsibility [has meant that] tribal rule has to some 
extent and in certain areas been sapped of its vital ity by the intru-
sion of European individualism in advance of the habits and under-
standing of the people with the result that there is confusion and 
doubt where order and coherence are necessary . 46 
43 Smurthwaite (pp 146-147) analyses the reasons for the irregular retirement of 
E E Barrett as Secretary for Native Affairs in 1923: 'There may have been 
other reasons behind the retirement of Barrett connected with his criticism of 
the government's handling of both its policy towards Africans and the Native 
Affairs Department. Barrett, like many others of the department, was a Cape 
man, and therefore not always in agreement with the government on matters 
affecting Africans.' New appointments after Hertzog's accession to power 
show a definite move away from the Cape . Along with the appointment of 
E G Jansen, a Natal man, as Min ister of Native Affairs, this could account 
for the strong bias in favour of Natal traditionalism. 
44 Address by J F Herbst, minutes of Natives Conference,3 December 1925, 
NAC report 1925-1926, UG 17-27, p 22 
45 NAD report 1922-1926, UG 14-27, p3 
46 Ibid 
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NAD officiols in Notal backed Hertzog's 'call for uniformity'. Like him, most of 
them deplored the Cope system. Many agreed with him that a system controlling 
African interests together with those of the whites wos wrong; while others felt 
that a common administration was bod for African interests and in confl ict with 
African tradition and tribal custom. 
In 1926 Herbst defended the ideal of a uniform policy: 
[This Bill] was on attempt to put on a proper footing the whole 
administration of Natives throughout the Union. Delegotes knew 
thot the Government was still working under the lows of the old 
Colonies, so that instead of having one administration they were 
still working in comportments. 
While Notal hod a complete system under Acts passed by its own 
Parliament - lows providing even for the various solutes to officials 
- in the Cope there were no solutes at all. While in the Tronsvaal 
the low is that the Governor-General is the Supreme Chief and is 
given full power and authority to corry on as if he were a Native 
Chief. 
In the Transkei they had evolved a perfect system for Parliament hod 
given the Governor-General the power to make lows. 
These different lows and powers led to confusion, and in addition, 
stultified administration. For where there were no powers (i.e. in 
the Cope) nothing was done for fear of coming into conflict with the 
low • .• , 47 
He elaborated: 
There are two distinct directions in which greater uniformity is 
desirable in the existing systems which were established prior to 
Union. Firstly, the assimilation of the special statutes applicable 
to natives by which their contacts with the European social organism 
are governed, as for example, the pass laws, the laws relating to 
exemption, contractual relationships and such restrictions as develop-
ment. Secondly, the assimilation of the conditions in which native 
law and custom can be mode operative for the regulation of their 
relationships inter se (i. e. the adoption of Native law and custom 
throughout the Union in accordance with the police practices in 
Natal) . 48 
Like others before him, Herbst wonted a un iform system to control race 
relations. But he claimed this was being stultified because administrators were 
afraid of 'coming into confl ict with the law'. His comments echo the new respect 
for Natal traditionalism . Of the old fascination with the Transkei all that 
remained was its 'perfect system'of ruling by proclamation. Why this change of 
emphasis? 
47 UG 17-27, p 21 
48 UG 14-27, p 2. 
The Natal system was commonly, though erroneously, called the 
'Shepstonian system'. The tradition that grew from Shepstone's days still kept 
race the main divide, but in a way quite unlike the ex- Boer republics. Natal 
had been divided horizontally into cultural groups, with the 'civilised' whites on 
top. Ethnic and racial barriers became entrenched over the years keeping the 
groups apart. .After a time many whites refused to accept a common destiny for 
all races in Natol, and instead supported the separation of what they termed the 
'civilised' and 'uncivilised' {or even 'non-civilisable'}. The Natal system aimed 
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to maintain this social and racial divide by stressing ethnic and cultural differences. 
The ideological implications of this will be discussed in due course . First let us 
weigh the administrative advantages of this Natal traditionalism, for there is little 
doubt it had endeared itself to most administrative men at the time. 
One of the most distinctive features of the Natal system was the institution 
of the Supreme Chief. Recogn ition of the Supreme Chief and customary law had 
been pioneered by Shepstone and upheld by Britain in 1849. 49 His powers were 
defined in the Code of Native Law 19 of 1891 : 
he exercised all political power over Africans in Natol; he appointed 
and removed chiefs; he could divide and amalgamate tribes; he 
might remove tribes or portions of tribes and individual .Africans; he 
might call out armed men and levies and he had power to call upon 
Africans to supply labour for public works; he might punish by fine 
or imprisonment, or by both for disobedience of his order or for dis-
regard for his authori ty. 50 
'Most striking of all', says David Welsh, I was section 40: 
The Supreme Chief is not subject to the Supreme Court, or to any 
other Court of Law in the Colony of Natal, for or by reason of any 
order or proclamation, or of any other act or matter whatsoever, 
committed, ordered, permitted, or done either personally or in 
Council . 51 
49 In terms of Ordinance 3 of 1849 the Lieutenant Govemor was to 'hold and 
enjoy, over all the chiefs and natives in this District, all the power and autho-
rity which, according to the laws, customs, and usages of the natives, are held 
and enjoyed by any supreme or paramount Native chief with full power to 
appoint and remove the subordinate chiefs or other authorities among them.' 
G W Eybers, Select constitutional documents illustrating South African history 
1795-1910, p 237. 
50 David Welsh, 'The State President's powers under the Bantu Administration 
Act', Acta Juridica, 1968, p 82 
51 Ibid, P 83. In 1894 the courts decided that 'section 40 amounted to no more 
than the "general immunity" which attached to the Govemor's office. ' 
Siziba v Meseni 1894 15 NLR (new series) 237 cited by Welsh, op cit, p 83. 
Another power, Welsh notes, wos the Supreme Chief's theoreticol power 
to legislate by proclamotion;52 he was empowered 10 'modify, vary or alter any 
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of the said provisions of Native Law, customs and usages as may be found necessary 
or exped ient for such purpose'. 53 According to Herbst, little use was made of the 
Supreme Chief's legislative power, and his functions remained largely pol itical 
d d .. • 54 an a mlnlstratlve. 
In 1877 after Britain annexed the Transvaal, Henrique C Shepstone tried 
to reinstate native law and custom there. He recommended that the Governor or 
Administrator be appointed Supreme Chief, as in Natal. .According to Simons, 
The effects of his action were, however, subsequently null ified by 
bad draftmanship and an unduly formalistic approach on the part of 
the courts when construing the limilotions placed on the recognition 
of Native custom by Law 4 of 1885 .•. so much of the indigenous 
system was declared inval id that very I ittle of the African's legal 
status survived. 55 
Discussing the position in the other provinces prior 10 1927, Simons notes: 
In other parts of South Africa, the Native law was in an even worse 
plight. Both in the segregationist Orange Free State and the assimi- . 
lationist Cape Colony the only concession made to the tribol culture 
was the enforcement of the Native law of inheritance. 56 
Although this was true for the Cape proper, it wos not for the Transkei. 
The Pondoland chiefs, for instance, still enjoyed traditional authority,57 but no 
effort had been made to secure their position, nor had' Native law' been codified. 
Instead, there had been a policy until 192710 undennine the chiefs' authority,58 
52 Ibid, p 83. This system differed from that of the Transkei under the Trans-
keian Annexation Act 38 of 1877. See Welsh, op cit, p 84, and below pp 
121-123. 
53 Decisions under this law were appealable to the Governor-Generol-in-
Council only. Welsh, op cit, p 84. 
54 J F Herbst, 'Explanatory memorandum re the Native Administrotion Bi"', 
Herbst papers A 1 (a) quoted by Welsh, op cit, p 84 
55 Simons, 'The law ••• ', p 47. Welsh examines a series of cases in the courts 
before 1927. His findings appear to corroborate Simons' conclusion . 
56 Simons, op cit, p 47 
57 Hunter, p 421 ff 
58 According to Hunter (p 425), 'In 1921 the Bunga passed a motion requesting 
the Government 10 investigate and codify Native law, but the Government 
opposed codification on the same grounds as did the commission of 1903-5. ' 
These were 'that they did not contemplate Native law as 0 permanent insti-
tution, and codification would fix and strengthen what they wished to 
disoppear' . 
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so that even troditianal chiefs were subject ta executive rule by the Governor. 59 
The Governor in the Tronskei ruled by proclamation but his powers were 
not completely arbitrory. All lows had to be laid before both Houses of Porliament 
within 14 days; and assent of all Bills was reserved for the crown. But these safe-
guards were insufficient, according to J T Jabavu before the 1917 Select Committee: 
the Government had no authority to issue proclamations just 'off 
their own bat', as it were, but they they should adapt certoin 
stotutes passed by Parliament already in existence, so as to suit the 
circumstances of the Natives, and that, I think, is a very good 
safeguard. 60 
He therefore opposed the principle that the NAD could initiate legislation or be 
invested with discretionary powers. He bel ieved too that all proclamations should 
be widely publicised before implementotion, as a further safeguard. Under an 
1897 Amendment the Governor had even greater pawers than Jabavu suggested, 
for he could authorise summory arrest and detention of anyone considered a danger 
to public peace. (According to Welsh, this power was used only once before 
192Z) 61 
As we have seen, there was an attempt in 1917 to bring all four 
distinct systems into line with the Tronskeian policy, but this had failed. In 1927 
legislation by proclamation was still favoured, but now this was to be combined 
with the institution of the Supreme Chief as found in Natol. Only in the Cape 
were Africans to be excluded from the Supreme Chief's purview. 62 
59 Act 38 of 1877 provided that laws applicable to the Transkeian territories 'may 
. be made and may be repealed, altered, amended and modified by the Gover-
nor with the odvice of the Executive Council by proclamation published in the 
Government Gazette'. For a full exposition of the changes and anomal ies in 
the system see the evidence of E E Dower, Senator W E M Stonford (later Sir 
Walter), A H B Stanford, W T Welsh; and for .African opposition, that of J T 
Jabavu, to the Select Committee on the Native .Administration Bill, SC 60-17. 
60 SC60-17, para 3813 
61 Welsh, op cit, p 85. In view of later events the reason for this Amendment 
is significant. Welsh notes that the Amendment Act 29 or 1897 was passed 
after the Supreme Court had ruled that the Governor had no 'power of exer-
cising judicial functions which have never yet been exercised by the Parlia-
ment itself' since this would mean that Africans 'would be liable to be 
deprived of their life and property, as well as their liberty, otherwise than 
'by the law af the land'. See Sigcau v The Queen 1895 12 SC 256 quoted 
by Welsh, op cit, p 84. 
62 .According to Welsh, Africans in the Cape were excluded only after a plea 
in the Senate by Sir Walter Stanford. See Welsh, p 90, and Senate Debates, 
1927, cols 1144 and 1220. 
The wording of the 1927 A ct was defin i tive : 
The Governor-General sholl be the Supreme Chief of all Natives 
in the Province of Notal, Transvaal and the Orange Free Stote, and 
sholl in any port of the said provinces be vested with all such powers 
and authorities in respect of all Natives as ore, at the commencement 
of this Act, vested in him in respect of Natives in the Province of 
Nato I. 63 
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Hoving been given such great authority, however, the Governor-General could 
under the Act delegate it to the Minister of Native Affairs or, through the Minister, 
to anyone in the NAD. As R V Selope Thema was later to claim: 'some of these 
Notive Commissioners are rulers in their own local ities, and therefore they toke 
up the position equivolent to that of the Governor-General. ,64 
This change hod important implications. For now, under the 1927 Act, 
extensive powers were allocated to the deportment to rule by executive decree, 
65 
and the safeguard of the crown hod been removed. 
Quite rightly Brookes accused the government of del iberate misreading 
of the 'normal conceptions of the Bantu Low'. 66 In 1933 he challenged that the 
government were doing this for their own administrative ends: 
Shepstone employed what is today the fashion to call 'indirect rule', 
and even artificially reconstructed the tribal system where it hod 
been broken down. The available evidence strongly suggests that 
Shepstone, who bel ieved in the Magisterial system, only accepted 
indirect rule faute de mieux in the absence of officials, police and 
money. The Native Administration ftct of 1927 recurs to what its 
framers conceived the Shepstone policy to be, under conditions so 
different that Shepstone in all probabil ity would not even hove con-
sidered indirect rule hod he been working under them. 67 
63 Act 38 of 1927, section 1 (1). In 1929 on Amendment extended these powers 
ond the Governor-General was to be 'vested with all such rights, immunities, 
powers and authorities in respect of all Natives as are or may be from time 
to time vested in him in respect of Natives in the Province of Notal.' 
64 Verbatim report of the proceedings of the Natives Representative ("ouncil 
1944, v 1, p 18, and similar statements on pp 23 and 59, quoted by Welsh, 
op cit, p 99. See section 3(1) of Act 38 of 1927. 
65 It is almost as if Hertzog onticipoted the sovereign powers to be vested in the 
Union Parliament under the 1934 Status Act. See also Report of the Select 
Committee on the i'kltive Administration Bill, SC 11-27. 
66 Brookes, The colour prob/ ems .•. , p 73 
67 Ibid, p 75 
--------------------------------_.----------------
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Many Africans deplored the attempts to reinstate the tribal system, 
especially in the way the government had reconstructed it. Brookes cited the 
protest by 0 chiefs' convention at Bloemfontein in 1928. This convention criticised 
retribalisatian, especially the policy relating to the extra powers of the white 
Supreme Chief under the 1927 Act. They argued that it was in the extension of 
the powers of the Supreme Chief that Shepstone's policy was most obviously mis-
I· d 68 app Ie : 
The pol icy of Shepstone differs from that of the present Government 
in that it recognised Native progress. The Natives, as soon os they 
acquired civilised habits of living, were to be exempted from coming 
under the direct rule of the Supreme Chief. ... But under the Adminis-
tration ,Act of 1927, Native progress is not sufficiently recognised . 
But the civil ised and the uncivil ised Natives, the profess ional man 
ond the ordinary Native living in his primitive stote, are subject to 
the outocratic rule of the Supreme Chief. 
If it is the policy of the Government that the Bantu people should be 
governed by means of their own law and customs, we feel it our duty, 
as guardians of our people, to point out that this should be in accor-
dance with Native Law, and not with the wishes of the White race. 
It is our firm conviction that the pol icy underlying the Native Admi-
nistration Act is a violation of the Bantu system of government. 69 
Despite these objections and the foct that the tribal system in the other 
provinces was disintegrating, the thrust of the new policy was towards retribaliso-
tion. So native law and custom, and bureaucratic control through the Supreme 
Chief/O became the common stock of the NAD. 
68 As the foregoing analysis suggests, the real point of departure from the Shep-
stonian system was the 1891 Law. But even then the judicial power of the 
Supreme Chief was curtailed and his legislative power to rule by proclomation 
was theoretical and little used. See above, p 116 and n 3.51. 
69 Convention of Chiefs held under the auspices of the A NC, Bloemfontein, 6 
April 1928, quoted by Brookes, The colour problems ... , p 106. See also 
SA Outlook, 62, 1932, p 103 where the Johannesburg Joint Council analyse 
the actual powers of a paramount chief in traditional African society; and 
Welsh who cites three cases in which the Governor-General's powers under 
the 1927 Act were examined by the courts and the NAD were found to have 
exceeded their authority; and pp 126-129 below where these powers are 
discussed. 
70 Act 42 of 1956 which amended the 1927 Act finally made the Governor-
General Supreme Chief of Cape .Africans as well. But as H F Verwoerd, the 
Minister of Native Affairs, maintained during the debate, this added very 
little to the power of the Governor-General 'because he could exercise 
"almost the same powers" in the Cape as the Supreme Chief by means of sec-
tion 25 (the power to proclaim laws for scheduled Bantu areas) and section 27, 
which gave him wide powers ta make regulations.' House of Assembly Debates, 
v 92 (1), 1956, cols 4460 and 4903 quoted in Welsh, 'The State President's 
powers ... " p 96. 
Simons orgues that as long as the appl ication of native law and custom 
stayed flexible it deserved support. Howeve~ he decried the discretionary powers 
awarded NCs for these powers were I iable to be abused. Besides, the tendency 
of the 'native' appeal courts to vacillate between western and traditional legal 
systems had created confusion. The only reason for their existence, he asserts, 
was Parliament's intention to bring about 'legal segregation' of the Africans. 
Since the sys tem was politically motivated, both policy decisions and the system 
adopted by the courts hod become rigid through parliamentary directives?1 To 
understand this, one needs to real ise the scope of the Governor-General's execu-
tive authority. 
Legislation by executive decree 
The government's determination to enforce 'legal segregation' manifested 
itsel f as early as 1929. At that time the government introduced on amending Act 
to reinforce aspects of native low and custom that hod been enacted in 1927 but 
not rea lly accepted by the courts. This Amendment even allowed the Governor-
General as Supreme Chief to 'amend the provisions of the Natal Code of Native 
Law' simply by proclamotion in the Gazette.
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Put bluntly, 'the powers of the 
supreme chief', Brookes wrote, 'are such powers as the supreme chief by proclama-
tion allocated to himself. It is legal ised despotism.,73 How accurate was that 
assertion? 
First let us look briefly at the wording of the judgement given by Justice 
Fischer in the case of Rex v Mabi & Others/4 
The acc used hod been ordered to remove to a place without water 
or accommodation, whereupon they had refused to move unti I they 
had been compensated for losses sustained. 75 
Welsh reports that al though the judge acknowledged that the facts alleged showed 
'possibilities of considerable hardship', he declined to set aside the order, holding 
I 
that the Governor-General's discretion was "unrestricted".' When counsel for the 
71 Simons, op cit, p 52 
72 Act 9 of 1929, chap 5, enumerates the Governor-General's powers as Supreme 
Chief. 
73 Braokes, The colaur problems ... , p 107 
74 Rex v Mobi & Others 1935 TPD 408 cited by Welsh, op cit, P 84 
75 The order was issued under section 5(1 )(b) of Act 9 of 1929 which amended the 
Native Administrotion Act 38 of 1927, section 5(J)(b). The proviso in the 
clause was that if a tribe objected to such removal, 0 resalution would have to 
be adopted by both Houses of Porlioment sanctioning the removal. But under 
section 5(2), on individual who refused to comply with an order given under 
this sect ion would be guilty of an offence and liable to a conviction of 0 maxi-
mum of ten pounds or imprisonment for 0 maximum of three months. For further 
discussion see below, P 308. 
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accused raised the wider issues implicit in 'civilised law' - such as a presumption 
against taking away rights without compensation and generally upholding the 
individual's rights - Fischer's response, as Welsh records it, was as follows: 
The Court was always very astute to uphold these matters but we are 
not entitled on that account solely to override the unequivocally 
expressed intention of the Legislature that the Govemor-General 
should act in this manner. 76 
As Welsh remarks, 'If injustice were being committed or hardships were being 
created, that was the Legislature's, and hot the Court's concam.' Butitalso 
raised other issues. To others this definition of the Govemar-Gene",1 's powers 
was unacceptoble, for it made no mention of arbit",ry government action. It 
failed to insist on the requirement of equality before the law. As such it was an 
. 77 
abrogation of the Rule of Law. 
The 1927 Act moreover, by aliowing the NAD to rule by executive 
decree, laid the system open to administ",tive abuse. Personal freedom was now 
a privilege held at officia l discretion, as the executive's power to presc ribe and 
proclaim pass areas was now extended and the laws of exemption revised. Also 
under this system the Governor-Gene", I was given authority to impose rules and 
regulations on almost every aspect of African existence. As Davenport explains, 
these governed 
censorsh ip, control of weapons, wearing of clothes, carrying of 
passes - and, in a controversial Section 29, he could punish 'any 
person who utters any words or does any other act Or thing whatever 
with intent to promote any feel ing of hostility between Natives and 
Europeans.' 78 
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76 Welsh, op cit, p 94 . See also section 10(1) of Act 38 of 1927: 'Neither the 
Supreme Court nor any other court of law shal I have the juri!diction to question 
and pronounce upon the val idity or legality of any act done, direction or order 
given or punishment inflicted by the Supreme Chief in the exercise of his 
powers, authorities, functions, rights, immunities and privileges.' This 
approach is accepted by most white South Africans concerned only that the 
correct constitutional procedure had been carried out and executive given the 
necessary power by the sovere ign legislature. This equates the Rule of Law 
with the rule of law and order. It justifies an all-white Parliament in sanction-
ing a breach of the Rule of Law to support repression of those who seek to 
disturb the prevailing social order. See also discussion of the Riotous Assemblies 
Amendment Act 1930 in chap 8. 
77 For further discuss ion on the suspens ion of the Rule of Law, see Davenport, 
South Africa ... , p 206H; J Lewin, Politics and law in South Africa, p 56 
H; Edgar Brookes & J B Macaulay, Civ il liberty in South Africa, pp 12-29; 
and Brookes, The colour problems ... , p 104ff. 
78 Davenport, South Africa ... , p 206 
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If one tokes these, combined with the powers given the bureaucracy under 
the 1927 Act to rule by extending its own rights and immunities, there is little 
doubt that by 1927 the Hertzog government hod assumed the very powers tvIotthews 
said would give the government 'greater power than Parliament'. So in 1927, 
Parliament can be said to have endowed the government 'with powers that Parlia-
ment itself [did] not possess. ,79 
tvIoreover, ruling by proclamation, which hod been disallowed in 1917, 
was reintroduced under the 1927 Act even in the Cope where the franchise hod not 
as yet been abol ished. By then there were too few whites schooled in the old 'Cope 
liberal' tradition prepared to protect African interests, and too many who valued 
the status qua above all else and were prepared to support the erosion of African 
rights if it guaranteed their interests and position of dominance. Those who praised 
and supported the system argued: it allowed flexibility in the government of widely 
different areas; it ensured that rules and regulations could be made to suit the 
local scene. Rule by proclamation was accepted as necessary especially where 
tribal institutions still carried on - chieftainship, land tenure, polygamy, lobola, 
male domination, vicarious responsibility, and other elements of collectivism. 
But even where these things were withering away, as more and more Africans moved 
away from traditionalism, the 1927 Act sought to reinstate them. It was this aspect 
possibly more than any other that the Africans strongly denounced. As the following 
discussion attempts to show, their criticism was often warranted. 
Implications of Hertzog's resolution 
a For different groups 
With the belief growing that Africans in their own oreas should stick to 
tribal custom, the 1932 NEC decided to investigate the pros and cons . 80 Witnesses 
were asked several questions. Was the tribal system breaking down, and if so, why? 
Should the erosion of tribol traditions be speeded, slowed, or left to itself? How 
important was the institution of chieftainship, especially the chief's stotus, function 
ond powers in the various regions? How for did Africans cleove to traditionol low 
79 See E l tvIotthcws' statement above, p 110 and n 3.29. 
80 Although the commission was meant to look only at urban Africans, the whole 
of port 1 of their report is about the reserves. It is not merely about I ife as 
it affects Africans in town either, but discusses the merits of the tribol system. 
So it seems the commissioners wished to support the new administrative I ine of 
the 1927 Act - which is why other reactions to this policy are included here. 
custom, how for hod they become westernised, and was this good or bad?81 
These questions in 1932 suggest that the state was still unsure of the 
retribalisation policy introduced in 1927. Views ranging from support to rejection 
had mony underlying motives and as many practical reasons, as the following 
discussion shows. 
Retribalisation in the interests of whites 
J Y Gib~on explained his I iking of the traditional Natal system thus: 
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first, groups of families could be placed under a chief for administrative purposes. 
'The advantage~ he said,'was that it has been highly effective as a controlling 
organization'. The hierarchical structure of this control system worked particularly 
well, he thought. Of it he said: 'it may confidently be affirmed that for adminis-
trative purposes the system was faultless'. He regretted that 'even in Natal the 
system was breaking down' and attributed this to 
the gradual change which has taken place in conditions of land 
tenure and forms of industry to which people have found it necessary 
to adapt themselves, and a Iso changes in Native pol icy. 82 
Many others also deplored the breakdown of the tribal system in Natal. 
It deprived many farmers of their workers, according to Serio tor H D Winter, Minister 
of Native Affairs before Union. As early as 1917 he said: 
The chiefs complain they have no power over their people; their 
complaint is that the only money they knock out of the Natives is 
for marriage fees and so forth. The power of Sibalo has been with-
drawn from them, and since you have withdrawn that, the Natives 
81 For full details see NEC report, UG 22-32, annexure 5, pp 250-251, where 
a detailed questionnaire on the topics to be investigated is given. The section 
investigated here falls under the heading 'Advantages and disadvantages of the 
tribal system'. 
82 NEC 1930-1932, written evidence of J Y Gibson . Gibson gave evidence to 
many other commissions too. He knew a great deal about African customs and 
traditions, according ta his testimony, having lived in the Klip River country 
for close on 60 years. He served in various parts of Natal and Zulu land, first 
as clerk and Zulu interpreter in a magistrate's court, then as magistrate for 11 
years in Zululand, later as magist rate in Natal, and finally as Sub-NC for 
Zululand. In view of Gibson's early experience with the tribal system, his 
evidence has been selected to explain how whites in general saw the operation 
of the tribal system in Natal. Shula Marks comments that Gibson was one of 
the few people 'sensitive to African views'. 
have run wild in the locations. 83 
He shared the views of many farming associates in saying: 'The Natives in the 
locations ..• are free men; they go to the Rand and live at their own free will 
an idle life. ,84 He echoed the feel ings of many more in his demand that the 
chiefs' authority be backed by the state. Only then, he claimed, 'could the idlers 
be forced ou t ta work. ' 
Natal even used the traditional system to extend control over the urban 
Africans. This had also been pioneered by Shepstone, and was characterised by 
the 'tagt' systems and the development of municipal compounds. 85 To whites 
threatened by African advance or opposed to the growth af a stable African commu-
nity in the urban areas, the Natal solution would have been of particular interest. 
How traditional control was extended to include African townsmen in Notal emerges 
from letters between R D Lyle, . Magistrate at Umgeni, and C A Wheelwright, Chief 
NC af Natal. Wheelwright commented on the impl ications of the 1923 Urban 
Areas Act for African townsmen in Natal: 
To me there appears little difficu lty in administering the Code of 
Native Law in an urban area to which the Act may refer. Under the 
Code it is not possible for a Native to become detribalised. Every 
Native must acknowledge allegiance to a Chief, otherwise it strikes 
at the root of Native Government of this Province. 
Even should the Urban Areas Act apply it will not affect the govern-
ment of Natives residing within such areas, they will still have to 
. conform to the Code of 1891 and be governed accordingly, and they 
will still be subject to the pains and penalties therein prescribed, 
although they may be at the same time subject to the local authority. 86 
83 Select Committee on the Native Administration Bill, oral evidence of Henry 
Daniel Winter, UG 60-17, paras 2014-2034. Born in Pietermaritzburg in 
1851, Winter was JP, MLA Natal Colony 1893 and Senator - Union (Weenen); 
Minister of Agriculture 1899 (Binns ministry) and 1899-1903 (Hime ministry); 
Acting Treasurer 1902-1903; Minister of Native Affairs (Smythe ministry). 
Winter also said the Natalians had asked ta have'sibalo' reintroduced. Shula 
Marks pointrout (p 43): 'The duty of chiefs to call out labour for the roods and 
public wo rks of the colony - the so-called isibalo - was probobly the greatest 
single cause of their unpopularity among their followers . The Natal Native 
Affairs Commission went so far as to suggest that one of the reasons Africans 
were moving from location lands and on to private farms was because of their 
distaste for the corvee.' The concerted effort to draw the chiefs into the 
system of labour control under the 1927 Act was equally unpopular. 
84 UG 60-17, para 2014 
85 For further details see M W Swanson, 'Urbon origins of separate development' 
Race, x, 1968-1969, pp 31-40. 
86 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of R D Lyle. The code defines a 'tribe', 
and section 238 lays down that' No Native under the operation af the Native 
Law shall be permitted ta reside permanently in the Colony, unless he becomes 
a member of a tribe as defined in this Code. See Section eight Natal Law No. 
19 of 1891.' Th is would have had important implications later for the state's 
urban pol icy. Lyle also refers here to 'Regulations governing marrioge by 
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Shula Marks makes the paint: 'that in the early days of Natal the separate adminis-
tration of Africans and Europeans under different codes of law was a practical 
d ... . hi' h d' f . ,87 a mlnlstratlve necessity; t e ca anlsts, owever, ma e a v irtue 0 necessity. 
In fact, the Natalians seemed to need mare and more contral as tribal power waned, 
and the policy of retribalisation was to give them this. 
The varied goals of those in favour of the Ac t show that retribolisation 
could be used - and exploited - far severa l different purposes. The main aim, so 
it seems, was to rule by decree with the chiefs drawn in as a crucial prop in the 
whole administrative system. We therefore need to see how this was to be achieved 
under the 1927 Act. 
The chiefs and the policy of retribolisation 
The chiefs were to be drawn into the system, lured by the only real offer 
of status in a submerged society . On this issue R D Lyle is quite exp licit. He 
shows, for instance, that the sys tem of calculating a chief's tribute by assessing the 
number of taxpayer.; in his district worked well because th is was an incentive to 
chiefs to encourage closer settlement on the one hand, while being in the chief's 
interest to ensure that taxpayers not only paid their taxes, but that they returned 
home to do so. He also remarked that with the chiefs' declining authority adminis-
tration in the 'native' areas was less efficient, but where chiefs still maintained 
control it was often at the cost of progress. 88 
Professor Macmillan reached a similar conclusion in the 1920s : 
In Basutoland, Natal and elsewhere the power of the chief may be a 
restriction on progress. The chief may (and does) put obstacles in 
the way of the progressive man, make his tenure insecure, or mulct 
Native Rites and the payment of Hut Tax. Law 48 of 1884, and regulations 
framed thereunder' and notes how urban Africans would fall under those as 
well. See regulations 27, 28 and 29, government notice 120 of 1910. 
87 Marks, p 199 
88 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of R D Lyle . The following works include 
interesting analyses on the changing role of ch iefs, and the impl icotions for the 
chiefs of the retribolisation policy: K Danziger, 'Modernisation and the legiti-
mation of soc ial power' in H Adam (ed), South Africa: Sociological perspec-
tives; E Feit, 'Conflict and cohesion in South Africa: A theoretical analysis 
of "separate development" and its implications', Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, July 1966, pp 484-496; P & I Mayer; G Mbeki, Sou th 
Africa: The peasants' revol t; B GM Sundkler, Bantu prophets in SouthAfrica; 
A Vilikazi, Zulu transformations : A study of the dynam ics of sociol change; 
Hunter . For an excellent discussion on the basis of the chiefs' authority, see 
J Peires, 'Continuity and change in Ciskei chiefship ', African Studies seminar 
paper, University of the Witwater.;rand, 29 August 1976 . 
him. In districts where suspicion and discontent are rife, the leading 
malcontents, strongly aided and abetted by many of the women, so 
far from being Communis t 'agitators', are often men of the old school, 
backward - in the locally used term, 'reactionaries'. The younger 
educated men are separated from these by an inevi table gulf. Recent 
legislation [Native Administration Act], however, tends only to make 
the hard lot of the educated and progressive Natives st ill harder. 89 
This harsh attitude of the chiefs was backed by the administration. 
However dubious the chief's white colleagues were, his own power could 
well carry on unaffected. After all, he was the only source of good and ill for 
others, as Adam impl ies: 
The increased bureaucratisation and regimentation of I ife chances 
of the non-white population has thus strengthened the power of these 
secondary rulers, despite their waning traditional legitimacy. Where-
as under the former 'pure' colonial conditions, the white bosses were 
satisfied if the chiefs kept their followers' in their place' and provided' 
the imposed services and taxes, they now have to insist that the pol iti-
cised subjugates are in fact ruled, administered, and controlled. 90 
This process began with the 1927 Act. 
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We know something about the troditional and modern roles of the chiefs, 
but shou ld also be aware that chiefs have often had to bridge the gap between them. 
Significant, therefore (but very I ittle researched) is how chiefs have had to span 
confusing loyalties in their dua l role of being at once traditional leaders and leaders 
authorised by whites. This emerges clearly in the following extracts. 
Wv:lny witnesses insisted that chieftainship had fallen into disrepute with 
whites abusing the chiefs' authority. It was further weakened, they said, by loss 
of the right to dispose of land - a right I inked by custom to the whole structure of 
tribal society, as John Dube said: 
the Chief's power was largely dependent on his control of the land . 
A man offending him could be cut off from the land and from 
subsistence. 91 
Most whites demanded land restrictions, and at the same time wanted the chiefs 
to have greater power. But control of land was a prime source of a chief's outhority. 
Without it, the only way ta keep his position was through white support. The 
89 Macmillan, p 249 
90 H Adam, Wv:ldemising rocial domination: South Africo's political dynamics, 
p 73; also Walshe, p 237 
91 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of J L Dube. See especiol ly Peires, 
op cit. 
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tragic irany was that, to keep control over his fellow tribesmen, the chief had to 
bow to greater control by white officials acting in the name of the white Parliament. 
The 1927 Act denied chiefs the very basis of their power because it taok away their 
right to allocate the land that their power depended on. It was therefore necessary 
to set up a scheme to prop up their authority artificially. This in turn made the 
chiefs dependent on the goodwill of whites for their people's future prosperity. 
Henry Ashton Key reported on the tribal system outside Natal. Like 
Gibson, he felt it helped with running African areas. But problems arose, he argued, 
when white and African interests clashed . Chiefs lost control when people moved 
away and discovered that tribal rule was unenforceable, a matter af 'judicious bluff'. 
A few chiefs were outstanding in both rule and law, Key said, but most 'just carry 
on for what they can make out of the tribesman'. 92 
Like many other top administrators, Key was ambivalent over the reinstate-
ment of tribal authority. He saw that the chief was a 'very useful administrator' 
but also 'a great hindrance ta the progress of the individual'. Weighing up the 
pros and cons, he concluded: 'Where the system is of material use it should be 
assisted up to a point for the better control of the people. ,93 
Chiefs were the obvious scapegoat for African and white resentment, it 
seems, and the butt for the department's inefficiency. But the view held by depart-
mental officials that the chiefs had a util ity value underlay much of the evidence. 
So on the whole chiefs were not seen as people in their own right but as administra-
tive tools - and even as tools, only doing jobs for whites. This attitude to the 
chiefs is clearly illustrated in the words of the Chief Magistrate of Johannesburg: 
My last experience of working with Chiefs was in the Ciskei, where 
very little use is made of their services.' For more use was made of 
the Headman of each location. In the Transvaal my experience has 
only been with minor chiefs on communally owned land. Their 
services are not utilized except perhaps to assist in the collection 
of Native Tax. In Natal Chiefs were given certain powers under 
the Native Code. They were regularly consulted, their authority 
upheld and their services frequently made use of especially in the 
locations. Their utility broke down owing to the hereditary system 
92 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of Henry Ashtan Key. He was NC in 
Herschel. His evidence is of particular interest since at the time he had 
been in the NAD from 1897: for the first 20 years under the South African 
Republic, the colonial govemmen t after 1902, and the Union government 
until 1926. He was therefore well placed to comment on changing cond itions, 
and with his Transvaal experience, to comment on a totally different system 
in the Cape. 
93 Ibid 
I _________________________________________________ 4 __________________________ ~ 
of succession, where the Chief turned out to be 0 drunkard or of 
weak character. 94 
Britten believed 'Natives living under tribal conditions such as Natal and Zululand 
are the most content', and considered this proof af the excellence af the tribel 
system. 
A one-sided view, one would think. The administration in drawing the 
chiefs into the system placed them in a very invidious position. They were pushed 
into the impossible, straddling general African interests, their own lives, and 
white demands. They became puppets trying to look like chiefs; chiefs trying to 
have lives of their own; and local champions trying to score advantages for their 
own people. 
Africans on the receiving end, and their reaction 
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The views cited thus for overshadow the crucia l importance of what the 
African commoners and chiefs thought - and they, after all, were on the receiv.ing 
end of pol icy changes and white demands. Sometimes these changes were confusing, 
and their very uncertainty had bad side effects. 
J M NIohapeloa traced some of the policy changes that 'signalled the dis-
appearance of the chief as the recognised au thority over the tribe'. In the Transkei , 
he said, some attempt was made initially to preserve the chiefs' power but their 
final position wes no happier: 
for although Native Law was administered chiefs were reduced to 
the position of stipendiaries. Tribel divisions and tribal chiefs were 
ignored. Districts were divided into locations without respect to 
tribes, and each location was under a headman nominated by the 
94 NEC 1930-1932, written evidence of Henry Britten. Britten described his 
own career in these words: 'From childhood up to age of 24 years in Natal; 
15 years as NIogistrate and Native Commissioner, Transvaal; Brought up in 
district Ixopo, Natal where there is a large native popula tion on farms in 
locations. Had 3 years experience in an Attorney's office, entered Public 
Service in 1895 and became Clerk and Zulu interpreter. Served mainly in 
Ixopo. Transferred to Native Affairs Departmen t on promotion 1901; Magis-
trate, Native Court, Krugersdorp , 1902; Served in various Transvaal 
districts as Magistrate and Native Commissioner for 15 years and as NIogis-
trate and Native Commissioner, Kingwill iamstown, for 4 years.' He also 
claimed to have made a special study of native lew and custom, and to this 
attributed his promotion to Chief Magistrate of johannesburg. This seems 
to have conv in ced the commission that he was better qualified than Africans 
to gauge the effects of African pol icy. 
people and appointed by the Transkei Government. Some of these 
headmen were traditional chiefs but they did not possess their former 
powers, and they were no longer guardians of the land. 95 
This description fitted many parts of the country after colonisa tion. 
With a long history of pol icy changes in various areas, more often than 
not at the whim of a government or NAD official, it is little wonder that the new 
scheme of retribalisation confused and angered people . Evidence to the commis-
sion in 1930 bears this out. Anger was also clear-eyed, as when Mohapeloa wrote 
of white encroachment: 
This is a step which aims at protecting the people without abolishing 
chieftainship. But it is hateful to us because it is imposed ab extra, 
which ·is a reflection on the chieftainship; for it means the chief is 
no longer 'the father of his people'. He is inclined to become an 
overlord who I ikes to use his people for his benefit. 96 
This was true. Chiefs were alienated from their people, shifting real power 
towards the whites. Whites gained too in being released from the job of ruling. 
Meanwhile, the chiefs' fellow tribesmen grew disenchanted. 
Urban Africans were far more scathing on the whole when they publicly 
attacked the chiefs. But they usually attributed the chiefs' decl ine to officialdom 
or government policy: 
The Government of this country have made the task of the detribalised 
Africans much easier by knocking the bottom out of the system of chiefs, 
thereby weakening the foundations of Bantu culture and civilisation. 
They are now, for all intents and purposes, Government policemen and 
are no longer custodians of African culture and civil isation. 97 
Paradoxically, the 1927 Act was also seen as a catalyst to detribalisation. The 
Martindale and Sophiatown ratepayers saw it as 'a blessing in disguise' as 'the last 
nail on the coffin of tribal ism'. Because it introduced' hybrid codes and laws of 
succession', they claimed it also loosened 'the ties and obligations which once 
held family and tribe toge ther. ,98 
Not only urban Africans denounced the rigged revival of the chiefs' 
power. As was to be expected, the longest and loudest res istance came from 
95 J M Mohapeloa, Africans and their Chiefs: Should Africans be ruled b their 
Chiefs or elected leaders?, p 13 c 1930-1935 (n d) , Cape Archives J 
96 Ibid 
97 NEC 1930-1932, written evidence of the Sophiatown and Martindale Non-
European Ratepayers' Association 
98 Ibid 
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Africans in the rural areas of the Eastern Cape. Why did so many Cape Africans 
oppose the chiefs being set up in authority again? For one thing, they feared 
losing the right to own land as individuals. As one witness said: 
if the chief is given authority to rule over the people, individual 
tenure would have to be abol ished because in what way could his 
authority be exercised if he has nothing to say over the land? 99 
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Again, Africans in private locations in the Cape had had the same powers as white 
municipalities. John Shishuba, the headman of Oxkraal location, a highly respected 
Cape leader, discussed the point. Africans lost these powers, he said, when the 
Native Affairs Act of 1920 scrapped their village management boards. Instead they 
were to have a local council with very curtailed powers. Even this promise was not 
kept. 1OO Then came the scheme to revive tribal authority. Africans in the Cape 
felt this would erode their autonomy still further: in their view, chiefs should have 
symbolic status and no more. 
The administrative bible - an official view of the 1927 Act 
The NEC tested out official opinion on retribalisa tion for more seriously 
than the opinion of Africans. It was the departmental officials, of course, who 
had the best theories and highest hopes of the governmen t 's policy working. The 
NEC report gave great weight to those favou r ing retribalisation, for instance -
despite the statements again and again that the tribal system had broken down, as 
here: 
The inevitable effect of the under-development of the Reserves is 
that orientation of most advanced Natives has been towards the 
European. Instead of finding in their own area a fruitful field for 
using their energies and their knowledge to uplift their own people, 
they have been forced out from among them and have become 
'exiles' elsewhere. To develop the Natives, and the Reserves; to 
make the dead hand of tribal ism relax its grip; to convert triba I ism 
into a progressive force; to set the Natives in motion on the upward 
path of civilisation, and to enable them to shoulder the burden of 
their own advancement - such must be in the op inion of your Com-
missioners the main approach to the solution of the Native problem 
in its economic aspect. 101 
99 NEC 19 January 1931, oral evidence of an African witness representing 
Oxkraal and Lesseyton locations. This fear was confirmed by others inclu-
ding white officials who said that one of the reasons why relatively few 
areas hod been surveyed under Glen Grey tenure was because the less 
progressive chiefs feared losing their authority. 
100 NEC 1930-1932, oral evidence of John Shishuba, headman of Oxkraal 
location. Village management boards were the equivalent of health com-
mittees in peri-urban areas, and fell under the divisional council. They 
were establ ished in mony locations under the 1879 Locations Act in both 
African and white districts. 
101 UG 22-32, para 82 
Yet having said this, their recommendations for on efficient administrative system 
show that they fovoured retribalisation. 102 
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The unpubl ished written and oral evidence to the NEC has a contradictory 
pattern as well. The official bios for reviving tribali sm come ma inl y from Notal 
people. The ambivalence of other officials suggests that outside Notal, tribal 
institutions hod decoyed to 0 point of collopse in many districts. Yet most people 
outside the Cope agreed thot if ways could be found to reinstate the chiefs, it 
would help African administra tion and have their full support. Here we must note, 
as fvIocmillan did, that NAD officials whatever their own v iews, 'were governed 
by Acts, the spirit of the Acts and the force of Porliament behind them.' 103 
The 1927 Act undertook to put segregation into practice. For many the 
Ac t hod become on odministrative bible. But it was not only the enthusiastic 
bureaucrats who be lieved in tribal chieftainship for Africans. Firm segregationists 
like the 'Liberal' Notalian, Maurice Evans, also sow great merit in thi s, the 
104 Notal system. To this group Brookes adds the traditional anthropolog ists as very 
influentiol in determining 'native' policy. Cynically, but with truth, he writes: 
All the infl uence of the older social onthropology has been thrown 
in the direction of regard ing the urban Native as on annoying 
intruder, who has no business to live where he lives or to be what 
he is . Combined with the segregationist school, the anthropological 
school has created in the publ ic mind the impression that nothing 
need be done or ought to be done for the urban Native beyond 
forming vogue plans for some day sending him bock to 'his own area' 
- the segregationist Utopia - where he will develop 'along his own 
102 See UG 22-32, paras 199-243; on employment by the state and the co-
operation of chiefs in checking the breakdown of tribal authority, 230-319; 
and on tribute and stipends, 26, 37, 221-222, 240. 
103 NEC 1930-1932, ora l evidence of W M fvIocm illan, 7 fvIoy 1931 
104 MlUrice Evans said that the state's race policy should not uproot African 
institutions but develop them where they were of "se. Africans absorbed 
western ideas on ly if they first respected their own. Their culture might 
be primitive but it could still evolve to su it the African genius. These 
views swayed many intellectuals, with far-reaching effect. See invaluable 
sources: M Evans, Black and white in South East Afr ica: A study in socio-
~ and R F Hoernle, South African native policy and the liberal spirit. 
Indirect rule through tribal authorities was first practised in Indio and later 
in all African dependenc ies colonised by Britain. It was only after 1939 
that Bri tai n began to modify her pol icies . But all this, and Evans too, was 
very different from a del iberately enforced pol icy of retribal isation. 
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lines' - the anthropological Utopia. 105 
b Afrikaner notional ist ideology 
The segregationists and older anthropologists mode the some kinds of 
claim:· they both stressed differences of origin and tradition between Africans and 
whites, and described the variety of life accordingly. ('Inherent', 'racial', 'ethnic': 
these were the identifying terms.) They also held that society should cater for these 
differences. Only then, they said, could each race carryon its own pure culture 
without contaminating the other, and so bui ld up its own civil ised inheritance. The 
many whites who supported this thesis rationalised that justice demands the preserva-
tion of both European and African culture. This was the Utapian dream. 
It also struck a sympathetic chord for those Afrikaners who had argued 
along the same lines about respecting Afrikaans and English interests. Hertzog's 
two-stream policy involved the nationalist virtues of pride in race, a separate 
ethnic identity, and a separate calling and destiny, and made people all the more 
determined to secure Afrikanerdom. Whether for English or Afrikaans or for block 
106 
and white, the myth was that of paralle l development. 
The Calvinist ethic so heavily relied on today was not central to Afrikaners 
in the 1920s and early 1930s. Indeed they championed nationalism and their 
cultural growth, as NIoodie shows. 107 The commitment to these issues was much 
105 Brookes, The colour problems ... , p 141. In his analysis of the older 
anthropological school Brookes sets out to chal lenge such theories as those 
of M Levy-Bruhl, which he says 'have been fastened upon with such avidity 
as representing the truly "scientific" viewpoint.' Likewise the view preached 
by this school thot amongst savages there was an 'obsence of differentiated 
individual judgement.' He cha llenges hi s readers to study the views of 'the 
greatest social anthropologist Professor NIolinowski' instead, and those of 
Professor Rodin. 
106 On the origins and tenets of Afrikaner ideology, see H Adom, Modernising 
racial domination and' Ideologies of dedication vs . blueprints of expedience' 
Social Dynamics, v 1, 2, pp 143-157; W A de Klerk, Puri.tans in Africa: 
A stOry of Afrikanerdom; Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond; NIoodie; Edwin S 
Munger, Afrikaner and African nationalism; A P Treurnicht, Credo van 'n 
Afrikaner; B Naude, 'The Afrikaner and race relations', SAIRR topical 
talks, 9, 1967; H Vatcher, White laager; F A van Jaarsveld, The awaken-
Tng;f Afrikaner nationolism 1868-1881. 
107 NIoodie, pp 81-91 
safer at that time, for the role that the English were to play in the world of 
Afrikanerdom was still a very con tentious issue within the National Party. 108 In 
fact one could say that Hertzog used the white interest in exploiting African 
labour to keep whites together despite their rival views. In so doing, he gave 
Afrikanerdom a far more powerful and acceptoble racial theme. If white traditions, 
beliefs and heritage were to be safe onl y in the hands of the National Party; if the 
Notional Party unde rtook to protect white interests and western civilisation from 
the threat of extinction or dilution by the assimilationist creed of their opponents; 
then clearly Afrikaner ideal ism would be accepted by the masses when disguised 
in this racist form. 
In this way the imperative of white survival made segregation and 
retribalisation look I ike common sense for moral people. So racism could appear 
as a sort of ethnic idealism. Lewin explores the theme. Many whites really felt 
that Africans, with the culture they had, were 'unfit to assimilate the standards 
and values of the richly "civil ised" Europeans.' 
It follows that the stondards and means by which white men shape 
their relations with other white men need not be applied to black 
people. In plain words, in order to exploit Africans fully, it is 
necessary to disguise the process by professing to have a deep 
respect for their peculiar culture. 109 
Cultural segregation made it respectable for whites to be on top in the first place. 
It also kept Africans down or at least moving in directions that did not threaten 
white supremacy. Or as David Welsh has shown, ethnicity and traditionalism were 
'politically harmless from the white's point af view'. 110 
Changes introduced under the 1927 Act did more besides. They removed 
the 'native question' from local pressures and in this way the gulf was artificially 
if not deliberate ly widened. The state did this, Margaret Ballinger argues, by 
conditioning the public into believing that it alone was responsible for African 
affairs. They also created 'a common illusion ihat Native affa irs are something 
aport from the mainstream of South African life ... a happy hunting ground for 
intellectuals and philanthrop ists.' She mentions the 'complex of lows and regula-
tions governing the day to day existence of Africans which were exclusive of 
whites in their application, with the result that the ordinary citizen represented 
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in parliament had no immediate knowledge of their existence or how they worked. ,Ill 
108 Ibid 
109 Lewin, p 104 
110 Welsh,' The cui tura I dimension ... " p 35 
111 Margaret Ballinger, All Union politics are native affairs, p 8 
The emphasis on separat ion and exclusiveness also exaggerated the differences 
between the races. As Iv\argaret B.all inger concludes: 
Thus separation, coupled with the na tural inarticul ateness of a 
largely ill iterate population with ways of thaught unfamil iar to the 
rest of the populat ion, crea tes a lmost insuperable obstacles to various 
experience and strengthens the impression that the African population 
is something apart and essentia lly different from the rest of the com-
munity. 112 
This is true of what began almost impercep tibly after the 1927 Act had 
been passed . It d id not take long before the ideol ogues found they could exploit 
cultural differences and e thnic ity to rationalise and leg itimise their racial 
theories. The Cape franch ise was the one v ital obstac le . With it gone, the 
National Party could begin to spread their segregation policy uniformly through-
out the Union. The firs t step had been token by dropping the day to day adminis-
tration of African affairs a lmost en tirely from white debate. Once Cape African 
affairs could be run the same way, Cape Africans and the ir grievances would also 
conven iently drop out of sight. In this sense, the 1927 Act was a mi lestone for 
the National Party in an administrat ive pol icy begun by their predecessors. 
In the policy of enforced re tribalisation the National Party deviated, 
following a new path. They endorsed ethnicity and tribalism, thereby destroying 
the assimilationist trend preached by the ir more liberal opponents. Even the 
Shepstonian tradition of recognis ing the gradual uplifting of the ' civilisable ' 
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African was trodden underfoot by white baasskap. Since the retribal isation policy 
could guarantee the paramountcy of whites, it had the main ingredient for party-
political success. The 1927 Act was a definitive step by the National Party towards 
separate development, as the sta te's racial ideology is known today ~ 1 tet this step 
was only as far as admin istration went, and even that (as in 1917) seemed doomed 
to fail. 
For Africans the harsh reality was that the segregation policy went on 
restricting them to a mere 7 per cent of the land. It was a quota that exposed the 
insincerity of whites, fo r all thei r high moral tone. As Professor DDT Jabavu put 
it: 
112 Ibid, p 10 
113 Many hold that separate development arose naturall y from the segregation 
policy of the 1920s. True, it does embOdy some of the early ideas. But 
overall, the trusteeshi p policy of the mid-1930s was profoundly different 
from Hertzog's segregation scheme. In the policy of administrative reform, 
however, it is possible to identify some of the changes and underlying 
motives at this early date. This will be pursued in the conclUding chapter. 
We are constantly exhorted ta 'deve lop along our own lines', as 
apart from, aga inst, and in competition with white civilisation , just 
because we a re Africans . This shallaw fallacy has by sheer repetition 
become papular and almost a fetish with those who reiterate it. When 
weseek ta elicit further exp lanation on this article of creed from our 
kind exhorters we find their conception of it indefinable. Others 
interpret it ta mean that the black man should withdraw from 'white' 
a reas (the towns ) a nd emigrate in Israel ite fashion back to his own 
areas, the reserves (wh ich, as we have pointed out, are now over-
crowded), the re to make hi s own discoveries and inventions, stew in 
his own juice and work out hi s own salvation away from the white man 
who now wants the towns to absorb the poor whites ...• Thus is Native 
repression often born of race prejudice, here hidden under academic 
terminology and disguise. 114 
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Segregation was an excuse for repression, many felt. It was an ideologi-
cal bluff because whites never intended anything like a true share-out between 
races. 
c Soc ia l consequences - African land shortage and urbanisation 
These cr iticisms were val id . In introducing the policy of territorial segre-
gation in 1913 the leg islators had stressed that it was not enough to divide the 
Union into 'native' and 'non-native' sectors . For segregation to work, they sa id, 
the areas exclus ively far Africans would have ta be enlarged. Yet most whites 
denied that the reserves were inadequate, and therefore would not sanction the 
grant of extra land promised in 1913. 
Hertzog's first term of office had been a bad time for getting extra laws 
through to release the promised land. With the fortu itous boom conditions after 
the First World War, South Africa advanced industrially and prospe red between 
1923 and 1928. The higher standard of living and security lulled whites into 
greater self-interest than ever. It was not a time to fulfil promises of land to 
Africans. Besides, most whites feared that extending the reserves would check 
the flow of labour just when all sectors of capital needed it most. The best way 
to boost the labour supply, they said, was to restrict land for Africans and so 
drive them into jobs . The land pol icy froze accordingly. 
As one government after another failed to grant extra land, Africans saw 
more c learly that land segregat ion threatened their right to hire and own land 
outside the reserves. This is how John L Dube, a prominent spokesman, summed 
up in 1931: 
114 Jabavu, The segregation fallacy . .. , p 10 
Land is the greatest question that exercises the mind of the Native . 
Nearly all his grievances are subordinate to that of the land. He 
feels that if he had adequate land, he can flee from the troubles of 
urban areas and live in peace in his own land. But even Pondos, 
Basuto, Swazis and Bechuana are compelled to leave their lands 
and seek money in industrial centres. So while land is badly needed 
for the Native people, since the Reserves are crowded and some can-
not support their present inhabitants there must be considerations as 
to the use of land . No fair-minded person can assert that Natives 
have adequate land. The first duty of the Government is to provide 
several million acres of land for the Natives . This promise was made 
by the then Government when the Natives Land Ac t was passed in 
1913. The other provisions of that Act are in operation and the 
matter of land for Natives has not been ac ted upon. This has made 
a difficul t problem worse confused. The partial working of this Land 
Act has been the source of much Native unrest. It has stopped the 
Natives from hiring land except under servile conditions; hindered 
Natives from buying land in European areas; refused Natives the 
opportunity to hire land on shares; become the mother to the Urban 
Areas Act etc., and yet it is asserted on all hands that the Natives' 
future is in agricul ture and not industry fo r the present t ime at least. 
When the case is put before the Legislature, nearly a ll Members of 
the House of Assembly cry out, 'Not a single additional acre for the 
Natives' . 115 
This view of the whites' response is confirmed by pari iamentary debates and other 
less formal proceedings of the time. 
Little wonder then that Africans so restricted began to do all they could 
to stake their claim in the reserves . Those who established a claim clung to it as 
the only hape of even fragmentary security and independence. But many failed, 
and hod to I ive precariously as flotsam with no land of their own. Despite loud 
white protestations the reserves were badly overcrowded - a fact that had been 
stressed not only by Dube and many others before the commission during 1930 
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and 1931, but also by Beaumont in his report as early as 1916. With growing over-
population and congestion, and until extra land was released, the only way to 
accommodate people was to keep subdividing their holdings. As for the landless, 
they resorted to longer periods away from home: families had to split up more and 
more. 
Thus the Africans whose labou r sustained the country failed to get for 
themselves the only possible advantage that segregation had to offer: places of 
their own where the idealists said Africans wou ld be free to 'develop along their 
own lines'. Instead of extra land and a rising standard of living which the growing 
demand for African labour should have produced, there was only a widening circle 
of poverty and frustration for both rural and urban African people. As a resul t, 
115 NEe 1930-1932, typescript evidence of J L Dube 
tens of thousands of Africans who had formerly been able to work on a migrant 
labour basis were forced to leave the reserves permanently. The farms and mines 
which offered increasing opportunities for employment did so while denying both 
stability and security, for they refused to house the families of married workers. 
For the landless, deprived of their right to an independent existence in the rural 
areas, and the disenchanted migran ts whose jobs exiled them from their famil ies, 
the only recourse was to migrate to the urban areas where these rights had not as 
yet been entirely restricted. 
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This greater influx to the towns speeded up in the early 1930s with the 
depression and the worst drought in living memory. This mass move meant less 
labour for the mines and the farms which were said to be in a labour crisis already. 
It also brought unresolved urban problems to a head. So, during his second term 
Hertzog had to shift fram an almost tatal preoccupation with the land, franchise 
and administration to coping with the economic side of his 'native' policy -
which we shall consider now. 
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4 MINES AND FARMS' 
CONFLICT OVER LAB OUR 1895 - 1924 
Landowners - land and labour 
State control - land and labour 
Farmers' case for squatter eviction 
State's case against eviction 
Landowners' case against eviction 
The mines' confl ict with the farms 
The farmers' Squatters Bills 1908 
Labour taxes before 1910 
Partial solution in the Cape 
Cope influence on the 1913 Act 
Limits on Cape squatting before 1913 
Squatters and labour tenancy under the 1913 Act 
Squatters and labour tenancy under the 1917 Bill 
Recent studies that concentrate on the reserves as a subsistence bose to 
the cheap labour pool for the white economy have assumed falsely that the white 
forming sector had olways supported the system of migrant labour. 1 In fact, the 
main aim of the form labour policy was to immobilise labour in the white rural 
sector, not in the African reserves. Most formers believed this would solve their 
labour shortoge. Hence the Hertzog ministries between 1924 and 1933 worked 
towards binding roughly two million resident Africans - classed as squatters, 
labour tenants and full-time servants - to farmers in the white rural areas. 
This meant a reversal of policy. The 1913 Act hod said squatters would 
be resettled on specially granted land. Now in 1926 Hertzog abandoned the ideo. 
The 1913 Act hod also arranged to extend the reserves. Nothing was done about 
that either. 2 
With the move to keep Africans in the white rural areas, the mines and 
farms were at loggerheads over labour suppl ies. Rival ry also grew between landless 
poor whites and Africans as they all streamed into the towns. 
Our concern here is to trace the origins of Hertzog's pol icy to see if the 
first intention hod been to keep the African labour supply bound in the white rural 
areas rather than migrating from the reserves. Clearly this was a delicate balance. 
The farmers favoured a local labour force, the mines a reserve pool. It is of 
crucial significance to on understanding of Hertzog's motives (not to mention 
changes of plan) that we see what policies the Pact government inherited and how 
his predecessors had tried to resolve the confl icting interests of mines and forms. 
The interests and demands of forms and mines between 1924 and 1933, and how 
far they impinged on Hertzog's plans, will then be reviewed in chapters 5 and 6. 
Wolpe focusses on the economic function of the reserves as a source of cheap 
migrant labour. Legassick takes Wolpe's thesis a stage further by showing that 
from the reserves one could redirect and reallocate the labour supply between 
the two dominant sectors of capital - 'gold' and 'maize'. But in both these 
interpretations the perpetuation of the migrant labour system located in and 
controlled from the reserves is seen as vital for keeping cheap labour. This 
chapter contends that a migrant labour system founded in the reserves was seen 
by most farmers as being detrimental to their interests. This was certainly the 
case until 1936, possibly until the late 1950s. See H Wolpe's article, 'Capita-
lism and cheap labour power ... ', pp 425-455; M Legassick, 'South Africa: 
Capital accumulation and violence', Economy and Society, v 3, 3, 1975, pp 
253-291, and 'Apartheid and the labour market', collected seminar papers, 
Southern African research in progress, Centre for Southern African Studies, 
University of York, v 1, December 1974, pp 99-117; also H Wolpe, 'Industria-
lization and race in South Africa' in S Zubaido (ed), Race and racialism. 
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2 This comparison of the squatter resettlement policies of 1913 and 1926 has neces-
sitated an evaluation of pre-Union squatter laws. See chap 5 for a detailed 
analysis of Hertzog's squatter legislation, and chap 2 fo r his policy towards the 
immediate extension of the reserves. 
141 
Landowners - land and 'abour 
As Africans and whites increased, land grew harder to come by ond race 
relations were strained until eventually on answer hod to be found to the land 
problem. However, any solution at the turn of the century was inextricably I inked 
to the 'abour shortage. As the Transvaal Labour Commission reported in 1903: 
It was stated by ••• experienced witnesses ••• that the fluctuating 
character of the labour supply is due mainly to the limited character 
of the native wonts and the easy conditions of his life: 
,The subject of the food supply is thus intimately bound up with the 
fact that African natives are in possession or occupation of large 
areas of land suitable for both agricultural and postoral purposes. 
This explains the attention which was paid by witnesses to suggested 
modifications to the system of land tenure ••.• 
It follows from the above, that in our opinion, the principal causes 
affecting the labour supply must be sought in the conditions affecting 
the natives in his home and kraal and not until these conditions are 
greatly modified can any great improvement occur. 3 
Clearly, white employers meant far more than African workers did to the 
commission. The powerful landowners hod to be catered for. Their demands, 
said Brookes and Frankel, echoed the farmers' traditional view of land and labour: 
'The overvaluation of land as land, and the strangle-hold of the landowner on the 
rest of the economic society increased. ,4 Land hod increased in value: it might 
be rich in minerals, one could easily get loons on the strength of it, and its lustre 
grew with the population and a 'still greater mania for land ownership'. 5 But, 
these writers argued in 1930, things were I ikely to get worse for the landowners 
despite the rise in land values, because the white formers were as incompetent as 
ever. They hod not learnt anything more about forming, and their adjustment to 
a market economy hod been slow. Uncritically they kept to the old formulas: 
amassing land - 'no matter how much remained uncultivated' - and carrying on 
with 'cheap' servile African labour however inefficient. 6 
Labour hod a rising premium as the mining industry grew, and the public 
works alongside it, breaking the long monopoly of the formers. The forms and the 
3 Report of the Transvaal Labour Commission 1903, paras 71-80 quoted by D 
Hobart Houghton & J Dagut, Source material on the South African economy 
1860-1970, v 2, P 87 
4 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of E Brookes and S H Frankel. See also 
C W de Kiewiet, A history of South Africa: Social and economic , pp 178 ff; 
Macmillan, Complex South Africa, pp 70ff ond The South African agrarian 
problem and its historical development; also chop 7 below on origins of the 
poor white problem. 
5 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of E Brookes and S H Frankel 
6 Ibid 
mines expected the traditional answers to shortage - a continuous supply of low-
paid labour. The farmers preferred a no-wage labour tenancy, the mines a low-. 
wage system of migrant labour. After the Anglo-Boer War the labour shortage 
become so bod that a solution hod to be found at once. Several commissions and 
committees were appointed simultaneously to review it. 7 We sholl focus on the 
Transvaal where the labour was scarcest and the confl icting interests of mine and 
8 
fo rm greatest. 
State control - land and labour 
Formers in the Transvaal relied utterly on local Africans. In 1903 an 
estimated 143200 African moles lived in the Transvaal, of whom only 27 700 
worked on forms. 9 The mines employed 54 000 Africans of whom an estimated 
10 23.4 per cent were from the Transvaal. The formers, in competition with the 
mines, demanded a solution to the land problem that would strengthen their hold 
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on the labour supply. One such solution was to enforce the 1895 Squatters' Law,ll 
they said, which would push Africans off unoccupied land. These evicted people 
12 
could then be pressured to settle on forms. 
The plan meant uprooting tens of thousands of Africans. Sir Godfrey 
Lagden, the NC, tried gouging what the upheaval would be. The African 
7 SANAC 1903-1905; Transvaal Labour Commission 1903; Notal Lands 
Commission 1902; Transvaal Land Commission 1904. In the Cape the 
govemment appointed a Select Committee to review the Private Locations 
Act and the granting of individual tenure . 
8 Remarks will be confined on the whole to the Transvaal policy between 1894 
and 1909. This is not to suggest that the ORC, Notal and the Cope were not 
involved in working out policies to resolve their land and labour difficul ties. 
On the contrary, restrictions were instituted on squatting and land purchase, 
and existing labour policies were called into question there too. What 
changes there were will emerge in course of discussion in chops 4 and 5. 
See also chap 2. 
9 Transvaal Labour Commission report, para 25; Hobart Houghton & Dagut, p 86 
10 Wilson, table 7, p 70. On the shortage of unskilled labour on the mines, 
Donald Denoon shows the shortage re lative to the present situation. By 1899 
the Transvaal gold mines hod built up a labour supply totalling 107482 
Africans and 12350 whites (a ratio of 8.6 to 1). It proved so difficult to 
recruit Africans after the war that in t-kJy 1904 - two years after Vereeniging 
- the numbers were 70 608 and 12 414, making a ratio of 5.7 to 1. Deport-
ment of Mines statistics quoted by Donald Denoon, 'The Transvaal labour 
crisis 1901-1906', Journal of African Histary, v 7, 3, 1967, pp 481-482. 
11 Enacted as Low 21 of 1895 amending Law 11 of 1887 
12 Hobart Houghton & Dogut, v 2, doc 3.4.7, pp 85-91 
populot ion in the Transvaal, he calculated, was distributed thus: 
On private fanns owned by Europeans or companies 
On establ ished government locations (reserves) 
On crown lands 
On land owned by Africans 
On remainder of the Transvaal 
One-fifth 
One-fifth 
One-eighth 
One-twelfth 
Two-fifths 13 
To appreciate the range and effect of the Squatters ' Low, a knowledge 
of how Africans fared in the various areas is essential. Questions gennone to such 
on analysis are: what measure of freedom did Africans I iving in different areas 
enjoy? Whom would the Squatters' Lawaffect? Where were the people 
affected by the Squatters' Low to be resettled? Would they have a choice? 
What would they prefer? 
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The Squatters' Law would not affect Africans I iving on government locations 
or reserves and on land they owned themse lves. African farms were owned by 
individuals or tribes under the SAR . 14 On these fanns the Africans were completely 
free of state control . The locations and reserves were defined areas held by the 
government in trust for Africans, and Africans there were subject to I imited state 
control. In the more remote districts of the Northern and Eastern Transvaal where 
many of these locations were situated, Africans were still relatively independent 
15 
of working for wages at the turn of the century, says Sheila van der Horst. 
A second category, African tenants on unoccupied white-owned land -
held in the main by large land companies closely associated with the mines 16 -
13 Report on the acquisition and tenure of land by natives in the Transvaal, 
24 July 1904, p 3. Sir Godfrey Lagden was appointed as the only represen-
tative of this commission to enquire into the past history, distribution and 
general condition and location of African tribes in the Transvaal. Reports 
of widespread unsettlement and refusal by Africans to vacate land they had 
re-occupied during the Anglo-Boer War had led to this enquiry. The report 
gives full official details of land held in trust, occupied and acquired by 
Africans between 1836 and 1899 . 
14 Africans were forbidden to own land in their own righ t until 1905 in the 
Transvaal (case Tsewu v Registrar of Deeds, 1905 TPD 130-8). The most 
common fonn of purchase was through an intermediary, usually a mission 
society . See 1904 Land Commission for full details of acquisitions. The 
impl ication here that Africans I iving on mission stations were entirely free 
is not quite accurate, for a complex productive relationship existed between 
the mission society and their African tenants. They were, however, out of 
reach of control by either the state or the farming community. 
15 Van der Horst, p 153 
16 For an unders tanding of the confl icting in te rests of mines and farms and their 
atti tude to the land purchases of successive govemments, it is essential thot 
the mines' interest in land be fully grasped. This is dealt with more fully 
below, pp 149-154 and nn 4.44 and 4.46. 
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were also fairly independent. 17 So were those on crown land, because although 
they had "the govemment fo r landlord its control was very I imited. In fact, Africans 
on crown land were better off because they paid £1 less than tenants did on the 
farms and also had free grazing and water for their cattle. landless Africans there-
18 fore, preferred these crown areas . On African preference for crown land Donald 
Denoon records: 
The I iabil ity to work was less onerous and less arbitrary for squatters 
than for labour tenants, and was paid for at Government rates:- £1 
per annum per adult - was significantly lower than the real rent in 
labour, cash and kind paid to farmer landlords. Again, through 
lack of staff, the Government was remiss in collecting rents: the 
Landowners' Association angrily protes ted that the land Department 
had collected only £5 000 of a possible £27 000, with the result 
that many of the members' tenants were abandoning their landlords 
to settle on Crown land instead. 19 
Tenants ('squatters' under the Squatters' law of 1895)20 were said to be 
living illegally on unoccupied white and crown land although in most cases they 
hod owned this land before it had been appropriated by whites. Had the Squatters' 
law been appl ied, it would have affected whole tribes in these so-called unauthor-
ised locations scattered throughout the Transvaal. 21 
Finally, there were Africans living on occupied white farms. These 
tenants were of three kinds: those working unpaid for a set time period in lieu of 
rent; those who worked for cash wages if rent was levied; and the share-cropper 
17 A distinction is often made be "tween great locations (land occupied indepen-
dently of white landlords) and small locations (land hired, leased or rented 
from absentee landlords). Apart from the land companies, individual farmers 
often possessed "two farms. The second one could serve as a 'labour farm' 
where tenants resided who gave a specified period of service in return for the 
land. 
18 For details on crown land, see above pp 70- 72. 
19 SA NAC report, v 4, p 834, evidence of TlOA quoted by Denoon, pp 484-
485 
20 On the term 'squatter', Sheila van der Horst writes (p 144): 'Confusion os to 
the exact meaning of the term combined with the reluctance of farmers to 
admit that they permitted squa tting on their farms, makes it impossible even 
to estimate the locol or relative number of Natives living in these different 
ways.' These remarks are endorsed, but given the urgent demands by farmers 
to abolish squatting this practice was obviously widespread. To avoid confu-
sion, when 'squatter' is used here it applies to all Africons who hired, leased 
or rented land from the state or whites and who pa id either in cash or kind. 
Contemporary terminology included such terms as rack-renter, cash-tenant, 
half-share farmer, cash-cropper and 'kaffir farmer'. These are therefare 
synonyms for 'squatter' . 
21 The largest concentrations were in the Zoutpansberg, Lydenburg, Waterberg 
ond Middelburg districts. For descriptions of these areas, see above Pp 73-83 
and SC 60-17, paras 2383ff. 
or half-share farmer who gave part of h is crops to the farmer instead of rent or 
labour. 22 Sometimes grazing, water and arable land was included in the 
23 (unregistered) can tract. Even these tenants - also often termed squatters -
lived independently outside their contractual period of service, unlike full-time 
servants who worked throughout the year and were paid in either cash or kind. 
The aim of the 1895 Squatters' Law was to achieve a fairer distribution 
of labour amongst the farmers. This would have meant limiting each farmer to a 
maximum of five tenants and redistributing the 'surplus' tenants amongst the 
formers rather than removing them. The law had been unenforceable, however, 
because farmers claimed that the extra tenants squatting on their farms provided 
them with a reservoir of labour to draw on for their seasonal needs. They argued 
that stote control could be extended to squatters living on crown land, unoccupied 
land and the reserves instead so that Africans from these areas could be used to 
augment their supply. On ly then would they be prepared to reduce the number 
of tenants on their farms. The Transvaal Labour Comm ission in 1903 described the 
farmers' views on the Squatters' Low thus : 
They were all of the opinion that the farmers thraughout the Transvaal 
are unable to obtoin an adequate supply of labour; tha t of the natives 
living on Government farms, on unoccupied forms and in locations 
very few can be induced to work for farmers; and that owing to this 
condition of affairs the farming industry is carried on under the 
greatest difficulties. 24 
Farmers' case for squatter eviction 
So, farmers' demands focussed on the problem of squatting on unoccupied 
land. They demanded the enforcement of the Squatters' Law in full in these areas, 
but at the same time they vehemently opposed extending the reserves to accommo-
date evicted squatters . They also rejected the idea of Africans getting the right 
to buy extra land for themselves. Detailed evidence along these I ines was given 
to the three bodies that were investigating at the some time - the Transvaal 
22 This class, the so-called labour tenants, gave service in lieu of rent. They 
usually resided on the land of the landlord/master, but could have resided 
on the second unoccupied 'labour farm' of the same person - in which case 
they were variously classed as squatters, 'kaffir farmers' or labour tenants. 
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23 It should also be noted that the head of the household usually remained a cash-
tenant (squatter), bu t his chi ldren, wife and dependants could be called upon 
to labour for a stipula ted period, o r work as domestic servants, seasonal or 
casual labourers. 
24 Hobart Houghton & Dagut, v 2, pora 23, p 85 
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Labour Commission, SA NAC and the Lagden Transvaal Land Commission. 25 The 
farmers suggested three ather ways to increase the farm labour supply: compulsion, 
either direct or indirect, modifications of the native tribal system,26 ar changes 
in native land tenure. 27 Compulsion was the most popular ideo, apparently 
because farmers felt it was the only way to get immediate results. 28 What pressures 
would improve the labour supply best? Force all Africans to work for a set period 
each year, some farmers said, perhaps by cutting down drastically on their right 
to land. Push Africans into the wage economy by new taxation, said others. Or 
stop them from finding refuge anywhere: step up state control of the reserves, 
especially those near the Transvaal in Bechuanaland and Swaziland, or even 
abolish them. To sugar the pill, they said, the tenant formers on each farm should 
get arable and grazing rights, reasonable fixity of tenure, and legol safeguards in 
the form of registered work contracts. This, however, created problems for the 
white formers with only a limited amount of land, and for the farmers who formed 
intensively. Labour tenants could be lured away from them by large landowners 
who could offer these conditions of service. As one wauld expect, then, it was 
this group of large landowners who emphasised the value of restricting formers to 
five tenants eoch and using only full-time wage labourers . Although still a 
minority, they insisted that this aspect of the law be strictly applied. 29 
Even if all this did not attract enough labour, 
Under the provisions of the Pass Law, where it deals with labour, 
owners whose lands are thus occupied would have a reosonable 
preference of the labour of the adul t males resident on their forms. 30 
The farmers' response was summed up: 
25 Donald Denoon, Southern Africa since 1800, pp 129-132 
26 The merits of a pal icy of detribalisation or retribalisation and the supply of 
labour were discussed in chap 3, p 124-126 below. 
27 See especially the discussion on the Glen Grey system of individual tenure 
and how this was linked to the supply of labour, chap 2 above, pp 58-60. 
28 Hobart Houghton & Dagut, v 2, para 88, p 88 
29 Although throughout this discussion farmers are referred to in general terms, 
fhese distinctions show that farmers did not all have similar interests and 
attitudes to squatting. Small farmers and progressive formers who formed inten-
sively opposed all forms of squatting because it led to maldistribution of the 
labour supply and it was uneconomical. This group however had no other 
alternative but to compete with thei r less progress ive colleagues by offering 
privileges in kind. This distinction should be kept in mind when farmers 
generally are referred to. 
30 Hobart Houghton & Dagut, v 2, para 88, p 88. See olso SANAC report, v 5, 
Q 39950, where the Secretory for Native Affairs gives details of these 
draconian laws. 
Witnesses generally anticipated that the result of this policy would 
be that the heads of native families having been thus provided for, 
the surplus adult males would find it ta their interests to seek labour 
among the farmers or elsewhere. Natives would no longer squat on 
unoccupied farms and the Govemment lands, nor crowd into loca-
tions beyond the number that those locations could support under 
decent conditions . 31 
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The whole idea of coercion hinged on the state getting absentee landlords 
to cooperate. If these landowners - individual farmers and land companies -
agreed to end squatting on their land, all those Africans could be moved to 
occupied farms. 32 The farmers of course presupposed in this case that the state 
would not extend the reserves. Another presupposition, given this arrangement, 
was that the mines would be catered for by the 'surplus' labour on their farms. 
Surplus here meant the families and dependants of tenants who, once they had 
served their contractual period, would be free to work elsewhere. 
State's case against eviction 
These ideas about how to make the best use of the available labour supply 
had arisen before: they had produced the Squatters' Law of 1895 in the first place. 
But even as law they could not be applied. In 1899 General Cronje, Superinten-
dent of Natives, said it was impossible to move the' Native from crown land as the 
locations were tao small'. Instead, he said, 'Natives should be allowed on Govern-
ment farms more especially in those districts where it was unhealthy for whites, 
such as Lydenburg, Waterberg and Zoutpansberg,3~ many of these areas being 
still sparsely populated. He urged settling them in state locations because they 
would not 
go to work with Boers, as they do not wish to live on barren fields. 
The consequence of this is that they fly across the borders, and in 
that way many are lost. 34 
The so-called squatters, understandably wanting ta avoid I ife on the 
'barren fields' of Boer farms, were reluctant to move. Lagden's response in 1903 
was: 
31 Hobart Houghtan & Dagut, v 2, para 27, p 86 
32 Ibid 
33 Ouoted in Memorandum on Occupation of Lands by Natives Bill 1908 
furnished to the Transvaa l Land Owners' Association by the Government when 
forwarding the draft of the Bill 1908 (Land memo 1908), p 14 
34 Ibid 
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it would be inadvisable to summarily disturb this form of occupation 
at the present time in certain districts. Were such done, it would 
tend to place a good deal of land out of cultivation which is now of 
benefit to the country and at the same time probably, besides entail-
ing a direct loss to the publ ic revenue, drive away across our borders 
very many people who contribute to the labour supply, and are of 
great value from industrial points of view. 35 
How did Africans generally benefit the country? First, as Lagden said, 
they did some farming themselves. 36 Then, those on unoccupied land were a 
source of labour, for the mines particularly, and males over 18 years of age paid 
£2 a year in tax, amounting to a sizeable revenue for the state. 37 
Cronje and Lagden both implied the SAR had no means of enforcing the 
law because Africans on crown lands and unoccupied private farms were outside 
the government's control . Even when the government had tried to enforce the law 
in Pietersburg, for example, Africans had trekked away across the borders. Hence 
Cr01je ' s sugges tion that Africans be moved into Zoutpansberg, Lydenburg and 
Waterberg . tvlalarial, dry, hot and isolated these areas might be,38 but suitoble 
nevertheless because there the government had a fair amount of control. 
Landowners' case against eviction 
Individual farmers opposed the removal of squatters from private farms. 
More often than not the farmer who objected was an absentee landlord himself, 
owning a second farm unoccupied which he kept as a 'labour farm'. He could 
then demand that his tenants work three months a year on the main farm in lieu of 
rent. In a labour-starved community, farmers who enjoyed a continuous supply of 
labour from this source would be loath to surrender their advantage. Others again 
35 Ibid, P 15 
36 Donald Denoon wri tes: 'white ownership of land, in many cases, developed 
into a veneer of white ownership, superimposed upon actual African land use. 
With the possage of time, two further possibilities arose: the African tenant 
might acquire sufficient cash or sufficient goods with which to buyout the 
white owner; or he might prove himself so efficient and so capable of produc-
ing a good annual rentol, that he acquired in effect a long-term lease. ' 
(p 129) The agitation for legislation to put an end to share-cropping and the 
right to buy land (extended to Transvaal Africons in 1905) lends weight to 
Denoon's arguments. 
37 On revenue, see Hobart Houghton & Dagut, v 1, P 344 where recapitulation 
of income and expenditure for 1899 is given. 
38 Compare this description with those in chap 2 above, p 74 and chap 5 below, 
p 175. 
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charged a cash renfOl of anything between £5 and £20 a year, the higher rents 
being paid on the more productive farms of the highveld. 39 
The mines' conflict with the farms 
The major land companies also wanted squatters to sfOy undisturbed on 
their own land, although they did not object to the removal of squatters on crown 
land. Represented by the TlOA, they set out their objections in a lengthy memo-
randum written in 1908,40 reveal ing some complexities of the labour problem and 
the confl icting interests of mines and farms. The TlOA wanted the Squatters' law 
repeoled, and in its stead ' the principle be adopted that natives who work as bona 
fide employees be exempted from their taxes'. 41 The TlOA suggested more than 
once that as the Squatters' law was an 
attempt to make natives work especially for the white farmer, the 
best way to attain success would be by means af raising the rent on 
crown land to a rate which would approximate to the value of the 
services rendered by the Native squatter to the owner on an occupied 
farm. 42 
In other words the land company owners wanted the farmers to draw labour from 
the crown areas rather than unoccupied private farms. Why was that? 
Most land company owners owned or had shares in mines. For instance, 
of the Comer Hause group of companies,43 A P Cartwright wrote: 
that apart from gold mines the group controlled, and its large interest 
in De Beers and the Diamond Syndicate, it was the biggest landowner 
in the country, for through the Transvaal Consolidated land and 
Exploration Company (TCl), it controlled some 2400000 acres 
(l 142857 morgen). 44 
39 1904 Transvaal land Commission (lagden), appendix 7, and NAD report, 
UG 10-13, pp 13-14 
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40 Copy of notes on the 'Squatters' Act' ~ icJor 'Occupation of Lands by Natives 
Bill, 1908' (Baily memo) addressed to the members of the Squatters' Act sub-
committee of the TLOA by H A Baily, secretary, 10 February 1908. This docu-
ment (which includes a commentary on the 1908 Transvaal Native Tax Act) is 
housed in the SAIRR library. This Bill is discussed below, p 153. 
41 Ibid, P 16 
42 Ibid, P 15. See also TLOA evidence to SANAC quoted in n 4.19 above. 
43 See A P Cartwright, Golden age: The story of the industrialisation of South 
Africa and the part played in it by the Comer House group of companies. (The 
Corner House group of companies included Wernher Beit & Co; Eckstein & Co; 
Rand Mines Ltd; and the Central Mining Investment Corporation and its asso-
ciated Transvaal Consolidated Land & Exploration Co.) 
44 Ibid, P 17 
Originally land compan ies bough t land for its agriculturol potential, but later 
the mining possibilities of these farms attracted men looking for mining Oreos. As 
Cortwright notes: 
It must be remembered that gold had been foun d in the north-east 
at Pilgrim's Rest, Graskop and Sabie, and at Barberton. Between 
these fields and the Witwatersrand there lay some 200 000 square 
miles of land that had never been prospected. With land at 2s 6d 
an acre it required little capital to form a syndica te. 45 
He mentions Eckstein, Sammy tv'Y:lrks, Abe Bailey, Alois Nellmapius
46 (whose 
1 262777 acres were later acquired by TCl), the Marais family, T B Bourke 
and T W Beckett (proprietor of the biggest store in Pretoria): 'all owned, or were 
members of syndicates that owned, farms in Rustenburg, Waterberg, Middelburg 
and lydenburg districts. ,47 
Squatters were doubly valuable as they meant labour as well as rents to 
the land companies. As long as the land companies could ensure that Africans 
continued I iving on their farms they would cont inue to enioy a monopoly over 
this source of labour. So, as far as the land company owners were concerned, it 
was imperative to keep Africans out of the formers' clutches if mining interests 
were involved. African tenants were also encouraged to settle on land company 
farms because the perpetuation of the migrant labour system depended on the 
African peasants keeping a family anchorage on the land. 48 It was in the mines' 
interests therefore to secure a subsistence base for potential mineworkers - and 
where better than on land company land over which the mines through their agents 
could be sure of being able to exert some control? Any attempt to disturb this 
pattern would be strongly resisted by those with mining interests, and by those 
interested in seeing mining reach its pre-war level of productivity. 
The landowners were outspoken in putting their case against eviction. 
Like Cronie, they feared that eviction under the Squatters' law would drive 
Africans across the border. As they put it in 1903: 
45 Ibid, p 268 
46 African & European Investment Co was a subsidiary of lewis & tv'Y:lrks; SA 
Townships Mining & Financing Co and Transvaal Gold Exploration & land Co 
merged with lydenburg Mining Estates in 1895, to be known thereafter os 
Transvaal Gold Mining Estates owning properties which covered 200 000 
acres extending over 30 miles across. This pre liminory evidence shows an inti-
mate relationship between ownership and con trol of the lorgest registered land 
companies by different mining houses. No empirical study, it seems,has yet 
been done on the nature of this association, but some of the implications with 
regard to labour supply and control are suggested here. 
47 Cartwright, p 268 
48 On migrant labour and the mines see pp 91-93 above ond 230-232 below. 
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in order to limit the danger of the Transvoal losing a large number 
of its native inhabitants, a uniform South African Squatters' Law is 
essential, otherwise the Colony which introduces a stringent measure 
will suffer. 49 
Losing Africans also meant losing labour. 
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The Squatters' Law threatened landowners in yet another way. Africans 
unable to produce enough crops for the ir cash needs had been forced into the 
labour market. As long as they hired land on company farms, they were easily 
traced, for rent and tax were collected by the land company agents who also acted 
as recruiters for the mines. A variation of this was the appointment of traders as 
recruiters. When unable to pay their rent, taxes or debts, Africans could sell 
the ir labour and in retum the trader would cover the ir debts for them. Assured of 
having these debts repaid on the labourers' return and certain of a recruiting fee 
into the bargain, traders developed the common practice of encouraging indebted-
h . Af· 50 ness amongst t e,r ncan customers. 
Losing Africans not only meant losing labour but also rent. Land companies 
had a basic unit charge of 
£2 per Native adult and £2 for every youngster whether he is married 
or not, as soon as he is entered in the Native affairs register as a 
taxpayer. 51 
Charges were levied on extra wive~ and grazing fees of large and small stock were 
additional. According to the NAD report of 1907 there were 495 783 Africans 
living on private farms. 52 If one takes a family as a unit of five, roughly 100 000 
souls, the rent accruing from the heads of household alone would be about £200 000. 
Hence, like the individual farmer, the land company owners were receiving a 
considerable return from the land. If in addition the land company held land in 
productive areas, beneficial occupation by peasant cu ltivators ensured that the 
value of the land would not decline. In the agriculturally poor areas, where few 
whites would contemplate ever buying land, the landowner was still assured of a 
steady income from his African tenants. 
49 Land memo 1908, p 5 
50 E S Haines, 'The Transkei troder', SA Journal of Economics , v I, 1933, 
pp 201-216; also evidence of H M Taberer, NC, to the Transvaal Labour 
Commission 
51 This was a uniform rental paid by tenants hiring land on the farms of companies 
represented by TLOA. As indicated previously there was no fixed rental for 
Africans on unoccupied farms owned by ind ividuals - see above pp 148-149. 
52 Quoted in Baily memo, p 17 
Lastly, as the TLOA pointed out, eliminating squatting on private forms 
would mean a moss resettlement of Africans and their stock. The 806818 morgen 
classified as private forms in 1907 held 495 783 families. On the number of stock 
Boily in 1908 quoted figures from the Registrar of Deeds: 
in the Zoutponsberg alone, from the returns in his possession, the 
Natives own about 100000 head of cottle, as against 34 485 Depart-
mental estimates. Lydenburg he estimates at 50 000 head, Barberton 
at 10000 head and Middelburg at 10000 head. The Departmentol 
estimate of these districts is 37 670. I think the toto I returns of 
native-owned cottle will exceed 300000 head. 53 
The TLOA noted: '0 very large proportion of th is stock is the property of the 
natives settled in districts unoccupied by whites, and therefore [alsoJ subject to 
54 
removal. ' 
Where, they asked, were these families and their stock to be resettled? 
Who would control them if they were chased away as 'squatters'? As the TLOfl. 
said: 
What guarantee will the government now give private owners that 
they will so control the Natives after removal that they sholl not be 
able to escape observation in large numbers ond hive off again to 
private forms? It will be on easy matter for a Native to escape 
observation, as the country is vast and unoccupied by Whites and 
may remain so for many years to come. The number of South African 
constabulary to-day in the rural areas amounts to 195 or approximately 
one man for every 260 square miles. 55 
56 In 1907 government locations totalled 1 056818 morgen. The 1904 
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Lands Commission hod laid down strict boundaries for the different African chief-
doms to prevent further expansion. fl.s it was, these were pretty full already in 
1904 without the possible influx of over two million people who would be forceably 
removed if the Squatters' Low was appl ied. The formers, Lagden argued, could 
not toke in anything like that number either, especially as most (with the exception 
of small landowners) olready hod their own complement of resident workers. 57 
53 Letter by Registrar of Deeds to TLOA, 31 January 1908, quoted in Boily memo, p 19 
54 Ibid 
55 Ibid, P 19 
56 Transvaal Land Commission report 1904, oppendix 3, p 79 ff 
57 Boily memo, p 17 and Transvaal Native Affairs annual report, June 1909, 
TG 16-10 
Land company owners who more often than not had persona I vested 
interests in the mines as shareholders, were also close to the seat of power at 
Whitehall. Their arguments would therefore corry a greot deal of weight. Since 
the Transvaal Labour Commission had stated in 1903 that their investigation showed 
there was insufficient labour in Southern Africa for the gold mines, the colonial 
legislature would be very reluctant to enforce any low which would interfere with 
the mines' existing labour supply. Their main concern was to get the gold mines 
back to their pre-war productivity and in the circumstances the government sided 
with the mining sector: it refrained from a stric t implementation of the Squatters' 
Low, despite the formers ' counter claims and demands. 58 
The formers' Squatters Bills 1908 
The labour crisis come to a head aga in between 1906 and 1908. There 
were several causes. The failure of squatting measures in the Transvaal had been 
59 
cushioned in 1903 by the decision to indenture 10000 Chinese labourers. In 
the ORC the colonial representatives had agreed in 1903 to amend the tvlaster and 
Servan ts' Law so that it applied to farm tenants as it had to full-time servants. 60 
This meant that all farm tenants had no option but to serve a stipulated period in 
return for the right to occupy land on a private farm. Breach of contract was also 
considered a criminal offence. This brought some relief to the farmers there. In 
the Cape, the Private Locations Act had been amended to restrict squatting on 
unoccupied farms and crawn lands, while in Natal the low was strictly applied, 
severely limiting the sale of land to individual Africans. 61 
58 Evidence for the close relationship between the mining capital ists and Milner 
during the reconstruction period is to be found in an unpubl ished article by 
Donald Denoon, 'Capitalist influence and the Transvaal Government during 
the Crown Colony period' lent to me by Professor Davenport. Denoon brings 
out the infl uence of a section of the mining magnates in shaping native policy 
(and every other major department of government ) in this article. Of particu-
lar interest are his remarks on Sir Godfrey Lagden who chaired SA NAC and 
the Transvaal Land Commission. On Lagden he writes (p 8): 'The Commissio-
ner of Native Affairs, Godfrey Lagden, was intellectually feeble and tempe-
ramentally unstable: through assiduous flattery, the members of the Chamber 
persuaded him of his abilities, and helped him draft his policies.' 
59 See Peter Richardson, 'tvlabilizing labour for the South African gold mines: 
The recruiting operations of the Transvaa l Chamber of Mines in South Africa: 
1903-1905', ICS, v7, 21, pp 117-138, and Denoon, 'The Transvaal labour 
crisis ... ', Journal of African History, v 7, 3, 1967, pp 481-494. 
60 SC6a-17,para 2666, evidence ofAMBaumonn; and see n 5.52 below. 
61 tvlarks, pp 119-144; Slater, pp38-53 
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These expedients proved unsatisfactory. Drought, followed by a slump 
in 1906, brought many formers to the brink of bankruptcy. 62 In 1907 the decision 
to repatriate Chinese mineworkers and the industrial strikes hod brOJght labour to 
crisis point in the mines. Coupled wi th this labour crisis, the rebellion of Africans 
in Notal forced whites in all four stoles to question the basis of their separate 
Af ' I" 63 ncan po rc res. 
Whites in the Transvaal also took fright at the Supreme Court judgement 
in 1905 in the case of Tsewu v Registrar of Deeds which gave Africans the right 
to buy land freehold - something which hod only been possible th rough on inter-
mediary before this date. The new right for Africans made whites feel all the 
more insecure at a time when growing rural poverty was driving whites off the land 
into the· towns. 64 Africans, who were already considered a commercial threat in 
the marketing of produce, would now be given the chance to compete with whites 
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in buying land. 65 This increased the threat of commercial competition. In the 
meantime forming on shares between whites and their African tenants was becoming 
more widespread. This practice displaced the bywonEn, for the lotter, unlike the 
Africans, did not offer labour to the landlord in addition to a return in cash or kind. 
These developments threatened 'the traditiona I moster-servant relationship and were 
denounced with alarm . 66 . 
These events culminated in a strong line being taken on squatting and the 
hiring, leasing or purchasing of land by Afrlcans. The legislatures of the Transvaal 
and ORC were the most vehement. These bodies, with responsible government from 
1906 and 1907 respectively, hod majorities of Dutch-speaking farmers . 67 The 
stage was set for posing the squatter problem again. Both Houses gazetted Bills 
that set daunting penalties against landholders and Africans who continued to hire, 
lease or cultivate land on shares. 68 
62 Transvaal Indigency Commission report, TG 13-08, p 10; and UG 49-23, p 5 
63 Shula Marks writes (p xx) on the lessons learnt by both block and white from 
the events of 1906-1908: 'apart from all else, the policy of allowing "native 
affairs" to drift was questioned; the Africans had somehow to be token into 
account. For many whites Notal's experience showed the urgent need for 
white unity and a single "native pol icy".' 
64 De Kiewiet, pp 193-195, and below chop 7,pp 251-252 
65 See Denoon, quoted above in n 4.36. 
66 This is discussed more fully below in chap 7. 
67 G H L Ie May, British supremacy in South Africa, chop 7; N G Garson, 
'Het volk', Historical journal, v 9, 1, 1966, pp 101-132 
68 The Transvaal Bill dealt with residence of labourers on farms, in Afric~n 
locations, mission stations, urban villages and townships. The Free State 
Bill was on anti-squatting measure designed also to outlaw share-farming. 
The farmers rei ished these proposals, which met their demands in full. 
But others strongly criticised the Transvaal's Occupa tion of Lands by Natives Bi"-
of 1908. A Cape advocote, J M Orpen, sa id: 
This Bill to prevent Natives from making a living by ag riculture or 
pasturage would go so for as to reduce the Blacks to an absolutely 
servile con dition throughout the country. It is said to be at present 
lying in the Colonial Office, not disallowed, but reserved for 
further consideration. It is believed that the enforcement of this 
law wou ld cause the eviction of a large population of Natives 
(600 000 was mentioned) who have for mony years been engaged on 
farms and for whom there would be no room elsewhere, as the 
Native Reserves are overcrowded. 69 
The same was said of the revised Squatters' Law tabled but disallowed in the ORe. 
Both these measures had two distinct objects: ' to prevent the farming and rack 
renting of Na ti ves' and 'to bring about a more satisfactory distribution of native 
70 labour on the forms'. In the Transvaal measure, though, provision was also made 
for 'the esta blishment, regu la tion and control of Loca tions , Mission Stations and 
Native Townships'. It was thus the first comprehens ive land Bill dealing with 
Africans on all classes of land including "fricans in urban areas . 71 
The fact that both these measures were disallowed at the time meant they 
had no immediate significance. Their implications in the long term were to be far-
reaching, however, as will emerge in a later analysis of the land and labour 
measures introduced by Hertzog after 1924 - but this anticipates later developments 
h . I" d I 72 w ose Imp Icatlons we nee not exp ore now. 
As could be expected, many opposed the Bill s out of self-interest. 
Leading the opposition were the landowners and mining sector. The TLOA threa t-
ened: 
If the government proposals are such as the first draft Act [Natives' 
Occupation of Lands Bill] sign ifies , then owners should combine 
and face the government unitedly wi th a request to remove a ll 
Natives off members' private farms . 73 
Such a move would release the landowners from having to pay the prohibitive 
I icences which ranged from £1 for every family over five to £5 per year where the 
69 J M Orpen, The native guestion in connection with the South Africa Bill, p II 
70 See also Transvaa l Gazette Extraordinary 529 of 1908, Government Notice 484; 
ORC Gove rn men t Gazette 599 of 1908, Government Notice 362. 
71 It is interesting to note that section 9 (2) sta tes: 'It shall not be lawful to 
grant or transfer ta any native any title to land in a township, other than a 
vill age established or recognised under this section.' For urban policy, see 
chap 8 below . 
72 Chap2 above, p 100 and n 2 .136, and P 168 below. 
73 Baily memo, p 20 
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number of families exceeded fifty. But this wos'a veiled threat; their real objec-
tions and alternative plan they stated thus : 
The extension of the Location system is the on Iy proper method of 
dealing with this question. The Boer leaders hove openly stoted 
their views on the matter. They are opposed to the idea. If the 
system of segregation of Na tives on Crown land is not practical, 
the alternative is to regulate the terms of settlement of Natives on 
private land, but no limit can obviously be placed on the numbers 
allowed to squat. 74 
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Their suggestion of how this se ttlement of Africans on private farms should 
be regulated shows exactly where the true interests of land company owners lay. 
They argued: 
The terms to be arranged should be of such a nature that, while they 
do not compel a Native to leave his holding, they should not at the 
same time be so easy as to allow him to squat in idleness, nor, on 
the other hand, so harsh as to amount to rock renting. 75 
In short, the only acceptable arrangement would be for the government to ensure 
Africans enjoyed a partial subsistence from their land. They were vehement in 
their opposition to the clause that prohibited wives and children from staying on 
white land unless they were actually paid servants of the white owners, but they 
agreed with the farmers that progressive peasant farming amongst Africans was 
against their interests because it enabled Africans to spend their time in 'idleness' 
on the land. Yet unlike the farmers, the land company owners did not wont I>fricans 
to become wholly dependent on the modern sector for their existence . 
Thus mining capital - influential in Whitehall - fought the Bills that 
favoured the farmers at their expense. It was argued that the mines' labour supply 
could not be disrupted just when the Chinese labourers had left. The decision to 
repatriate these indentured men intensified the rivalry between the mines and forms 
for labour because it agai n emphasised the rei iance of both on the local labour 
supply. Departmental officials in thei r turn had pointed out that these Bills were 
premature as there still was the problem of where to resettle the thousands of squat-
ters. Those working for closer union between the four colonies feared on the one 
hand that the Bills would hamper negotiations, and suggested on the other that 
Union with the inclusion of the High Commiss ion territories could be the answer 
for resettling Africans. The Bills should therefore be delayed. 
74 Ibid, p 19 
75 Ibid, P 20 
Labour taxes before 1910 
Under the circumstances, as Orpen noted, the Colonial Office kept these 
Bills for further consideration. To appease the farmers they let through the Native 
Taxation Act in 1908. 76 This Act extended partial exemption to labourers residing 
on a proprietor's second farm. This exemption appl ied only ta tenants who gave 
90 days' service in the twelve months preceding the date of collection; but by 
including for the first time Africans squatting on privately owned, unoccupied 
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farms, the government gave legal recognition to the' labour farms'. This was done 
in the hope that tenants af these unoccupied farms would volunteer at least 90 days' 
service ta the farmers in order to avoid the increased tax . In addition, after 1908 
all foreign Africans - that is, those from outside the Transvaal - except those 
already under contract of service, had to pay tax if they stayed in the Transvaal 
mare than a year. (Six months was the period specified in the ORe.) This measure, 
reminiscent of the original pass fee, was designed to coerce foreign Africans en 
route or returning hame from the mines to offer three months' labour on a casual 
basis to the farmers. In this way the fa rme rs' seasonal demands for labour could be 
met without having to offer land and grazing rights in return for service. 
The additional tax was meant to force more Africans into the labour 
market. From 1908, moreover, taxes were to be paid promptly by Africans them-
selves. This relieved the under-staffed NAD of the responsibility of collecting 
from them. With the onus shifted on to every African male over 18 years to pay 
this tax or prove exemption, it was argued, the tax would work effectively as a 
labour measure. Non-payment meant immediate arrest. 
government gave was that 
The reason the 
defaulters have frequently escaped conviction on the technical 
ground that the prosecution must produce evidence of default. 
Such a caurse would entail considerable labour and production 
in Court of Registers and counterfoil receipt books from all parts 
of the country. In fact, it is difficult to see how a conviction 
could be secured under such circumstances without dislocating 
the work of collection. 77 
76 See Memorandum explaining reasons for variations between present Ordinance 
and the Draft Native Tax Amending Bill furnished to the TLOA 1908 (Tax 
memo). Evidence for this section has been drawn from this memo and should 
be compared with the section on farmers' demands before the Transvaal Labour 
Commission cited above, pp 146-147 
77 Tax memo, p 25. 
Thus began the farmal system af labaur tenancy in the Transvaal, and anather 
caercive measure had been added ta the statute baak designed ta farce Africans 
to enter the wage economy. 
This law, in merely regularising labour tenancy, left unresolved both 
the squatter problem and the matter of Africans being allowed to buy land freely. 
As Frankel said: 
The short-sighted outlook of the dominating agricultural class of 
white employers was able to see in this situation only one problem -
the donger that with the increased number of locations, and the 
independen t ownership of land by Natives, the labour supply became 
insufficient for their needs; the growth of the amount of land in 
Native possession must, therefore, be I imited. For was not the 
Native penetrating too deeply into the European areas, and was 
not the ideal of a 'White South Africa' in danger? 78 
These views and the fact that the labour crisis was no nearer a solution by 1910 
forced the first Union government to face this problem almost immediately. 
Partial solution in the Cape 
Even such a cursory survey of the labour problems and solutions in the 
pre-Union period makes it clear that, allowing for local differences, the labour 
problem in the wake of the mineral discoveries could not be solved along the 
traditional lines demanded by the farmers. The areas of conflict between mine 
and farm had been clearly defined, but no way through them had been found. 
This was still the position at Union when, with the Natives' Land Act of 1913, 
the labour problem was first tackled on a national basis . The farmers still made 
the same old demands. They urged the Botha min istry to abolish farming on shares 
and also the indiscriminate kind of squatting on unoccup ied land. Except in the 
OFS, the 1913 Act did neither. 
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The government's aim was to bring the farm labour pol icies of Natal and 
the Transvaal into line with the Cape where squatt ing and farming on shares had 
been controlled to some extent. But because the 1913 Act also delayed the immedi-
ate wholesale eviction of squatters from crown and unoccupied white-owned land 
in Natal and the Transvaal, it was never fully supported by traditional farmers or 
those who kept 'kaffir farms' either for labour or rent , even in the OFS. This-
together with the Act's concem to extend the African reserves for the resettlement 
78 NEe 1930-1932, typescript evidence of S H Frankel 
of evicted squatters from unoccupied white-owned farms - shows that the 1913 Act 
actually fovoured the mines, and not the farms as is usually supposed. 
We shall review the subject here, and shaw that the decision to extend 
the reserves by releasing extra land was motivated by the need to perpetuate the 
mines' migrant labour supply. It was not an altruistic move to compensate .Africans 
in Natal, the Transvaal and the Cape for the loss of their free right to buy land, 
nor did it have anything to do with 'allowing Africans to develop along their own 
I·, d" I' t' t 79 mes as tra Itlona Interpreta Ions sugges . 
Cape influence on the 1913 Act 
How for did the 1913 Act incorporate Cape labour policies? SANAC 
favoured the Cape laws in their report. 80 Along with most whites they thought 
that squatting by Africans on private lands should stop. After reviewing the anti-
squatting laws in each of the four states, however, they concluded: they approved 
of squatting as a policy, but it should be regulated along clearly defined lines. 81 
In recommending this policy, they went on to say: 'attention may be drawn to the 
Cape Colony system, which admits of private locations upon certain governing 
conditions,.82 As well as the Cape system ta control squatting on unoccupied 
land, they I iked the Cape way of cutting down squatters on occupied farms. Basing 
their recommendations on the Private Locations Act of 1899, they declared: 
that outside of bona fide servants of the owner no Native should be 
permitted to live on private land except under Government sanction 
and even then subject to an adequate annual licence to be paid to 
the owner. 83 
79 See n4. 108. The motives underlying the state's land policy are explored in 
chap 5, where traditional interpretations are also examined - see p 171. 
80 Although land tenure was dealt with in chap 2 (pp 58-60 ) SANAC's recom-
mendations have a bearing on the discussion here. They advocated individual 
tenure along Glen Grey lines, it will be remembered, so that the right of 
permanent occupation would be assured but subject to certain reservations not 
applied to white holdings. For examp le, Africans would lose their title if 
convicted af rebell ian, treason ar sedition; if they failed ta pay rent or tax 
punctually; or if they were convicted for a second t ime of stock theft. It 
was also recommended that (unless there were special ci rcumstances) the 
maximum holding should be approximately four morgen and no mortgaging 
should be permitted. Further, no transfer or 01 ienation af the land was to 
be allowed without government appraval. These recommendations should 
be borne in mind when assessing SA NAC's views on squatters. 
81 SANAC report, v I, para 175 
82 Ibid 
83 Ibid, para 181 
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They continued, 'As in the Cope, the principles oppl ied to privote property should 
be oppl ied to crown land.' However, they emphasised: 
removal can only be gradual after the most careful consideration, 
and under circumstances which will enable the Natives to find work 
and live el sew here .... 84 
SANAC therefore also believed that squatters should not be summarily evicted 
before additional land had been provided for their resettlement. Hence they 
recommended 
the creation, subject to adequate control, of native locations for 
residential purposes near labour centres or elsewhere, on proof that 
they a re needed. 85 
The principle of territorial segregation was therefore not presented as on a priori 
h b . 86 . I trut, ut possessory segregation certa In y was. 
The SANAC proposals, the Cope Private Locat ions ftct of 1899, and its 
1909 Amendment are significantly like the Natives' Land Act of 1913 (chapter 2 
and clauses 13 and 14 of the final chapter headed 'General and miscellaneous'). 
Comparison shows that J W Sauer drew on what he knew of Cope pol icies and the 
SANAC proposals when drafting his original Natives' Land Bill in 1913. This was 
not surprising since on ly in the Cape had labour tenancy been regularised and 
squatting effectively killed. His Bill set out to do the same for the whole country. 
limits on Cape squatting before 1913 
Anti-squatting measures date back to 1878 with the first attempt to 
restrict residence on white farms to bona fide employees. Other enabling ftcts 87 
followed, until in 1891 Walter Stanford, Chief /vIagistrate of Tembuland and 
84 Ibid, para 175 
85 Ibid, 
86 Brookes first used these terms to distinguish between a complete or residential 
segregotion which he soid was 'dead', and partial or possessory segregation 
which simply meont African rights to land were restricted to certain areas. 
These a reas cou Id be del imited so as to accommodate the labour needs of the 
whites on proof that such areas were needed. See Brookes, History of native 
pol icy ... , pp 320-321 . 
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87 A private location was defined by Act 8/1878 as ony number of huts exceeding 
five within an area of one square mile occupied by Africans not employed by 
the farmer. The definition was changed by Acts 37/1884, 33/1892 ond 30/ 
1899 by which time a private location meant any number of huts occupied by 
one or more African male adults other than those employed by the farmer. 
See Keppel-Jones, p 191. 
considered a staunch'Cape Liberal', 88 was able to write: 
There is no more vacant land for the young swarms to hive off into 
now. Thus the labour question is bound up with the land question. 
The man who has no land and no trade must work for someone else 
who hos. 89 
The shortage of land produced new problems. Landless Africans were being forced 
to rent land from farmers at exorbitant rates, an easy means of income which the 
whites affectionately termed 'farming kaffirs'. It became a widespread tradition 
in the Cape. This exploitation of landless Africans was partly why these private 
locations or 'kaffir farming' areas proliferated. There were other reasons, though, 
as Beaumont suggested in his 1916 report - for instance, why the Cape locations 
in the Great Kei valley were set up: 
The farms in the valley, especially those now occupied by the 
Natives, would not carry sheep on account of the heat prevail ing 
in the low lands. Cattle farming was attempted, but the prevalence 
of ticks more particularly in the bush veld parts rendered this industry 
unprofitable. Agricultural pursuits were, under the circumstances, 
quite an impossibility. It is not difficult, therefore, to understand 
that land in these parts of the country would be of very little value, 
and owners would be prepared to welcome the arrival of the Native 
lessee or squatter. Thus began what is humorously styled 'Black 
Persian' farming. On account of his I imited requirements, and with 
small winnings from his gardens and cattle, supplemented with 
liberal cash returns from the Gold Mines, the Kaffir would maintain 
himself, and, when in sufficient numbers, he could pay a handsome 
return to his landlord. 90 
This crude official account shows why absentee landlords and those interested in 
securing labour for the mines valued these locations on dead land. The locations 
even proved a convenient pool of seasonal labour for farmers nearby. These three 
white sectars would oppose any move to abolish them. 
However, as land arid labour got scarcer, farmers' complaints began to 
focus on the rural location system and the related problem of African squatting. 
A t the 1891 Congress, Rodney Davenport records, 
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88 Sir Walter Stanford, former Chief Magistrate of Tembuland and Superintendent 
of Native Affairs in the Cape Colony. He served on the SANAC 1903-1905; 
as Secretary for Native Affairs 1904-1908; as Cape delegate to the National 
Convention 1909; and on the Beaumont Commission 1913-1916. He wos seen 
as truly representative of the 'Cape Liberal' tradition. See Tatz, p 20. Like 
Sauer, he gave his support to the 1913 Natives' Land Act. 
89 Cape Notive Blue Book 1892, p 43. See also W T Brownlee's remarks, Cape 
Native Blue Book 1894, p 52 quoted by Brookes, History of native polic~., 
p 328. According to Brookes, p 109, Standford was closely associoted with 
the formulation of the Transkeian notive policy and the Glen Grey system . 
90 UG 19-16, appendix 8, p 9 
the Bondsmen pressed for radical changes in the Locations Act, 
urging the imposition of heavy penalties on individuals who maintained 
squatters on their land. They wanted legislation to prevent Africans 
who could not prove that they had a bona fide means of livel ihood from 
settling in locations, and to place all locations under the supervision 
of the Colonial police. 91 
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By 1899 almost all the farmers' demands had been met. Squatter permits had been 
made expensive and difficult to get; the number of adult males in each location 
had been limited to 40; all locations were put under the control of the NAD. 
Before issuing a licence to establish a private location, the needs of the particular 
farm had to be assessed. There was only one issue on which Cape farmers, I ike 
their northern counterparts, could get no satisfaction, however - how to end 
squatting altogether . The farmers urged 'the government not simply to prevent the 
estobl ishment of more locations, but so far as possible to abolish those which 
already existed'. 92 On the farmers' motives for such a move, Davenport writes: 
A good many Bondsmen undoubtedly hoped that the abol ition of the 
locations would force more Africans on to the labour market by making 
them dependent on the mercy of some farmer for a place of abode . 93 
In view of the difficulty of finding other places for squatters, the govern-
ment had refused to abolish est~blished locations in the Cape. However, an Amend-
ment in 1909 to the Private Locations Act gave the farmers some satisfaction. 94 
For the first time there was a distinction between labour tenants (needed for the 
farm) and squatters - who under the Act were now called ordinary tenants. The 
latter were to be phased out by charging a high licence fee of at least £36 a year, 
and making private locations conditional on the permission of both the divisional 
council and the Governor. The government hoped this would stamp out squatting 
by encouraging labour tenancy instead, as Africans now had no land to trek to and 
prohibitive licences to pay. 
Despite these new restrictions, the government stil l be lieved in keeping 
a territorial base for potential migrant workers, in the interest of the mines' labour 
supply. They therefore regulated private locations only on unoccupied private and 
crown lond. In the remaining locations the one-man-one-Iot in survey districts 
was to be encouraged, as an earl ier chapter has shown. 95 
91 Davenport,' The A frikaner Bond ... " p 301 
92 Ibid 
93 Ibid 
94 In 1907 the Cope Colony appointed a departmental commission to investigate 
land settlement on unreserved land, wi th a view to contro ll ing squatting and 
applying existing location laws. As a result of thi s report the Private Locations 
Act was amended. But the inadequacy of the land set aside for Africans had 
also been highlighted. To study this question a second commission was appointed. 
See Van Biljon, p 428, and Cape Colony, Reports of the NAC, G 26-10. 
95 Hence the appointment of the 1909 Select Committee. See also chap 2, pp 83-87. 
Squatters and labaur tenancy under the 1913 Act 
Chapter 2 of the 1913 Natives' Land Act extended the ban on the sale · 
of land between 'natives and nan-natives' to the hire, lease and sale of land 
outside the scheduled reserves. This was an attempt to regularise and I imit the 
different forms of tenancy on occupied farms throughout the Union. Clauses 13 
96 
and 14 referred - though the term was nowhere employed - to the squatters 
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I iving en masse on both occupied and unoccupied farms in the 'non-native' areas 
and giving, in return, a share of their crops or a cash rental . These clauses aimed 
eventua lly to outlaw these practices . But as Davenport and Hunt have shown, 
The Act did not authorise the actual eviction of Africans from white-
owned land, except insofar as this was already required by law, and 
Section 8(1)(a} expl icitly stated that existing agreements for the hire 
of land could remain in force until such time as Parliament had made 
provision for the release of further land for African use. 
Wilson sees the Act differently: 
The Act, like many laws before it, was aimed also at the elimination 
of 'Kaffir farming' ... (Africans who were allowed to live on their 
farms in return for rent paid either in cash or labour), the Act was 
97 
96 Although the term 'squatter' is not defined in the Act, Sol Plaatje writing in 
1913 described a squatter cis 'a native who owns some livestock and having 
no land of his own, hires a farm or grazing rights from a landowner' (p 17). 
See also House of Assembly Debates 1913, cols 2270-2298, and Davenport & 
Hunt, p 33. 
97 Davenport & Hunt, doc 68. This did not apply to the OFS where existing 
legislation prohibiting squatting, leasing and ploughing on shares was reasserted 
under Law 4 of 1895 . See Natives' Land Act 1913, section 7(1)(2}(3}. Daven-
port & Hunt argue that under this sec t ion contracts were not immediately 
invalidated in the OFS. Many Free State farmers, they suggest, after reading 
section 6(c} of the Act in conjunction with sections 7 and 8(2} concluded that 
they 'were obliged to force African farming partners either to leave the farm 
with their stock, or to sell their stock as a condition of remaining on as labourers. 
(doc 68, p 42) This view is not consis tent with that given by the Beaumont 
Commission report UG 22-16, P 3. There is also a possibility that Sauer intro-
duced section 7 (l )(2)(3) excluding the OFS into his second draft only after 
Hertzog had accused him on 28 February 1913 (when the Bill was first introduced) 
of not going far enough in his squatter provisions. See Gazette Extraordinory 
361, 5 May 1913, and Devenport & Hunt, doc 91, p 57. Why else did Sauer 
reassert the status quo in the OFS but specifically abolish the restrictions that 
applied in the Transvaal ? See Natives' Land Act 1913, section 6a (7). Until 
a copy of Sauer's original draft is found this assumption is necessarily tentative. 
I ittle more successful than its predecessors in compelling farmers to 
forego the benefit of substantial revenue from land whose opportun ity 
cost was negligible. Squatters continued to be 'an evil', in the eyes 
of fa rmers who did not have them. 98 
Wilson's .argument is based on a common misconception that the farmers wished to 
abolish all forms of squatting. Our earlier analysis of the Transvaal conditions 
shows farmers wanting the absentee landlords (including land companies) to be 
forced to evict all squatters from unoccupied land in the hope that these Africans 
would have to seek work on the farms. It also shows the mines opposing this 
policy. Hence the moratorium on evicting squatters before extra land had been 
secured for resettl ing them in 1913. 
Squatting, in the form of half-share farming, share-cropping, rack-
renting and all the other derogatory terms used to describe the tenant who lived 
on an occupied farm and paid for the privilege in cash or produce, was another 
matter entirely. Under no circumstances did the large landowner wish to see this 
man evicted. What he did want was some means to force him to labour for a set 
time each year - hence the 90-day exemption clause for all labour tenants in the 
1913 Act. 99 As had happened in the Cape, 100 the government obviously hoped 
that with an exemption from high fees, former squatters would opt for labour 
tenancy. 
As for the radical restriction on the number of labour tenants to five, 
this limit had been re-introduced to accommodate the demands of the small 
farmer and those who had begun farming intensively. Unable to offer land in 
exchange for service, these farmers - often the most progressive - were experi-
encing great difficulty in attracting labour. The govemment, by placing a 
moratorium on the eviction of 'surplus' labour tenants, showed they realised that 
this aspect of the law would also be unenforceable. In the main they lacked the 
means to redistribute labour tenants amongst the farmers, and they were not 
prepared to use force. Moreover, the farmer who kept a location on his farm 
opposed any attempt to interfere with his private labour reservoir, especially as 
the govemment could not guarantee to channe l the reserve ,IIfricans to the farms 
to meet the farmers' increased seasonal needs. 
98 F Wilson, 'Farming 1866-1966' in M Wilson & L Thompson (ed), The Oxford 
history of South Africa, v 2, p 128 
99 Natives' Land Act 1913, section 10(1) 
100 Report of the Select Committee on Native Affairs, SC 3-10, p 4 discussed 
the success of the Private Locations Act 1909 in the Cape, the recommended 
legislation broadly on the lines of the resolutions arrived at by the SA NAC. 
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The true objects of the labour clauses were summed up by Merriman: 
They came in a sort of half-hearted way and professed that they 
were against squatting. Now they were gaing to turn these squatters 
into something like Russian serfs. What was this idea of serfs? It 
was a man who lived upon the land and had to give service in return. 
They were going to wink also at this labour tenancy. If there was 
one thing that kept his country back it was labour tenancy. (Hear 
hear.) He had heard the Prime Minister declaim against the slovenly 
way in which these farms were worked by labour tenants. A man, 
instead of working his land like a European, hired a lot of families 
to squat upon it and work it. P.nd they were going to legitimise 
this. For four months a year these natives were going to scratch up 
a man's ground. Normally they were in a man's employment, but 
actually they were in the position of Russian serfs. A more degrading 
class of farming could scarcely be imagined, and the whole object 
of the Bill should be to do away with it. 101 
Contrast the official interpretation. According to the departmental Agricultural 
Journal, the Act was a 'death-blow' to 'kaffir farming' - always the bugbear of 
right-thinking farmers: 
It wi II mean the clearing off of large numbers of natives from European 
farms, the native simply being allowed to work in return for a wage. 
The result will be good, clean, straightforward farming, whilst land 
in non-native areas that.is not being farmed by Europeans will simply 
remain idle. ' 102 
What the Agricultural Department really wanted was a complete transformation in 
the system of farm labour, where only full-time wage labour was employed. This, 
even if farming land in the white areas had to stay idle to prevent Africans from 
avoiding work on the farms . 
The appointment of an official body ta determine individual farmers' 
labour needs was also a Cape method that had worked successfully. Yet most 
farmers condemned it. In a heated debate a Natal farmer challenged: 
'Squatters' and' Labour Tenants', which is another aggrava ting Clause. 
It practically places an employer of labour on a level with the appl i-
cant for a canteen I icence. He has to make all sorts of appl ications, 
and to advertise, and to pay an excessively high licence. Then again 
you have to make an application to a Mag istrate and he has ta consult 
the Divisional Counci l, and if there is not a Div isional Council, two 
or more persons nomina ted by the Governor- General- in-Council. Now 
what does the Divisiona l Council know about the conditions in that 
instance and what can the two men appointed by the Governor-General-
101 House of Assembly Debates, 5 June 1913, col 3150 
102 The Agricultural Journal of the Union of South Africa, v 4, 1, July 1913, 
p4 
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in-Council know about the quantity or the quolity of the work the 
former requires to be performed? .. I never sow such gross in terfer-
ence with the rights of the sub ject as appea rs in this Bill, and I am 
surpr ised that anybody pu ts up with it. 103 
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There was a stay of execution on these clauses until a commission had recommended 
what extra areas could be releosed. Only then would the saving clause go. By 
including the saving clause , however, Sauer showed that he sympathised with the 
mines' labour needs and not with those of the ira te farmers who were demanding 
to be left alone. He justified his action thus: 
The crux of the whole ma tter was the unsatisfactory position with 
regard to Native squatters. This was a Bill to make provision for 
the se ttlement of the squa t ter question by providing land or places 
to which they might go if they were removed from the farms. 104 
Linking the resettlement of squatters with the decision to first set aside other land, 
he argued that 'there were 200 000 squa tters in unlawful occupation in 1912' . He 
was convinced that' in the interests of the Natives it was well that the question of 
squatters should be dealt with'. Like his predecessors he was not prepared to 
abolish squa tting without first providing other areas for people. 
The OFS was exc luded from th is moratorium, 105 and in the Cape squatting 
was controlled under the 1909 Private Locations Act. What significance did Sauer's 
saving clause have for the Transvaal and Natal? 
Squatters and labour tenancy under the 1917 Bill 
There is enough evidence to suggest that despite vehement opposition 
from farmers, the government at the time of the Native Administration Bill in 1917 
was still set on its resettlement policy. In this connection it is important to realise 
that the Beaumont Commiss ion had already reported and the extra areas it recom-
mended releasing were listed in a schedule a ttached to the 1917 Bill . Once the 
Bill became law, therefore, ev ic ted squatters could in theory be sent to these 
oreas. That this was the government ' s intention is clear from the type of question-
naire sent to all magistrates a nd NCs by the 1917 Se lec t Committee. 106 In it 
103 Evidence of Senator J Schofield, SC 60-17, para 3477 
104 Quoted by the Johannesburg Joint Counci l, Memorandum 1, Natives' Land 
Act (1913) Amendment Bill, appendix D 
105 See above, n 4.97. 
106 The quesl'ionnaire asks specifica ll y for 'Approx imate number of families like ly 
to be turned off farms if provisions of Natives Land Act proh ibiting sowing on 
shares or leasing of land e tc . [ sic] by Europeans to Natives were strictly 
enforced.' See appendix C. 1. 
officials throughout the Union were asked about the 'approximate number of 
families I ikely to be turned off farms if provisions of the Natives' land Act 
prohibiting sowing on shares or leasing land etc . by Europeans to Natives were 
strictly enforced' • 
Had the emphasis been on the present and future needs of Africans 
restricted in the scheduled reserves and on what extra was needed to resettle 
Africans moved from white areas - which would accord with the professed aim of 
racial segregation - there would be some substance in saying that the 1913 Act 
was a precursor of the separate development policy. But this was never the case. 
At no time were predictions or projections called for ta assess the viability of the 
reserves as the Tomlinson Commission later had to do. The government was faced 
with possibly having to scrap renting agreements of roughly 200 000 families, 
Sauer said, and how and where were the government going to resettle nearly 
1 000 000 souls along with their stock? For this would have been the result if the 
anti-squatting measures had been immediately applied to Africans on unoccupied 
land in the white sectors of the Transvaal and Natal. 
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It would have been disastrous for the mines had most squatters agreed to 
convert the ir tenancy into a three-month labour service so as to keep some foothold 
on the land. Setting aside extra land was a pre-emptive move by the Botha govern-
ment to ensure that the mines' labour supply was not disrupted. 107 As ~ch, it 
prevented the farmers from regaining their former monopoly over the Union's labour 
supply in all provinces except the OFS. 
Sauer's resettlement policy was denounced by one farmer after another in 
evidence before the 1917 Select Committee. Senator Schofield, a Natal farmer, 
excla imed in obvious distress: 
I do not understand what is the difference between the meaning of 
'servant' and' labour tenant', and to my way of thinking I do not see 
why there should be oppressive conditions of this sort, they are so 
differe!1t to what we have been accustomed to that they appear to 
be oppressive. I am speaking now of the relations between the 
European farmer and his se,-vant. As far as I can understand there is 
no interference with them in the Cape Province in the manner in 
which it is proposed to dea l with Natal in this Bill, and I do not 
know that these labourers that I have seen down here are any differ-
ent or any better in any respect than the Kaffirs are with us •... 
I am wondering whethe r it is not possible that there shall be provision 
in this Bill such as there was in the 1913 Bill whe reby it was provided 
107 The areas the mines recruited from (both before and after the 1913 Act was 
passed) are discussed in chap 6. That analysis lends extra weight to the 
argument given here . 
that it should not apply to the Transvaal . It was in Proviso (a) of 
Clause 6 of the Act; I think the Prime Minister will remember that 
there was a provision in that Bill thot the Act would not apply to 
labour in the Transvaal. 
Sir Bisset Berry Until the Commission reported? 
Schofield Yes. 
Sir Bisset The Commission has now reported, you see? 
Schofield I want to know what right the Government has to interfere 
between me and my Native servants. 
General Louis Botha (chairman) Now that is the principle of the 
Bill? 
Schofield The principle of the Bill? 
Botha That is the principle of the Bill - territorial separation? 
Schofield I mean that the servant who is working for me - you are 
not going to take him away from me: you make provision for me to 
have him. Now I want to know why you interfere with me. You 
know that I am a farmer and I must have labour to work my farm, and 
I have labourers I iving on my farm and some will come from the loca-
tions to work for me. What right have you to interfere with the 
liberty of the subject? Why can there not be provision in the Bill 
that there shall be no interference with labour in Natol? 108 
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Because of vehement opposition from almost every farming witness, it had to be 
expla ined repeatedly that, as land hod been allocated by the Beaumont Commission, 
squatters would be removed to it in accordance with the segregation principle. 
This latter proposition scared the farmers a long way from the reserves most of all: 
they had become accustomed to relying on 'kaffir locations' conveniently scattered 
amongst their farms on private and crown land.
109 
When the local land committees 
reported in 1918, this was still the position. Stubbs noted that his committee was 
'vitally concerned with the issue of how far these licensing provisions are calculated 
to react on the broad question of the adequacy and suitability of the recommended 
areas ', since 
The object of these provisions is, no doubt, to abolish squatting and 
labour tenancy conditions and to reduce all Natives resident in nOI1-
Native areas to the level of full - time servants within the meaning of 
the Bill.... 110 
108 SC 60-17, paras 3459-3465. See P 155 above. 
109 The validity of th is is borne out by the evidence of farmers in the Vryheid 
and Utrecht districts, for instance . In Vryheid no reserves were contempla-
ted, but in 1916 the estimated population was whites 5 595, Africans 
48 568. In Utrecht there were 2 796 whites ta 25 678 Africans. Other 
areas with a similar phenomenon were Dundee, Klip River, Lions River, 
Newcastle, Paulpietersburg and Weenen . The position was much worse in 
the Transvaal, where only 1 000000 or so morgen consisted of defined 
locations. See Macmillan, Complex South Africa, appendix B where Oreas 
with no reserves and relative distribution of Africans and wh ites are given. 
110 Eastern Transvaal Local Land Committee report 1918, UG 31-18, quoted 
in the Johannesburg Joint Council Memorandum 1, P 14 
Considering the effect on the African squatters, he continued: 
If the squatter decides to move, as he may well do when contronted 
with the panoply of law and order, it becomes a matter of vital 
importance ta decide whether in fact, the areas are ready to receive 
him. 111 
Stubbs felt the Transvaal land was not ready for the moss of squatters who would 
be summarily evicted. 'Much of the land described as "aroble and productive" 
was still virgin bush', he said, 'which would have to be cleared before it was 
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even suitable for native cultivation.' Land said to be 'suitable for glOzing was 
valueless and would have to be supplied with boreholes before it could be adequate 
112 
to meet the needs of man or beast.' 
The link between the land company owners' interest in land and the 
supply of labour to the mines has already been indicated. A strong presumption 
of this link and the fact that unoccupied white-owned land served as a labour 
pool for the mines is given in the following exchange between the TLOA and the 
Select Committee in 1917. On this occasion Reginald Whitcombe Townsend of 
the TLOA stated: 
Although we may be called upon to check the residence of able-
bodied Natives, under Clouse 17 we are practically used as a dumping 
ground for infirm or destitute Natives .... 
I will put it ta you that it is not a fair thing to ask the landowner to 
retain these old and infirm or destitute people without being asked 
whether he wishes ta retain them or not. Surely our rights over that 
land are sufficiently extensive to enable us ta decide whether they 
have a right to continue to be there. 113 
Under the migront labour system no provision was made for wives, let alone men 
past their prime. The appeal here is clear: these areas were not to become the 
'dumping grounds' for the sick, old and infirm. The implication was that the TlOA 
wanted only able-bodied manpower-workers for the mines. 
The next question ta the TLOA vice-president, Percy Greathead, proves 
how real the fear was that squatters would be evicted wholesale if there were no 
saving clause. 
Acting chairman Supposing the Bill becomes low as it is, what will 
the members of the Association do with these squatters? 
Grea thead Clear them out. 
111 Ibid 
112 Ibid 
113 SC 60-17, paras 2577-2578 
Harry Stanley lyons (TlOA president) We da not know what we 
can do. 
Acting chainnan Have you made up your mind on any course? 
Greathead We have made up our minds that we will have to get 
rid of them, and we are asking for the machinery to do it. 114 
No landowner was prepared to lease land under the prohibitive licensing provisions 
- £5 per yea r for every 18-year-old squatter - while non-licensed tenants would 
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be a better economic proposition. Few African household heads could have afforded 
this sum, let alone the extra for their unmarried sons. The 'machinery' demanded 
was not only the provision of extra land but state responsibility for this mass removal 
to the reserves. It was to be given 20 years later under the Native Trust ond land 
Act. 115 In the mean time, the almost total reiection of the Beaumont recommenda-
tions was one reason why the 1917 Bill was withdrawn. The 1913 Act with its 
saving clause was allowed to stand. Once again, tens of thousands of squatters in 
the Transvaal and Natal were granted a reprieve. 
From this analysis it is clear that the decision to provide extra land under 
the 1913 Natives' land Act was govemed by the squatter measures. For the mines, 
the only acceptable idea had been rese ttling Africans on reserve land so that the 
migrant labour system could continue uninterrupted. The wholesale eviction of 
squatters far resettlement on the forms continued to be opposed by the mines. 
Botha's decision in 1918 and Smuts's in 1923 to invoke the administrative dispensa-
tion' ~g provide rei ief for landless Africans can also be seen against the background 
of a labour policy designed by the SAP with mining interests in mind. This - and 
the continued refusal by the SAP governments to take steps to eliminate squatting 
on unoccupied land - earned the wrath of the fanners . Sauer, by trying to satisfy 
both sides, had compromised and ended up pleasing nobody, least of all the formers. 
Between 1924 and 1933 the Hertzog govemmen ts revised the form and 
mine labour policies. These revisions will be studied in the nex t two chapters. 
114 Ibid, paras 2582-2585 . Iv\aior Percy Greathead was the land manager of 
TCL. According to Cartwright (p 272) he was instrumenta I in sell ing off 
2000000 acres of TCl's land between 1917 and 1925, retaining only the 
m inera I rights . 
115 Act 18/1936, section 37. Not only would land have to be prov ided for 
evicted squatters from areas proclaimed under the Act, but the NA D was 
responsible for finding land for squatters in the reserve and supervising 
their removal. 
116 For detai Is, see chap 2, pp 80-81. 
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The time for compromise wos over. By 1924 politicol power loy firmly 
with the rura l electorote and its demands were unlikely to foil on deaf ears. The 
Pact government's programme shows they responded to the farmers' call. By 1933 
a comprehensive farm labour policy had been tobled. This oimed eventuolly to 
immobilise roughly two million Africans in the white rurol sector for 0 minimum 
of three months' service a year to formers. In this chapter we analyse the farm 
lobour problem from 1924 to 1933 in depth to determine its noture and origin and 
how for the Hertzog government octually carried out the immobil isation pion. 
The farmers' demands over the years had not been completely ignored. 
The stotute book and odministrative practices alike bear witness to this. Squotters' 
lows I imiting the number of African fomil ies permitted on each farm had been 
possed in the hope of being able to 'rotion' the ovailable supply of labour. 
Master ond Servant Acts had given the farmer on extroordinary measure of control 
over his labourers in that they gave to civ il contracts the support of criminal 
sanctions. 1 Pass laws designed to curb the movement of Africans from one place 
to another had been re inforced by farmers' agreements among themselves to pay 
a uniform wage in order to avoid counter-bidding for labour. Regulations and 
laws existed to prevent farm labourers from changing their occupation by requiring 
2 
a permit and signed service controct. Rigid extra-economic measures such as 
land and taxation Acts coerced migront labourers to work on farms. Tactics such 
as indebtedness were used in some areas to ensure that farm labourers stayed 
3 
continuously in the farmers' employ. To these one could add such gambits as the 
government's declared policy not to engage in its own service African labourers 
who might be regarded as farm labourers; the permitted use on farms of 'foreign' 
labour not allowed in the towns; and the so-called apprenticeship of vagront 
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See Bundy, 'Abolition .. :, pp 37-46; Report of the Inter-deportmental Committee 
on the Notive Poss Lows 1920, UG 41-22, pp 2-7, and onnexure B (Poss laws 
of the Union), pp 27-34; and 'Resolution against the Natives' Land Act 1913 
and the report of the Natives' Land Commiss ion, by the SA NNC', 2 October 
1916 in Karis & Carter, v 1, doc 26, P 86. 
2 The inability af the sto te to control the efflux of farm labour to the towns through 
pass regulations and service contracts resulted in new regulations being introduced 
to forbid the employment of farm labourers unless th e ir service contract specificolly 
stated that they were permitted to work - see pp 204-205. Labour tenants were 
excluded until 1926, when the Master and Servants' (Transvaal and Natal) Amend-
ment Act was passed - see pp 195-197. 
3 UG 22-32, Lucas addendum. Magistrates' responses are analysed in A 101-188, 
pp 187-201. See also House of Assembly Debates on convict labour, 18 May 
1931. 
children to farmers . 4 These were the means the farmers olready had at their 
disposal in 1924 to deal with the farm labour shortage. Yet the shortage had not 
been helped. On the contrary, the farmers' cry hod grown lauder and more 
insistent as progressive farming practices began to reap far higher profits. 
Labaur shortage - the farm labourers' view 
So far discussion has revolved around the farm labour problem as seen 
by whites . Where farm labourers have featured at all, it has been as 'labour 
units' or 'categories'. This is a true reflection, however, of the approach adopted 
by the various bodies investigating the farm labour problem. Except for the . 
African Grievances Commihee of 1914, this approach persisted well into the 
1920s when a change became discernable. Starting with the EWC of 1925, the 
NEC (1930-1932) and the Farm Labour Committee (1937-1939), evidence from 
the farm labourers themselves began to pile up. Coupled with this, African 
political organisations became more vociferous in their demands. Multirocial 
bodies prepared a mass af evidence for pori iamentary committees and for pub I ica-
tion. Thus a completely different view of the farm labour question began to 
emerge. 
Our purpose here is to try to understand the farm labour shortage fram 
the Africans' point of view, for the evidence of the time shows a direct link 
between that shortage and the restrictive legislation. The following exchange 
which took place before the NEC shows haw important this approach is: 
NEC Chairman Mr Anderson's point is that quite a number of 
advanced farmers objected very much to the labour tenancy system? 
Professor Iv\ac mil Ion I am glad to hear it. 
Chairman But they say it is kept up because it is an assurance that 
they will have labour; they must have labour at any cost. It is 
less economical than the payment of wages, you cannot get your 
labour at the moment you want it. That is the general view in the 
country? 
Macmillan Very probably. Even the native likes to have a home, 
ond the share system being barred, labour tenancy is the only thing 
that remains .•.. 
Chairman If the farmer is to be sure of his labour .•. ? 
Macmillan That is what is wrong with the cauntry. It is always, 
'How does it affect us?' I am suggesting we want to get out of this 
way of thinking and begin to consider how it affects the native .... 
4 See Ballinger, 'Problems of form labour ... '; Mocm ilion, Complex South 
Africa, chap 15; Von der Horst, chop 14; and Hunter, p 509ff. 
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Chairman I think it is a fa ir conc lusion from your statement that 
the farmer would still be sure of his labour? 
Mocm illan I am saying you are cons idering the farmer in iso la tion 
much too much; and the country does that. But you are I ikely to 
get a bette r result from natives who have some inducement to build 
up their own homes and live their own lives. 5 
Mocm i1lan, one of the few to have gone deeply into famr labour conditions, 
condemned the sys tem of labou r tenancy. He had no doubt that it was mainl y 
the liv ing and working conditions which drove Africans off the farms: 
the condition of the fomr native is, speaking broadly, a quite 
impossible one •... I tried to make very strongly the point that 
there is so little inducement for a fomr native to do anyth ing at all, 
that he cannot even save for his old age; he is prohibited by law 
from either buying or leasing or acquiring in any sort of way a spot 
he can call home. In that very large famring area where the Land 
Act applied, that is just the position. 6 
Macm illan repeatedly emphasised the lack of security for the farm labourer, a 
result of restrictions in the Natives' Land Act. 
Nothi ng [he argued] could be worse than this homelessness, the 
utter lack of inducement, the utter lack of security; and I think the 
prob lem for the Commission is to make the country face that fact. 
The re are a million and a half natives, all said and done, whose 
prospects on the land are not what in a decen t ordered community 
they should be. I know we disagree, but it seems to me that is the 
point. 7 
The evidence of former farm labourers and tenants to the NEC confirmed 
his assertions. For instance, it was found that Africans hiring or leas ing land 
outside land outside the proposed released areas were becomi ng increasingly 
unsettled and insecure. After the 1913 Act, they had been dec lared illegal 
residents . For these men arbitrary removal or eviction was a constant threat. 
Countless witnesses described this unsettling effect on peasant farme rs. 
Filipus Bopape explained from his own experience: 
A native is not allowed to hire a white's farm by money, except by 
work ing for nothing 'Boroko'. We are really ignorant of the place 
where the Government wishes to be I iving for to the heaven we 
ore unable to go in order to avo id the cruelty of these laws. The 
5 NEC , ora l evidence of W M Macm ilion, 7 May 1931 
6 Ibid 
7 Ib id. Macmillan was not olone in condemning labour tenancy. See also 
oral ev idence of Henry Br itten, Chief Magistrote of Johonnesburg; Professors 
S H Frankel and E H Brookes; J D Rhe inallt-jones; Dr W B Rubusana; R W 
Thornton, Directo r of Native Agriculture. Also C H Nevel ing & J C Neeth-
ling, 'Wages of natives on farms', Farmi ng in SA, v 5, 54, September 1930, 
pp 255-256 quoted in UG 22-32, annexure 24-viii, p 315. 
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Government knows, then if he , 0 native, has no farm for himself 
to live, where will he live if he does not hire a white's farm with 
money for his life, becouse the Europeans have occupied the whol e 
country, and natives ore I iving through the help of white people 
and the whites also through natives. To hire a farm by money is 
for better than to work for nothing I ike a slave who is caught from 
the battle ..•• 
For living to buy the Permit or Licence in our farms which we 
bought through the Government allowance or permission, be damaged 
as if we have stolen these farms. These show plainly how that 
although the Government would compel us by force without our own 
free-will, he will within a few years of our living there come and 
remove us again toward the East •... If the Union Governor is going 
to decide by force and remove all Zoutpansberg chiefs with their 
tribes to the sa id country, then Union Government will be like a 
butcher who drives his herds to a butchery house to be all slaughtered 
at a time. Because the country is liable for people to live in, but 
for wild beasts and people who were born in it. The country is as 
hot as fire. That how it possesses diseases of different kinds and 
deaths. 8 
Whites had described this released area (No 5) in similar terms. 9 What options 
did a chief or a peasant farmer like Bopape have? Under the 1913 Ac t thei r 
leasing contracts were not renewable, and new con tracts with sons were forbidden. 
Either they accepted removal to this 'waterl ess, sterile tract of country' or they 
agreed to work for nothing 'Boroko'. But not everyone had these opt ions, and 
many more refused them. These were the men, it appears, who joined the stream 
of Africans migrating pe rmanently to the towns . In so doing they aggravated the 
farm labour shortage, the farmers claimed . 
The open ing up of new areas had also caused widespread unsettlement. 
Macm ilion explained : 
In Natal, natural development and the very prosperity arising from 
the cultivation of sugar or even wattles, have left I ittle room for 
the old- time squatters, and under cover of the law the same process 
of eviction has been constant. 10 
Iron ically, these new developments had not only intensified the demand for 
labour, but had in themselves been responsible for creating the labour shortage. 
8 Minutes of evidence, Eastern Transvaal Natives Land Committee, 
letter from Fil ipus Bopape to the sub- NC at Pietersburg, 23 November 
1917 quoted by Karis & Carter, v 1, doc 27c, P 92 (sic) 
9 See p 74 above. A Natal farmer described the same area thus: 'When 
transport goes through Lou is Trichardt and Bandol ier Kop the nearest point 
is through that admirable road direct to Messina, but drivers prefer to go 
twice the distance round in order to get something for their cattle to eat 
and drink' (SC 60-17, para 201). 
10 Macm ilion, Complex Sou th Africa, p 242; and see discussions on crown 
land above, p 70, and appendices B. 2 (a) and B.4 below. 
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As new lands were braught under cultivation and occupied, African squatters who 
had I ived there undisturbed suddenly found they hod either to render at least 
three months' service or to leave. 
Rather than work for the new owners, tenant farmers were leaving these 
areas in droves. The rest could stay on as labour tenants or full-time servants, 
depending on their former status. If they refused they could be summarily evicted 
by the new landlord. This was becoming comma" as the reports of the NCs and 
., h 11 magIstrates In new areas s ow. 
A second group also left valuntarily. Faced with new restrictions and 
fewer privileges in kind - always a strong attraction before - many left in search 
of work offering better conditions. Failing this, they tao joined the rural exodus 
to the towns . 
The depressed world market which sent the prices for agricultural products 
down to abysmally low levels, and the great drought of 1932-1933 which killed 
thousands of I ivestock, had also forced farmers inta bankruptcy. Some farmers 
were forced to let their servants go, while others sold up and moved to the towns. 
In such cases the tenants left beh ind found themselves under new masters who 
could demand service under more restrictive terms, should the tenant wish to stay 
on the new owner'·s land. 
But it was not only former squatters who were leaving. Far more serious 
for the farmers was the breakdown of labour tenancy. Herbst in his 1926 report 
showed labour tenancy was the whites' first chaice of farm labour, and the most 
widespread; and argues that the farmer would fight ta keep the system: 
A number of reports indicate that the system is in many areas 
regarded as indispensable on the ground that a standing quota of 
labour cannot be effectively employed throughout the year. The 
advantage to the farmer of having in residence on his farm a 
supply of this class of labour for use as occasion requires at a 
minimum cost either in cash or in kind, seems apparent; and the 
system itself would on the face of it appear beneficial to both 
parties, provided it be fairly carried out, as indeed is generally 
reported ta be the case. 12 
Colson, in his evidence to the NEC, outlines advantages to farmers of this 
labour-tenancy system. Land shortage also benefite d them, he said, at great 
11 Minutes of Native Conference, 9 December 1930, NAC report 1927-1931, 
UG 26-32, P 21 
12 UG 14-27, p 8 
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cost to the labourer: 
Owing to the scramble for squatting sites the former can pick and 
choose. An old man, post work, with a large family, is a more 
valuable acquisition than a young man with one wife and infant 
children •.•. 
There is no rule as to the contro l of labour between the service 
period - a former working a large area can keep his labour 
constantly employed. A small man cannot possibly do so. A 
mealie fanner ploughing on extensive area treats his labour of 
necessity in a different way to a sheep or cottle raiser. Wheat, 
citrus and tobacco fanning each has its own needs. • . . 13 
These various rhythms in the year could mean follow times for labour, and that 
was when fanners lost their workers. 50 said many whites, refusing to accept 
that it was bod conditions that drove them away. But a unique study of new 
arriva ls in Alexandra township proves the fact. Men who hod settled in the 
township were asked why they hod left the fanns. The Church of the Province 
mode the survey and gave the infonnation to the NEC. To toke one response at 
random: 
I lived on the fann 5terkspoint for eleven years; I was well treated 
by my master; he gave me enough land to p lough and gave me as 
many head of cottle as I could [run]. He allowed me to breed 
horses and sheep. In 1928, I noticed a great change in the treatment 
of my master. My boss complained of the number of cottle I had -
and said there was not sufficient grazing. Consequently he asked 
me to reduce my livestock. I was unwilling to do this but he pressed 
on me, saying his cottle were not getting enough gross because of 
mine. 50 I tried to sell my livestock, but could not get a good 
price . Finally, I decided to buy a plot of ground at Alexandra 
Township, so I left the fann and settled out here. I hod 35 head of 
cottle and 4 horses when I got to Alexandra, one ox-wagon and one 
horse- trap and some paul try . 
At Alexandra I was met with the difficulty in regard to grazing land. 
-I asked the boss of the adjoining fann to allow me to graze my cottle 
on his fann; this he did, but charged me 2/- per head of cottle a 
month. As this was impossible, I sold some of my cottle to a butcher 
and the rest died through lock of feeding. Two of my horses died; 
now I have got two horses, one wagon which I cannot use, and a 
trap. I have got to buy food for the horses and they are a trouble to 
me. 
13 NEC 1930-1932, written evidence of R Colson who at the time was 
Additional Magistrate of Johannesburg_ He hod, however, served as 
magistrate and NC in Piet Retief (1919-1922), Marica (1922-1926) 
and Harrismi th (1926-1930). 
14 NEC 1930-1932, orol evidence of Archdeacon Hill, Fr S Corter and 
Miss 5 R Maud, representing the Church of the Province, 11 May 
1931 
14 
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Many witnesses had such stories to tell. Others mentioned recent changes in 
their conditions of service where, as one said, 
the master had allowed him 9 months in the year to go anywhere 
for work, but now things have changed considerably. The people 
are forced by some farmers to work the whole year round; wives 
and ch ildren are ta work without pay. Very little land is given 
for ploughing. 15 
That was why an immense number of people gave up form jobs. Such accounts 
were confirmed by as many magistrates. Henry Britten, Chief Iv\ogistrate of 
Johannesburg, commented thus: 
I am aware that in rural areas the removal of natives from forms 
each winter is a constant occurrence . The existence of many 
demol ished or party [sic] demolished native houses shows this, in 
addition to the evidence which the average Iv\ogistrate's office 
can provide as the result of complaints from either the former or 
the native. In many cases the natives leave on notice from the 
former, in almost as many the na ti ves leave owing to absence of 
wages, misunderstanding of conditions or inability to get on with 
the former; absence of sufficient grazing for their stock is quite 
frequently the reason why natives move to another farm. The 
increase of their stock is one of the most prol ific sources of 
friction between former and his native tenants where grazing is 
scarce and diminishing ... • Much misunderstanding results owing 
to disagreement as to dotes and amounts. . . . 16 
The consistent complaint by magistrates was that no registered agreement was 
drown up and this led to a great deal of misunderstanding and friction. From the 
Africans' side many asserted that even if they were forced by law to sign an 
agreement, they placed little trust in the law. These admissions measured against 
the statement mode by K H Hathorn, a retired judge of the supreme court, lend 
weight to these accusations . Judge Hathorn's racial prejudice was evidenced in 
statements such as 'it [the segregation policy] would involve very large expendi-
ture in the expropriation of lands and the erection of fences, kaffir proof if 
possible and certainly goat proof' - yet even he could still state: 
Slavery seems to be in the nature of many of the European population 
of South Africa, and unfortunately the Government has countenanced 
and encouraged this .•. and is continuing to do so in the proposed 
Ac t now before Parliament ••• 'The Native Service Contract Bill'. 
The Native Locations are said to be crowded and without room for 
receiving as residents more natives, and the Lows I have referred to 
make it impossible for natives to hire land from Europeans or to have 
a place to I ive on without binding their bodies to serve the land 
15 Ibid 
16 NEC 1930-1932, typescript and oral evidence of Henry Britten, 4 May 1931 
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owner and making him have, or entitled to have all sorts of controls 
over them and their people, which drives one at once to think of 
the ownership of the slave days. This horrible control in the hands 
of the brutal landowner is a terrible thing and it is difficult to see 
how the tied native can even get out of his hands. He is sure to 
get into debt to the landlord, and if he should get into a position 
to free himself it is almost impossible to find a place where he and 
his family can make a home, or I ive, and if he finds one he must 
again be tied to the landowner. The landowner being an unfair and 
yet not brutal man is able to do the most dreadful things to make 
the lot of the native unbearable without any sort of resort to the 
Sjambok and the Shot Gun. These two things are in not uncommon 
use in the hands of a brute and he is seldom, if ever, punished. 
Perhaps this will be cured when Juries are done away with.... 17 
Fanner stereotypes were becoming the norm amongst Africans. The 
actions of a few individuals were ascribed to farmers in genel1Jl. Africans showed 
their opposition by deserting, resisting fann employment and evading the law 
where possible. The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (lCU) took up the 
cause of the oppressed farm labourer and busily discouraged Africans from volun-
tarily accepting fann labour service. The popularity of the ICU, wrote Wid,~ns, 
'can be explained by the deteriol1Jtion of the position of Africans working on 
white-owned land.' Spreading 'from Durban into rural Natal and thence among 
the farm labourers of the Tl1Jnsvaal, the Ol1Jnge Free State, and even the Cape 
[it] became the embodiment of rural protest.' 18 The bitter accusations bandied 
about the townships and reserves against the farmers natul1Jlly made fann jobs less 
appeal ing than ever, and so aggravated the labour shortage. The anger was 
articulate and informed, as here: 
17 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of K H Hathom. Judge Hathom lived 
in Pietermaritzburg from 1852, was a solicitor until 1872 and then an advo-
cate unti I 1910 when he was appointed judge of the Supreme Court of South 
Africa until his retirement in 1926. On the question of corporal punishment, 
note too that the 1932 Native Service Contract Bill was introduced by the 
Minister of Justice and not by the Minister of Native Affairs - clause 11 
deals with the institution of corporal punishment to be administered by the 
courts. Further, in reply to a question on why whipping should have been 
introduced in the 1932 Bill, Senator P W Ie Roux van Niekerk, member of 
NAC, told the Native Conference convened to discuss this measure: 'the 
Minister of Justice had been actuated by a desire to restrain farmers from 
taking the law into their own hands'. See UG 26-32, p 21. 
18 P L Wickens, 'The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa', 
unpub paper, Conference on Southem African Labour History, African Studies 
Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, April 1976, p 9. See also Roux, 
p 173; and NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of G Champion and W G 
Ball inger. 
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The starving wages paid in the Forms and the unhuman conditions 
imposed by the Land Act of 1913. whereby the 'Boos' in the forms 
is given excissive powers with the result that the contract gives all 
the advantages to the Boos, and all the disadvantages to the native 
Labourer. There being no safe guards for the abuse of these excess-
ive powers of the 'Boos'. When the ill-treated natives find that 
they are absolutely in the power of the 'Boos' and have no Umpire 
to appeal to, who can guarantee them human treatment. They are 
I iable to sudden evictions at the caprice of the white Formers and 
according to the Land Act of 1913. They must not only contract 
themselves but their wives and children as well as their Stock, a 
mode of Contract that enslaves the natives their families and stock. 
The rule of the 'Boos' is arbitrary and merciless thot he -some times 
imprisons them for imaginary offences even for petty misunderstand-
ings, the educational facilities provided for them are nil. 
To soy that natives come into Towns, in order to obtain money for 
the purchase of cottle for lobola is, to soy the least, untrue. In 
fact the disabilities under which the natives are suffering are so 
many and varied that it is indeed very strange to find the Govern-
ment enquiring inta them as though it were not aware of them. 
There is every reason to believe that, the report of the Commission 
has its facts pre-assured I ike all other Reports of previous Commis-
sions. 
-What form labourers are worth - the formers' view 
19 
An indictment of this kind was either refuted as 'the words of a trouble-
maker' or countered with stack arguments for agriculture . So they expatiated on 
the value of the 'privileges' in kind which traditionally were port of the labourers' 
earnings. Why couldn't the Africans see this? formers vociferated. The formers, 
it wos generally agreed, were on the whole good employers and not themselves 
responsible for the difficul ties in which Africans found themselves. As for the 
African form labourer, he was lazy, inefficient, wasteful and therefore 
necessarily cheap with his low productivity. 
The editor of the Notal Witness20 dared to refute such arguments. His 
leoder suggested that labour would be more productive if only formers would 
accept the need to pay a reasonable cosh wage. A torrent of letters flooded the 
Notal newspapers for weeks on end . Honi Soit Qui Iv'ol y Pense was one of the 
milder responses in the Notal Former. After challenging the editor's competence 
to write on what labourers were worth, the writer continued: 
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19 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of the African Residential Association, 
Benoni. It should be noted further that despite the protestations of the 
commissioners, many African witnesses were former form employees or engaged 
in form labour on a casual basis. See comment below, p 186 and n 5.33. 
20 Notal Witness, 7 February 1927 
There is no need for me to stote the 'unearned increment' the 
tenant and his family receive, as this has already been given far 
more vividly and capably - but also truthfully - by your corres-
pondents 'Sickanomics', 'A Loafer', 'Ex . Field Cornet', and 'A 
Farmer' . 
There is one point they have all missed, and thot is, that no 
matter how much you pay them they do no better work for it. 
In fact a farmer who pays more than the usual rate is looked upon 
as soft, and unless he stands over them all day he gets less work 
than usual. 21 
He ended with a familiar parting shot: 
Finally, I may say that were they paid treble the amount that is 
ridiculed by the' Natal Witness' it would be of no economic 
advantage to the girl - the worker. It would simply be more for 
her lazy, beer-loving, 'baba' to collar and convert into cows to 
make further inroads on our God-given-for-nothing pasturoge. 22 
Sickonomics after several bouts challenged the editor of the Natol Witness to 
answer the 'following facts': 
(1) Is it not a fact that one shilling per day, plus meal, plus 
free rent, plus free grozing, plus free cultivation, and lots of 
other I ittle plus's are a fair wage for the amount of labour done 
by an ordinary fann native? 
(2) Is it not a fact that most of our crops are grown at an infini-
tesimal profit and frequently at a loss? 
(3) Is it not a fact that consequently we find it difficult to pay 
our wage bill even at a shilling per day? 
(4) Is it not a fact that when the native has cash it means that 
native will not work? 23 
The general inefficiency of African fann labour was rarely disputed, but why it 
went on being so certainly was. Here the coercion into labour tenancy was only 
one of many explanations. Colson, who had spent many years as a magistrote in 
the fanning areas before becoming Assistont Magistrate of Johannesburg, gave 
this view on African inefficiency: 
The present system of granting a 'seeking work' pass by the 
employer entitl ing the native to be absen t for 2 or 3 months is 
degrading to the native and uneconomical to the state. 
It is uneconomical, because the period has to include the time 
spent in seeking employment. Before employment can be found 
an undue proportion of the Pass-period has been wasted; 
employers will not toke on a native, except for the roughest 
fonns of manual labour, for so short a period as two months; 
21 Natol Farmer (Hammersdale), 14 February 1927 
22 Ibid 
23 Natal Farmer (Umvoti), 11 February 1927 
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the time spent in seeking work and returning to the farm has to be 
deducted from the pass-period. 
It is degrading to the native because hunting for a job for weeks 
without means teaches hi m mendicancy; he has no real chance of 
mastering a job and is thought to be shiftless and unrel iable; 
because he gets his leave of absence when it suits his master i.e . 
when farm work is least urgent, he cannot get employment in the 
same farming area and must go far afield; because he gets his pass 
at uncertain dates he cannot exercise foresight and arrange for 
other employment, hence he is forced to go far from home, to herd 
among the most undesirable elements of location populations, falls 
foul of Pass Laws, Location Bye- Laws and other enactments to 
spend part of h is Pass Period in Gaol. . • . 24 
This approach is the sort used to justify the farmers' efforts to 'tie their labour 
down' and prevent an exodus of workers. It also bears on the government's cheap 
labour policy which Frankel alleged depended on keeping Africans unskilled and 
inefficient. 25 It would then be much easier to 'keep Africans in their place' as 
the common South African saying went. Or to put it another way, they would be 
held back by artificial checks on their lives. 
On African inefficiency Pierre von den Berghe later said: 
Racia l stereotypes may also have an indirect economic effect, 
though there is I ittle so l id evidence for it. For example, the White 
view of the non-White worker as 'unrel iable' and' irresponsible' can 
easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy. A worker who has been 
reprimanded for showing initiative, and who is treated as a simple-
ton, is likely either to lose all interest in his job and perform his 
tosks unthinkingly and apathetically, or to exhibit his spite by 
deliberate irresponsibility, coupled with punctilious obedience to 
the letter of stupid orders. This method can be an effective means 
of passive resistonce and could have an appreciable effect on 
production. Fulfilment of role-expectotion provides the non-
White worker with a relatively safe and satisfying way of expressing 
hostility towards Europeans. 26 
Both Co lson and Van den Berghe's assertions ring true as one considers remarks by 
witnesses to the NEC - both Afrikaans and English - that reflect the typical 
racial stereotyping which was even sanctioned, encouraged and enshrined in the 
low: 
24 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of R Colson 
25 NEC 1930-1932, combined oral evidence of E Brookes and S H Frankel 
26 P L van den Berghe, South Africa: A study in conflict, p 199 
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Ek wi! dit se .;. die gewoon kaffer wat mens ontmoet het net die 
mentaliteit van 'n wit seun von 16 or 17 jaar oud en nie meer nie. 
Proat U nou van die beskaafde kaffer? 
Nee, ek praat nou van die semi-beskaafde kaffer. Wat nou die 
kaffers op die delwerye by lichtenburg, waar ek baje [sic] met 
hul te maak gehad het, waar ek duisende kaffers by my en ron dam 
my gesien het en met hul in aanroking gekom het; doar sien mens 
dat die gewone naturel het die mentaliteit van 'n wit seun van 16 
of 17. Die word baje [sic] duidelik doar-
Hoe sien U dit? 
Daar is geen inisiatief onder hul nie; mens moet hul doar alles 
leer, hoe dit te doen en hoe dot te doen, en mens moet hul almal 
help •••• 
Hul gedra nog as seuns; 'n seun van doardie leeftyd het nog die 
insig nie van 'n opgegroeide persaon; en dit is die menloliteit 
waarop ek die gewone kaffer skat; hy het nie die minste inisiatief 
nie; hul is altyd baje [sic] opgeruim en vol van onsin; dit is een 
van die greot maeilikhede wat mens van daardie mense ondervind 
- mens kan nie van hul op aan nie. [sic] 27 
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A more sober and progmatic analysis of this system came from a completely 
different quarter. Dr C H Neveling, a respected senior member of the Deportment 
of Agriculture, argued that tronscending all the farmers' difficulties and the source 
of all their problems was the obsolete labour tenancy system. He articulated his 
condemnation of the system in a lengthy and convincing document also submitted 
to the NEC. As he saw it, labpur tenancy based on a 'cheap labour policy' was 
the real source of the farm labour problem: 
Deur ondoeltreffende produksie, die gevolg van ondoeltreffende 
arbeid, Iy die blanke produksie von die land jaarlike kolossale 
verliese. Die Suid-Afrikaanse boer het nog in die meeste gevalle 
sy boerdery georgoniseer op die leuse ,Swart arbeid is goedkoop 
arbeid', omdat hy oor veel arbeiders beskik het, is die arbeids-
distribusie en die voltydse gebruik van die arbeiders nooit as 'n 
ekonomiese probleem gevoel nie, m.a. w. doar was alteos in ons 
Landbou 'n verspilling van produktiewe arbeidskrogte. 28 
The traditional extensive farming in South Africa, cheap labour, and the farm 
labour shortage were all interrelated. The crux of the problem, Neveling suggests, 
was the reluctance of the conservative farmer, still in the majority at this time, 
to stop having labour tenants and/or cash tenants on the ir farms - or at least 
27 NEC 1930- 1932, orol evidence of Johannes Lodevicus Pretorius Erasmus, 
I I March 1931 
28 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of Dr C H Neveling, Department of 
Agriculture, Economic and Marketing Section. See also C H Neveling, 
'Farm labour in South Africa', Journal of the Economic Society of SA, old 
series, vol 5, 2. 
reduce them. These farmers with large unoccup ied oreos we re able ta allocate 
land to their tenants for cultivating and grazing. The tenonts in retum baund 
themselves for varying periods of service. 
These practices were, however, rejected by a grawing number of 
progressive and small-scale farmers. On farms close to markets and cities where 
the price of land was high, subsistence agricul ture practised by labour tenants 
on land set aside for their use was uneconomical, as was the sys j'em of maintaining 
a large contingent of underemployed labourers . This was becoming clearer in 
enterprises such as the wattle indus try for, apart from plan ting, work is of a 
seasonal kind and labourers were only needed in large numbers during a six-month 
peak for bark stripping. 29 During the remaining six months labour requirements 
fell to a very low ebb. To meet their seasonal requirements wattle farmers had 
either to rely on casual labour from squatter locations or the reserves, or they had 
to keep kraals of labour tenants who were really busy only six months of the year. 
The number of reserve Africans prepared to work on farms had gradually declined 
as impoverishment in the reserves became more widespread . In the 1920s fewer 
and fewer Africans could get by with just a six-month stint on a farm. Thus, 
unable to offer the 'privileges' linked with tenancy, unwilling or unable to offer 
a competitive cash wage, many farmers in positions similar to that of the wattle 
farmers found themselves outbid by industry one way and the conservative farmer 
the other. 
These progressive farmers were the ones most insistent on the 1913 Land 
Act being applied: squatters should go, and the number of labour tenonts per farm 
reduced at once . This was the only way, they said, to shore labour fairly. It 
was this small group alone who gave the ir wholehearted support to the 19131>ct 
insofar as it made provision to resettle evicted squatters in the reserves, 
whence they could be redirected to the farmers. 
Vested white interests, the slow pace of change, and the fact that most 
farmers were still conservative meant that this so lution was no easier in the 1920s 
than it had been in 1913 or in the pre-Un ion period when the original squatters' 
laws were first promulgated . As Frankel remarked in 1931: 
Unfortuno tely it is equally true that the same genera t ion has not yet 
leamed where and why the old woy of life in South Africa falls short 
of what the present demands, and how imposs ib le it is to build a 
modern state accord ing to economic princ iples, habits, and systems 
------------------------------------------- - ----
29 R H Smith, Labour resaurces of Natal, p 40 
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of labour, suitable to the conditions of the eighteenth rather tha n 
the twentieth century. 30 
These comments were irrefutable . Unless something were done about the 
mass harbouring of underemployed labour tenan ts the more progress ive farmer could 
not hope to compete. In fact , the available labour was so badly dist ributed tha t 
the whole forming industry was being retarded, for as Macm ilion said : 
This whole class of labourer is so immobile that the proportion of 
Transvaal natives employed in Transvaal mines and works is negl i-
gible .... Natal, with its huge native population, draws largely on 
Pondoland for work on the sugar estates. Even High Veld maize 
fanmers about Bethal draw suppl ies of labour from the Cape Reserves, 
from anywhere except from the neighbouring Low Veld. This unequal 
distribution is to the country as a whole one of the many evils 
resulting from the resolute refusal to treat the landless farm natives 
os anything but 0 convenience for farmers. 31 
These. assertions are borne out by the facts. R H Smith found that, of the 62 000 
.Africans listed as 'resident in indus trial compounds' in the 1936 census, the 
majority were engaged in the sugar industry, in field or mill work. This large 
labour force was hard to ma in tain because 
over the sugar areas as a whole at least 40% of the workers were 
imported, the Zul uland demand being met partly from Portuguese 
East Africa and the Natal de;"and from Pondoland. 
Because of this 'the number of Natal Natives engaged in cultivating sugar', Smith 
says, 'is less than one-third of the total working-age male population on the 
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farms.' This despite the fact that suga r was the most important crop of the pravince. 
The 400 000 or so Africans resident on whhe fa rms in Natal had become so 
immobilised that the coal mines, the sugar belt and the towns had to either rely 
on Africans from the reserves or import labourers from outside the province. 
Mac m ilion has shown' this problem was not confined to Natal . 
Official view on the farm labour quest ion 
Few pol iticians, let alone offic ials, we re prepared to risk the ir party or 
personal interests by open opposition . So the po litically powerful white rural 
group had a sway that could be detected in the opening remarks on the fanm labour 
question as tabled by the NEC: 
30 NEC 1930-1932, written evidence of 5 H Frankel 
31 Macmillan , Complex South Africa , p 249 
32 Smith, pp 42-43 
There was much camplaint on the part of Native witnesses heard 
by the Commission throughout the Union of the terms under which 
labour tenonts work and are remunerated on farms. Very few of 
these witnesses however were themselves labour tenants. The 
evidence of the individual farmers and representatives of Farmers' 
Associations heard by your Commission, on the other hand, was 
practically unanimous to the effect that farm labour was on the 
whole reasonably well paid, fed, and treated. At the same time 
farmers complain that the general run of Native labour available 
to them is unreliable, inefficient, and often insufficient in 
quantity . 33 
It was hard for a government commission to recommend reforms against 
government policy, as we see here. When Frankel challenged the commission on 
the question of opposing traditional farming practices, Roberts took exception and 
said: 
[Dr Roberts interpolating] Have you any thought that the 
Commission will not? 
Frankel No, there is no insinuation. It may be thought .that 
there is a danger in that certain people who have come to certain 
conclusions, wish to see those conclusions real ised; certain people 
may feel that the time is not yet ripe for the statement of those 
conclusions. I gather there is a danger there. Therefore I first of 
all maintain that as far as we are concerned we are giving evidence 
to a Commission which is going to face the facts themselves as to 
the problem, the practical problem of how to get those facts 
instilled into the European population so that they will be accepted. 
There is no personal insinuation agoinst the Commission, but there 
is a big difference there between the two points. 34 
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There seems to be a real case for the insinuation, considering what Lucas 
went on to say: 
[Lucas
l
] I put to you in brief what seemed to me to be the main 
obstac es in the way of getting an improvement in the present 
condition, and those obstacles have got to be faced, and the 
Commission will have to face them particularly . I wanted yo u in 
effect to give, as far as I was concerned, a basis on which a 
Report could be framed to deal with those points. I know you have 
dealt with most of them in detail, and on some of the details I 
wanted to ask you some questions. That will come later. But we 
have those two big factors : a widespread bel ief that the improv<;!ment 
of the natives will mean loss to the whites; and the other one, that 
you have industry based to-day on low paid native labour, and 
everything that is suggested is examined from the point of view of 
the effect it will have on the adequate or inadequate supply of such 
low paid labour? .. 
33 UG 22-32, para 352 . Lucas was the only NEC member to dissociate himself 
entirely from these remarks. The other six endorsed the maiority report with 
some reservations - it should be noted that three of the members were 
themselves farmers. See also n 2.3 on p 56. 
34 NEC 1930-1932, oral evidence of S H Frankel, 131V1ay 1931 
[Lucas continues] ... I think you can take it as still very widely 
held by the farming population that no changes can be made in the 
wage level of na tives. That view is very widely held, and, as you 
know, thot is a very big practical factar. When you come to the 
tawns you get what the Wage Board has found, the argument being 
put up, 'You must not fix such a wage for natives (which is usually 
above the customary wage level) because it will stop the natives 
we now get staying with us for six or nine months, because they 
will get enough in three or four months, and they will then go home.' 
Both are very practical difficulties, the farming one being much the 
more difficult? 
Frankel Well, it is a difficulty which a Commission such as this 
faces, that it gets a common denominator of popular views and tries 
to counter them. But where you have an ignorant electorate - the 
farming population, with ignorant views existing as to the effects of 
rising standards in lower classes - that is an actual fact of reality 
which you must face. 35 
The farmers' demand 
The NEC evidence shows that farm labour was cheap, misappl ied, and 
of low productivity. It also suggests that the exadus of Africans from the rural 
areas had accelerated during the depression. 36 What was notable about the 
testimony of farmers and most parliamentarians was its insistence - despite a lot 
of contrary evidence - that the farm labour shortage came from anything but 
restrictive laws or the new, unacceptable conditions imposed on farm workers. 
Farmers went on insisting that to make a profit they needed 'cheap' labour on 
their farms. Hence whatever laws were introduced to solve the farm labour crisis, 
conditions and wages should not have to compete with other sectars, farmers 
should not rival each other, and Africans in the white rural areas should be tied 
down exclusively for the farmers. This latter paint grew in emphasis through the 
1920s and 1930s as the exodus of farm workers to the town accelerated. The 
farmers complained they could not hold on to enough labour against the pull of 
industry which, they said, attracted more than its share by wages that the farmer 
could not match. 
The farmers at this time began to focus strongly on tighter laws to bind 
the Africans securely to the farms. Pass laws should be more strictly enforced. 
The state should force the local municipal authorities to check the registration af 
service contracts in all areas and not only those proclaimed under the 1923 Urban 
35 Ibid. Lucas was Chairman of the Wage Board at the time. 
36 See tobles showing urban African population 1904-1936, tables 8.3 - 8.6 . 
See also H A Shannon, 'Urbanisatian 1904-1936', SA Journa I of Economics, 
v 5, 1937, pp 164-190. 
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Areas Act. Form workers should be made to return if they hod already moved to 
the town. Since municipalities hod been unable to enforce the restrictions of 
the Act, further measures hod become necessary. The system of recruiting by the 
mines should be extended and controlled beyond the existing 'closed' districts, 
for the presence of the recruiting agents, it was claimed, tended to create a 
freer economic market for labour, and the price of labour was forced up in 
response ta this competition. Lastly, squatters should be penalised,and 'kaffir 
formers', whites 'forming kaffirs', and those harbouring more labour tenants than 
they actually needed should be heavily prosecuted. 
Labour got scarcer with the unprecedented growth of forming between 
1923 and 1929. Agricultural census reports showed that opening up new areas 
and subdividing forms went along with more intensive and progressive forming 
methods. These developments increased the need for more reliable and efficient 
workers. For example, the call to evict squotters exactly matched the extension 
of the railway as it moved along, opening up a new sense of production economy 
through the area. Similarly, new dams and irrigation schemes which helped 
towards production also revised people's views on labour. 
But the massive subsidising of farmers under the Pact government hod 
been the most important thing in transforming agriculture. Mcdavo outlines what 
the state did: 
Besides assuring Europeans abundant land, the Union government 
set up a deportment of agriculture in 1913 which placed heavy 
emphasis on veterinary, entomology, plant pathology, and soil 
research. The government further poured money via infrastructures 
and provided credit via the Union Land Bonk, on institution which 
mode loons to formers, on mortgage of land, for improvement, 
purchases of land, stock and plant. The bonk loaned R37 854 476 
(£19 million) between 1912-1929, while the deportment of 
agriculture as a whole spent over R224 000 000 (£112 000 000) 
between 1910 and 1936. 37 
Official findings seem to bear this out. According to the agricultural 
censuses
38 
the number of forms owned by white occupiers between 1918 and 1925 
37 Mcdavo, p 36. See also Frankel, p 136, and L C A Knowles, The economic 
deve lopment of British overseas empire, v 3, p 177. 
38 Details for the following tables are drawn from five reports: the Report of 
the Drought Investigation Commission 1923 (Final), UG 49-23; Report of 
the Land and Agricultural Bonk of South Africa 1926 (Annual), UG 12; 
Report of the Agricultural and Postoral Production, Awicultural Census 8, 
1924-1925, UG 13-27; Agricultural Journal of the Union of South Africa, 
v 4, 1, 1913; Report 4, The future of farming in South Africa 1944, UG 
10-45. 
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grew considerably in all provinces. This is shown in the following table: 
Table 5.1 GROWTH IN THE FARMING SECTOR 1918 - 1925 
FARMS OWNED BY WHITES 
Province 1918 1925 + or - I 
Cape 17596 23887 + 6291 
Natal 4356 6075 + 1 719 
Transvaal 12 181 17307 + 5 126 
OFS 10107 12995 + 2888 
Total 44240 60264 + 16024 
This increase was attributable to the splitting up af existing farms and the opening 
up of new areas - thus canfirming African allegations that their hiring and leasing 
cantracts had not been renewed either by landowners who had decided to bring 
their land under production, or by new owners who had bought in areas that had 
been squatter locations. The extent to which the hiring and leasing of land to 
Africans was being gradually eliminated - except significantly in the OFS where 
this practice had allegedly been outlawed - is shown here: 
Table 5.2 FARMS OWNED BY ABSENTEE lANDLORDS 
Leased Share system Managed 
Province 
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1918 1925 +/- 1918 1925 +/- 1918 1925 +/-
Cape 8 120 7539 - 581 2560 16421-918 2843 2 322 - 521 
I Natal 1 603 2770 +1167 375, 360 1- 15 777 702 - 75 
2 65512 441 1- 214 Transvaal 5797 5222 - 575 I 1 481 1 417 - 64 OF S 3048 2822 1- 226 1 282 : 2 006 I + 724 1 368 1 151 . - 217 
i 
Total 18568 
, 
18 353 I- 215 6 872 i 6 449 i - 423 6469 5592 - 877 
From these statistics the rapid increase between 1918 and 1925 in the 
percentage of white owner-occupied farms relative to other types of tenure con be 
ill ustrated: 
I 
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Table 5.3 NATURE OF TENURE OF WHITE - OCCUPIED FARMS 
1918 1925 1930 19.37 
No of No of I No of No of 
forms % form s I % forms % fanns % 
Owned by occupier 44 240 58.10 60264 166 .48 65306 67.37 69512 66.49 
Leosed by occupier 18568 24.38 18353 20.24 19465 20.08 20895 19.98 
Occupied on shores system 6872 9.02 6444 7.11 5884 6.07 7 305 6.99 
i 
Mmoged for other per.;ons 6469 8.50 5592 6.17 6.285 6.48 6842[ 6.54 
Thus by 1925 two-thirds of the farmers were independent owner-occupiers. 
This had an important bearing on the financing of the industry, for if the awner-
farmer needed money he could get it by mortgaging his farm. Heavy borrowing, 
mortgaging and indebtedness fol lowed, as the Land Bank reports of the time show. 
The pressure on farmers to succeed was therefore also greater. It is not surprising, 
then, that the demand for state assistance and protection a lso intensified during this 
per iod . 
Interestingly, the average size of farm was a lso declining. This was the 
position in 1936: 
Table 5.4 NUMBERS AND SIZES OF FARMS 
IN WHITE AREAS 1936 
5-20 
2/-/00 
(1 morgen = 
0.857 hectare) 
/3.,/03 
'1;608 
3,567 
2,/42 
Overlo,OOO 8/2 
Undivided 2,307 
Tot-al 
But although there were more of the smaller farms in 1936, the percentage of 
whites in the rural sector showed a steady decl ine: 
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Table 5.5 WHITE POPULATION 1918 - 1936 
Rural Urban 
Year 
1000s % total 1000s % total 
1918 655 46 766 54 
1921 672 44 848 56 
1926 701 42 975 58 
1931 708 39 1 120 61 
1936 696 35 1 307 65 
At the some time the African occupiers {excluding casual labour} increased 
in the rural areas: 
Table 5 .6 LABOUR ON WHITE- OCCUPIED FARMS -
REGULAR WORKERS, INCLUDING OCCUPIERS 
Iv\ales 
Year 
African White Coloured Indian 
1925 340343 138186 62030 14052 
1930 361 269 149 363 59154 12544 
1937 463889 160 183 68490 14383 
Females 
1925 93842 22499 14762 2451 
1930 114640 35448 14459 2320 
1937 194523 44 078 18747 4 117 
In other words, the number of form labourers resident on white farms showed 
an absolute and relative increase. But as well as farm employees, the squatters in 
the white rural sector also increased so that by the 1936 census, Africans numbered 
2275000 - or 663 000 more than the 1916 estimate of 1 612000. This 41 per cent 
influx can be accounted for only in part by the bigger demand for form labour as 
. suggested in the farm employment figures above. The overflow from the reserves is 
also. include? in this figure, because landless Africans mostly crowded onto the forms 
of absentee landlords or the crown londs that had not been sold to whites. 
Contrary to the segregation plan, therefore, more and more Africans were 
being farced to find land in the 'non-native' areas, but this does not mean that they 
were opting for farm employment. Judging by the formers' demands for more restric-
tive measures to tie Africans down to the farms, clearly many hod become squatters 
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on crown land and land owned but not occupied by whites . It was this situation that 
the farmers found intolerable. 
Development of the white farms automatically meant a greater demand for 
labour. In turn the farmers insisted that workers be shared more evenly. This could 
be done, they said, by new ways of controlling the labour supply. 
Trying once more to tackle the labour shortage in the primary sectors, the 
Minister of Mines and Industries appointed the Inter-departmental Committee on the 
Labour Resources of the Union in 1929. One of its tasks was to enquire into 'the 
supply of male and female adult labour of whites, coloureds (excluding Asiatics) and 
Natives suitable and available in the different areas of the Union ••• for agriculture 
39 
and other forms of employment'. Here was an emphasis not anly on what the 
different sectors needed but where they might find their workers. 
The committee reported glowingly on farming progress in the five years before. 
Basing their estimates for the future on this unprecedented advance, they concluded: 
In agricul ture a steady increase in the demand for labour must be expec-
ted. As the popu lation increases, land must be worked more and more 
intensively to supply enough food and raw materials. All this means more 
labour. Intensification means that land becomes more expensive in rela-
tion to other factors of production. It therefore becomes more economical 
to use the land to better purpose by employing more labour. .•• 40 
But they warned that 'a distinct shortage exists in mining areas, and on farms in the 
Eastern Transvaal Highveld, Western Transvaal, other Transvaal districts, Orange 
Free State and Natal Sugar Cane Areas'. The farming industry was at risk, they said, 
unless steps were taken at once to boost the labour supply. To meet the country's 
farm labour needs 'an increase in the Native labour force of 2 or 3 per cent per annum 
41 
would have ta be budgeted for. ' Labour was scarce, they felt, because occupied 
forms had increased at an average of 2.34 per cent a year and this rate was expected 
to continue. To cater for this growth and for farms already there 'the native now 
39 Report of the Inter-departmental Commi t tee on Labour Resources of the Union, 
An 89-1931, para 43. The Departments of Mines, Agriculture and Marketing, 
and Commerce and Industry were all represented on this committee. 
40 Ibid, para 97 
41 Ibid, para 47. According to this committee there were 375 000 farm labourers 
in 1929. This figure excluded squatters and casual labourers, but included 
included labour tenants. H M Robertson estimated that 528400 African adult 
males were engaged in farm work in 1931; while the SAIRR, quoting the first 
occupational census of 1937, gives 403 500 males and 184276 females for 
1936. Prior to the 1936 census : see RR 10/44 (mimeo). 
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resident on the land will become the normal labour force', 42 but also it must be 
expected thot any new developments will bring an increased demand for labour'. 
The govemment would therefore have to stabil ise the farm labour supply that was 
already there by somehow getting the regulations to work. Another source would 
have to be found for future needs as well. In a later section the needs of the other 
sectors are discussed and the committee's deep forebodings on labour will be more 
fully appreciated. 
Writing about the same time on the alleged shortage of farm labour, 
Margaret Ballinger refuted these findings outright: 
Thanks to all the restrictions on the fluidity of labour, agriculture 
has maintained its hold an a large proportion of the available 
labour supply, a much larger proportion indeed than its contribution 
to the national income appears ta justify, a larger proportion indeed 
than is healthy for the agricultural industry itself or for the country 
at large. 43 
Proving her charge, she continued: 
Without counting casual labour which constitutes 0 considerable 
factor in agriculture, the proportion of Non-European to Europeans 
on farms owned by Europeans is four to one. If casual labour is 
included, as it should be, the proportion is considerably higher ...• 
Put in another way, and using figures for 1936, 1 651 200 persons 
engaged in agriculture outside Natives'reserves, of whom 309 500 
were Non- Europeans produced 20% of the national income, and 
444 200 persons engaged in mining, of whom 397 800 were Non-
Europeans, produced 19% of the national income. 44 
42 Africans 'resident' on the land would include full-time servants and their 
families, in addition to the labour tenants who rendered three to six months' 
service . It must be assumed that the committee here included squatters who 
were seen as potential labourers. See toble 2.7, p 97 for statistics on 
rural popu lation distribution . For discussion on reasons for increased labour 
needs, see An 89-1931, paras 97 and 132-138. 
43 Ballinger,' Problems ... ', p 3 
44 Ibid. Owing to changes in the methods of classification adopted in the 
various census enumerations it is difficult to get stalistical evidence of trends 
in the employment of farm labour. The 1936 census classifies farm labourers 
as 'occupied in farming' (resident workers on white farms) and 'non-resident 
'<IOrkers' (regular workers recruited from other, usually 'na tive', areas). A 
comparison of the number of farm employees with the number of farm residents 
indicates that in each of the provinces practically the whole of the African 
male population of working age resident on white forms was active ly engaged 
in agricul ture - this excluded totals for females , non-resident labour (about 
30-35 per cent of the regular labour force) and casual labourers (for shearing , 
reaping, fruit-picking, and so on) . The lotter category were not recorded at 
all. Margaret Ballinger's statistics are therefore conservative and her remarks 
appear to be justified . 
The government responds 
The formers' demands appear to have carried so much weight that the 
government was even prepared to rush through the Native Service Contract Act 
in 1932 without waiting to hear from the commissions studying the 'native 
question'. How else can one explain this? The government shored the same 
disregard for the opinion of the statutory NAC. This exasperated I-he commission, 
as we can see from their letter to the Minister of Native Affairs. They noted 
first of all that the Native Service Contract Bill hod been sent to a Select 
Committee before its second reading, that the SelectCommittee hod been 
instructed to take evidence, but that despite this opportunity 
the bill has now emerged from that Committee in on amended form 
(AB 15-31). 
Members of the Commission were not invited to tender evidence 
before the Committee, and they wish now to emphasise the following 
points •.•. 45 
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Bodies of inquiry evidently counted for less than sections of political and economic 
interest. In fact, the NAC points help us to understand both the political influence 
of the farming sector and the government's plans in response to their demands. The 
NAC stated: 
3 (i) The Prime Minister has placed before the country and Parlia-
ment his proposals for deal ing with the acquisition and the occupa-
tion of land by Natives in the Natives Land (Amendment) Bill-
(AB 22-29). 
(ii) This subject is of such a far-reaching and important nature 
that he has subsequently tak81 the unusual step of obtaining 
Parliament's approval of the appointment of a large and representa-
tive Joint Committee of both Houses for the purpose of considering 
' ••• the question of making special provision for •.. the acquisition 
of land by Natives .••• ' 
(iii) That Committee is still sitting. 
(iv) Parliament is now being asked to consider the Native SerVice 
Contract Bill which purports:-
(0) to amend the low relating to Master and Servants in the 
Transvaal and Natol; 
(b) to amplify the Natives Land Act, 1913 - on Act which 
deals with the acquisition and occupation of land by 
Natives; 
(c) to impose a tax on certain owners of land i.e. of land 
occupied by Natives 
45 NAC to the Minister of Native Affairs, April 1931, copy sent to NEC 
1930-1932 (extract from letter) 
(v) The proposals conta ined in the Native Service Contract Bill 
not only impinge directly on the proposals of the Prime Minister 
but also upon the very subject upon which the Joint Committee is 
engaged . 
4. Members refrain from expressing any view on the Bill, 
inasmuch as they consider that, in view of the above mentioned 
points, a B ill of this nature should not be passed when the Govern-
ment is pledged to a comprehensive measure embracing all the points 
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with which the Bill proposes to deal. 46 
The commissioners were obviously utterly aware of how totally the government had 
brushed them aside in order to satisfy the farme rs . 
The 1930 inter-departmental committee also reported before the NEC 
did. This may account for its silence on the problem as diagnosed by Africans 
themselves. However, in retrospect, even if this information had been made 
available to the committee, there is every likelihood it would have been ignored, 
just as the findings of commissions and committees after this report were ignored. 
The action taken by the Hertzog government even after the NEC report had been 
released shows that they too rejected all arguments that the farm labourer shortoge 
could be I inked with legal restrictions. 
It was against this background that the farmers renewed their demands, 
and the Hertzog government's response can now be assessed. 
a Labour tenants 
An important pillar of the Nationalists' farm labour policy was the 
system of labour tenancy. This is clear from the speed with which successive 
laws were passed to entrench this system between 1924 and 1933. The government 
was by this time convinced that the labour tenancy system should be prevented 
from disintegrating any further. 
The first law to implement this scheme was the Natives' Land Act (1913) 
Amendment Bill 1926. When Hertzog realised, however, that the implementation 
of the Land Bill would be delayed - unless of course he had been prepared to 
revoke the condition that the Land Bill remain interdependent wi th his other three 
Bills, which he was not - he was forced to seek an olternative solution. During 
the same pari iamentary session in 1926 he the refore introduced ond enocted the 
Moster and Servants' Law (Transvaal and Natal) Amendment Act 26 of 1926. 
This Act brought labour tenancy into line with the OFS system. In effect the 
46 Ibid 
labour tenant was tied as securely to the farmer as the full-time servant, except 
that the labour tenants' compulsory term of service ran for 180 days (double the 
time formerly stipulated in the Transvaal, but not Natal). 
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The reasons for this immediate action are not hard to find, with continued 
complaints about shortages of farm labour and repeated failure to get laws to 
immobilise the labour tenant - who after his contractual three to six month period 
was virtually free of any labour obi igations to the farmer and could easily desert 
to the town. What the farmers wanted, therefore, was machinery enabling them 
to act against the deserters' family to prevent individual defaulters from abrogating 
their responsibilities. As one Camperdown falmer argued: 
This is the form of tenancy which is most acceptoble to the Native, 
because it gives him an opportunity of working elsewhere for a cash 
return at higher wages in urban areas. I found in my sixteen years 
experience in Camperdown District, Natol, that this tenancy has 
worked exceedingly well where the kraal head is able to compel 
his sons to work. 47 
Smith also emphasised the importonce of urban employment to the farm labour 
tenant: 
It is becoming increasingly evident that the Natives' attachment 
to the soil is losing its power to retain him in farm employment in 
the face of competing labour demands and higher money wages. 
In any case, he has a need for cash, not only to pay his taxes but 
usually for food and clothing too, and in the absence of a cash 
wage on the form he must seek outside employment, at least 
temporarily. 48 
The stotutory six-month labour tenancy allowed the farm tenant a 
period off to earn cash . It was therefore an acceptable arrangement to those 
farmers unable or unwilling to employ wage labour. With the system of labour 
tenancy breaking down, the formers supported its reinstatement but many 
qual ified their acceptance of this system thus: 
In my opinion, some such tenancy is the goal which should be 
strived for. It does away with the stigma of 'forced labour' in every 
way. But, the kraal head must have authority to bind his inmates 
to work for the rent - without this sense of security the farmer 
cou ld not look ahead with any sense of security. It is because of 
the decline of the kraal head's authority and power over his inmates 
47 F B Burchell, evidence to the Select Committee on Native Service Contract 
Bill, copy sent to NEC 1930-1932. See also the Select Committee report, 
SC 7-31 . 
48 Smith, p 51 
that this form of tenancy has been converted into a purely 'labour 
agreement' • 49 
In these terms the 1926 Act also proved unsatisfactory. The farmer found that 
unless there was one contract between the kraal head - binding on al I inmates -
and himself, he had no legal means of forcing a tenant ta work. Apparently at 
one time farmers had been able to rely on the kraal head to bind the inmates of 
his kraal to a general contract. This custom, however, had never been given 
the force of law. 50 Outside the contractual service period, moreover, the 
penalties under the M:lster and Servants' Laws fell away. The labour tenant 
then regained his former independence and neither he nor his fomily could be 
forced by law to work for the landlord longer than the contractual period. The 
farmers experienced the greatest difficulty in getting labour at the height of the 
season, for this coincided with the period when Africans from the reserves would 
be least likely to offer their services as well. If these omissions could be rectified 
by further legislation, at least all labour tenants could be forced to work for the 
farmer for a six-month period, their family and dependants standing by for the 
farmer's busy months. 
Other ways of coercing or luring labour had also lost their hold. 51 
This mattered all the more because proceeding against the errant tenant was a 
sizeable undertoking for the farmers. They objected to the cost involved in 
prosecuting their servants under the Master and Servants' Laws. Magistrates 
involved in thousands of cases bel ieved the only answer was to lay dawn that 
all contracts should be registered. 52 They also agreed with formers that the 
passes of farm workers should carry a spec ial endorsement making it easier to 
trace absconders. 
49 Burchell, ev idence as above (n 5.47). See also address by the Minister of 
Native Affairs, E G Jansen, to the 1931 Native Conference called to discuss 
the Native Service Contract Bill. His remarks are almost identical in the 
NAC report 1927-1931, UG 26-32, P 16. 
50 Burchell, evidence as above; although the former had law on his side. 
51 See discussion on diminish ing value of 'privileges' pp 176-178. 
52 A M Baumann, a Free Stote magistrate, hod this to say on the operation of 
the M:lster and Servants' Law in the OFS: 'The great difficulty in the Act 
is that in the old Free State days the master had to prove a contract, he had 
to prove it by means of two witnesses if it were verbally proved or else he 
had to prove a contract in writing, whereas now, since 1903 that hos been 
done away with, and we very often see in the court a case where a man says: 
'my contract is so and so' and the servant denies it, well noturally in the Free 
State the master's word is taken and that is the great diff iculty under the -
M:lster and Servants' Act.' SC 60-17, para 2666. Magistrates in Natal 
and the Transvaal also complained : see UG 22-32, paras A 101-164. 
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Accordingly the government passed a series of laws to give the farmers 
better contro l of pass law offenders - the Native Administration Act 1927 and 
its Amendment in 1929 extending labour control in all rural areas,53 and the 
Natives' (Urban Areas) Amendment Act 1930 gave greater control in prescribed 
urban areas over the comings and goings of African farm employees. 54 Clearly 
the main thrust of the Pact government's segregation policy in its initial form 
was to stabilise labour tenancy and share out lobour tenants more fairly amongst 
farmers. At this stage the state system of labour control was not designed to 
repatriate redundant workers from the towns to the reserves for the purpose of 
reallocating them fairly between the farmers and the mines, for the government 
still believed that the labour tenants and squatters already resident in the white 
rural areas would be enough for the farmers' needs. As long, that is, as the 
Africans in the white rural sector could be secured for six months' labour on the 
farms. 
b Squatters 
What the state appeared to be aiming towards by 1929 was full control 
over the labour supply in the white rural sector in aid of the farmers. In this 
Hertzog's labour pol icy differed from those of his predecessors, but it was in 
line with the practices extant in the OFS. The SAP policy, it will be remembered, 
was biased in favour of the mines. Only a three-month service contract was 
stipulated in the 1913 Act, presumably because it still left labour tenants free 
to work in the mines thereafter. Under Hertzog this period was doubled even 
though the mines in 1924 had instituted a 270-hour contract for locally recruil,:,d 
workers who were signed up under contract. This chonge meant a contractual 
period of 11 months would be required, thus cancelling out a period of service 
on the mines unless the labourer entered under the voluntary ossisted scheme. 55 
But it was in Hertzog's measures towards squatters on unoccupied lond 
that 0 chonge in his pol icy is most marked. The I ink between squotters and the 
mines' lobour policy has already been shown. 56 It wos argued that Sauer's 
squatter resettlement policy was devised with the mir,es ' labour claims in mind, 
hence the decision not to enforce onti-squatting measures before land in the 
53 For discussion on h"""the Notive .Administration Act 1927 was used to 
control lobour see above, pp 121-123. 
54 For discussion of these laws see below, pp 204-209, also pp 136-137 and chap 8. 
55 See also p 245. 
56 See pp 149-151. 
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reserves had been obtained . The reprieve for squatters was opposed by Hertzog 
as early as 1913. During the debate he expressed -his views thus: 
Well, he must congratulate the Minister, and he hoped that, having 
gone so for, he would go a little bit further, and would also accept 
the rest of his [General Hertzog's] proposals when legislation was 
introduced into this House •..• The Minister had told them that he 
would lay before this House a Bill providing for legislation in regard 
to the purchase and lease of land, but he cou ld not do that without 
at the same time introducing a measure providing for the question of 
squatting. Well, it was just on this matter that he desired to soya 
few words and in regard to which he felt compelled to propose an 
amendment. The Minister had said that the reason why he could 
not introduce a Squatters' Law now was beca use they would not 
know what to do with the large number of natives who would be 
thrown on their hands. He only wished to say this that if the 
Minister :"ould also accept the further part of his tGeneral Hertzog's] 
proposal, he would see at once that he need not fear that, because 
provision was made that they should go gradually, and that in those 
districts where they found natives in large numbers, they could be 
left even for years, and that they should go step by step from 
district to district, so that gradually they would deal with all 
the natives. 57 
He~tzog's plans had been thwarted in 1913 when he was made to resign 
his portfolio as Minister of Native Affairs in the December of 1912. In 1924 as 
Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs he again had the chance to put 
his original squatters plan into practice. The situation as far as the farmers were 
concerned demanded action. 
By the late 1920. the farmers were still opposed to the 1913 squatter 
resettlement plan. Most still harked back to the old republican system. They 
still believed squatting should continue in locations for the convenience of 
whites; or they shuuld be evicted, to be distributed fairly amongst the farmers 
as labour tenants or full-time servants. The latter solution was preferable in 
1926 for, as many witnesses to the NEC claimed, many squatters from these 
locations had become urban workers and the farms and mines were being by-
passed as a result. But the farmers suffered most from this new development. 
The Assistant Magistrate of Johannesburg, R Colson, was among those who 
thought so. Years of experience in the Marico and Transvaal bushveld districts 
also led him to note that Africans in these areas were quite 'uncontrolled': 
They form a reservoir of farm labour in bad seasons when the labour 
is not much needed; at other times the natives prefer to go to the 
57 Davenport & Hunt, doc 91, p 57 and also doc 92; and P Dickson, 'The 
Natives' Land Act 1913', unpub M/l thesis, UCT, 1969 
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urban centres for work. 58 
Africans in these areas were free of pass laws, service contracts and the various 
other devices used to tie farm labour down, and were thus 'free' to choose other 
jobs. As a result some farmers insisted the government devise a system whereby 
the squatter, like the labour tenant since 1926, could be subject to greater 
control. Squatters should be compelled, they said, to give at least six months' 
service before being allowed to take up jobs in the towns and mines. 
In fact the farmers had no objection to Africans having other jobs for 
six months, because many farmers were unable or refused to pay cash wages. It 
was also an important reason why Hertzog prevaricated on the whole question of 
influx control - but this is dealt with in a later section. 
c Full-time servants 
Before discussing the new laws tying squatters and labour tenants more 
firmly to formers, let us look at the last group - full-time servants. They were 
'securely bound to th~ farmer by 1923. The even more effective system of pass 
low controls under the Urban Areas Amendment Act of 1930 hod, according to 
the NEC, also stomped out most of the earl ier opportun ities for desertion. The 
pass carried by the full-time servant had a special endorsement, and after 1930 
the onus was on the urban employer for the first time to ensure he was not taking 
on someone whose pass was endorsed as a form employee . 59 This virtually can-
celled out all other work than that on the farms for full-time servants . These 
workers hod limited options even within their own district. Not only would a 
former be reluctant to pooch his neighbour's servants, but as Francis Wilson said 
in discussing the 1913 Act: 
It is possible to regard the .1913 Land Act as being an oct of 
collusion amongst the hirers of form labour not to give remuneration 
above a certain level. 60 
A I though the form worker was protected by the courts, in general the low was 
not on his side. A magistrate from Ladybrand explained why . On the adminis-
58 NEC 1930-1932, written evidence of R Colson. He was well qualified to 
speak on matters dealing with farmers and their labourers: see n 5.13 
for curriculum vitae. It should also be noted that districts in which he 
served coincide with d istricts in which large areas were held by land 
companies and the crown: Piet Ret ief, Z6utpansberg, and the Groot 
Marico district. 
59 For discussion on Natives' (Urban Areas) Amendment Act 1930 see chop 8. 
60 Wi Ison, 'Forming .. • ', p 128 
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tration of justice under the Moster and Servants' Low he wrote: 
This Act in my opinion, has worked very smoothly in this District. 
The powers given to the Magistrate, if properly and wisely, and 
impartially exercised, are sufficiently extensive to cope with any 
contravention of the Act either by employer or labourer. 
He went an: 
I soy wisely and impartially advisedly because the inherited 
prejudice against the unfortunate native is so strong that magistrates 
need a fair amount of worldly knowledge and a strong sense of 
justice to deal with these cases. Why I particularly mention this 
aspect of the matter is because the magistrate's popularity in his 
district depends to a large extent on the severity shown when 
dealing with the Native as against the white man and if his sense 
of justice is not sufficiently developed it may easily be swamped 
by a desire to be well spaken af by the farmers. 61 
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This was not an isolated report. Outside the Master and Servants' Laws, magistrates 
also objected to formers lending money to their servants to pay their poll taxes, 
wheel taxes, dog taxes and various subsistence cash needs. 62 Once in debt the 
labourer would be refused a trekposs and no other employer could engage him. Dr 
Neve ling was not exaggerating when he described the position of the form labourer 
as 'up against the stone wall of always having to remain a farm labourer'. 63 
Legislative solution - a forced labour policy 
Of course only the cases of dissatisfied employers and employees were 
recorded. The evidence of the former farm tenants suggests too that, until the 
crisis in the 1920s, Africans on the whole were in a better bargaining position and 
farmers were generally more tolerant of the labour conditions under the traditional 
forms of tenancy. 64 But the lows of the Pact era and second Hertzog ministry, 
culminating in 1932 in the Native Service Contract Act, proclaim the end of 
tolerance and compromise from the formers. The Native Taxation and Development 
Act of 1925, the formalised use of convict labour, and the Native Service Contract 
Act were all forced labour measures introduced and passed by the govemment 
between 1924 and 1933. 
61 NEC 1930-1932, written evidence of the Magistrate of Ladybranrl, OFS 
62 Publ ished comments in tabled report UG 22-32; for references see n 5.52. 
63 Nevel ing, 'Farm labour ... " p 8 
64 See evidence of the Church of the Province above, pp 177-178. 
The league af Nations in 1930 defined forced labour as 'all work or 
service which is extracted from any person under the menace of any penalty for 
its non-performance and for which the worker does not offer himself voluntarily 
,65 The various forms of legal indirect compulsion were 
taxation, vagrancy or 'pass' laws, the deprivation of lands, the 
retraction of lands, cultivation or cattle-rearing, and other 
measures, when adopted with the intention of forcing workers 
into employment. 66 
All these indirect forms, sa id the IlO report, were just as bad as direct pressure. 
a Taxation 
An Outlook editorial on how workers were coerced, specifically 
mentioned the taxing of Africans: 
So impartial and influential a body as the Associated Chambers 
lost year passed the following resolution '(a) that the Native is 
sufficiently taxed through the customs tariff; (b) that the poll 
tax is out of proportion to the income tax levied on Europeans; 
and (c) that the collection of tax is expensive, irksome and 
unjust, causing inconvenience and annoyance to the Native 
who has paid the tax and to employers generally'. 67 
Commenting on this mild reaction the editor wrate: 
Whatever the motives may have been for the imposition of heavier 
taxation upon Natives than on Europeans, the effect is to drive 
the Natives ta eam more money by working for Europeans. The 
poll tax in certain circumstances is in effect a labour tax. 68 
In doubling the general tax, or poll tax as it was commonly known, under the 
1925 Tax Act, the government resorted to a tactic that had proved itself in the 
past. Frankel put it to the NEC thus: 
65 Wilson & Perrot (ed), 'Forced labour', p 318; also lord Hailey, An African 
survey, whose 1936 edition has a chapter on forced labour in Africa . 
66 Wilson & Perrot, op cit, p 319 
67 Ibid, p 320 
68 Ibid. The 'poll tax' was one of the important grievances voiced by the 
majority of African witnesses before the NEe. It should be noted that the 
fourth term of reference of the commission dealt specifically with the 
'proportion of the publ ic revenue contributed by the Native population 
directly and indirectly ...• ' The evidence of DDT Jabavu and 5 Plaatje 
is porticularly valuable on this quest ion. See a lso paras 532, A335 and 
A337 in the published report where taxation as a means of augmenting 
the labour supply is discussed. 
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There can be no doubt that the historical cause of the present general 
Native tax of £1 (and probably also of pass fees), is to be found in 
the desire to force Natives to work. In my opin ion ••• the Natives 
are today already being driven by a for stronger force than taxation, 
to find work on almost any terms that will give them and their 
dependants a I ivel ihood. This force is the threat of starva tion in 
the overcrowded reserves. It is therefore most important to rea lise 
what is the real effect of the tax under the present conditions in the 
Native territories. It results in nothing less than' a drastic weakening 
of the Natives' wage bargaining power so that the customary low wage 
which exists as a result of the pressure on the labour market of the 
masses of unskilled Native labourers seeking work is further reduced 
(or prevented from rising). In other words the effect of such taxation 
is ta undermine further the functioning of any bulwarks against gross 
economic exploitation of the Native peoples that might still exist. 69 
So, as the demand for labour grew in the 1930s, Africans were forced 
into jobs by dint of being taxpayers. Tax defaulters suffered the same fate, for 
they ended up as convict labour. But white liberals hailed the 1925 Tax Act as 
a blessing despite its discriminatory guise, since it ruled that at least one-fifth 
of the total poll tax should be for 'native development'. Most Africans, however, 
stigmotised it as a 'labour tax' from the outset, voicing their abhorrence in terms 
like those of Frankel cited above. Their response was understandable. This law 
added yet another to the multitude already passed under which Africans could be 
arrested for a so-called 'technical offence'. African movement was hindered by 
the 1925 Act and an Amendment Act 25 of 1930. The former required every 
African to carry his tax receipt - issued at his place of domicile, be it the reserve, 
a farm or a town - and an identity pass a t all times. The 1930 Act specified that 
curfew regulations restricting the times when Africans could be abrood could be 
promulgated. The penalty for contravention of these statutory restrictions was 
summary arrest, and a period of imprisonment upon conviction . In 1926, 63941 
Africans were orrested under the 1925 Act alone. 70 
b Convict labour 
Considering that a vost omount of convict labour was to be employed 
officially for the first time in all sorts of industries and undertakings, this charge 
that the Taxation Act was used to augment the labour supply is further substontiated. 
Or as Stuttaford, the MP for Newlands, saw it: 'it was for the convict's own good 
that they should be kept usefully employed' ond he 'did not see why 0 mon should 
69 NEe 1930-1932, typescript evidence of S H Frankel 
70 R E Phillips, The Bantu in the city, p 177, ond toble 8.7 below 
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be able to retire from work simply because he committed a crime.,71 
c Further urban restrictions rejected 
The Transvaal Agricu ltura l Union sow another way to augment their 
labour supply: they tried to put pressure on the govemment to reallocate Africans 
I iving in the reserves to the farmers' advantage, by 
the complete segregation of the Natives from the towns and the 
gradual repatriation of all male Natives except such as housed 
under the compound system. 72 
In short, some farmers were demanding that the govemment restrict all rural 
Africans from entering the towns, and not merely workers off farms. Their accept-
ance of an urban compound system ties up with the no-wage-Iow-wage policy 
already discussed, and thus the restrictions were to apply against only those rural 
Africans who could not prove bona fide employment on a farm for at least six 
months. 
The govemment rejected these demands at the time. Presumably they 
believed they could supply the farmers adequately by other means. The Native 
Service Contract Bill first tabled in 1929 and then each successive year until it 
was finally passed in 1932 shows that the Hertzog government had devised a policy 
which if strictly implemented could have secured more than enough workers for the 
farmers' needs. 
2 000 000 Africans tied down to the farms 
a Labour tenants and full-time servants 
Under the 1932 Service Contract Act roughly two million Africans could 
have been secured in the wh ite rural sector. Firstly, labour agreements were 
amended so that for the first time 'the unit of employment' was the married man 
as head of the kraal , his family and his dependents . What was destructive of 
African mobil ity was that workers were required to have a document of identifica-
tion before they could be employed or even issued with a pass to leave the ir 
place of domicile; and if that place of domicile was a whi te's farm then the 
document of identification had to be accompanied by a labour-tenant contract 
71 House of Assembly Debates, 18 May 1931. 
72 Wilson & Perrot (eds), 'Forced labour', April 1930, p 318 
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endorsed by the landowner to the effect that the African was not required ta 
render service during a specified period. Nor could on African juvenile from 
the white rura I areas be employed without the consent of both guardian and 
landowner. 
Secondly, if a single member of the 'unit' foiled to fulfil his or her 
labour obligations the former could, without recourse to the courr.;, evict all 
members of the defaulter's family. In this way two further demands of the 
formers hod been met: the problem of 'costly and time-consuming' legal pro-
ceedings hod been overcome; and a six- month (180-day) labour service could 
be enforced on all members, who were bound to serve at one time or another, 
taking turns at the former's convenience. This labour contract was to apply 
unless the Governor-General expressly sa id otherwise. 
Thirdly, although both magistrates and Africans hod pressed for written 
contracr.; these hod not been mentioned in the Act. The system therefore still 
loy open to even wider abuse. Since the length and period of the tenanr.;' 
services was not stipulated, a labour tenant's service could be extended through-
out the year, if the former so wished, and the tenant could be forced to comply. 
It was this which moved Rheinallt-Jones ta comment in 1931 : 
I am impressed by the wastage entailed by Squatting and Labour 
tenancy as well as by the misery they entail. The wastage is due 
ta the fact that large numbers of Natives are kept 'hanging about' 
when their labour is not wonted •••• The misery is due to the 
complete absence of status, and the extent to which Natives are 
turned off because their children have grown up and left for the 
towns. In one tawn in Notal on official told me thotas many as 
3 Kraals would come into town because of this. 73 
Under the 1932 Native Service Contract Act this eviction of whole famil ies was 
given the sanctity of low. The 1932 Act therefore seems to be On attempt ta make 
kraal heads control the inmates of the ir kraal more fully. Should the threat of 
eviction foil as a deterrent, however, whipp ing hod been legal ised. This 
innovation, reminiscent of the 'Strop' Bill introduced in the Cope Parliament in 
1891 but never passed, was welcomed by formers. It empowered a magist rate to 
inflict lashes on on African servant for breaches of the low regulating the position 
of masters and servanr.;. Formers hod complained that their servants should not 
be afforded the luxury of languishing in jail at their expense. 74 Disciplinary 
73 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of J D Rheinallt-Jones 
74 This was a repeated complaint from formers who wished to do away with court 
proceedings, and was a further reason why the proper reg istration of contracts 
was not insisted upon . 
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action under the Nlaster and Servants' law had always made breach of contract 
a crim inal offence for the full-time se rvan t. Now for the first time th is was 
extended to all forms of form labour service - regardless of the period of con tract. 
Aga in, the offender and the kraal could be penal ised. Edgar Brookes saw how 
for-reaching this law could be: 
In the year '1926 [the government J passed the Master and Servants' 
Law (Transvaal and Natal) Amendment Act, by wh ich tenants 
became for discip l inary purposes ordinary labourers. When we 
real ise that the 1913 Act has forced the gradual substitution of 
labour tenancy for squatting, it means that Union legislation has 
introduced a system which can only be called forced labour. And 
this in the sacred name of segregation, though a grea ter proportion 
of Natives I ive in European areas now than in 1913. 75 
No f igures exist to shaw how many rent-paying tenants were demoted into labour 
tenants between 1913 and 1926. But the very foct that this group of labour 
tenants was specially catered for in the 1926 Amendment is indicative of a con-
siderable increase in their number. 
Even before it was passed, the Native Service Contract B ill struck 
people as forced labour - it was delayed for this reason for three years in conse-
quence of fierce opposition by members of the SA P. Selope Thema, a moderate 
ANC executive member, found it coercive: 
It seemed the object of the Bill was to provide for a continuous supply 
of cheap labour. He thought the time had come when the Natives 
should soy to the farmer' If you want labour you must pay for it like 
the farmers of Canada and Australia are doing.' The farmers were 
taking advantage of the foct that the Natives required land, to 
force these conditions on to them. 
The Bill restricted freedom of movement among the Native people, 
denied them the right of bargaining with the lond to their best 
advontage and introduced a new pass system . 76 
The Reverend Nlahabane was to add: 
The most obnox ious and pernicious feature of the meosure was 
section 11 deal ing with whipping •.. . The Bantu peopl e had 
advonced in civilization; even in the olden days a Native could 
not inflict corporal punishment on his son of 18 years of age without 
ass istance af the boy's uncles and the consent of the fa mily council. 
Now this section provided for the whipping of a servant, who 
might even be an o ld man. Was there better proof that they had 
returned to the days of slavery? 77 
75 Brookes, Colour problems .• . , p 60 
76 S Thema o t the Native Conference, 9 December 1930, NAC report, 
UG 26-32, p 22 
77 The Rev S Nlah~bane at the same Native Conference, p 21. During the 
Committee stage on Amendment was introduced providing for the wh ipping 
of boys only. See n 5.8 . 
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The new pass law Thema referred to was one that required special 
endorsemen t on the passes of all Africans domiciled in the 'white' rural sector 
- al ready noted - introduced under the 1932 Service Contract Act. All sorts 
of ploys were used that gave the farmer a technically legal right to refuse such 
an endorsemen t: indebtedness; non-fulfilment of the 180 days because the 
farmer had stretched the service over many months instead of the labourer 
serving his time in six consecutive months; fathers ar brothers be ing forced to 
labour in place of a kraal defau lter - to name just a few. 
The fact that the ward ing of the Act was so vague - with no built-in 
safeguards against unscrupulous employers - is further corrobbrat ion that the 
Act was a forced labour measure. Exponents of the Act argued that, given the 
acute labour shortoge, no farmer would dare exploit his labourers. Bu t by the 
some token , with the congestion in the reserves and the stringent contro ls to 
prevent des'ertion or access to other job opportunities without the farme r' s 
permission, the labour tenant, like the full-time servant before him, found 
himself immobilised at the farmer's conven ience . The only difference was that 
the labour tenant was stuck for six months in the year . After that he could get 
wage employment e ither with the same employer, or another farme r or in a 
d ifferent sector altogether, whereas the full-time servant was tied to the farmer 
until either pa rty gave three months' notice to terminate the contract. Even 
then , the full-t ime servant would be barred from seeking work in another sector . 
b Squatters 
How did Hertzog propose to dea l with illegal squatters under the 
Native Service Contract Act? Here the government comp letely reversed its 
predecessors' pol ic ies. Extra land for rese ttl ing squatters was not to be made 
avai lable. The moratorium contained in Sauer's saving c lause was therefore 
dropped. Instead the Governor-General-in-Council was g iven the power to 
proclaim areas where clauses in the new Act for the eviction of squatte rs would 
. d· I . f 78 Imme la te y come Into orce. 
What was to be the fate of ev icted squatters? It seems they were not 
mean t to be resettled in the reserves because, as we saw earl ier, 79 the provi-
sions under the Land Amendment Bill showed Hertzog had no intention of 
extending the reserves. Since the Act did not provide for any other land 
78 See c hap 3, p 119 . 
79 See chap 2 above, p 56 ff. 
207 
where the evicted could go, 011 the squotters could do was seek iobs on the 
white forms, and this no doubt was the intention of the Act. The ideo of 
segregation hod obviously been abandoned here. As Edgar Brookes wrote at 
the time: 
Here for the first time, all pretence of carrying out the 1913 policy 
was dropped, and no concessions of further lond, however illusory, 
were mode in the Act. A II was lost, even hypocrisy. 80 
The SA P's land segregation pol icy hod been reversed in yet another 
way, in that even the administrat ive dispensat ions that hod operated since 
1923 were apparently to be phased out. Edgar Brookes drew attention to this 
in 1933: 
From 1930-1932 things have gone from bod to worse . First of all, 
a quiet odministrative ruling which only leoked out some time 
later, deprived the Natives of the right to acquire land in 'released 
areas' . ... 81 
In the preceding chapter we sow that magistrates hod met with such opposition 
on this ruling from individual formers and formers' unions that it was in effect 
a dead letter, but Brookes's statement is the firs t suggestion that the policy hod 
been official ly dropped. 
So the govemment hod no intention of providing a hoven for squatters 
in the reserves. Add ta this the clouse under the 1932 Contract Act which, 
with some exceptions, ensured that any African mole domiciled in the Transvaal 
or Notal outside the 'native areas', 'who is or oppears to be above the age of 
18 and under the age of 60' would be I iable to a special tax of £5 unless he 
could prove that in the year in question he hod worked for at least three months 
under a contract of service or as on artisan. It becomes quite cleor that Hertzog 
meant to tax squatting out of existence. The ex-squatter would then be moved 
into regularised labour service on the forms for ot least three months in the year, 
or else pay the state £5 a year for his mobility or refusal to accept wage employ-
ment. The white formers gained one way, the state the other. 
What other option did the squatter have? Few squatters could have 
afforded the £5 tax in addi tion to the rental and grazing fees to be poid to the 
landlord. For a man and his two sons over 18 this could work out at 0 minimum 
of £15 special tax, £6 rental and £6 poll tax. The new restric tions on the 
80 Brookes, Colour problems •.. , p 68, and chop 2 above, pp 80-81 
81 Ibid, p 61. For discussion on administrative dispensations see above, p 80, 
n 2.25, and append ix B.5 below. 
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hiring and leasing of land had all but destroyed the communities of peasant 
cash-croppers that existed at the time Lagden reported in 1904. The reserves 
were congested and overstocked; they could not hope to accommoda te thousands 
of squatters and their livestock in 1917, let alone 1932. To appreciate the· 
hopelessness of the squatters' plight, it is worth reca lling the resolution of the 
TLOA before the Select Committee on the Native Administration Bill in 1927. 
This read: 
That its proposals regarding Native squatters in non-Na tive areas 
are of such a nature that they must result in the wholesale eviction 
of thousands of Native families. The enforcement of the law as 
drafted will result in ser ious lass and severe hardships to both 
landowners and Natives, and will give rise to a general feeling 
of insecurity and alarm mOre especially amongst Natives .•.• 
The Association is of the opinion ..• it will be only fair ta 
Natives and landowners that their existing relations should 
continue until such time as suitable provision has been made for 
such Natives inside Native areas. 82 
The moratorium on evicting squatters which Sauer had insisted upon in 
1913 was continued in 1917 because the land for resettlement of squatters had not 
been released. As a result, Africans who hired or leased land from farmers or 
absentee landlords in Natol and the Transvaal could not be arbitrari ly evicted. 
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In the interven ing years, crown lands and farms owned but not occupied by whites 
had been the only refuge for both landless Africans from the reserves and squatters 
evicted from occupied farms. These latecomers were squatting illegally, for the 
moratorium applied only to tenants who had leased or hired land in these areas 
before 1913. The thrust of the 1932 Bill was to effect the eviction of these families. 
Oswald Pirow, the Minister of Justice, made this plain when introducing the 
Native Service Contract Bill in 1932. 'Clauses 7 and 8 contain certain provisions,' 
he said, 
the intention of which is to facil itate criminal prosecution in case 
of contravention of the Native Land Act. We find today that not 
thousands, but tens of thousands, and possibly hundreds of thousands 
of natives wrongfully and in confl ict with the Native Land Act of 
1913 occupy and use private land. If, however, we wa nt to prose-
cute a private person today, then the crown prosecutor has to prove 
that the native has not lived on thot land before 1913, a thing 
impossible in practice. 83 
But the 1932 Bill went much further thon this. It aimed to end all forms 
of squatting outside the 1913 scheduled reserves, so that not even Africans hiring 
82 SC60-17, paro2383 
83 House of Assembly Debates, 4 February i932, cols 643-644 
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or leasing land in the areas scheduled for release would be exempt from the restric-
tions of the 1932 Bill. Pirow explained this innova tion during the second reading 
debate: 
Let me, in the first place, say what land or territory is affected by 
Clause 9 : let me be quite frank and explain to the House that it 
includes all land except proclaimed locations [84J and certain 
urban areas .••• Therefore all the other land fall s under the tax, 
and, in my opinion, all the land must come under this Bill, because 
otherwise the so-called native farming will merely continue to go 
on on a large scale. 85 
If anyone still harboured the illusion that the Hertzog government intended 
releasing land before dealing with the squatter problem, Pi row's speech dispelled it. 
He dismissed the Select Committee's chief recommendation 'that the 1932 Bill be 
delayed until the Joint Select Committee on the Prime Minister's Bills reparted', as 
'groundless', contending that 
we do not know whether these other Bills will ever be passed •• •. 
Moreover, the three Bills before the select committee do not even 
primarily deal with the occupation rightsi those are merely a 
subsidiary matter. 86 
Pirow was even more explicit in committee. It is true, he said, 
that in the schedule to the Prime Minister's Bill there are areas 
specified as white and native. I have always understood, however, 
84 Defining locations, Pirow stated: 'I want, in the first place, to draw the 
attention of the House to the definition of the word "location". I do so 
because it is said that this Bill aims at forcing every native to work for three 
or four months in the year whether he owns his own ground or I ives on ground 
which is described in the annexures to the 1913 Act. According to the 
definition clause the word "location" means -
* Any land within an area included in the schedule to the Natives Land 
Act, 1913 (Act No. 27 of 1913). 
*Land acquired by natives for tribal occupation. 
*Any area proclaimed by the Governor-General as a location for the pur-
poses of the Native Administration Act 1927 (Act No. 38 of 1927). 
*Any land owned and occupied by any native. 
*Any land owned or controlled by an urban local authority as defined by 
section 29 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, 1923, (Act No. 21 of 1923). 
*Any mission station exempted by the Governor-General in terms of sub-
section (l)(h) of section 8 of the Natives Land Act, 1913 (Act No. 27 
of 1913). 
This means, therefore, that natives who I ive on this land are excluded. In 
practice the provisions of th is Bill will, therefore, be restricted to land 
belonging ta private persons, to a certa in extent to Crown lands occupied 
by natives otherwise than as a location.' House of Assembly Debates, 4 
February 1932, cols 642-643. 
85 Ibid, col 634 
86 Ibid 
that the select committee is not to be tied down to those particular 
geographical areas and that the schedule was to be on the basis 
rather of a numerical than a geographical one •• .• The term 'released' 
area has no geographical defin ition. The intention is not to stick 
to the schedul e. 87 
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Smuts rejected Pirow's interpretation. The question of squatting was being 
reviewed by the Joint Select Committee, he said, and 'here the Minister gaily 
barges in and makes a provision which, if carried out, will lead ta absolute chaos 
in this country'. 88 Using the same argument the supporters of Sauer's Bill had 
aired almost 20 years earl ier, he warned: 'If this provision were carried out every 
squatter on every private farm would get notice to quit. ,89 Thase evicted would 
have nowhere to go - 'the locations are full, we know our towns are chock-a-
block with Natives already, and the whole cry in this country is for the Govern-
h• . . f N' h ' 90 C . h I ment to stop t IS migration 0 atlves to t e towns. ommentmg on t e rea 
motive behind the Bill, he said the existing system evoked criticism because 
land companies sit with large tracts of territory which they fill with 
natives, who, the farmers say, they want badly for service on their 
farms. To think that a provision of this kind will have the effect of 
dislodging the natives from these company farms and spreading them 
wholesale among the rest of the farmers is worthless. 91 
The whole de bate was conducted on a non-party basis. Not a single MP 
who was either a farmer or who represented a farming constituency outside the Cape 
sided with Smuts . Without fail they all welcomed the fact that the government was 
not prepared to comp-omise on the squatting question. 
The squatting clauses in the 1932 Bill met the farmers' demands in full. 
In effect the Bill would force all Africans into labour service. Only the squatters 
who worked for three to six months each year could stay on the land without paying 
the prohibitive tax - but then they would be reduced to being labour tenants, 
trapped in a new complex of restrictions and regulations. 
Resisters could also be dealt with. The 1932 Contract Bill said that unless 
a rent-paying tenant 'was registered within a month of the Bill becoming law and 
87 Ibid, 29 February 1932, col 1593 
88 Ibid, 4 February 1932, col 648 
89 Ibid, col 649 
90 Ibid 
91 Ibid, col 650 
annually thereafter, he would be deemed a labour tenant for the purposes of the 
Act. Since it was the farmer or absentee landlord alone who did the registration, 
quite clearly the farmer was being offered an indirect way of forcing the rent-
paying tenant into the position of a labour tenant by simply fail ing to register him 
as a squatter. Unregistered squatters thus automatically became labour tenants, 
tied to service for the specified period. 
The ' Service Contract' in the Bill's title may have seemed to promise a 
new respect for workers' interests, but in fact the Bill meant that they could be 
coerced as never before. Formerly labour service wos confined to working for the 
landowner. But under clause 3 of Pirow's Bill, a labour tenant could be required 
to serve 'in any place in the Union'. This was a particularly contentious clause, 
for it meant that if the kraal head or a guardian contracted for children under 18 
even they could be forced to leave their parents' farm and work elsewhere. 
The MP for Mowbray, R W Close, proposed an amendment, arguing that 
clause 3 embodied the principle of child servitude: 
Let us picture a case where we find that some unscrupulous native 
realizes the potentialities of this clause and becomes the farmer of 
child labour. Let us suppose he lives in a large native location 
attached to an urban area. If he can say that he is in fact the guar-
dian of a native he acquires the right to enter into a contract with 
regard to that native. How are we to place any check upon an 
unscrupulous man under such circumstances? A child of ten may be 
so dealt with, and this Bill applies to female as well as male children. 
Such a person may be a procurer of child native labour, and may 
make a regular income by taking them to places where contracts can 
be entered into. Then the owner of land is referred to. The owner 
of the piece of land may be a native himself, so that you have on 
one side the opportunity of trafficking in native children, and on 
the other that a native may acquire control over native children. 
What guarantee have we aga inst the most gross and terrible abuses? 
But this is nothing to the Minister of Justice. I can only appeal to 
publicity to give us same assistance in this matter. 92 
Others argued that the same abuses could be perpetrated by white 
recruiters who signed up children under contract. The whole of clause 3 in the 
hands of an unscrupu lous employer was wide open to abuse. 
Exponents of the Bill ridiculed Hofmeyr's attempt to expose it as a forced 
labour measure, as defined by the 1930 Geneva forced labour convention. 93 The 
92 Ibid, 29 February 1932, col 1630 
93 Ibid, 22 February 1932, col 1335- 1336 
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farm labourers and kraalheads in particular had welcomed the Bill, said MPs 
representing the farming sector. It was they and not the formers who pleaded for 
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laws to help prevent their children deserting to the towns. But if the parents 
demanded this, the opposition countered, why did the Minister allow formers to 
indenture children over ten years for work away from their parents' home? Modeley, 
MP for Benoni, challenged his Transvaal colleague: 
the han. member for Wonderboom (Dr. van Broekhuizen) says: 'What 
are you fellows grumbling at? If a farmer turns his native off his 
farm he comes back with tears in his eyes and asks to be re-engaged.' 
If that is true, why turn him off the land, why thrash him into sub-
mission, why force a contract on him, why allow a guardian to enter 
into a contract of service for an indefinite number of years on behalf 
of a minor native? Why do you bring such oppressive legislation to 
bear on the native? 94 
The answer came fram the MP for tvlagaliesberg, SF Alberts. The Bill 
was necessary, he claimed, because the young people were deserting to the towns. 
As a result, 
the farmer is left on his farm with the old natives whom he cannot 
drive off. .. . It is not because we want money, but because we want 
to abolish those illegal private locations that exist on the farms. The 
farmers have nothing but inconvenience with the natives, who are 
useless, grow up in sin, and subsequently become unfitted for work •.. 
we must put an end to those undesirable locations. The natives squat 
there and do nothing .... The land remains undeveloped and there is 
work for every native and European in the country, but we have to 
compel the people ta work by legislation. 95 
Yet it seems that many Africans throughout the country had already 
suffered - and needlessly, in terms of what the land could support. Farms in white 
areas were still largely unoccupied, or else at least had areas still uncultivated. 
Land was physical ly available for squatters. '30.30 per cent of the farming area 
in 1929 was composed of farms of more than 5 000 morgen', wrote Robertson at the 
time . '75.932 per cent of the area was taken up in farms over 1 000 morgen and 
much of th is is little utilized.' Thus, 'if they pay their native labourers in land to 
cultivate for themselves it costs the farmers little or nothing. ,96 
He went on to report that in 1929 no less than 59 822 adult male Africans 
were I iving on land owned but not occupied by whites. 97 This gives a total af 
94 Ibid, 23 Februa ry 1932, col 1351 
95 Ibid, 4 February 1932, col 655 
96 Robertson, p 150. See also table 5.4. 
97 Robertson, p 150 
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about 250 000 souls who would be affected in the Transvaal and Natal by the new 
conditions once the 1932 law was enforced. To this number must be added the 
squatters, labour tenants and full-time servants an occupied farms. It then appears 
that by 1933 roughly two million in the 'white' rural sector98 could, if the govern-
ment so wished, be forced to render at least six months' service to the former each 
year. 
Thus there is I ittle doubt that Hertzog had decided against putting the 
policy of territorial segregation into practice. Two million Africans were to stay 
in the 'white' rural sector to serve the farmers' needs. The link between the land 
and farm labour provisions hod been severed. The farm labour clauses under the 
Land Amendment Bills now stood as two independent Acts - the Moster and Servants' 
Law (Transvaal and Natal) Amendment Act of 1926, and the 1932 Native Service 
Contract Act - while the release of further land was still conditionally tied to the 
abol ition of the Cape franchise. The franchise question would pale into insignifi-
cance over the next few years. The negotiations with Africans were over. Land 
was still on issue, but this time Hertzog would be bargaining with the mines, to 
which we now tum. 
98 See rural distribution table 2.5. 
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6 MINEOWNERS' D EMA NDS AND 
MIGRANT , LABOURERS 19,24 - 1933 
The central importance of the min ing 'industry 
Mining economics and the labour shortage 
Causes of acute shortage 1924-1933 
Confl icting interests - mines and farms 
Hertzog's pol icy pion for the mines 
The central importonce of the mining industry 
It is important to remember throughout this chapter that capitol in 
South Africa was not a home but an 'uitlander' quantity. 1 This meant that the 
exploitation of the country's mineral wealth was made possible by capital from 
foreign investors in Europe, mainly Britain. The Union thus depended on maintain-
ing its economic links, as a peripheral state, with the imperial power. This 
unwelcome fact inspired the staunch Afrikaner nationalist to support Hertzog in 
his efforts towards asserting South Africa's political sovereignty. 
2 
Coupled with this drive for pol itical independence was 0 similar desire 
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for national economic independence so as to free South Africa from the stranglehold 
of foreign capital. This stranglehold, said the nationalists, was detrimental to 
South Africa's interests, especially where her 'native' and 'white labour' policies 
were concerned. 
It was in the realm of agriculture, however, that Hertzog's economic 
nationalism first aroused criticism. Reviewing the National Party's policy towards 
this sector, Professor C S Richards wrote in 1933: 
The Union suffers from a chronic bucolic complex . Though recent 
events have done something to dissipate the idea, the bel ief is 
still firmly held that agriculture is the principal industry of the 
country, despite ••• the obvious fact that the prosperity of the 
Union is based on its gold mining industry. 3 
Richards proceeded to castigate the government on its pol icy of 
indiscriminate subsidies, wasteful and impossible irrigation schemes, 
Land Bonk loans which, not infrequently, finally develop into gifts, 
protection for the growth of products such as wheat ••. together 
with unbusinesslike control boards and export quotas. . .. 4 
The pursuit of these policies, Richards said, has 'succeeded only in 
breeding an attitude of mind among sections of the farming community which looks 
continually to the government for assistance. 5 This assistance, as we saw in the 
See Frankel, p 69 ff, and also his Investment and the return to equity capitol 
in the South African gold mining industry 1887-1965, chap 1; Wilson, 
Labour .. . , p 22 ff; and L Katzen, Gold and the South African economy 1886-
1961 , p 33 ff. 
2 See Introduction. 
3 C S Richards, 'Economic revival in South Africa', Economic Journal, v 64, 
1935 
4 Ibid 
5 Ibid 
lost chapter, was clearly manifest when it come to devising a labour policy 
acceptable to the formers. 
A for more virulent attock against the state's determination to assert its 
economic independence come during Hertzag's second term of office. This 
attock was directed against the National Party's refusal to follow Britain when she 
left the gold standard in September 1931. Remaining on the gold standard 
symbolised South African sovereign independence. Hertzog refused to yield. A 
parliamentary Select Committee recommended that South Africa stay on gold. The 
majority of formers, for sentimental reasons, supported Hertzog's stand. Even the 
Chamber of Mines, on the grounds that on increase in the price of gold would mean 
. .., ... II H h . 6 on Increase In miners wages, Inltla y gave ertzog t elr support. 
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Conditions reached their nadir in December 1931. Smuts, in a whirlwind 
tour of the Union in January 1932, denounced the government for its ruinous 
obsession with the gold standard, which he claimed was responsible for the impending 
collapse of public finances; the progressive strangulation of the export industry and 
domestic trade; as well as the sufferings of ordinary people. 7 
The stand token by the Select Committee on gold and the government's 
continued refusal to reconsider its monetary policy towards the gold mining industry 
was also strongly criticised by leading industrialists and economists at the time. 
Professor Frankel claimed: 
Monetary pol icy in the Union has been determined without adequate 
reference to the course of other economic developments in South 
Africa. It has been pursued, as it were, in vacuo, and debated as 
if it could be considered apart from the course of trade, production, 
the levels of incomes and wages and other non-monetary factors. 8 
He was especially critical of government bios towards promoting subeconomic 
industry and forming pursuits al cost ta and expense of the mines. 
These denunciations had th~ full backing of the mineowners and foreign 
investors. These men resented Hertzog's attempts to translate his anti-imperialism 
6 For the reasons behind the governmen t 's decision to stay on the gold standard, 
see SC 9-32; for criticism and consequences of the government's dec isian, 
see articles by S H Frankel in the Rand Daily Moil, 14-17 June 1932. 
7 Hancock, v 2, p 243 
8 S H Frankel, 'South African monetary policy', SA Journal of Economics, v 1, 
1, 1933, p 80 
into 0 norrow economic notionolism. There were mony who hod always opposed 
the government's fiscol policy of heovily toxing the excess profits mode by foreign 
investors in order to subsidise subeconomic locol industries, 'white labour' and 
'civilised labour' policies, and non-progressive forming practices. 9 
During the brief period of prosperity from 1923 to 1929, with the full 
backing of the politically powerful rural electorate and the white working closs, 
the Notional Party in its pact with Labour largely ignored these claims. But 
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during the depression it was brought home to the government that economic interests 
and the stote's internal policies could not be divorced . Overseas investors were 
also showing a decided reluctance to invest, despite the fact that the mines hod 
entered a new expansionary phose. 10 Speculative cap itol was be·ing exported and 
on overa ll lock of confidence in the country's economy and the government's 
policy sent prices tumbl ing across the board on the Johannesburg stock exchange. 
Borrowing abroad hod been severely curtailed. Export prices - all but gold - fell 
by 46 per cent. The over-valuation of South Africo's currency against sterling 
priced the South African exporters first out of the preferential Dominion morket 
ond then the world morket - agricultural and postoral exports alone fell by 44 per 
cent. The future of South Africa's export industry was in jeopardy. More immedi-
ately, the personol debt and sufferings of many thousands were increased. 
The pol itical undercurrents generated by Hertzog's economic notional ism 
were important, for they alerted the government to the central importance of the 
mines in the notional economy as a whole. 
The depression compelled the government, however reluctantly, into 
9 R L Word, 'Are the mines overtaxed?', SA Journal of Economics, .v.arch 1936 
10 Katzen demonstrates how, during on upswing in the economy in 1929, output 
increased but the working profit per ton decreased and profits in the gold 
mining industry remained static. 'Net investment in the period was negative 
ond by 1929 the position of the low-grade ore mines in the industry hod become 
serious. Three mines closed down in 1929 and of the 32 produc ing mines 
belonging to the Transvoal Chamber of Mines, 10 paid no dividends (only the 
For East Rand mines fared bette r).' However, he continues, 'Gold output 
expanded mOre rapidly in the depression, with a lorge increase in the numbers 
employed and only a slight fall in costs. In other words, just prior to the 
depression morginal mines were in a critical position. But during the depression 
the gold mining industry entered On expansionary phose. This in turn acted as 
a stabiliser on the economy as a whole. It was this that charac terised gold's 
anti-cyclicol business phose .' See Katzen, pp 76-83. Also D Hobart Houghton, 
'Econom ic development' in Wilson & Thompson, v 2, pp 32-35. 
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admitting that ave~eas vested interests and the influence of the business world 
could not be disregarded, an attitude that wou ld merely cut off foreign investment. 
The investor was vividly real to the Low Grade Ore Commission appointed to 
investigate, amongst other matters, the closing down of three marginal mines in 
1926, and the problems facing the owne~ of the new mines on the "or East Rand. 
They reported: 
The uncertainty in regard to SO vital a factor in the operations of the 
Industry as the Native labour supply has a most adve~e effect on 
efforts to raise fresh capital for the establ ishment of those new mines 
which are so necessary to neutral ise the progressive decrease in the 
scope of the Industry forecasted in the statement of the Governmen t 
Mining Engineer. . . . 11 
The Government Mining Engineer, Dr H Pirow, was not only worried about the 
enOrmous capital outlay (and hence foreign loans and investment) which would be 
needed to develop the recently discovered reefs on the For East Rand. But, as he 
noted in his report of 1929, 
a shortage of labour, whether skilled or unskilled, reac ts unfavourably 
on the Mining Industry as on any other industry, but it may be desirable 
to point out that mining on narrow stope widths entails more handling 
of broken rock and requires a greater labour force, both skilled and 
unskilled. This is a factor which should be borne in mind with regard 
to the opening up of new areas on the For East Rand, where this method 
of mining will undoubtedly have to be resorted to on a considerable 
scale. 12 
Any further loss of investor confidence at that time would therefore have critically 
affected the new growth of the For East Rand mines. Investor confidence, as the 
committee said, was intimately bound up with the availability of on adequate 
labour supply. 
11 Report of the Low Grade Ore Commission, evidence of the Transvaal 
Chamber of Mines, statement 7, ' The provision of an adequate Native 
supply', para 34 (5), copy of typescript evidence to NEC 1930-1932 
12 Report on the For East Rand and features I ikel y to affect the future of the 
Witwatersrand go ld min ing industry, May 1927, para 39. They also 
calculated that on inadequacy of unskilled nat ive labour would lead to 
increased overhead costs, while at the same time make it impossible to 
achieve an output 'approximating to the maximum crushing capacity of 
the mines.' An adequate native supply on the other hand would have 
'an effect similar to that of a fall of 2s. a ton in cost of production'. 
See Report onthe For East Rand, statement 1, para 18, copy of type-
script evidence to NEC 1930-1932. 
Mining economics and the labour shortage 
The effects of a labour shortage on the mines have already been well 
detailed in both official sources and secondary works. Here we need only note 
some of the characteristics and adverse effects on the mining industry. 
Most important was the sensit ive and circumscribed cost structure of the 
gold mines. Profits on the mines were totally dependent an law production casts, 
bath because the average gold content of the are was law and because mining 
companies could not transfer any increase in working casts to the consumers 
(since the price of gold was fixed and controlled on the international market). 
In consequence, the most cammon way to keep casts down was through law wages. 
The Chamber of Mines fel t their main task was to create and maintain a vast 
supply of cheap African labour. 13 
Questions debated over the years were whether the Chamber of Mines 
should have continued its cheap labour policy, and whether the government should 
have intervened to support it. For us here the point is that both the Chamber of 
Mines and the government agreed that the mines depended on a cheap labour 
policy. Labour legislation was therefore designed with this premise in mind. Also, 
the centrality of the gold mining industry made its continuing prosperity something 
that had to be catered for in shaping labour policy. The dependence of all ather 
sectors an the profitability of the mines could not be ignored. These were the 
arguments most frequently used by the state to justify its intervention and support 
for the mines' cheap labour pol icy. 14 
13 Eddie Webster, 'Background to the supply and control of labour in the gold 
mines', Sft Labour Bulletin, v 1, 7, November-December 1974, p 5. For 
a detailed historical background of the labour shortage and the attendant 
cast structure problems see Van der Horst, and Wilson, Labour .... 
14 Successive governments, fearing any contraction in the mining industry for 
the South African economy as a whole, appointed several commissions to 
study the mines' wage policy. See Report of the Low Grade Mines <om-
mission 1919-1920 (Inte rim), UG45-19, paras 41, 209-210; Report of the 
Low Grade Mines Commission 1919-1920 (Final), UG 34-20, paras 127-137; 
EWC report, UG 14-26, para 58; Report of the Low Grade Ore Commis-
sion, UG 16-32, para 16; and Report of the Inter-departmental Committee 
oothe Labour Resources of the Union, 1930, An 89-1931, paras 22-48. Of 
all these bodies, only the 1919 Commission and the Mining Industry Board 
(Solomon Commission) recommended revising the mines' wage policy towards 
greater efficiency and better pay. 
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In designing a labour pol icy it was not enough, therefore , to ensure the 
supply of workers . 'Cheapness' was equally important. Up to the mid-twenties 
the mines had very little competition from others and so the Chamber of Mines 
could keep wages very low indeed. As the EWe: said in 1925: 'the exploitation 
of Native labour, in the sense of payment of a wage below the equilibrium level 
of competitive conditions, was a characteristic of the South African labour 
market.,15 Incredibly, despite the mines' continued ability to exploit labour, 
the EWC could still report that 
the gold mining industry shows, a higher average level of wages 
both European and Native, than any other branch of economic 
activity of comparable importance. 16 
One important reason for this was that the state used different devices to prevent 
h • . d . f . fib 17 h .. . I' d t e various 10 ustnes rom competing or a our, as t e commiSSioner Imp Ie : 
'the mines were able to prevent the native from receiving as favourable a rate of 
pay as the normal play of supply and demand would otherwise enable him to 
secure. ' 
18 
Sheila van der Horst considers other factors that enabled the mines to 
control the supply and demand. For example, the monopsonistic position of mines 
enables them 'to take advantage of the immobility of many natives, and use the 
recruiting system to offer less favourable terms of service.' 19 The monopsonistic 
position held by the mines enabled them to perpetuate their cheap labour policy. 
They could do so in three ways, Webster explains: 
the maximum average system (a collective agreement of the mining 
companies not to permit the average wages of the African workers 
to exceed a very low maximum rate); the recruiting monopoly over 
the recruitment of African labour, to prevent the competitive 
15 Van der Horst, p 200; also the EWC report, UG 14-26, paras 58 and 243 
16 UG 14-26, para 247 
17 For example, the Native Labour Regulation Act 191 i which laid down speci-
fic areas (see p 238 below), repression of urban wages, and the myriad pass 
laws designed to regulate the flow of labour. 
18 UG 14-26, paras 248-249 
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19 Sheila van der Horst explains : 'I use the term introduced by Mrs. Joan Robin-
son in her Economics of Imperfect Competition, and now generally adopted to 
describe a buyers' monopoly in order to distinguish it from a sellers' monopoly.' 
Van der Horst, p 200. This refers to the formation of the two recruiting 
organisations: the Native Recuiting Corporation (NRC), and the Witwatersrand 
Native Labour Association (WNLA). For details about them, see Van der 
Horst, p 164ff, and Wilson, Labour ••. , p 5. 
determination of African wage rates through a free relationship 
between supply and demand; and servile labour measures (such 
as the closed compound system, pass laws and severe provisions 
against breach of contract embodied in the Master and Servants' 
Act). ' 20 
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The use of indentured foreign labour also affected the whole cost structure 
of the mines by keeping wages low and making control over labour easier. On the 
latter, Wilson notes that indentured labour was favoured. The mines coul d use the 
threat of dismissal as a more powerful weapon than it would have been had the men 
been living permanently near the mines - in which case it would have been easier 
for them to find another job if they were dismissed. If workers proved troublesome, 
they could be sent home and replaced by others. And again, in the event of 
trouble on the mines, worker action could be contained by simply seoling off the 
mine compounds . These, among other points, led Wilson to conclude: 
it does seem likely that the relative absence of strikes in the South 
African mining industry over the past century is not unconnected 
with the enOrmous power of control that the mines and also the 
police are able to exercise over the movement, assembly and 
general I ives of the mineworkers. 21 
Denied trade union rights, Africans remained in a weak bargaining 
position . Willi am Ballinger gives an example of how this affected the mineworker: 
He has little or no choice as to the nature of his employment. The 
wage schedule rates to which he contracts constitutes one of the most 
amazing documents as it is a medley of base and piece rates with 
diminishing remuneration for increased output. But the nature of-his 
contract is very one sided and is all in favour of his employer, as 
are most contracts between native and European in South Africa. .22 
Migrant labour, whether indentured or from local sources, was said to be 
the cheapest form of labour. The main reason for this was that workers were 
20 Webster, p 7. See also Van der Horst, chap 12, and" !> Johnstone, r:lass, 
race and gold, chap 1. For arguments presented against increased remunera-
tion see Witwatersrand Mine Natives' Wages Commission report . U'" 22-44, 
paras 40-41; on effect on mines of in creased expenditure see paras 32:;-440; 
on opposing view see Report of Low Grade Mines Comm ission ('inal), Ur-
34-20, pora 199 where higher wages leading to greater efficiency is discussed. 
"or an invaluable up-to-date source, Wilson, Labour . .. , and Hobart Houghton 
& Dagut, v 3, pp 22-41. Here the sensitive cost structure of the mines needs 
to be understood, briefly referred to above on p 220. 
21 F Wilson, 'International migration in Southern !>.frica', SA Labour and l'evelop-
mentResearch Unit (SALDRU), Working Paper 1, May 1976, p 23. For a 
detailed study of the compound system os a means of labour control see rharles 
van Onselen, Chibaro: African mine labour in Sou thern Rhodesia 1900-1933. 
22 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence ofW G Ballinger 
remunerated an the basis of the requirements of one individuol. Their families, 
so cloimed exponents of the migrant labour system, were provided with at leost 
a subsistence I iving by the tribal lands in the reserves . 
The relationship between the situation in the reserves and the mines' 
labour supply was therefore not fortuitous . It has been shown that lands comprising 
7 per cent of the whole country were schedu led in 1913. Outside these, purchases 
and leases of land by .Africans were forbidden except by special permission. From 
the table showing population distribution 23 it will be seen that about 45 per cent 
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of the African population had homes and residential rights of some kind in the 
reserves. The evidence shows that there was no prospect of any substantial propor-
tion of the remaining 55 per cent getting rights in the reserves, until 'or unless the 
supplementary legislation releasing the extra lands was passed. By 1933 there still 
seemed little hope of this as the land and franchise questions remoined interdependent 
and anyway most whites were still dead set against any proposal for releosing the 
promised land. 
In addition, it is well to recall that even in the case of families who 
held arable land in the reserves, their holdings were restricted to a size that made 
it impossible for them to earn a living. The land policy, which the administration 
enforced, was that of one-man-one-Iot - or as the N~C reported in 1932: 'in 
actual practice this means, with the scarcity of arable land ... that individual 
holdings are three to five morgen in extent and sometimes even smaller.' According 
to the commission, 
this involves the maintenance of a system which cannot continue 
except on a very low economic level. It confines the development 
of special gifts to individuals within very narrow bounds. . . . 24 
Commenting later on the pol icy of survey and grant of individual titles, the 
commission stated: 
But our chief criterion is that the holdings were noj' big enough to 
make agriculture a whole time iob for those who had the energy, 
the desire, and the skill so to moke it .. ,. 25 
It follows from these findings, which later commissions confirmed, that 
since the land policy pursued in the reserves inhibited any appreciable number of 
23 See p 80 above, table 2.5. 
24 NEe report, UG 22-32, para 146 ' 
25 Ibid, para 148 
the peasantry making agriculture a 'whole time iob', Africans were thrown back 
on having to labour for wages for at least part of the time. A population on the 
'low economic level' referred to by the commission had obvious ly been prevented 
from accumulating capitol . Wage labour therefore meant labour outside the 
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reserves in areas where Africans were forbidden by law to own Or lease land and 
cauld only occupy it in special tawnships and locations or other specially authorised 
accommodation (mine compounds, or as wage labourers on white farms). We must 
note too that this obligation to work for wages was imposed by law, since the law 
cut off all other sources of independent productive a ctivity except to the extent 
described above. 
It was on the basis of the flow of cheap labour thus artificially stimulated 
that the Witwatersrand gold mining industry establ ished itself. A Chamber of Mines 
spokesman said that 'a fundamental factor in the economy of the Gold Mining 
Industry' was the 'ability of the mines to maintain their Native labour force by 
means of tribal Natives from the reserves at rates of pay which are adequate for 
this migratory class of Native but inadequate in practice for the detribalised urban 
Native.' The Lansdown Commiss ion laid emphasis upon this evidence. 'In its 
evidence,' runs the report, 'the Chamber laid great stress on the fact that its 
policy was to employ cheap Native labour.' The policy was iustified, the mines 
claimed from the outset, because skilled mineworkers were mainly immigrant whites 
whose scarcity value was reflected in high wages. Consequently, the only wages 
to economise on were those of the unskilled workers, and the cheapest labour was 
migrant labour. 
The profitability of the industry was also constrained by the very low 
grade of ore on certain mines. In 1929 the viability of these low-grade mines 
was debated once more. On the labour shortage and its effects on these marginal 
mines, the Low Grade Ore Commission in their 1930 report stated : 
Not only is the labour supply of the industry as a whole inadequate, 
but sOme of the low grade mines are working with an underground 
Native labour force equal to little more than half their requirements; 
their scale of operations is, therefore, greatly restricted, and their 
ability to make ends meet correspondingly diminished. 26 
The Gold Producers' Committee estimated 'the disastrous effect on the 
operations of a mine of an inadequate Native labour supply' in the following 
chart: 
26 Report of the Low Grade Ore Commission (Interim), UG 16-32, paras 104-105 
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Table 6.1 ESTIMATED EFFECT ON WORKING 
OF A SHORTAGE OF AFRICAN LABOUR 27 
,- I I African labour ! 
i Tonnage milled Profit I 
i Percentage of 
I I T ota I at work requirements 
I 6300 100 93 000 £ 21 354 1 ! 
5650 90 80 000 14 460 
5 150 82 70 000 9 215 
I 
4650 74 60 000 3 970 I 
4 150 66 50 000 1 275 ( Loss) 
I 
Here we see that a reduction in the African labour force by one-third would reduce 
the tonnage milled from 93 000 tons a month to 50 000 tons a month, and the work 
would be done at a loss. With a fu ll stock of labour, however, 93 000 tons could 
be milled, at a profit of ~22 000 a month. 
As the inter-departmental committee was anxious to point out: 
The economic disadvantage to an industry I ike mining, with heavy 
overhead costs, which dependence on an irregular labour supply 
entails, is considerable, and for the reason that this is a serious and 
important aspect of national economy in South Africa, your Committee 
has deemed it advisable to lay some stress on this aspect of the 
question. 28 
The Chamber of Mines made a further point. The shortage, according 
to them, arose out of the 'violent fluctuations in the supply from the British South 
African source'. To inustrate this point they submitted in evidence to the 1930 
Low Grade Ore Commission the follow ing statistics showing the monthly African 
labour strength over a period of four years: 
27 These figures were quoted for the West Rand Consol idated Mines by the 
Transvaal Chamber of Mines, sta tement 7, UG 16-32, para 3. 
28 Report of the Inter-departmental Committee on Labour Resources of the 
On Ion 1930, An 89-1931, para 57 --
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AFRICANS ON WITWATERSRAND GOLD MINES -Table 6.2 
& 6.3 MONTHLY LABOUR STRENGTH AND SEASONJ>L FLUCTUATIONS 
Total number employed 
On last day of I 1927 1928 I 1929 1930 
Januory 179784 193 063 192 526 190 663 
February 183 971 197 340 196 150 196 752 
March 186975 199 489 197 646 200 134 
April 187981 199 820 197 412 202 434 
May 187 209 198 461 195 733 202 182 
June 185637 197 186 192 595 201 324 
July 183702 194 584 190 031 201 111 
August 184379 194 788 190 062 202 257 
September 186413 194 936 190 567 
-
October 188 025 193 147 180 739 
-
November 188 879 190 870 186 941 -
December 188 516 187 970 184 280 
-
Maximum and minimum employed {local workers} 
Year Maximum Minimum Difference 
1923 113464 96 712 16 752 
1924 106 544 100 188 6 356 
1925 110 048 89 311 20737 
1926 108 839 95 331 13 508 
1927 109 159 95 895 13 264 
1928 109 109 96 295 12 814 
1929 111 565 100 462 11 103 29 
On these figures the mines argued that the local labour supply was extremely 
uncertain, and they urged the government ta lift the prohibition On recruiting 
labour north of latitude 220 S. 30 
29 Low Grade Ore Commission, evidence of Transvaal Chamber of Mines, 
statement 7, UG 16-32, appendices A and B 
30 Recruitment from the area north of Beit Bridge was stopped in 1913 because 
of the pneumonia death rate. This bon was lifted only in 1933. 
Several other developments also gave the mineowners' demands a more 
immediate urgency during this pe"riod. In 1928 the Mozambique government cut 
down the number of workers allowed to contract with the mines . This reduction 
came just when the mines were set to expond. New reefs had been proved on the 
Far East Rand, and at the onse t of the depression the mines moved into an anti-
cye! ical business phase which gave a new impetus to mines to inc rease their 
d •• 31 pro ucllvi ty. 
These factors taken together must also be seen against the background of 
a n accelerated influx of Africans to the urban areas. That influx not only made 
an already chequered labour supply even more uncertain, but threatened to break 
dawn the whole migrant labour system. Here the failure to extend the segregation 
policy to the Cape is of specia l interest. These developmenl5 led the mines to 
demand radical reforms in the government's labour policy. 
Causes of acute shortage 1924-1933 
The Mozambique Convention in 1928 contributed to the start of a new 
labour crisis. Before the convention the gold and coal mines had been free to use 
up to 107 000 workers" from Portuguese East Africa. This was to drop to a maximum 
of 80 000 by 1933, five years after the convention came into force. 32 A second 
worrying clause was that the period of service of each migrant was to be I imited to 
18 calendar months at most. This, as the Gold Producers' Committee explained, 
'entailed a reduction of about one-third in the average period of service of the 
Portuguese Natives employed on the gold and coal mines to 85 125 at the end of 
August 1930. 33 This development was as serious as the reduction in numbers. In 
effect it disrupted a carefully constructed labour reservoir which the mines had 
used to draw upon during the seasonal and cyc lical traughs created by the 
31 For estimates on gold production see analysis by Dr Hans Pirow, Government " 
Mining Engineer, Union year book 11, pp 1111-1112; for significance of the 
Far East Rand Mines see Report by Sir Robert Kotze, Government Mining 
Engineer, on the Far East Rand, UG 49-25, and see al so Gregory, pp 
493-505. 
32 Low Grade Ore Commission, evidence of the Gold Producers' Committee, 
statement 7 on 'The provision of an adequate Native labour supply', UG 
16-32, para 12(a) 
33 Ibid, para 13. Note that the figure is just over 15000 less than the figure 
calculated under the progressive reduction scale under article 3 of the 
convention which stipulated that no more than 95 000 Portuguese Africans 
would be allowed to work on the mines in 1930. For progressive reduction 
totals see evidence in paro 12 (a). 
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reluctance of local Africans to enter into contracf-s at busy forming times of year-
mainly between August and December. The chairman of the Witwatersrand Native 
Labour Association (WNLA)34 reported: 
Since early 1929 the East Coast labour strength hos progressively 
declined month by month, leaving only 77 500 natives in service 
at 31st Morch lost. It is therefore doubtful whether upon the 
Association resuming operations at full pressure, the reservoir of 
natives that may have been brought about since November lost 
will provide a sufficiency to meet the unceasing wastage and to 
rebuild the Portuguese native force to permitted numbers. Out 
of the 105 000 natives employed under the 1909 Convention at 
the time the new Convention was put into operation, viz., 
September, 1928, only 12000 now remain. This small number 
will, I fear, rapidly dwindle away, thus eliminating a body of 
workers thot throughout the many years has played a great port 
in stabilising the stonding native labour force, espec-ially during 
those frequent periods when there has been an acute shortage of 
labour offering for mi ne work fr'Jm areas within British South 
Africa. 35 
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As well as ensuring the supply, a labour policy hod to provide a reservoir. 
This, the mines believed, should be controlled so that it would disgorge into 
whichever sector needed labour most. The supply, moreover, should be continuously 
available so that the mines could draw from it when they hod to. Here the Gold 
Producers' Committee argued: 
The tribal Native is only available as a wage-labourer to the extent 
to which economic necessity forces him thereto, and at the present 
time this economic necessity is only active to a limited extent. In 
bod seasons it increases, in good seasons it diminishes. An industry 
like mining, which requires a steady flow of labourers, must, there-
fore, continue to be subject to the disturbing influence of this state 
of affairs, to the extent to which it continues to be dependent on a 
labour supply of this nature. The utilization of the labour offering 
in such a woy as to reduce the harmful effect of the fluctuations to 
a minimum, must remain one of the important problems of mining 
economics. 36 
As was shown earl ier, the mines kept down the 'harmful effects' of on 
inodequate and fluctuoting lobour supply thanks to the progressive underdevelopment 
34 WNLA was the only body allowed to recruit labour in Mozambique. For 
organisation and recruiting methods see Von der Horst, pp 191-197; also 
Wilson, Labour ... , pp 4-5 and 127ff, and 'International migration ... ' 
35 UG 16-32, evidence of the Go ld Producers' Committee, statement 7, para 77. 
See also Transvaal Chamber of Mines annua l report 1933, pp 40-42 and 46. 
36 UG 16-32, para 79, and table 6.2 above_, p 226, for heavy fluctuations in 
the loco I labour supp I y 
of the reserves. 37 Moreover, with the freezing of African land ownership in 
1913, Africans were less and less able to resist participation in the wage economy 
- to a point where, despite what the mines sa id, migrant labour in South Africa 
had become the norm ond short contractual periods the exception. This wos the 
cose even in areas least affected by capitalist intervention. 38 
We have the story in trenchont detail from Mac mi IIan whose researches 
were first published in 1930. 39 After Macmillan, Frankel added to it before the 
NEC in 1931: 
With in the last few months, as we all know, the supply of native 
labour has for the first time supposedly been adequote; it has been 
adequate only because of the desperate pi ight of the Terri tories. 
And it will it seems to me in future be adequate only when the 
Territories are at their last gasp, and that is not a good foundation 
to build on .. . by recognising that the foundation which the mines 
have grown up on cannot continue. It is very unfortunate they 
have grown up on the assumption of an unl imited, what they call 
adequate, supply of native labour. The whole organisation of the 
mines has contempla ted an unlimited or os they say, adequate 
supp ly of native labour on the o ld terms. 
Lucas: At very low wages? 
Frankel: At very low wages. We have now come to the point 
that the number cannot be suppl ied, except so far as the Territories 
are ot the ir last gasp ond send more men out than is socially justi-
fiable. 40 
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37 See pp87-88. Also M Leg assick, 'Development and underdevelopment in 
South Afr ica', unpub seminor poper, Oxford University, 1971; Webster; 
Wolpe, 'Capital ism ... ' and"' The theory of international colonization : The 
South African case', ICS seminar papers, v 5, and N Bromberger, 'Economic 
growth and political change in South Africa' in A Leftwich (ed), South Africa: 
Economic growth and political change. See also lJ3 22-32, paras 68, 92, 
342, 700 and addendum, para 216 where Lucas isolates many of the points 
made in these more recent writings . 
38 UG 16-32, para 44. Francis Wilsan writes: 'It is worth noting that in 1930 
a study of black mineworkers from South Africa and j"he High Commission 
Territories found tha t their average length of service an the mines was 10.9 
months. However c lose examination of the sample shows that it contained 
relatively few AVS men [non-recruited workers] whose average length of 
service was approximately 6.2 months. Yet during the early 1930s AVS men 
formed a large proportion (of the order of holf) of the miners drawn from 
"South Afr ica and the High Commiss ion Territories. The sample drawn was 
unrepresentative because it drew only on men who were discharged in Novem-
ber, a time of yeor when most men choosing to work 6 months at the mines 
wou ld alreody be back home for agricultural purposes. The decline of the 
AVS men is 0 pointer to the increasing pressure on land in the Bontustans.' 
'Internationa l migrotion ... ', p 11. Also see UG 22-32, pp 212-213, and 
NRC onnual reports. 
39 Macm illan, Complex South Africa 
40 NEC 1930-1932, orol evidence of S H Frankel, 13 May 1931 
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More men than ever before were being forced to seek employment in the 
wage sector ond as Frankel confirms this was related directly to the utter impoverish-
ment experienced by Africans in the reserves. Why then the continued labour 
shortage in the mines? Frankel suggests here that this shortage existed because 
Africans res isted mine emp loyment at very low wages. Sheila van der Horst agrees 
and odds that 'shortage' as defined by the mines 'simply means at the prevailing 
price it wou ld pay to employ mo re labour'. 41 
As the Mozambique maximum impl ied, the mines gauged their labour needs 
in surplus terms so as to ensure a steady flow of labourers. For the inter-departmental 
committee, the labour shortage was not simply a shortage in surplus terms. They 
refuted 'the common idea that there was a surplus of Native labour in the Un ion 
available for work on the mines and other industries. ,42 There was a real shortage, 
they said, and one reason why the mines' supply was short was because men in the 
reserves (where most of the Union mineworkers came from) worked for only about a 
half of their time: 
The Native ... works, intermittently, altemating a period of 
service with a stay at his kraal, res ting and attending to necessary 
domestic and tribal affa irs. His tribal habits and his concepts of 
what constitu tes welfare and a good I ife make him only partially 
dependent on wages. 43 
The reports of the Low Grode Mines Commission and the inter-departmental 
committee were tabled before the NEC findings refuting these assertions were 
pub I ished. 44 So, in 1931 these two earl ier bodies fully supported the mines in 
saying that a labour crisis existed. They agreed with the mines, furthermore, that 
the main cause was the Africans' ability to resist employment through being able to 
survive on their own in the reserves, even if only at subsistence level. 45 
41 Van der Horst, pp 201-203 
42 Report of the Inter-departmental Committee on labour Resources of the Union 
1930, paras 79-80 
43 Ibid 
44 For forebodings of the inter-departmental committee vis-C.-vis form labour 
shortage: it was noted that the committee estimated that not only were the 
farmers short of labour but an extra 2 to 3 per cent would have to be budgeted 
for to meet the needs of the farmers in newly opened up areas. See above, 
pp 192-193. 
45 It should be noted that the mines did not oppose the allocation of extra land 
for the resettlement of squatters from the white rural sector, but they opposed 
the granting of additional land to Africans already resident in the reserves if 
these gronts enabled Africans to become independent peasant formers. See 
above, chap 4. 
Lastly, the inter-departmental committee said the labour shortage would 
actua lly get worse, African underemployment being what it was with both the 
reserve-Africans and the form labourers having to work for only port of the time. 
As a result the local labour supply would be inadequate all round, not only for 
the mines. 
The mines then summed up their position on labour: 
There is not, indeed, sufficient Native labour available from the 
present sources of supply to meet the requirements of the Gold Mining 
Industry and the other industries of the country under normal circum-
stances. The Committee is convinced, not only from a study of the 
position, but mainly from the actual practical experience gained in 
its recruiting operations, thai' the supply obtainable by the gold 
mines from the Union and the Protectorates cannot, unless in most 
exceptional circumstances, provide more than 115 000 Natives in 
the early part of a favau rable year, fall ing to abaut 100000 at the 
end of that year. In other words, this supply, added to the Portu-
guese supply, must, even in a good year, still leave a deficiency 
ranging from 20 000 Natives at the period of the year when the 
influx is greatest, to 35 000 at the least favourable period, with 
on overage deficiency of not less than 25 000 Na tives. 46 
As for as the mines and forms were concerned, the shortage existed 
because rural Africans were by-passing the primary sectors for better opportunities 
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. h 47 Th' . . . . h' h NEC 48 In t e towns. IS interpretation was gaining currency at t e time t e sot. 
The committee chairman, Dr Holloway, suggested that influx control could be a 
solution not necessar ily because Africans were rivalling white workers in the town, 
but because a case could be mode out for 'directing labour into certain channels': 
laok at the position as it was five years ago certainly and practically 
it has continued up to the present day, with the intermission of a 
few months; that there has been on inadequate supply of Native 
labour, and a superfluous supply of white labour. Now, would not 
you think thot it is on economically justifiable procedure to direct 
the thing so that the surplus on the one side should make up for the 
shortoge on the other? 49 
46 UG 16-32, para 20 
47 NEC 1930-1932, ora l evidence of H M Taberer, 5 May 1931, and Major 
H D Cooke, 4 May 1931 
48 UG 22-32, paras 523-528 and A 289-292 
49 NEC 1930-1932, oral evidence of Margaret Hodgson (later Ballinger), 
18 May 1931. During the depression the mines' labaur supply was boosted 
by the thousands laid off work to the extent that recruiting agents were 
asked to reduce their quota between November 1930 and February 1931. 
After this the mines again experienced a shortage. See H M Taberer's 
evidence to the NEC. 
Margaret Hadgson 50 to whom these remarks were addressed countered: 'it sounds 
to me like 0 specious argument •... ,51 The labour shortage, according to her, 
centred on questions of supply and demand; poor conditions and the obsence of 
means whereby African workers cauld combine to improve their conditions of 
service; the monopolistic behaviour of the mines; and the artificial restrictions 
imposed and sonctioned by the state to mainta in a 'cheap, adequate, unskilled 
52 labour force' . 
In evidence to the NEC, A W Champion;~ fonmer president of the 
Transvaal African Mine Clerks' Association, reiterated most of the points made by 
Frankel and Hodgson and went on to say : 
I wonder if the Commission have been struck with the absence of 
natives to come and give evidence from the industrial centres such 
as sugar plantations, fanms and the Mining Indus try? The Commission 
was appointed to ascertain the views of natives themselves. As for 
as I am aware nothing has been done to get in touch with the 
affected natives themselves. Before I was exiled I attempted to 
have the Commiss ion meet the natives in a body - a request that 
was turned down by this Commission. 54 
As a fonmer employee of the mines from 1915 to 1925 he claimed 'to have 
unchallengeable experience of the mine Native's life' . His evidence most 
certainly provides insights into conditions of work which may have deterred many 
Africans from joining the mines. Champion challenged: 
Even at this very late stage one would like to know whether no 
effort could be made ta ascertain the views of the natives employed 
in the Mine compounds whose position is not for removed from that 
of a slave. These men have no choice as to what they must eat as 
to both quantity and quality. They have to sleep in the place 
allotted to them by native pol ice boys in many cases not of their 
tribe. They have to get up at a certain hour in many compounds 
at the .. • [of sjambokJ [sic]. 55 
50 Better known as Margaret Ballinger 
51 NEC 1930-1932, orol evidence of Margaret Hodgson, 18 May 1931 
52 Ibid 
53 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of Allison Wessel George Champion, 
trade unionist, clerk at Crown Mines 1920-1925, presiden t of I-he Native 
Mine C lerks' Association in 1928. He was second-in-command to Clements 
Kadalie . After the split in the ICU he fonmed the powerful leu yase in 
Natal. He was banished from Natal after rioting in 1930. See ;;Iso chap 8 
below, p 307 . 
54 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of A W G Champion 
55 Ibid 
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/In ex tract from Henri A Junod's book, The life of a South African tribe, 
sent to the commission depicts the seamy side of what mineworkers were exposed 
to in compounds - as he put it, 'fittingly spoken of, by a wise South African 
statesman, os the University of Crime'. He gave a deta il ed description of the 
'unnatural vice ' (bukhontshana)56 which hod 'become 0 regu lor institution in the 
Compounds', and explained its origins thus: 
The cause of the evil is not difficult to detect; it is the segregation 
of the Native Mine rs in these enormous conglomerations of males , 
for from home, far from their wives, 0 most obnormal condition of 
life for men who have a lways enjoyed the freedom of the Africon 
bush. When prostitutes were allowed to I ive near the Compounds, 
unna tural vice was not so common; when they were driven out 
bukhontshana at once increased enormous ly, and thus the d isappear-
ance of one evil brought a new one in its troin. 57 
He made the start ling disclosure: 
I was tol d that it is severely prohib i ted by law and that any boy 
found guilty of buk hontshana is condemned to twelve months 
imprisonment. But it is extremely difficult to bring the evidence 
necessary for conviction. The indunas and native pol icemen enter 
into a conspiration [sic] of silence, be ing themselves the first 
and greates t sinners in this respect. 58 
Like so many others, he dwelt on the destruction of family life by the migrant 
labour system and pleaded: 
The only conclusion I would offer on this pa inful subject is this. As 
white c ivilisation is respons ibl e for the introduction and the frightful 
development of this vice amongst the Natives, the whites must not 
remain indifferent in the face of an inqu iry which threatens the very 
I ife of the South African Tribe. 59 
Controry to official pro testations, Africans were not simply by-passing the mines 
for better wages in the towns, for, as the evidence of these witnesses proclaims, 
life in the compound and the break in family life wou ld have been enough reason 
to avoid mine work if a man could . 
.As for as the mines were concerned, the situation in the Cape presented 
even more serious difficulties. 
56 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of Henri A Junod, copy of extroct 
from The life of a South African tribe, pp 492-493 
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57 Junod wrote: 'Unnatural vice (bukhontshana) has become a regular institution 
in the Compounds . The word nkhontshana seems to come from the Ngoni , a 
Zulu dialect spoken in the Limpopo plain. The nkhontshana is the boy used 
by another man to satisfy his lust, and the man is cal led his nuna, husband.' 
Ibid. 
58 Ibid 
59 Ibid 
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The accompanying chart shows that the Cape and Transkei had become 
the main suppliers of mine labour in the Un ion os a whole. 
Table 6.4 AREA OF ORIGIN OF LABOUR SUPPLY 
1922 1923 1924 
Terri tory Mines & Other Mines & Other Minei 8- Other I Mine, I-works employ Totol works employ Totol works employ Total ~ .. , 
I Un ion of South Africa 
Cope Province 7'" 443 9508 83951 76510 9 BSI 86361 761m I 9262 85971 70074 
Notol &. Zulvlol"d 13819 r 16 425 30244 IS OBB 16730 131818 13646 1,6473 30119 13 BB3 
OF S 1600 3324 
'" 924 2 159 3 196 I 5 355 2 024 I 3328 53:'>2 T 850 
Tronsvool 17755 37 067 54 822 17979 36242 54221 18609 J7 SUi 5613:') 177.57 
Totol 107 617 6& 324 173941 111 736 66019 177 755 110988 66189 In 577 103 OM 
Othe r Sritilh territories 
8osutolond 19027 1 B09 20836 20603 1639 22242 23291 1630 24921 18322 
Be-chvonolond Proteeloroto 3319 9CJ7 .( 226 3775 961 4736 3 038 9BS '" 023 2nO 
Nyosolond Protectorate 5B2 949 1 531 523 BB4 1 '07 563 967 1530 72B 
I Northero Rhode$ro 72 148 220 B6 117 203 B2 158 2'0 102 
Southern Rho<ksio 307 1 581 1 BBB 271 1 338 1609 30B 1782 2090 36' 
Swo:r.ilond 6447 387 6 B3< 5396 440 5 B36 " 979 514 5493 5643 
Total 29754 5781 35535 :"J 654 5 :r79 36033 32261 6036 38 297 7793< 
I Porlvgve1e territorio$ 
~ coast S of lot 220 84206 lB45 86051 90 O9S I B45 91940 B7693 , 839 89532 91914 
Tropicoh N of lot 2~ 310 27 337 329 69 39B 226 21 247 204 
Totol 64 516 1872 8638B 90424 1914 9233B S7 919 1 B60 89779 92 118 
u-,clossifiod 34 77 111 29 14 43 1 42 
9B 140 46 
Grand totol 221 921 74 054 295975 232 B43 73326 306 169 231210 :745B3 30S 793 1 223162 
Table 6.5 LABOUR ENGAGEMENT BY W N LA 1930 
RECRUITED NON-RECRUITED 
by WNLA by NRC * ** engaged 
Territory (12 month & certain from by mines 
contract) mines territories locolly 
British 
Transvaal 8 123 7452 4599 
Swaziland 5268 817 347 
Bechuanaland 5601 515 395 
Cape Prov ince 42478 45905 10413 
Basutoland & OFS 20403 10724 4803 
Natal & Zululand 1 774 3573 1 281 
Other districts 78 85 
Portuguese 
Mozambique 
S of lot 22° 50682 402 5 174 
Total 50682 83647 69466 127097 
* Africans engaged on trovelling passes from their homes 
** 
60 
Africans who transferred from other employmen t to that of the mines, 
or transferred from one mine to onother 
NAD report 1922-1926, UG 14-27, annexure D (adap ted) 
61 WNLA report, Board of Monagement, 29th ordinary general meeting, 
27 April 1931 
60 
1925 
Other 
employ Total 
9917 79 991 
16554- r 30 A'J7 
3418 I S 268 
38 460 I 5S717 
6B 3<9 171413 
1470 19 792 
1 00;0 3 ~20 
991 1719 
,., I , .7 1413 17E2 
563 6206 
6652 34 586 
1970 93 AA.4 
16 220 
1986 94104 
116 162 
n 103 300 265 
61 
Total 
20 174 
6432 
6511 
I 98796 35930 
I 6628 I 
163 
I 56258 
230892 
A comparison of recruitment from the various sources shows that from 1922 
to 1925 there is a steady increase in recuitment from British South African sources, 
the Cope increase being the largest. Except for the period 1925-1929, when the 
mines experienced intense competi tion from secondary industry, recruitment from 
the Cope continued its upward trend. In 1922 Africans in mines and works totalled 
74443 out of 107 617. By 1930 this number hod increased by over 20 000 to 
98796. These figures are even more significant when we reme mber that in 1906 ' 
the percentage of Africans recruited from the Cope was only 13.7 per cent of the 
total and by 1936 it hod soared to 39 .2 per cent - 11.7 per cent more than from 
Portuguese East Africa . 62 
However, although the increase of Cope Africans relative to the other 
labour sources hod steadily increased between 1922 and 1930, a comparison of the 
Cope figures alone through the years tells a very different story . The figures for 
the years 1926-1929 are not included on the chart, but according to table 8 in 
Labour in the Sou th Afr ican gold mines by Francis Wilson, between 1916 and 1926 
recruitment in the Cope dropped from 33.0 to 29.8 per cent. From 1924 to 1925 
alone a drop of over six and a half thousand was recorded. 63 
These figures confirm what the mines said at the time: that Africans in 
increasing numbers were by-passing the mines to seek other jobs in the towns. In 
fact, the mines were so concerned about it that soon after the new Mozambique 
Convention of 1928, the Chamber of Mines met with representatives of the 
Transkeian and Pondoland General Council to find out why the Africans were 
avoiding the mines. The hope was to redress any grievances and so win bock the 
supply. 
The minutes of this meeting not only confirm and explain why many 
Africans were avoiding mine work. They also show how I ittle control the state 
hod then over Africans living in the Cope reserves and how easy it was for these 
Africans to evade the travell ing pass restrictions (which were appl icable in the 
Transkei but not in the Ciskei), as this extract makes plain: 
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62 See table 6.4 for the geographical distribution of the main sources of the mines' 
labour supply. See also Wilson, Labou r ... , p 70 for figures on where the 
Chamber of Mines got its labour for the years 1896-1969. This chart also shows 
that, in 1906,8 per cent of the Chamber's labour supply stemmed from north of 
latitude 22° S. 
63 Wilson, Labour .. • , p 70, and table 6.4 above. 
Commenting on the Travelling Poss System Councillor Sakwe said it 
was a tiresome thing and asked the Government to abolish it. He 
pointed out the many ways in wh ich the Travel I ing Pass System was 
vexatious and irritating, and said that rather than submit to the irk-
some procedure many natives preferred to seek work at the Coast 
Towns. It was pointed out that Natives were required ta obtain 
travelling passes only when they were proceeding to wo rk outside 
the Cape Province, and that within that Province they were free to 
travel without any such restriction •... 
The Chairman (tv\ajor H S Cooke, Director of Labour) said that this 
matter was one with which the mining indushy was unable to deal. 
The government was, however, at present considering the amend-
ment of the pass Regulations and was in possession of all the facts of 
the case ••.• 
Councillor Sakwe referred to the Cha irman's remark that the Pass 
System was not one with which the Mining Industry could deal, or 
with which the present Conference was really concerned. He said 
the question was of vital importance to Natives wh ... desired to 
proceed to labour centres, and he explained at considerable length 
the difficulties, inconveniences and trouble occasioned to Natives 
by the present system •••. 
Mr Young (Assistant Chief tv\agistrate, Transkeian Territories) 
supported Councillor Sakwe's remarks on this point. He expla ined 
that in many districts travell ing passes were issued by the Pol ice, 
at stations often considerable distances from the tv\agistracies, 
subjecting the Natives to many difficulties and hindrances which 
might easily be avoided .•.• 
Mr Thompson (District Superintendent, NRC, Umtota) referred to 
the ease with which Natives could leave the territories to seek 
employment in the Cape or Natol Provinces and said that the pass 
system as it at present operotes was a clear hindrance to the flow of 
Native labour from the territories to the Gold Mines ..•. 
The Chairmon said that while he had no wish to stifle discussion he 
was assured that all the facts of the case were perfectly well known 
to the Government. He thought it might be accepted without 
further discussion that the conference agreed to the principle that 
if greater facil ities were provided for the more prompt and speedy 
issue of travelling passes to Natives in the Transkeian and Pondoland 
territaries the Native supply of the Mines might in some measure be 
stimu lated. He bel ieved that it was the intention of the Government 
to afford even greater facilities than those which had been proposed 
by the Delegotes ...• It was not necessary that this matter should be 
brought before Parliament, and as soon as the regulations were 
finally drafted and approved the machinery of the Native Adminis-
tration Act could be employed to give immediate effect to them. 64 
Hence, despite a highly sophisticated and regulated recruitment system 
and the state's support and promotion of their cheap labour policy, the mines 
64 Report of a conference between representatives of the Union government, 
the Transvaal Chamber of Mines and the Tran-;k~~;;:;:-;"torics -;;"dPo';;dc;land 
General Councils, NEC typescript 385 . The c~nference was held in the 
Chamber of Mines Building, Johannesburg, on Friday, 30 November 1928 . 
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still could not secure their full complement of labour. The situation, occord ing 
to officia l estimates, had reached a new crisis point. It was brought to a head by 
the drop in numbers from the Cape and the simultaneous reduction in the Portuguese 
supply in terms of the 1928 convention. This meant that the mines' fwo major 
sources of supply were being severely threatened. Despite urgent pleas from the 
mines, the government also refused to lift the bon on recruitment north of la titude 
22° S until 1933. This new area had become a ll the more vital because after 
1928 Po rtuguese Africans not employed on the mines of the Transvaal were rega rded 
as prohibited immigrants. Both the Natal collieries and the Natal suga r plantations 
were hit by this ruling, for neither could get permission to recruit African la bour 
from Portuguese te rritory. The farmers' supply had thus a lso been prejudiced by the 
1928 convention. 65 
Conflicting interests - mines and farms 
It will be remembered that during the labour crises of 1903 and 1908, the 
farmers demanded that a strong line be taken on squatting. Mining capital -
still influential in Whitehall - successfully fought the anti-squatting measures 
which favoured the formers at their expense. 66 The first Botha government also 
realised that a policy of enforced labour tenancy, demanded by the farmers and 
supported by Hertzog and party dissidents,67 would be disastrous for the mines. 
Sauer's pre-emptive move whereby provision was made for setting aside ex tra land 
so that squa tters could be settled in the reserves was one way of ensuring the 
mines' labour supply would not be d isrupted. This prevented the farmers - so it 
was a rgued - from regaining their former monopoly over the Union's labour supply 
in all provinces except the OFS. 
It is interesting to note that in May 1913, a month before the Land Act 
was passed, the mines were paralysed by a general strike . This, in addition to 
65 See Van der Horst, p 197; also NEe 1930-1932, ev idence of H Taberer, 
and the Report on notive lobour in Zulu land, Transkei etc, para 48 quoted 
in Van der Horst, p 197. 
66 See chap 4 above, p 156. 
67 The 1913 emba rgo, in addition to labour unrest ond strikes in that year, had 
brought the labour crisis to a head. But it must also be r",membered that a 
cris is had been reached between General He rtzog and General Botha, the 
latter possibly fearing that the new National Party under Hertzog would use 
the labou r question to further erode SAP support. For further analysis of 
motives behind the 1913 Natives ' Land Ac t see chap 4 above. 
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the govemment's decision in 1913 to place an official embargo on the recruitment 
of labour north of 22Q 5, brought the labour crisis to a peak - far the embargo 
meant that the 8 per cent formerly indentured from tropical Africa would have to 
be made up by recruiting locally.68 This could have been one of the reasons why 
Botha put pressure on Sauer to pilot the land Bill through Parliament. 69 A labour 
confl ict between mines and farms could not be tolerated within the party just then. 
Initially, however, Botha tried to reconcile the demands of the mines 
and farms through the Native labour Regulation Act of 1911. This Act empowered 
the govemment to make orders for the regu lation of labour. 70 It was the first 
post-Union attempt to regulate the supply so as to overcome the conflict of 
interests between mine and form. In effect it controlled the recruiting system, 
the Direc tor of Native labour having the power to declare any district 'closed' if 
the local supply of labour was being drown away badly enough to prejudice the 
local demand. We have seen already that the formers hod the initiative in 
demanding labour since the rule-of-thumb apparen tly was to allow local employers 
their usual labour force at the usual price . Since the recruiting agents tended to 
create a freer economic market for labour, and for its price, formers went On 
demanding that the Director of labour declare on increasing number of districts 
'closed' to those recruiters for the mines. Originally the NRC, established a year 
after the Regulation Act in 1912, could appoint agents for the mines, but only in 
specified areas. 71 To protect the formers' needs, no mine labour agent could 
recruit outs ide those areas. So from the outset the mines' sphere of influence 
over local supplies was limited. This, together with the land restrictions and 
labour tenancy licences, shows that the Botho ministry was not indifferent to the 
formers' demands. 
The SAP under Smuts continued this compromise policy. The decision to 
sanction administrative aci"ion allowing Africans to buy land in the committee 
72 hi· h· fib d areas was per aps 0 so a concessIon to t e mines, or on y yaccommo ating 
londless Africans in the reserves coul d the migrant labour sys tem continue. There 
68 See p 235. 
69 This assumption is suggested by the evidence. A more detailed investigation 
of the evidence is required to substantiate it. 
70 See p 239. 
71 For de tai Is of labour distric ts see appendix C.2. 
72 That is, the areas recommended by both the Beaumont Commission and the 
local lond commi ttees. See above, n 2.75. 
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is little doubt, moreover, thot the formers blocked this move. 73 The 1923 Natives' 
(Urban .Areas) .Act, which was intended in port to prevent form employees and 
mineworkers from being employed in the towns while still under contract, was a 
partial solution to meet the demands of the primary sectors for measures to prevent 
pfrican ingress to the towns . .As will be shown later, registration of contracts 
under this Act applied only to Africans who come under the Mos ter and Servants' 
Lows and the 1911 Native Labour Regulation Act - and then only in urban areas 
proclaimed under the Act . Its effect therefore was negl igible, and Africans from 
the reserves and the uncontrolled squatting areas who were not under contract 
continued to stream unhindered into the towns. 
This African move from mining and forming to commerce and industry was 
closely linked with another and for more serious development - the breakdown of 
the migrant labour system. As the NEe reported in 1932: 
on increase in the numbers in the Reserves unaccompanied by any 
more than a slow improvement in agricul tural methods, but accom-
panied by a rise in wonts, brought even greater pressure to bear 
on the tribal Natives .... 
They come into towns in their thousands to supplement the living 
which they obtain from their tribal lands Or from labour tenancy 
on the forms. They create a plentiful labour supp ly for urban 
occupations other than mining. 74 
The impoverishment of the reserves and the shortage of land, they (1sserted; were 
the two factors responsible for the accelerated migration of .Africans from the 
reserves ta the tawns . 
In the lost chapter we sow thot Hertzog rejected this view in 1926. 75 
He did this on two coun ts. Firstly, he opposed Souer's squatter resettlement plan, 
which laid down that extra land would have to be provided before the government 
took steps to remove squatters who hod been declared illegal residents in the whi ! , 
sector under the 1913 Land Act. Under his legislative programme Hertzog 
proposed instead that the problem of 'illegal' squatting could be so lved simply by 
phasing out hiring and leasing agreements between Africans and whites in the 
'non-native' sector. Those squatters who agreed to terminate these contracts by 
agreeing to a labour service contract with a white forme r would be allowed to 
73 For formers' attit'Jde to administrative dispensation see analys is on pp 80-82. 
On the dropping of the administra tive dispensation see p 209. 
74 UG 22-32, paras 532 and 544. For discussion on influx contro l, see chop 8. 
75 See p 198 ff. 
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stay in the white sec tor. Those who rejected these terms would eventually 
through prohibitive l icences be taxed out of existence . At whic h time they would 
be forced willy-nilly to accept form employment, the reserves being congested 
and the towns c losed to rural expatriots who could not first prove bono Fide 
76 
employment for at least 180 days on 0 form. In supporting I'he formers' demands 
like this, Hertzog showed he hod abandoned the ideo of segregating .6fricans " nd 
whites residentially. Or as Jabovu wrote: 
The proximity to the Europeans of the Bantu with their cheap unskill ed 
labour is a s ine qua non throughout the Union. It goes without saying 
that the most rabid segregationist does not want the African to be too 
far away from hi m fo r this purpose. 77 
From what we have seen of Hertzog's legislative programme, this was certainly true. 
It was not only Hertzog's revised plans for squatters that mode him decide 
against any immediate extension of the reserves. like countless others,78 he still 
bel ieved that the reserve Africans hod enough land for their subsistence needs. 
As late as 1930 the inter-departmental committee argued: 
The Native ... works, intermittently, alternating a period of 
se rvice with a stay at his kraal, resting and attending to necessary 
domestic and tribal affairs. His tribal habits and his conception of 
what constitutes welfare and a good I ife make him only partially 
depen den t on wages . 79 
Thus, although they refuted 'the common idea that there was a surplus of Native 
labour in the Union' available for work on the mines and other industries, the 
committee said this was because men in the reserves {whence most mineworkers 
come} worked for only about one-half of their time. With less land, Africans would 
be forced to contract to work for longer periods. 
In short, prior to 1932 the argument that extra land was essential ta 
240 
prevent the breakdown of the migrant labour system was rejected by the policymakers. 
Even the mines, it could be argued, were not concerned to extend the reserves so 
as to provide more land for the Africans already there. Their main goal in supporti ng 
Sauer's squatter rese ttlement plan was apparently to ensure that the mines, not the 
farms, would eventually draw on the squatter labour pool. But this cou ld only be 
76 See chop 5, p 208. 
77 Jabavu, The segrega tion fallacy, p 10 
78 See chop 2, p 84 ff. 
79 Report of the In ter-departmental Committee on the Labour Resources of the 
Union, 1930, An 89-1931, paras 79-80 
done really ance the squatters were removed from the white sector to the reserves 
where they would hove a safe foothold on the land - a necessary point if the 
migrant labour system was to keep going. 
In fact, by the 1920s the land restrictions had succeeded beyond their 
creators' hopes. The stream of workers from the reserves was not only constant but 
growing. What the legislators had not bargained for, though, was the simultaneous 
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migration of wives and other people to the towns. They had expected tb continue the 
pattern of the earlier days when a man contracted to work for a limited time simply 
to supplement his income derived from the land. Permanent family moves were a 
new and unwelcome feature . Sheila van der Horst noted of the early migration 
patterns: 
The first large-scale employers of labour, the mining companies, 
provided accommodation for their labour force but, where Africans 
were concerned, for men only. In the early years of mining when 
men wen t out to work for a few months at a time, it was doubtful 
whether many wou ld have wanted to take their wives and families 
even if there had been accommoda tion. Some women did accompony 
their menfolk to the towns, and at the time of Union there were 
some half mill ion Africans in the urban areas of whom less than a 
fifth were women. 
Within a decade the number hod risen to 147 000 women, and by 1936 they 
numbered 357 000. Lucas explained this rise thus: 
With the pressure of money taxation and of the steadily growing 
impoverishment among the Natives the migration from the Reserves 
to European areas increosed. The attractions of town life as well as 
the poverty met with there, kept more and more of the Natives who 
had migroted to the towns from returning home. Women followed 
the men and a permanent Native population became established in 
European areas. The stages of this process may be very clearly seen 
81 
in the history of Capetown in the past forty years. 82 
Originally the idea had been to force labour out of the reserves. But in the 1920s 
and 1930s it changed to regulating their exodus and ensuring that people returned, 
for by definition permanent migration to towns would destroy the migrant labour 
83 
system. 
80 For details of African urbanisation see table 8.3. 
81 S T van der Horst, The economic impli ca tions of pol itical democracy, p 14 
82 UG 22-32, para 216 
83 See chap 8 
The dangers of permanent migration must have been clear at the time, 
for it was this aspect of labour that loomed so large in Hertzog's revised 'native 
pal icy' in the early 1930s. 84 Yet even then there seemed to be no objection to 
men going to the towns. The farmers actually approved, as this was 0 necessary 
corollary to their 'cheap labour' policy.85 
The mines were far from sa tisfied. They were far more concerned to 
have African influx to the towns checked, as the only woy to preveni" the migrant 
labour system being undermined any further. They also insisted that if inter-
sector bargaining for African labour farced wages up, the law-grade mines wauld 
be jeopardised and the whale national econamy wauld suffer. State intervention, 
they insisted, was the only sure way to guarantee that the primary needs of the 
mines would be met. 
The mineawners' concern is understandable if one looks at the labour 
they could draw on then. As we hove seen, Africans in the white rural farming 
areas were to be virtually pegged for at least six months for the exclusive use of 
farmers under the 1932 Native Service Contract Act. This measure, although 
passed in 1932, had been tabled as early as 1929. The mines who had increased 
their contractual periad of service to 270 shifts - nine months - would therefore 
lose this source. 
Thus with the Portuguese supply cut back in 1928 the mines really only 
had the reserves to rely on far their labour. Their estimates for 1930 showed that 
already they were 30000 men shart at the height of the season. 86 How wos this 
shortfoll ta be met? 
Hertzog's pol icy plan for the mines 
Inevitobly the miners' demonds focussed on the reserves. The problem 
could be solved in two ways, they claimed. By revising the reserve boundaries 
the squatters already on the released lands to be included in the reserves would 
fall under the same system of control and administration os reserve Africans were 
already - that is, they would be considered part of the mines' migrant labour 
supply and be outside the control system regulating the farmers' labour supply. 
84 See the NEC's terms of reference. 
85 See chap 5, pp 186 and 196. 
86 See above, p 231. 
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The second method would be to extend lond segregation, with 011 its vorious 
restrictive implicotions, to the Cope. 
Hertzog rejected the first solution, but his administrative po licy under 
the 1927 Native Administration Act and its Amendment in 1929 shows he partly 
met the mines' demands as to Africans in the rese rves, including those in the Cape. 
Under the 1927 Native Pdministration Act, pfricans in the reserves had 
been brought under closer control, as the Act empowered the Governor-General 
to ru le by proclamation there. The Ac t olso allowed new pass oreas and new pass 
laws by proclamation in certa in districts. In the reserve the idea was to channel 
labour from there to the primary sectors by assuring trave lling passes to African 
workseekers at their point of departure. These we re to specify the labour area 
they could go to. 
The measures had failed for two reasons . With the failure ta implement 
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the proposed supp lementary land legislation to the 1913 Natives' Land Pct, 50 per 
cent of Africans in rural areas were still I iving on land outside the reserves . In 
other words, Africans classed as squatters I iving in the white rural sector on 
unoccup ied white-owned land, for instance (until the 1932 Native Service Contract 
Act was passed) continued to reside in what were virtually 'uncontrolled' areas 
f d .. . . f' 87 rom an a mlnlstra tlve poont 0 v Iew . 
One remembers a Iso that many of the problems experienced by the NA D 
in connection with the administration of areas stemmed from failure ta pass the 
supplementary land leg islation which would have added the 'released' areas to 
those scheduled in 1913. The extension of the system of legislation by proclamation 
had to be dropped because the status of certain areas occupied or acquired by 
Africans had still not been legally defined as scheduled areas. When the schedule 
to the 1917 Native Administrat ion Bill was withdrawn, so were the administrative 
I I· bl I . 'I 88 causes app Ica e to natIve areas a one . 
Undaun ted by this problem, the Hertzog government reinstated legislation 
by proclamation in the 1927 Native Administration Act. As they were soon to 
discover, however, the administrative controls under the 1927 Ac t could still be 
app lied only to Africans residing in the scheduled reserves. The two million in 
the 'non-nati ve' areas fell outside the 1927 Act's controls. The 1929 Amendment 
87 See pp 121-123. 
88 See p 110. 
to this Act tried to rectify the position. 
Under section 28 (I) of the 1929 Amendment the Governor-Generol-in-
Council could by proclamation declare pass areas where Africans hod to corry 
posses; make rules to control and prohibit any movement of pfricans into, within 
or from these proclaimed areas; and repeal any or all of the lows relating to the 
carrying of passes. The government overcame the problem of undefined scheduled 
areas by inserting a clouse specifying that 'no area included in the schedule to the 
Natives' land Act, 1913 (Act No. 27 of 1913), or any amendment thereof, shall 
be included'. In other words, section 28 (1) was to apply only to the control of 
Africans living outside scheduled 'native areas' - that is, the whole of the Cope, 
where Africans were living in peri-urban villages, townships and private location s 
or squatter areas as locations were more commonly known. In this way the 1929 
Amendment obviated any legal difficul ty tying the administrotive procedure to the 
1913 land Act. 
The government's administrative power was thus greatly increased under 
the 1927 Act. This Act gave the Governor-Generol unlimited power over every 
aspect of an African's life if he resided in a 'native area' . Now the NAD as the 
authority nominated by the Governor-Generol-in-Council could extend its control 
by proclamation to every single African in the areas that did not fall under 
municipal authorities. Even the fact that the Governor-Generol was still not 
considered the Supreme Chief in the Cope was thus overcome by the delegation 
of the Supreme Chief's authority to the NAD. 89 
But even these laws proved largely ineffectual, as Sheila von der Horst 
reported: 
In practice it has been found difficul t both to limit the entry of 
Natives into urban areas and to enforce the removal of unemployed 
Natives. During the depression officials in the Native Territories 
were asked not to gront permits to Natives wanting to come to Cope 
Town to look for work, but it was found that they soon I earnt to ask 
for permits to other districts, and once they were outside the Terri-
tories their movements were no longer sub ject to control. 90 
89 See pp 116-121 above for power of the Governor- Genero I under the South 
Africa Act 1909 and the 1927 Act which mode it possible to include the 
Cape. 
90 S T von der Horst, 'Some effects of industrial legislation on the morket for 
negative native labour in South Africa', SA Journal of Economics, v 3, 4, 
December 1935, p 498 
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It was one thing to legislate for greater control, but the government lacked both 
the machinery and the personnel to see the law implemented effectively. We have 
already discussed the decision to reinstote tribal authorities to help the government 
carry out its administrative policy. There is little doubt that the difficulties of 
controlling African influx from the reserves was an important factor behind the 
state's decision to refurbish the chiefs' traditional position. But this system would 
take many years to get going properly. 
Government failure to check the flow of labour to the towns was one of 
the main reasons for appointing the NEC. The government was finally beginning 
to see that a successful labour pol icy vis-a-vis the mines and farms could not be 
designed without first considering how to link it with the policy for the urban 
areas. When the 1929 Administration Amendment Act was passed, the way to link 
the two was still open to question. Anderson, a member of the NEC, demonstrated 
this by arguing that the farmers were not necessarily the prime movers for laws 
barring Africans from the towns. Edgar Brookes disagreed, arguing: 
I gather the effect is making itself felt a lready, that a Commission 
I ike this is appointed, and the Minister definitely lays down the 
question of the influx of natives into the towns as being an urgent 
question on which to report. I take it there must be some effect 
felt. 91 
Then Lucas suggested that the Minister instead could have wanted to study the 
problem for urban authorities - rather than for the mines and farms - should 
Tnf/ux control be introduced. Brookes continued to insist that the demand for 
influx control measures originated primarily with the farmers: 
Edgar Brookes .•• for example here in the Transvaal we have one 
of the leading officials of the Transvaal Agricultural Union conducting 
a campaign for the el imination of native domestic servants in the 
towns; in order to get cheaper labour on the farms. 
Lucas But even then it may be a question as to whether ' there really 
is not on the farms now quite on adequate supply, merely that it is 
not well distributed? ' 
Brookes Yes, granted. But the point is, if the natural process 
continues, and wages rise in the towns ... I don't soy it is the ideal 
method, but I mean it would be sufficient, although it would be 
very slow, if nothing were done to further protect the farmer beyond 
what he now has. The grave danger I foresee is, if this begins to 
make itself felt, panic legislation to try and restrict the native from 
coming into the towns, whateve r the motive may be, and the reby 
artificially maintaining a low standard of wages. 92 
91 NEC 1930-1932, oral evidence of E Brookes, 14 May 1931 
92 Ibid 
We have seen that inter-sector competition was a threat to the form 
labour supply, and the 1932 Service Contract Act was passed to prevent squotters 
evading farm employment. But when Brookes gave his evidence in 1931, this 
Act was not yet through. Braokes and lucas were both raising pivotal issues, 
centro I to the investigations of the NEC. 
Under the terms of reference the Minister had laid down that the 
commission should consider the whole question of I imiting the number of Africans 
in urban areas and that the inquiry should cover 
The economic and social effect upon the European and Coloured 
population of the Union of the residence of Natives in urban areas 
and the measures, if any, to be adopted to deal with surplus 
Natives in, and to prevent the increasing migration of Natives to, 
such areas. 93 
So whites (and white workers) in the towns were also an integral part of 
this inquiry. The interrelationship between the position of poor whites in the 
towns and the motives behind such an inquiry were made clear in an exchange 
between Margaret Hodgson and the commissioners. The chairman, Dr Holloway, 
refe rring to Margaret Hodgson's written evidence, asked: 
Now, on the next page you soy, 'European South Africa has brought 
the Native into its economic system by every meons in its power. It 
now wishes to push him out again, because he has become inconveni-
ent to the very interests which he has hitherto subserved'. Do you 
think that is a statement of fact? 
Hodgson Well, is that not the implication of the White labour 
policy; an implication of the White labour policy, that it is necessary 
to maintain the efficiency of the European population; that a good 
dea I of the sphere of labour which has been occupied by the Native 
should be redeemed for the European both in status and material 
standards; that means that the Native has to be put out. The whole 
implication of the White labour policy is to put the Native out and 
to put the European in. 94 
Thus by 1930 when the NEC was appo in ted there was every indication 
that the state had finally realised that a solution to the labour problem (including 
the problem of surplus whites in the towns) was linked to the accelerated influx of 
Africans from the reserves. But this realisation became important only after the 
NEC report was tabled in 1932. let us now see how Hertzog coped with the poor 
white problem and his urban areas policy before tha t date. 
93 UG 22-32, p 1 under terms of reference 
94 NEC 1930-1932, oral evidence of Margaret Hodgson, 18 May 1931 
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7 POOR WH ITES AND 
WH ITE WORKERS' DEMA NDS 
Nature and origin of the poor white problem 
Poor whites in the towns 
A 'c ivi I ised labour' pol icy 
Expensive white labour: employer res istance 
Conservative trade unionism undermined by the state 
Greater state control 
Poor whites and poor blacks 
By the logic of facts the segregationists were being forced ta abandon 
the plan of isolating Africans from the general economic life of the community. 
Still, the segregationist creed demanded at least that those Africans unavoidably 
drawn into the white economy would not rise in it. The legislative and traditional 
restrictions for keeping Africans at an inferior, untrained and ill-paid level would 
remain. Only thus could the 'standard of white civilisa tion' be protected. 
1 
Nature and origin of the poor white problem 
Two foreseeable but pol itically unacceptable develapments for those 
wishing to maintain the traditional master-servant relationship foiled the idea. 
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As the white papulation grew, more and more whites wanted jobs, and often without 
any great skill or ability to offer . This labour in most cases was simply the usual 
outcome of a rural people shifting under the impetus of industrialisation. In homo-
genous countries it would have found an opening in the unskilled and semi-skilled 
levels of expanding industry, but South African industry had shown little sign of 
grading the original steep slope between unskilled and skilled labour, the job-
stratifying typical of modem industry elsewhere. The whites who could not qualify 
as skilled wo rkers therefore hod no alternative but to compete with Africans on the 
lowest levels of the labour market, and for work paid at rates far below the cost of 
any white standard of living, however simple. As the Industrial Legislation 
Commission explained : 
The discussion in this section is based mainly on a study of the evidence of 
the Report of the Carnegie Commission on the Investigation of the Poor White 
Question in South Africa (Carnegie Commission) - port 1 J F W Grosskopf, 
economic report, Rural impoverishment and rural exodus; part 2 R W Wilcocks, 
psyc hological report, The poor white; part 3 E G IvIalherbe, educational 
report, Education and the poor white; part 4 W" Murray, health report, 
Health factors in the poor white problem; pa rt 5 J R .Albertyn & M E Rothmann, 
soc iological report, (a) The poor white in society, and (b) The mother and 
daughter in the poor white family. See also S H Frankel & E H Brookes, 
'Problems of economic inequality: The poor white and the native ' in Brookes 
et 01, pp 129-183 (it should be noted thot this essay was submitted by these 
writers in the same form as evidence to the NEC); Report of the Transvaal 
Indigency Commission 1906-1908, TG 13-08; Report of the EWC 1925, 
UG 14-26; Report of the Industrial Legislation Commission, UG 37-35; 
IvIacmillan, The South African agrarian problem . .. , Land, labour and 
unemployment, ond Complex South Africa; T F Cronje, Die armblanke 
probleem in die Transvaal; and R A Lewis, 'A study of some aspects of the 
poor white problem in South Africa', unpub research essay presented in partial 
fulfilment for the MA degree, Rhodes University, 1973. Lewis's section on 
'Rural exodus' (based mainly on unpublished material) and the comparative 
analysis of the solutions offered by different commissions over the years cover 
new ground and are invaluable. 
Europeon lobour, once a great scarcity, is now available in 
increased numbers in urban areas. Moreover, these increased 
numbers do not COl sist of artisans and capable managers and 
supervisors only, but of every grade of labour. The labour 
situation has accordingly undergone a radical change. In every 
race, the existence of grades of labour and of difference of 
ability must be admitted . The same applies to the Europeans in 
South Africa. While some are 'born' craftsmen and men capable 
of leading others, many are only capable of being led and of 
doing manual labour, which, until comparatively recently, was 
a monopoly of the non-European and, indeed, was commonly 
referred to as 'Kaffir work'. Europeans in increesing numbers 
are, therefore, entering the ranks of unskilled labour in the 
towns where they have to compete with growing numbers of non-
Europeans. 2 
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On the poor whites' preiudice against 'kaffir work', Wilcocks who drew up the 
psychological report for the Carnegie Commission saw this as an inevitable outcome 
of the 'radical changes' in the relationship between Africans and impoverished 
whites. Originally, he wrote, this relationship 
had been that of masters to servants, but the two sections now 
became competitors, especially in the field of unskilled labour. 3 
Wilcocks claimed that allowing Africans and whites to compete with each other 
rei~forced white racial preiudice. This preiudice extended to the field of manual 
work. As he explained: 
Should an impoverished European who is strongly imbued with the 
preiudice aga inst kaffir work be obi iged by sheer necess ity to 
undertoke it, he considers he is being degraded to the level of the 
native. At the same time he is convinced that he is the native's 
superior, and that he should be treated accordingly .... />s this 
type of poor white finds himself sinking in the economic sca le, he 
becomes more and more aware of the need of asserting his superiority 
over the native . 4 
On the poor whites' attitude to Africans being accorded the same opportunities 
as them, Wilcocks found that if 
2 Report of the Industrial Legislat ion Commission, UG 37-35, para 10. See 
also Report of the Transvaal Indigency Commission, TG 13-08, paras 46-50 
where they stote, ' .. . The white man 's preiudice against 'Kaffir' work, his 
inefficiency as an unskilled labourer and the higher wage he requires, have 
had the natural results that coloured labour, inefficient though it is, is 
cheeper to the employer for unskilled work than white labour'. The EWC 
drew attention to this comme nt. In their view the preiudice agoinst 'koffir 
work' had become less pronounced by 1925, but they believed inter-racial 
competition had intens ified os a resu lt - UG 14-26, P 107. Wilcocks' 
findings in the Carnegie report, however, confirm the findings of the 1908 
commiss ion. 
3 Cornegie Commission, part 2, pp 56-57 
4 Ibid, p 56 
the poor white be beaten in the competition for work, he is far from 
taking this as proof that the native has become his superior, or even 
his equa I. On the contra ry, he v iews the outcome as a further 
injustice which the European government of the country should not 
permit. 5 
In this way, ord inary unskilled work had become 'kaffi r work' in South Africa-
work carrying a moral stigma, earning only 'kaffir pay', a rate fixed by the low 
level of African spending and the livelihood allegedly available to many i'>frican 
workers through having a family home on the land. The result was thot the 
differentiotion of the whi te population wos not really into skilled and unskilled, 
but into skilled and poor white . 
C W de Kiewiet suggests further reasons for the start of poor white ism: 
Most of them wen t to the towns for the same reason that water fI ows 
uphill when driven by machinery. Drought and fences, the devasta-
tion of the Boer War and the collapse of the os trich feather industry 
at the outbreak of the Great War, inefficiency and bankruptcy .... 
i'> large proportion were defeated men, unable to main toin the ir 
hold on the land, destitute in both wealth ond energy, drawn into 
an unfamiliar world of re luctant opportunities and depressed wages. 6 
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Want of proper education was also stressed by various commissions. Industrial skills 
amongst poor whites were lacking, according to the Carnegie commissioners, 
because there was 'a certain stigma a ttached to these schools which made parents 
7 
reluctant to send their children to them.' Education for girls was considered 
unnecessary in many poor white homes, and this deprived a destitute family of 
extra breadwinners. The negative attitude of poor white families towards education 
is reviewed by Lewis. The effect of this attitude towards education was reflected 
in the low school attendance figures at the turn of the century, and this, Lewis 
recalls, caused J W Sauer to remark that in 1896 there were more non-white than 
white children at school in the Cape. 8 
The effects of poor education were far-reaching - bad farming methods 
forced many off the land. i'>s fa il ed farmers without any skill or training, few 
5 Ibid , pS7 
6 De Kiewiet, p 196. See also Carnegie Commission , part 1, chap 2 . 
7 The application of the Childrens' Protect ion Act associates these schools with 
crim inal tendencies and men tal deficiency, Joint report of the C:,rnegie 
Commiss ion, pix. 
8 House of Assembly Debates, 1896, Third session of the Ninth Pari iament, 
p 400, and Lewis, p 15. In chap 1 it was shown that whites in the 1920s 
still feared that educated African children would outnumber whites. Afrikaans 
officia ll y supp lanted Dutch as the medium of instruction in schools on ly in 
1925 - this did not help matters e ither. 
Fran ke I concl udes: 
Thus it wos thot those londless Europeans became at last what they 
were treated as - Poor Whites: regarded as I ittl e more fit economically 
than that other section of the South African economy from which the 
opportunity for economic improvement was withheld by the same system. 13 
In some ways the poor whites were even more exploitable than their African 
counterparts. This De Kiewiet stresses in his description of what is perhaps the 
crux of the poor white problem: 
In the towns as upon the land they were caught between the upper 
and nether millstones of two classes. In the country they had been 
extruded from the ranks of the londown ing and prosperous farmers; 
in the town they could not enter the ranks of the skilled and well-
poid workers, for they had no skill of their own. In the country the 
system of cheap and tractable native labour gave them no chance of 
becoming a useful race of rural labourers; in the tawn the same 
natives obstructed the absorption of the poor wh ites in the ranks of 
unsk ill ed labour. 14 
Poor whites were not only to be found in the towns. The Carnegie 
commiss ioners used the term 'to denote principally the economic and soc ial 
retrogression of a considerable part of the white rural (or originally rural) popula-
tion of our country'. 15 Included under this definition in 1932 were the poor trek-
boers of the north-western Cape; bywoners, agricultural labourers and shepherds 
from drought-stricken areas who were always on the move; men and women 
weokened by malaria, fram the Transvaal, who apparently still depended on 
hunting for their economic existence; the poor woodcutters in the George, 
Knysno and Tsitsikama reg ions; small groups of indigents who lived in isolated, 
well watered volleys; paupers in shanties on the outskirts of 'dorpe' or villages; 
and the many thousands who were to be found on the alluvial diggings. 
The commission's main criterion for classifying people as poor white was 
thot they hod lost their independence or ability to better their station without 
outs ide help. In this sense the urban dwellas formed the largest group because 
they were even denied a subsistence livelihood which their rural counterparts 
could eke from the land. 
13 NEC 1930-1932, typescript joint evidence of E H Brookes and S H Frankel 
14 De Kiewiet, pp 196-197. See also Carnegie Commission, part 1, chap 7. 
15 Carnegie Commission joint report, p v. For other definitions see Report of 
the Select Committee on Labour Settlements for IndigenT Whites, C3=06; 
Report of the Transvaal Indigency Commission- 1906-1908, TG 13-08, p 116; 
and Report of the Commission Appointed by the Govern~cnt of the ORC ta 
Enquire into the Position and Circumstances of the Poor Whites in the ORC 
1908, p 13 quoted by Lewis, pp 1-2. 
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An obvious fact, which the comm iss ioners felt worthy of note, was thot 
the tenm 'poor white' could only have come into common usage in a country 
16 . 
inhobited by on 'inferior' non-Europeon population as well as by Europeans; the 
very term implied that whites should enjoy a higher standard of I iving than non-
whites. 17 Sadly one could add a rider to this rocist atti tude: that it almost seems 
as though the poar whites were viewed as a problem and received what little help 
they did because they were white , not poor, I ike the impoverished Africons. This 
attitude was preva lent particularly in the towns where poor whites were totally 
dependent on charity channelled through the churches alone. 
Poor whites in the towns 
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Poor whites had increased so much by 1929 that a. reliable estimate put 
them at about 300 000. 18 Their emergence had contributed to the growth of major 
slums in town and there the poor whites and poor blacks were not on ly competing 
for jobs, but had integrated socially . In the context of South African society, 
contact at this level was poli ti cally exp losive. Thirty years later Margaret 
Ballinger recalled: 
It is difficul t now to remember or to appreciate the dark shadow 
which poor white ism cast over the country in the 20's and 30's of 
this century. Yet it was the fonmative force in the standardising of 
the relationship of Black and White in the country. The very 
pressure; that had been and were still being applied to get Africans 
to COme to the developing industries to work were forcing Whites 
off the land into a labour market where they had noth ing to offer 
that the African could not offer and in some cases not so much as 
16 Lewis, p 3 
17 Carnegie Commission joint report, p v 
18 'Data obtained from questionnaires sent to practically half the schools in the 
Union, covering 49 434 famil ies from which children are attending schools, 
are somewhat disquieting. Careful instructions were given to principals of 
schools, to indicate all children coming from ·very poor" families, i.e. those 
who are largely supported by charity, e.g. in c ities Or who subsist in dire 
poverty on farms. The figures obtained show that 17. 5 per cent of al l the 
families with children a t school were described as "very poo r". If we apply 
the sOme percentage to the tatal European population (just over 800 000 in 
1931), more then 300000 (at a conserva tive est imate) of the white population 
were "very poor". The writers note further: "These figures were obta ined in 
1929/30 before the effects of the present depression were so noticeable"; a 
further indication of the extent of poor white ism is contained in the statement 
made by a Cabine t Minister who claimed that "of all Europeans over the age 
of 65, no less tha n 47% received old age pensions".' Carnegie Commission, 
part 5, pp 80-81 and 121. 
he had, for example brawn . To appreciate all the social implications, 
it has to be remembered that it was a period~f great econom ic 
instability in wh ic h the alternations of boom and depress ion - and 
more and more serious depressions - aggravated all the strains 
inherent in the process of urbanisation amon g communities so ill-
prepared for and as yet so ill-adapted to the new way of life. 19 
Just how ill-adapted and ill -prepared this pennanently underemployed 
class of the white community was, has been graphically dep icted by C M van den 
Heever in his short story' Nooit'. C M van den Heever's description shows the 
demoralisation of a ruined farmer in Johannesburg who lives in rooms hired from 
an Indian, with his wife a nd chi ldren. The conditions under which so many poor 
wh ites I ived are starkly conveyed in the stary, and the hero is presented as a man 
who is unskilled, unemployed and humilia ted at be ing powerless to help his family. 
David Welsh gives the scene: 'He had to set as ide everything that constituted his 
very nature - to come and live he re. He had to cut out his self-respect, he had 
to become a dog who licked the hands of those who gave him food. ,20 
A con temporary description of one of the many racially integra ted 
suburbs was depicted by G Ballenden in his evidence to the NEC. 21 The point 
he emphasised was the rising standard of the Africans compared to the degradation 
of the whites. The ensuing discuss ion on slum c lea rance and the creation of 
segregated locations reveals white concern over this development: 
Lucas Take these two tON nships . When you have cleared the whole 
of your town under the Urban Areas Act, [22] how would you be able 
to prevent slums coming into existence in Sophiatown and Newclare? 
Ballenden They will be treated I ike the rest and will be proclaimed 
in the ordinary way . [23J That is to say tha t no Native, except the 
freehold owner and his family will be allowed to reside there. It is 
conceivable that the Council may follow that policy. You must bear 
19 Margaret Ba ll inger, 'Migrant labour - historical background', Ballinger 
papers, UCT collection, D70/ 80 9(d) 
20 C M van den Heever,' Kortverhale (trans), p 4 quoted by D Welsh, 'The 
growth of towns ' in Wi I son & Thompson (ed), v 2, p 207 
21 Manager, Municipa l NAD, Johannesburg 
22 Natives' (Urban Areas) Act 1927 Amendment Act 25 of 1930, section 5. 
Means were provided for enforcing the res idence of Africans in segregated 
locations. Legal technicalities had made this section largely inoperative 
before 1930. After that date an urban authority could procure the proc lama-
tion of its area even though it had not provided the requisite hous ing 
accommoda tion. See chap 8 below, p 317. 
23 1930 Urban Areas Amendment Act, sec tion 7 . Thi s confe rred spec ial powers 
for purchase Or expropriation of African-owned property in the town of any 
African who under the segregation c lause was not entitled to reside on such 
property. (This did not apply in the Cape. ) Chop 8 be low, p 315. 
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in mind that it is not free in the sense thot any Native [24] may just 
go and reside there as he pleased. 
Lucas Supposing the freehold owner wants to go away, what is to 
happen then to r.is house? 
Ballenden With the approval of the Council, the owner may let it 
ta an approved tenant, or a tenant who will come under the provision 
of the Urban Areas Act but the approval of the Council will definitely 
have to be given. 
Lucas Do you anticipate that you wili be able to do thot without 
difficulty? 
Ballenden I think so. I do not think that there will be any undue 
hardship imposed on them, but, of course, restrictions must definitely 
be enforced against overcrowding and the residence there of undesir-
able persons. We are not going to allaw that to develop into an area 
whi ch may become a danger to us or to the respectable Native residents 
there or the White residents on the outside. [25J 
Chairman Are these townships showing any slum tendencies now? 
Ballenden Yes, I think they are. There are quite a lot of types of 
buildings, shacks, etc., which are slummy. [26J They are not to be 
compared a ltogether with ordinary slums, because they are more open 
in the first place, but they are just as unkempt Or more unkempt than 
the places which you saw in Doomfontein - Nathan' s Yard. [27J 
Chairman That yard is not by any means the worst? 
Ballenden No, that is so, not by any means. 
Chairman But you say that on the whole Sophiatown is no worse than 
Nathan's Yard? 
Ballenden Generally speaking, I would say that it is infinitely better. 
Chairman At its weakest point? 
Ballenden At its weakest point it is not worse. 
Roberts What about Jackelson's Yard? 
Ballenden It is infinitely worse than Nathan's Yard. 
Lucas In Sophiatown and New Clare, [28] do you find any signs of 
housepride? 
24 Other than those exempted under the 1927 Native Administration Ac t from 
ca rrying passes 
25 In such instances the govemment had the power to implement the Slums 
Clearances Act 1931. Th is also obviated the need to force municipa l 
authorities to proclaim their areas under the 1930 Act. 
26 Ballenden explained that African freehold areas had become overcrowded 
as a result of the 1923 Urban Areas Act and the reluctance of Africans to 
sett le in municipal locations . While places like Sophia town were over-
crowded, there were still vacant houses in the segregated locations. For 
reasons see chap 8 below. 
27 A racially mixed area 
28 Predominantly African areas 
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Ballenden Yes, very much so . Among the Natives generally you 
find a good deal of housepride. They are not people who allow 
their houses to go down if they can possibly help it. 
Chairman The Tribal Native has a considerable degree of house-
pride? 
Ballenden Yes, and you can say the same about the town Native. 
Chairman He starts with the background of a clea n house? 
Ballenden Yes. You will notice always that every house, even the 
meanest, is c lean . There is always an attempt at keeping the outside 
yard clean. That is inherent among the Na tives . 
Roberts And their pe~ons they also keep clean? 
Ballenden Yes, that is so. There is a big tendency among the 
Natives to beautify their place. They do not do it in the kraal but 
when they come to Johannesburg they try and beautify their ploce 
with a little garden and they will add all sorts of little things to try 
and make the place look nice. 29 
The image of Africans and whites living cheek by jowl in the slums of Jackelson's 
and Nathan's Yard offended the sensibilities of good clean-living whites, but that 
Africans in Sophia town and Newc lare were houseproud was anathema. The hint 
of disbelief in Dr Roberts' 'And their pe~ons they also keep clean?' speaks 
volumes on white attitudes of the day, considering the fact that Roberts himself 
had been stigmatised by rocists as a 'kaffirboetie'. It was left to Professor Mac millan 
to convey the effects of abject poverty on both Africans and whites. After many 
years of intensive study of both poor whites and blacks, he wrote: 
I see no reason to modify some words I wrote in 1915, when my know-
ledge of Johannesburg was less than now, 'I shall not readily forget 
what I have seen in the slums of this town. In almost every case 
where whites and blacks live side by side, the blacks are on the 
upgrode, in the slums, because there is no other place for them, 
clean and decent : but their children are growing up there, learning 
"civilization" from white neighbou~, squalid and filthy, the very 
dregs of socie ty.' In other words, the continuance of present condi-
tions of society is having the effect of depressing our own race, 
making 0 hea lthy white South Africa impossible, and degroding and 
demoral ising the black himself in the process. 30 
This particular study was done during the toil-end of the boom which 
followed the Great War, indicating thot poor white ism was not specific to the 
recession in the early twenties nor to the world-wide depression of the early 
thirties. But obviously those years of depression, degrading and demorel is ing 
people, further accentuated the human misery of this class. The 1930 depression 
29 African houses outside municipal locations were, Ballenden also po;nted 
out, required to conform to municipal building regulations, 
30 Macmillan, The South African agrorian problem"" p 17 
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also highlighted the problem of unemployment amongst whites as it had done on 
few previous occasions. In the absence of re i iable statistics it is impossible to 
gauge unemployment figures for any specific period. There is, however, a 
significant correlation between the periods of recess ion coupl ed with high unemploy-
ment and the stepped-up demands for poor white rei ief measures. There were few 
such periods, according to the 1930 Unemployment Investigation Commi ttee: 
during the last thirty years, there hove been few periods of cyclical 
unemployment of an abnormal Or exceptional character .•• it is 
imposs ibl e to determine even approximately how great was the 
unemployment in each instance, but there is a consensus of opinion 
that relatively the depressions of 1906-8 and 1930-32 were more 
severe and more prolonged than the depressions of 1913-14 and 
1920-22. 31 
It is against this background that the poor white problem must therefore be 
assessed. 
Underemp loyment of poor whites during periods of prosperity is less 
easily explained. One reason for this was the acce lerated pace of urbanisation . 
The rate at which this was occurring is shown in the following table: 
Table 7.1 DISTRIBUTION OF WHITE POPULATION 32 
Urban Rural 
Census population population Total % urban % rural 
1891 217322 403297 620619 35.02 64.98 
1904 590926 525880 1 116806 52.91 47.09 
1911 695796 616446 1 276242 51.70 48.30 
1918 766894 654932 1 421 781 53.94 I 46.06 
1921 847508 671 980 1 519488 55.78 44 .22 
1926 975235 701 425 1 676660 58.17 41.83 
In 1904, 53 per cent of the total white population lived in the urban 
areas. The estimate for 1931 was given as 1 119 848 or 61 per cent, wi th a 
. d ' h I 33 proportionate rap In t e rurc group. 
31 Report of the Unemployment Investigation Committee, UG 30-32, paras 
65-66 
32 Fourth census of the population of the Union of South Africa, 4 lV'tJy 1926, 
(enumeration of Europeans only), UG 4-31, p 16 
33 De Kiewiet, p 194 
Since most of those who had been forced e,ff the land had I ittle or no skill 
or training, one can understand the demand growing apace for relief work and for 
laws to help whites get into c,ommerce and industry more rapidly. Initially every 
attempt had been made to establ ish colonies for poor whites as part of a 'back to 
the land' rehabilitation programme, but with little success. Thus the following 
comment in the report of the Unemployment Investigation Committee suggests: 
We are strongly of opinion that the Government should not entertain 
the policy of settling indigents on the land by its own direct action. 
The only way in which indigents can be turned into self-supporting 
farmers is when they are kept under discip line, made to work, and 
subjected to moral and rei igious influences. To put indigents on the 
land and then leave them ta themselves is to court certain failure. 34 
For many years the resettlement of poor whites in labour colonies along the lines 
of Kakamas35 had been advocated as a solution to the poor white problem . The 
main advocates of this school insisted that poor whites were the"victims of circum-
stances and that the state had a duty to provide cheap capital for the whites 
driven off the land. Attempts to persuade the land companies to settle whites and 
not Africans on their lands haye already been discussed. 36 This development was 
merely an extension of the fundamental objection that most whites had towards 
African share-croppers who were accused of displacing whites. lewis sums up 
white objections thus: 
The nativ~ labourer was cheaper than the white labourer; and the 
native share-cropper was (lften preferred to the bywoner because 
social pressures forced the farmer to see to the comfort and well-
being of the bywoner - an obligation he was not burdened with in 
the case of a native share-cropper. The unpopularity of the 
practices of taking black rather than white labourers and taking 
on black share-croppers rather than white bywoners was due not 
only to the fact that these practices tended to displace poor 
whites, but also because they offended the segregationalist 
consc ience, 
Even more than this, perhaps' it provided a much greater reward for ·a native 
share-cropper on a white-owned farm than other white farmers, who did not have 
large tracts of land and were prepared to pay a native labourer'. In the words of 
a Bethlehem farmer: farming on shares was 'detrimental to the country' - 'by 
getting into partnership with the natives •.. it will be difficult to know what to 
34 UG 30-32, para 89. See also Camegie Comm·issior. "fl" 5, whp-re the effects 
of injudicious method. of rei ief are analysed in deta,. anG part 2, p 108, 
and part 5, chap IV, where successful methods and solutions are analysed. 
35 lewis, pp 60-66 for assessment of the labour resettlement colony at Kakamas 
36 See chap 2 above, pp 99-101. 
37 lewis, p 30 
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do with them; they have become rich through the indulgence of the farmer ..• 
they always seek out the best land. ,38 As far as this farmer was concerned, 
There are many poor white people in the district who would be only 
too glad to get the opportun ity of taking the place of natives as far 
as farming is concerned. . •• 39 
A concerted effort was made to end share-cropping and replace Africans by poor 
whites on the land. The folly of resettling failed farmers back on the land was, 
however, no solution, as some of the reports of the several commissions show. 40 
By the mid-twenties earl ier enthusiasm for a 'back to the land' policy hod begun 
to wane . Grosskopf's objections to a solution of this kind tell why: indigents 
left to their own devices foiled to make the grode: 
Almost universally we hear the cry 'back to the land: keep the rural 
poor on the farms and out of the towns~' Undoubtedly, if this were 
feasible, the conscience of the nation would be less perturbed, 
because the so-called' Poor White Problem' would remain almost 
imperceptible if the poor were distributed over hundreds of thousands 
of square miles of the rural interior. But the average wealth and 
welfare of the whi te population would be no better; neither would 
rural poverty disappear in this way. 41 
It was not simply a question of out of sight out of mind . Old solutions had to be 
revised. There was no doubt that allocating land to people with no skill or ability, 
capital, or even the desire to better themselves, had doomed the policy to failure. 
Both the Unemployment Investigation Committee and the Carnegie commissioners 
were unequivocal on that point. 
38 Beaumont Commission report, UG 22-16, p 55, evidence of J J Bruwer, 
Bethlehem farmer, quoted by Davenport & Hunt, doc 95 
39 Ibid 
40 The 1908 Indigency Commission differed from other commissions in that it 
opposed the resettlement of poor whites on the land unless strictly controlled 
farm colonies were set up. They believed the 'poor white problem could be 
resolved, largely In the towns, largely by the poor whites themselves, and 
the hard way'. Quoted by Lewis, p 53. The Clay commissioners advocated 
a controlled 'back to the land' policy. The assumption here was this may 
have been seen as a solution to the over-supply of unskiiled labour, ,African 
and white, in the urban areas, wh ich had intensified state efforts towards 
the implementation of the:r 'civilised labour' policy. Secondary industrialists 
were baulking at having to pay the higher rate for white woges. The Clay 
Commission's investigations Into land company policy towards poor whites is 
dealt with ir ::hap 2 above, pp 99-101. 
41 Carnegie Commissior" par~ 1, P 79 . This statement by Grosskopf is an implied 
critic ism of urban white att ; tudes in general. Ir lends weight to the argument 
that 'back to the land' was one way of solving the problem of poor whites and 
blacks in the tawns to tr,e industrial ists· advantage - Africans were employable 
at 0 cheaper ",te. 
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A 'civilised labour' pol icy 
Hertzog's National Party's accession to power in 1924 in a pact with 
Labour brought new hope that the poor whites would be relieved. Within the first 
year Hertzog had laid down guide-I ines for his 'civil ised labour' pol icy. The 
poor white as a permanent city dweller had been accepted as a fait accompli. 
The wording of the c ircular sent to all departments by the Prime Minister reveals 
how tentative his first step was in this new initiative : 
Civil ized I abou r is to be cansidered as the labour rendered by 
persons whose standard of I iving conforms to the standard generally 
recognized as tolerable from the usual European standpoint. 
Uncivil ized labour is to be regarded as labour rendered by persons 
whose aim is restricted to the bare requirements of the necessities 
of I ife as understood among barbarous and underdeveloped peoples. 42 
The blatant rac ism of later instructions is completely absent from this 
1924 circular. Even the newly created Department of Labour began by interpreting 
this policy in its wides t form. 43 In due course all this changed. Ironically, as 
the state's interpretation of this policy narrowed to focus on poor whites, their 
position got worse. It became so bad tha t even before the depression the state 
approved the funding of a commission by the Camegie foundation to investigate 
the poor white problem in all its aspects. 44 Before the commission had a chance 
to report, however, a series of amending Acts were passed in 1930 effecting 
greater state control over labour. The negative repercussions of this policy will 
be discussed in due course. First let us examine and assess the early expedients 
adopted in implementing the Pact govemment's 'civil ised labour' pol icy. 
The size of the poor white problem had been highlighted in 1925 by the 
EWC. Their thorough analysis of how income and wages were distributed overall 
revealed some very worrying facts, one of the most startling being the uneven 
wage distribution which they summarised thus: 
42 RR 102/35 (mimeo) : copy of circularised minute, Prime Minister's circular 
5/21, Department of Labour, February 1925. 
43 See SAIRR, 'The civilized labour policy and the displacement of Non-
European labour', mimeo 102/35. In this, official statements on the interpre-
tation of the 'civilised labour' policy from the Secretary for Labour to different 
institutions are quoted. 
44 For deta ils of the five-part commission report and its members see n 7.1. 
Lewis, pp 54-55, makes some interesting observations on the qual ifications, 
interests and attitudes of the different members. Among other points he notes 
that they were all experts in their fields; thot they 'held traditionol ottitudes 
towards the natives'; and in addition 'their background and affiliations made 
them more sympathetic to the aspirations of the poor whites than the Milnerites 
on the 1908 Transvaal Indigency Commission' had been. 
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Table 7.2 DISTRIBUTION OF WAGES IN THE UNION 45 
Wage groups 
(£ per annum) 
REIJ.TlV[ PROPORTI ON OF EACH RACE WITHIN STAnD WACE CROUP . 
240-500 
120-240 
60-120 
36-60 
9-36 
The square represents the total number of wage earners in the Union. 
The rectangles when measured horizontally indicate the relative number of 
people of each race fall ing within the wage groups. 
The rectangles when measured ve rticolly indicate the relative number of 
people of all races falling within the wage groups. 
The black portion refers to Africans, the one I ightly shaded to coloureds 
and Asiatics, and the unshaded part to whites. 
Frankel wrote on their findings: 
A careful examination of this diagram shows that approximately 55 
per cent. of the wage earners in the Union in 1925 received between 
£9 and £36 per annum, that is, a range of wage whose minimum is 
only just sufficient to buy say one complete change of clothing for a 
worker on a civil ised standard of I ife, and whose maximum would 
not even buy the furniture for one of his living rooms .... The diagram 
illustrates clearly how sma ll compared to the moss of the workers of 
South Africa is that highly-paid, though not therefore always corres-
ponding ly highly-skilled, closs of white workers (there are practically 
no non- Europeans) who compose the group earn ing between £240-£500 
per annum. On the diagram it is shown to amount to under five per 
cent. of the total number of wage-earners ..•. For the rest the 
European, and espec ially, as is only too well known, the Poor White 
45 UG 14-26, reprinted in Brookes et 01, p 163 
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from the country, is being forced to accept low-paid occupations, 
and in 1925 they formed over 2 per cent. of the £9-£36 group and 
over 8 per cent. of the £30-£60 group. 46 
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These findings hod led immediately to the Wage Act of 1925, followed by a whole 
series of Woge Board determinations designed along with the 'civilised labour' 
policy to uplift the poor whites. On their aim and efficacy the Director of Labour, 
Major Cooke, wrote: 
In the report of the Wage Board for the three years ended February, 
1929, in the final part of Paragraph (5), it says : 'Unskilled work 
•.• is almost generally performed by natives, whose standard of 
I iving is much lower than that of i-he Europeans •... Such a fact 
must be recogn ised in wage legislation. ' 
A scrutiny of wage determina tions suggests that this principle has 
been borne in mind also in fixing the rates in the lower levels of 
semi-skilled work between which and those for unskilled work there 
is too wide a gap. Where wages are based upon European standards 
of I ife race prejudice favours the European, to the practical exclu-
sion of the native, from the performance of operations fcr which he 
has aptitude and ability .... The gap between wages for the unskilled 
and semi-skilled work coup led with race bias keeps the detribalised 
native from the opportunity of earning a wage which is essential to 
the normal needs of himself and his family and may also be uneconomi-
cal in unnecessarily increasing the cost of production. 47 
Regardless of cost, the state used the public and civil service extensively 
to rel ieve the position of the poor whites and, according to the Carnegie Commis-
sion, with considerable success. As a writer on 'European labour on the SAR & H' 
wrote with pride: 
In the South African Railways since 1925 - as in several of our 
bigger mun icipal ities - an interesting development has recently 
taken place in the way of providing regular work for whites, not 
merely a temporary job for unemployed men. 
The present pol icy of Our railways deserves particular attention, 
for it not merely aims at using the unskilled white man to replace 
the native, but is an attempt to create a new labour organisation 
which shall make more effective use of the character and qualities 
of the European, offering opportun ities to the more ambitious and 
efficient men to advance to the higher 'graded posts'. 48 
The increased jobs on the railways provided for unskilled white workers after 1924 
are clearly indicated in the following table: 
46 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of S H Frankel and E Brookes 
47 NEC 1930-1932, typescr ipt evidence of Major S H Cooke, Director of 
Native Labour and Chief NC, Witwatersrand 
48 SA Railways & Harbours, Special bulletin 135, 'European labour an the 
SAR & H', Apri l 1929, quoted in Carnegie Commission, port 1, p 195 
Table 7.3 WHITE LABOURERS ON THE RAILWAYS 49 
No . on com- No. on con-
-::l Year ple ted lines struction 
1924 3083 1 667 4760 
1925 7557 3193 10750 
1926 10 161 
I 
3 126 13287 
I 
1927 11 228 3624 14870 I 
1928 11 997 I 3901 15878 
1929 12906 I 2912 15818 
1930 12501 1 862 14363 
1931 12247 2304 14551 
Wil cocks in his report stated tha t mcst of the new empl oyees on the rail-
ways were from the poor white class and In h;s v iew 
No othe r measure specially des igned to cope practically with the 
poor wh ite problem is comparable in extent with that carried ou t 
on the railways. 50 
The phenomena l percentoge increase of whites on the railways especiall y during 
the depression confirms this. In 1924 only 9.5 per cent of ra ilway emp loyees were 
white. By 1928 the percentage had increased to 28.7; bare ly two yea rs later the 
number had shot up .a further 11 per cent, to 39.3. The corresponding decrease in 
the employmen t of Africans and Indians is instructive in that it shows how the stote 
was able to enforce its 'civilised labour' policy for whites and coloureds in sta te-
run institutions . The following table shows how this was done at the expense of 
other groups : 
Table 7 . 4 LABOURERS ON SAR 8, H IN SELECTED YEARS 
Year % whites % Africans % Indians % coloureds 
1924 9.5 i 75.0 I 4.2 11.3 1925 19.7 I 66.4 3.7 I 10. 2 i 
I 1929 28.7 I 55.9 I 1.8 13.6 1933 39 .3 48.9 i 1.5 10.3 
i 1936 28.9 57.8 I 0.8 11. 3 
49 Carnegie Commission, part 2, p 79 quoted by Lewis, p 79 
50 Ca rnegie Commission, port 2, p 79 
51 
51 W K Hancoc k, Survey of British commonwealth affairs, v 11, pa rt 2, p 52. 
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The fu ll table on which the above is based appears in Report of the Commiss ion 
of Enqu iry Regarding the Cape Coloured Popula t ion of the Union , UG 54-37, 
P 44 . Note how coloured employment increased until the depression took its 
tol l. 
The civil service also reported a fair measure of success. For example, 
the police and defence force recruited 6469 young men from the fanns, 65 per 
cent of whom were 'Dutch-speaking'. On municipal employment, Grosskopf said: 
During recent years the State has given much attention to finding 
work for unemployed men in the various municipalities, often paying 
one-half of the difference between the ruling pay for natives and 
the higher rate for Europeans. In the case of 'semi-fit' (old or 
sickly) Europeans the Department of Labour end the Provincial 
Administration have, for instance, each contributed 1s a day, if 
municipalities were willing to offer 3s; but many towns found even 
this too much . 52 
Many more had jobs as overseers, while on the tramways the municipalities were 
opening up job opportunities 'for the more intelligent labourers at much better 
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rates of pay'. Rates of pay generally were at 'civilised' rates detennined by the 
Wage Boord . Overseers, for instance, were paid anything from £6.5 . 0d to £6.9.6d 
a week, while the Johannesburg Municipality reported 'white labourers cost the 
city nearly £90 000 per annum more than native labourers ' to do the same work. 
This, they added, was paid without 'considering the quality of work' . 53 
The same measure of success was not recorded during the depression 
despite a concerted effort on the government's part. 
Owing to the policy of paying whites a 'civilised wage', public works 
undertaken jointly by the Unemployment Committee and the Department of Labour 
were at high capital cost, with the result that the scope of projects suitable for 
poor rei ief was limited. 54 Another reason why work was not available for poor 
whites was that local municipal councils refused the poor whites anything but 
maintenance work in their areas . They argued that local taxpayers were already 
having to bear the extra cost of the government's 'civilised labour' policy. 55 So 
poor rei ief works on a major scale were programmed for provincial and national 
56 projects only, and were funded by the government. Also, the Unemployment 
Committee insisted that any state assistance to the thousands made jobless by the 
52 Carnegie Commission, part 1, pp 196-1 97 
53 Ibid 
54 See UG 30-32, paras 87-89. The Carnegie commissioners also commented on 
this. They recorded that the Witwatersrand had become the 'Mecca of all 
unemployed in South Africa', and tell how the stote in an attempt to divert 
the stream of unemployed away from the major towns embarked on a pol icy of 
recruiting men for the railways, afforestation and irriga tion works, but as for 
as poss ible in the rural areas only. See Carnegie Commission, part 1, p 185. 
55 Carnegie Commission, part 2, chap viii, and port 5, chap iv 
56 UG 30-32, poras 43-50; Carnegie Commission, part 5, pp 77- 89 
depression should be considered quite seporately from ossistonce meted out to the 
habitually unemployed poor whites: 
The problem in most of the rural areas is not so much periodic or 
cycl ical unemployment as it is permanent under-employment Or lack 
of employment, and that the earnings of the rural unskilled workers 
are generally below what is required for healthy subsistence. 51 
They continued: 
Relief works have been resorted to during severe depressions as 0 
means of allev iating privation arising from unemployment, but they 
are not a cure for under-employment. 58 
In other words they endorsed the view that in the use of publ ic funds a 
clear distinction should be made between relief work and poor relief work. The 
latter was not the responsibility of private enterprise - the state could becane 
involved to a limited extent - but ongoing relief should be left to charitoble 
institutions on the whole. The Camegie commissioners disagreed with this point 
of view in some respects . 59 The problem, they said, had to be tockled on a 
national scale, and they recommended the estob l ishment of a seporate Department 
of Social Welfare to undertoke the job. 
The increased cost to the stote may not have been an issue prior to the 
depression, but it certoinly was for private enterprise. Nevertheless the stote 
was involved: to correct the mony problems, blamed largely on the poor whites' 
African counterparts, the govemment resorted to artificial devices to uplift and 
protect the interests of the poor white class. In addition to land grants, costly 
land settlements and rei ief projects to solve the distress of the rural poor whites,60 
the govemment tried to provide work for the urban poor thus: 
51 UG 30-32, para 49 
58 Ibid, para 51 
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59 The argument wos that the 'civilised labour' policy was a psychological neces-
sity in the rehabilito tion of poor whites. Wilcocks especially believed this 
policy was the best mea ns whereby poar whites would overcome their prejudice 
against manual work. See Camegie Commission, part 2, pp 170-176 possim. 
The Camegie commissioners did , however, express important reservations on 
the 'civilised labour' policy as a permanent solution. They believed that the 
'policy of protection by reservation of work for the European should be treated 
as merely a measure of transition for a period during which the Poor White is 
given the opportunity to adopt himself to new conditions in South Africo.' 
Joint report of the Carnegie Commission, pora 68. 
60 UG 30-32, paras 43-50; Comegie Commission, part 5, pp 77-89 
(1) substituting Whi tes for Non- Europeons in Govemment departments 
at increased wages; (2) influencing municipalities to employ Whites 
at work ordinarily done by Nat ives and to undertake new publ ic works 
for them by the granting of subs idies to make possible the increase in 
wage scales; (3) extending preferen tia l t reatment in awarding public 
contracts to employers who would guaran tee al l-White employment; 
(4) threaten ing to relax protec tive customs duties unless employers in 
those protected industr ies employed a certain percentage of European 
workers; and (5) by ' the powers of the Min ister of Labour being used 
to establish a quota of European labourers in relationship to the non-
European unskilled worker' • 61 
So the 'civil ised labour' po licy cou ld be judic iously applied by refusing 
'ff' d 62 d ' . . I b-ton protection, government ten ers, contracts an inCentives, vita to su 
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economic industries and new factories , unless they guaranteed what the government 
came to regard as 'satisfactory' labour relations. The gradual evolution of this 
pol icy Lewis describes thus: 
The Civilised Labour policy wa s .•. extended into private enterprise 
through pressure from the Department of Labour and the operation of 
wage determinations. In impos ing the Civilised Labour policy on 
private enterprise the Deportment of Labour used moral persuasion as 
a first expedient. When econom ic conditions were bad the Depart-
ment urged firms to take on more ' civi lised labourers' and when 
economic conditions were good it emphasised the fortunate opportu-
nity for doing just the same. Thus the Department's pol icy remained 
constant. When morol persuasion failed threots could be resorted to, 
on uncoaperotive firm could be threatened with exclusion from the 
61 Report of the Woge Boord 1926-1929, poro 57. The references that follow 
refer to the numbered sections in the quotation: (1) F W Lucas, ibid. In 
only one case hod the Minister requested the Wage Boord to recommend a 
wage for unskilled labour on other than a civil ised basis for on urban area -
Bloemfontein 1928 - 3/6 per day or 20/- per week; NEC report: 'In August 
Kroonstad requested a Wage Board hearing hoping at least to obtoin a wage 
determination on the basis of the Bloemfontein gront, this was turned down 
and not referred back to the Wage Boord by the Minister of Labour' - which 
had to be dane before further negotiations were possible. Para 1 034. (2) & 
(3) Van der Horst, 'Some effects of industrial legislation on the market for 
native labour in South Africa', SA Journa l of Economics, v 3, 4, 1935, 
p 494. (4) M Kooy & H M Robertson, 'The South African customs tariff 
and development of Sout h Africon indust ry ' , SA Journal of Economics, 
fvlarch 1967, p 214. (5) Ib id. This was commonly referred to as a com-
pany having establ ished 'sa t isfactory labour relations'. Kooy & Robertson 
also show how the Customs and Tariff Ac t 1925 had as its stated objective 
the creation of 0 diversified economy to prov ide employment for destitute 
poor whites. The es tablishment of !scor in 1928 was to serve the same 
purpose: it provided 'protec ted'employment for poor whites at 'civilised 
rates of pay'. 
62 Kooy & Robertson 
Union Tender Board or the list of approved tenderers for the Railways 
and Harbours. After 1925, when the Government adopted a policy 
of tariff protection, an industry could be refused protection against 
imported goods if it failed to maintain a satisfactary ratio between 
'civilised' and 'uncivilised' workers. 63 
Expensive white labour : employer resistance 
There is evidence to suggest that employers in industry and trade, far 
from allaying the fears of white workers, were confirming them. Apart from not 
increasing African wages64 and so making it far harder for poor whites ta find jobs 
for better pay, many secondary industrialists were beginning to find by the 1930s 
that they also could not afford the high price involved in implementing the govern-
ment's 'white labour' policy which applied in the main to skilled white workers. 
They had tried, and effectively, to evade industrial agreements and wage board 
determinations by using loopholes in the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act. A 
variety of circumstances helped them, not least the economic depression. 
In September 1931 Britain left the Gold Standard. Hertzog's refusal to 
fo llow suit plunged secondary industry into the doldrums. 65 With the flight of 
cop ital from South Africa credit become short, interest rates were increased, and 
66 
ma ny sub-economic industries were found to be severely undercapitalised. 
Unable as many were to get enough capital to keep going, firms began exploring 
how to balance or cut their costs. The wage bill was a good target. With the 
crisis, firms had to struggle along on their own without government assistance 
because the state itself could not afford to offer the incentives that had been 
available in the more prosperous years. Possibly all this together led employers 
to seize the option of retrenching whites and replacing them with Africans at 
considerably reduced wages. 
The government's response to employer resistance and evasion of industrial 
agreements was to be an immediate one. They were not prepared ta tolerate a 
break with establ ished practice by allowing Africans to advance if it meant whites 
were kept out. 
63 Lewis, p 81 
64 See letter to ICU of Africa from Chamber of Commerce and Industry, p 274 
below; UG 14-26. 
65 For refe rences see above, n 6. 1 and n 6 . 6 . 
66 See J C du Plessis, Economic fluctuations in South Africa 1910-1949, p 50. 
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In 1930 the government passed a series of amending Acts to redress the 
position. These fell into two categories . Some were directed against employers 
who hod tried to substitute cheap African labour for white, while others were 
del iberate devices to check African advance . As Lucas explained: 
One result, prior to the amending Act of 1930, of the limitotion of 
the Industrial Concil iation Act to non-Natives was the dismissal in 
a number of trades, notably the baking and furniture trades, of Euro-
peans whose wages were regu lated by on Industrial Council agreement, 
and the substitution for them of Natives whose wages were not so 
reguloted. [67] To remedy this stote of affairs, the Wage Boord was 
requested by the Minister to make recommendations for wages and 
other conditions of labour of employees in those trades who were not 
governed by the Industrial Council Agreements, that is, for Natives. 
This procedure, however, was often not satisfactory, because the 
Wage Boord [68J could not always see eye to eye with the Industrial 
Council and also it was unsatisfactory to hove two wage regulating 
instruments appl icable to one trade. 69 
As a result the Industrial Conci l iation Act was amended so that industrial 
agreements that formerly appl ied only to whites could be extended to include 
Africans even though the latter were excluded from the bargaining process 
altogether. 
The Wage Act also was amended in 1930. Thereafter only whites 
qualified for 'civilised' pay, and the gop between unskilled white and African 
labour widened. In evidence before the NEC, W G Bollinger showed how stote 
67 Industrial Concil iation Act 11 of 1924, as amended by Act 24 of 1930. 
Africans were brought under this Act in a way prejudicial to their interests -
see UG 22-32, para 300. Under the 1924 Act employees - which included 
Africans whose contract of service or labour was regulated by the Native 
Labour Regulation Act, or by the 1923 Urban Areas Act - were excluded 
from the benefits of Industrial Agreements. Employers could therefore evade 
the terms of on Industrial Agreement by employing Africans at cheaper rates. 
These were the primary reasons for this Amendment, for after 1930 the terms 
of on Agreement could be extended to Africans as well. It should be noted 
that the Apprenticeship Act 26 of 1922 was amended by Act 15 of 1924 and 
Act 22 of 1930 too - see H M Robertson, 'Native unemployment', address to 
the 5th Notional European-Bantu Conference, Bloemfontein, 1933: Report 
of Conference, p 114. Trade union representatrves, Robertson shows, were in 
a position to force employers to reconsider decisions where they hod been 
willing to accept African apprentices. Apprentices in terms of the Act could 
also be required to attend technical colleges to which Africans would be 
refused admission. 
68 Wage Act 27 of 1925, amended by Act 23 of 1930. See below p 283. 
This Act also falls into the second category, of measures to check African 
advance . 
69 UG 22-32, para A 301 
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intervention led to the fixing of wage stondards that automatically excluded 
Africans from both skilled and unskilled employment, while placing enormous 
strains on African entrepeneurs: 
A t present the Native, not without cause, regards the Wage Board 
Act as a Co lour Bar and most certainly in its operation the Ac t has 
fixed wages impossible of attoinment for Natives under existing 
cond itions. The effect of Wage Boord Determination has either 
been to exc lude Natives and Coloureds from industries or to make 
industries or trade predominantly Native, Coloured or European. 
The most recent example is that of the Determ ination for assistonts 
engaged in the Native Trade on the Witwatersrand, wh ich defines 
a rate of wages for certoin employment, such as floor sweepers and 
errand boys engaged in the Native Trade, that is approximately 
350% higher than for similar employment in European shops in the 
recogn ised shopping centres. Native store-keepers contend that 
the determination for the Native Trade on the Witwatersrand is an 
attempt to force them cut of business. 70 
The 1925 Wage Act a lso reinforced the'civilised labour' policy. The way this was 
done was ou tline d to the NEC by Ballinger. The ICU of Africa,7l he wrote, had 
been thwarted in their attempt 'to use the concil ia tion machinery to redress their 
grievances ', and it was not the board that stood in their way but the government. 
He recounted the Kroonstad incident as an example : 
An appl ication was made to the Wage Boord by the ICU for the 
hearing of a demand for £7 .10. O. minimum wage, for certoin classes 
of Kroonstad workers. The Wage Board granted the reques t for a 
hearing. The application was heard in August 1929. Up to the 
present [1931J no determination has been given because the Wage 
Board cou ld not recommend 'a civilised wage'. This decision was 
not unexpected but it was thought that the Minister of Labour would 
refer the matter back to the Wage Board for a determination similar 
to the agreed Bloemfontein Native minimum of 3}. per day. I 
understand that the Minister for Labour's Cabinet colleagues were 
not in favour of referring the matter back to the Wage Board. This 
action of the Cabinet has rendered appeals for a constitutional 
approach to the adjustment of Native grievances futil e . 72 
Lucas, as chairman of the Wage Boord, confirmed this. 73 He was also 
able to show that the Act set wages at rates that would drive employers to use 
70 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of W G Ballinger, adviser to the ICU, 
who also mentioned in his evidence that he was 1930-1 931 ICU delegate to 
the Non-European Conference, and that he assisted unregistered African 
trade unions in making representations to the Wage Boord. 
71 One of the branches reconstituted after the demise of the ICU 
72 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of W G Ballinger 
73 F W Lucas, 'Natives and the Wage Act', Report of the National Eurapean-
Bantu Conference, 6-9 February 1929, pp 119-129; and UG 22-32, pa ra 
A 319 
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whites instead of Africans. Whites after all were not only free of all constraints 
controlling African lobour, he soid, but since they were not liable to eviction 
from town they were considered a safer group to train in a iob.74 
Conservative trade unionism undermined by the sta te 
It was not only the employers and the Africans who were charged with 
harming the poor whites, however. The governme nt also accused the skilled white 
workers. In the first place, increasing trade union autonomy hod given the skilled 
white workers an almost monopolistic bargaining position. The ir scarcity value in 
a country where skilled manpower was at a premium enabled them to secure for 
themselves the top 5 per cent of the wages paid ta the labouring class, as the 
d• f d··b · h 75 lagram 0 wage Istrl utlon sows. 
A lso, apprenticeship boards in their bid to exc lude Africans from skilled 
and semi-skilled trades had, as it turned out, excl uded the ex-rural poor whites 
as well. Grosskopf exponded on these pracrices in his report: 
The actual ci rcumstances in our country must be considered - in the 
first place, that our production (whethe r we think it beneficial or 
not) is largely based upon unskilled native labour; in the second 
place, that many of the rural whites drifting ta the towns simply do 
not get the opportunity of becoming efficient workers - although 
many of them could be profitably employed in our industrial system 
- and are therefore only el igible for the unskilled tasks now usually 
performed by natives. But few employers would like ta let white 
men work among their black labourers; most of them would not 
accept a white man who offered ta work with Kaffirs. 
It must be admitted that not only organised labour, but a large 
proportion of the employers as well, cl ing to the narraw Trade 
Union tradition •... An employer of this type, a man that gave much 
of his time to duties on the Juvenile Affairs Board and Apprenticeship 
Committee, admitted that personal influence counted for a great 
deal in getting a boy apprenticed. Consequently the son of a poor 
man from the country, even if he is alert and intelligent, is handi-
capped. 76 
He gave the example of the South African metal industry where iobbing work 
still predominated because firms insisted on keeping their workshop character. 
Here he remarked thot conservatism was reflected in the un ion opposing the so-
called ' splitting up of trades' - the process of deskilling. 
74 UG 22-32, paras A 300-306 
75 See above, table 7.2 on p 261. 
76 Carnegie Commission, part 1, p 209 
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The govemment on the other hand supported the deskilling of certain 
trades only where this allowed the poor whites greater employment opportunities, 
This had already happened in the public sector, as Grosskopf explained: 
It is certainly a striking fact, that in recent years very marked 
progress has taken place - apart from protection - in those industries 
in which there are no troublesome appren ticeship regulations. Obviously 
this is one reason why the doughters of poor people from farms are 
beginning to occupy an important position in our factories; for on 
the whole there are not the ordinary apprenticesh ip regulations for 
female workers ..•• 
The present system on the railways shows how not only aid can be 
rendered, but useful workers can gradually be obtained from apparently 
unpromising material. Private industries also - without charity being 
expected from them - could certain ly often modify their labour 
organisation; this would benefit both employer and worker. Under 
the existing South African conditions a bigger class of semi-skilled 
factory workers is particularly needed. 77 
Despite govemment efforts, resistance by the unions increased especially 
wi th the onset of the depression and its threat of unemployment. By for the easiest 
and most profitable course for employers in hard times was for them to restructure 
the ir labour force by downgrading sk ill ed jobs along the lines already set in the 
public sector. There was a difference in the two practices, though: private 
enterprise embarked on this course so as to fill posts with semi-skilled Africans at 
the cheaper rate, whereas the state used the opportunity to create jobs for poor 
whites. The stage was set for the skilled white workers to demand guarantees on 
two counts: from the govemment that deskilling of jobs in the public sector would 
not undermine their position further; and legislation that would prevent employers 
from exploiting cheap black labour ot their expense. 
This attempt by skilled white labour to prevent the downgrading of 
certain jobs in the face of greater mechanisation and mass production is not unique 
to the South African trade unions. But the South African case was a spECial one 
in that the security of labour was being undermined not only by capital but also 
by the stote's attempts at, and increasing success in, dictating to the trade unions. 
State interference in the public sec tor had already led to the elimination of some 
of the old divisions between skilled and unskilled jobs, and in this way more jobs 
had been made available to poor whites. But in the public sector the govemment 
was the employer and it was possible to downgrode jobs without opening them to 
Africans. 
77 Carnegie Commission, part I, p 210. As with Africans, women did not 
fall under Industrial Agreements and they were therefore exploitable. For an 
excellent analysis of the ultro-exploitability of women, see J Cock, 'Domestic 
workers : A study in exploitation ' , unpub BA (Hons) essay, Rhodes University, 
1977. 
271 
272 
Without resorting to ortificial devices and pressures they could not guaran-
tee jobs for poor whites in the private sector, however. Hence their strategy of 
preventing the deskilling of jobs to thwart the entry of Africons into certain jobs 
ond their refusal to support deskilling where poor whites would suffer. In short, 
the problem for the government in the 1930s was how to keep the Africans down 
and yet relieve their paor white counterparts without at the same time alienating 
the skilled white workers . The genera l thrust of the secondary strategy of Amend-
ments in 1930 suggests how this was achieved . 
Greater state control 
All the industrial amending Acts passed by the government in 1930
78 
had two common features. On the one hand they gave the Minister of Labour 
greater control over labour SO that he gained even greater leverage over the 
employment conditions and opportunities for unskilled white workers; while on 
the other hand, the Acts put further obstacles in the way of African odvance?9 
By these Amendments the government hoped to foil employer attempts to substitute 
Africans for whites in the unskil led sector and at the same time they could force 
the unions to open their ranks to poor whites - for instance, jobs were to be down-
graded or entrance qualifications to certain trades modified and redefined to admit 
white apprentices who had been unable to qualify before. The comprehensive 
noture ond increasing power over labour vested in the Min ister under these Amend-
ments was summed up by R Stuttaford, MP for Newlands, thus: 
the hon. Minister of Lobour ••. is seeking autocratic power to deal 
with all trades and occupations. In order that nothing may be missed 
he is changing the definition of a trade to cover every occupation 
without reference to Pari iament or anyone else . ... 80 
The other Bills drew similar criticisms where it was clear that the government 
intended getting greater control over industrial conditions. 
The state's response here alienated many skilled workers even further. 
Earlier attempts by the government to uplift the poor whites had brought the state 
increasingly inta conflict with the ski lled workers, especially those represented 
78 See n 7.67 
79 See W G Ballinger, Race ond econom ics in South Africa; A J Haile, 'The 
problem of crafts and industries in native life', SA Outlook, 1 July 1936, 
pp 150-153; and 5 T van der Horst, 'Native labour and wages', Race 
Relations, 4, 3 August 1937, pp 66-70. --
80 House of Assembly Debates, 26 February 1930, col 1239 
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by the Councill ites. 81 This group under Madeley hod broken away from the 
Creswellite faction and opposed the Notional Party in the election of 1929. 
Creswell and his followe rs hod remained loyal to Hertzog . 82 By 1931 Made ley's 
faction hod become so disenchanted with the govemment's 'civilised labour' policy 
and the dictatorial powers assumed by the gove mment under the three 1930.Amend-
ment Acts, that in 1931 the SA Labour Party was reconstituted in distinct oppos ition 
to both Hertzog and Creswell ~3This was to have adverse repercussions for the 
Notional Party, causing them to lose or reduce the ir majorities in several by-
elections during 1932. The loss of the Counci llite support was also on importan t 
factor in the move towards coalit ion in 1933. 
Some apprenticesh ip boards and trade unions began to actively support 
capitol in on attempt to prevent state interference in the deskilling and cheapening 
of certo in jobs. As Lucas revea I ed : 
It has already happened on a number of occasions thot the employers 
and the we II po id European employees have agreed, in retu rn for 
concess ions to these employees, to sacrifice the interests of the 
unorganised and poorly paid employees, irrespective of race. When 
it is remembered that generally on the industrial councils the 
'emp loyees " representatives come from the well paid section of the 
employees, it is easy to understand that, by some further concess ions 
to them, the employers may secure the ir assistance to oppose conces-
sions to those really in need of protection, whatever their race, 
colour, or sex. 84 
How did these events affect the poor whites and the ir African counterparts? 
Poor wh ites and poor blacks 
In some sectors as a result of the govemment's 'civilised labour' policy 
a high proportion of white labour on the lower grades came to be paid according 
to the cost of a so-ca lled 'civilised' or 'white' standard of living. This not only 
gave the untrained whites an advantage over the untrained Africans in a growing 
field of employmen t, but also created a socia l distance and economic instability 
among Africans, making it almost imposs ible for them to gain a skill, or for those 
who ga ined it, to exercise it. The notable effect such a policy was having on 
'keeping the native in his place' was described by Archdeacon Hill to the NEC. 
Lucas then remarked : 
81 See lntroduction. 
82 Ibid 
83 See Roux, p 183 ff. 
84 UG 22-32, para A 307 
Are there any other factors which might account for the change 
which you mention in regard to your trade institutions and transfer 
after Stondard VI to a trade institution? This is a very important 
statement that you make here. You say here: ' The operation or 
threatened opera tion of the Colour Bar and Wages .Act: Though the 
Act itself contains no Colour Bar, it makes it impossible for Native 
boys to undertake skilled work in trades covered by Apprenticeship 
Committees which will not apprentice Natives. These two Ac ts 
considerab ly militate against Natives taking up trades. Their future 
is so uncertain that boys in schools nowadays rarely look to those 
for their future work, and so do not seek to go to trade schools . We 
have hod a secondary school for 10 years, and no boy has sought a 
transfer after comp leting Standard VI to any of our trade institutions. 
Before these Acts came into operation, there were boys in the lower 
standards looking in this direcTion, but since the advent of these 
Acts, it has not been so.' Do you suggest that that Act, the Colour 
Bar Act, and that pol icy, account for this or may there be some 
other explanation as well? 
Archdeacon Hill No, we say that the Act has given the Native the 
impression that it is no good for him to learn a trade because he 
cannot find employment, he cannot make anything ou t of it after-
wards, and the effect has been that our schools which catered for 
boys who were looking to learn a trade are empty as boys are no 
longer interested in learning Q trade. They are looking to pass JC 
and go to Fort Hare or to become teachers. The opening up of trades 
seems to be closed to them now . 85 
Employers were also responsible for this state of affairs. Many found it 
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was in their interests to support the state's call to implement the 'civilised labour' 
pol icy. They would then be indemnified by state protection, subsidies and so on 
against ony loss incurred in having to pay higher wages to whites. Yet the evidence 
we have also suggests that commerce and industry were happy ta let the state take 
the lead in setting the level of African wages. A good example here is an exchange 
between the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and the ICU who first wrote 
complaining that commerce and industry had foiled to raise wages despite the 
increased cost of I iving. They stated their case in a letter dated 27 November 
1929, and these are some of the points they raised: 
In view of the African Native unrest which we contend is all centred 
on the low wages paid by industries and Commercial undertakings all 
over the Union . We respectfully suggest that the Chambers of Industry 
and Commerce convene a meeting to discuss:-
(1) An agreed minimum wage for all African adult workers. 
ie Those over 18 years of age. 
(0) The Min imum to be based on figures given in Budgets 
supplied by the Joint Council' s I.C.U . of Africa and other 
Native Organisat ions . 
(b) A Committee to be appointed and report on Minimum for 
85 NEC 1930-1932, ora l evidence of representatives of the Church of the 
Province, 11 May 1931 
all African workers of the ages 14 and under; 14 to 15 years; 
15-16 years; 16-17 years; 17-18 years • • •. 
(2) living conditions. 
(a) Travelling long distances to places of employment and/or 
inadequate transport fac iI ities. 
(b) Clearance of areas and no provision for evicted peoples ••. . 
We would appreciate an early reply. 86 
In their reply dated 24 January 1930, the Chamber showed they knew very well 
the problems faced by the African workers, but wrote that they were not in a 
position to institute wage reforms ahead of the government. They then stated 
their case: 
Your letter dated 17th November, suggesting that the Johannesburg 
Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Industries should convene 
a meeting in Johannesburg to discuss the question of native wages, 
hours of employment, living conditions, etc etc., has been carefully 
considered by the Joint Committees of these Chambers. 
We are instructed to say that each of these Chambers is of opinion 
that no good purpose would be served by meeting your Association to 
discuss these questions, as ne ither Chamber has the power to bind its 
members. There are also a large number of traders and manufacturers 
who are not members of either of these organisations. 
The members of these Chambers are not unmindful of the difficult 
position in which de-tribalised married natives with famil ies living 
in the towns, or in the locations contiguous thereto, are placed as 
regards the remunera tion they are able to obtain in relation to their 
cost of I iving. These natives have to compete in the labour market 
with natives coming to town from native areas, who are employed 
in one form or other of commerce or industry at rates of wages which 
are sufficient to enable them to save a considerable portion to remit 
to their home or to take with them on their return after working 12 
or 15 months. 
There appears to be no good reason for raising the wages of natives 
I iving under tribal condi tions and who come into the labour market 
at intervals. If it were done, it is possible that, as they would be 
able to save as much money as they do at present by working for a 
shorter period, it wauld have the practical effect of reducing the 
supply of unski lled labour without material advantoge to anyone. 87 
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There was no reason why secondary industry should await state intervention 
except poss ibly that it would then be eas ier to blame their own continued exploita-
tion of African labour on the government. As early as 1925 the EWC had recommend-
ed action to prevent the continued exploitation of permanent town workers: 
86 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence, copy of letters exchanged between 
the ICU of Africa and the Johannesburg Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
submitted by W G Ba llinger 
87 Ibid 
the Native wha comes from a reserve is not in the some condition of 
complete dependence on his wages that is the normal condition of 
the wage eamer ••.. Security against exploitation - using that word 
to mean payment at a lower rate than the industry could reasonably 
afford ta pay and still continue to work at a profit - is in the case 
of the great majority of Native wage-eamers, therefore, ma inly a 
question of the adequacy of the Native reserves and locations. The 
urbanised Native, on the other hand, who has lost all connection 
with his pastaral origin and become de tribalised, is in the same 
position as the White wage-eamer. He finds the cost of living high, 
since he has to conform to urban requirements as to housing, clothing 
and transport and to pay urban prices for food; while the level of 
wages he is likely to receive is kept down in the neighbourhood of 
the standord set by Natives from reserves, I iving in compounds and 
working to supplement their agricultural livelihood. 88 
The NEe made the same points in their report, but just as long as commerce and 
industry benefited from the migrant labour system in the form of cheap lobour the 
proletarianised African workers had no security against exploitation. 
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As a result the state was also faced with a dilemma. The primary sectors 
demanded urban African wages be kept repressed so as to prevent inter-sector 
competition. If the state wanted commerce and industry to cooperate in protecting 
the privileged position of white workers, African wages would have to be kept at 
their lowest level. But at this repressed level, Africans had an advantage over 
the poor whites in the labour market. A cheap labour policy was therefore dis-
advantageous to the very group the state was trying to assist. Employer resistance 
and conservative trade unionism thus sabotaged the state's efforts to uplift the poor 
white class. The hardship of the times accentuated this. Employers began to 
focus on the wasteful expense involved in complying with state pol icy. Pari ia-
mentarians and commerce and industry became more critical and outspoken against 
govemment policy as a result. So did the skilled white workers on certain aspects 
of govemment policy. 
The skilled white workers, after being favoured by Hertzog's earlier 
industrial policy, had come to expect and demand state protection. In fact, 
economic and social developments in industrial relations had become so grounded 
in the expectation that white labour, by the mere virtue of its racial character, 
should command the high retums and so maintain a 'white' standard of I iving, that 
both skilled workers and employers (for different reasons) expected the govemment 
to assist in maintaining a plentiful labour force, simple in its needs and therefore 
cheap. What the poor whites were experienc ing therefore WOs a strong stand by 
the skilled white workers and capital in collusion with each other. While the 
88 UG 14-26, pora 57, and UG 22-32, paras 551-564 
skilled labaurer faught ta prevent bath Africans and paar whites fram encroaching 
on their position, cap ital was willing to protect the skilled whites' position just 
as long as unsk illed labour remained cheap. In South African terms cheap labour 
was A frican labour. 
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It appears also that the depression and the accelerated influx of both 
Africans and wh ites ta the town, with inevitable social and ecanomic results for 
both, confounded the situation and pointed up the failure of government policy. 
This failure moreover underlined a paradox inherent in government palicy. The 
very res trictions imposed to prevent the Africans' advance had actually enhanced 
their opportunity, and in so doing inadvertently made it easier for them to get more 
jobs than the poor whites. How was this? 
The government saw clearly that the success of their policy to upgrade 
poor whites and protect the interests of white workers generally, depended in the 
last resort on their being able to go on having an adequate supply of African 
labourers for secondary industrial ists a t the cheapest rate. This latter condition 
was being demanded by private enterprise before they would join in an expensive 
labour pol icy. Thus it was that the demand for the cheap labour ousted the poor 
white and the need for industrial coopera tion in implementing an expensive white 
labour pol icy forced the government ta ensure that cheap African labour was not 
in short supply. 
Thus the poor whites, who were supposed to benefit from a policy designed 
to check African advance and ensure that Africans stayed unskilled and therefore 
cheap, found that suc h a policy merely intensified competition between themselves 
and the Africans in the already over-supplied unskilled sector. The anomalous 
position the poor whites found themselves in is highlighted in the following 
exchange : 
Mr Lucas Now, in what way should this Commission answer the 
views of those White people who say that the Native, by being 
given freedom to do certain work, will oust the Eu ropeans? •• 
Take one of the least skilled occupations, say driving a trolley or 
motor lorry, the Native taday is will ing to take a lower wage than 
the European, and, because of that, in a number of instances, gets 
the job? 
Dr Seme Yes. 
Lucas Is there any other reason except the low wage that gives the 
Native that job? 
Seme Yes. The Native, I think, is a better driver of the lorry ... 
he will do more of the work of a driver than a White man will; the 
Whi te man will require a boy to assist him, whereas the Native 
driver alone will do all that is necessary; he will do the loadin g 
and offlooding and a ll thot; he will not ask for so many petty 
considera tions . 
278 
Lucas Well, does not thot perhaps give some support to the argument 
of those Europeans who urge that the Native will oust the White man? 
Seme Sir, that condition only can exist if the present attitude of 
discrimina ting legislation is enforced; but if it is removed, the White 
man wi II compete in the open labour market and take up any job that 
is willing to pay him; there wi ll be no compulsion to keep him on 
high pay while working on a low job, such as a porter at the Railway 
Stotion . 
Lucas Toke the job we were talking abou t •.• lorry driving; you 
say that the Native will be preferred, because he will do more of 
the necessary jobs than the White man wi ll do? 
Seme Yes, that is what I soy. 
Lucas Now, is the answer not then that the Whi te man must learn 
to do those accessory jobs or be will ing to do them in the same way 
as a Na tive would? 
Seme My experience is that the White driver wants more; he will 
want a boy to wa ter his horse and so on. 
Lucas The remedy lies in the hands of the White man being will ing 
to do those additiona l jobs in the way the Native does them? 
Seme No, sir, not altogether . What I mean is, it lies with the 
employer .. . the emp loyer should be free to engage whoeve r is 
efficient for his services, irrespective of colour. 
Lucas It is a very importont factor in South Africa today, that fear 
of the White man be ing ousted from certain occupations. We hove 
got to face that fact. . .. 89 
Grosskopf confirmed Seme's exp lanation : 
Among the very poorest, who cannot exist without help , one still 
finds that they often think it necessary to hove a little native servant. 
On the Labour Settlement at Losperfontein it was in some ways a 
problem how to prevent this. In various ports of the country reliable 
persons mentioned instances of poor men who hod come almost beg-
ging for work (like planting trees, trimming a hedge, wh ite-washing 
walls), and who, when given a job, subsequently appeared accom-
panied by a Kaffir whom they in their turn had hired to do the work. 
Perhaps they fel t themselves to be, in a way, contractors who had 
to execute the job with their workmen. 90 
89 NEC 1930-1932, ora l ev idence of Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, principal founder 
of ANC and its president, 1930-1937. Seme studied law at Jesus College, 
Oxford, and was admitted to the Bar at Middle Temp le in London, 1910. 
He returned to SA in the same year and estobl ished himself as on attorney in 
partnersh ip with Alfred Mongena . Seme launched the ANC newspaper 
Aban tu-Batho in 1912 . He was elected to the presidency by conservative 
vote in 1930, ousting the radical faction led by Gumede by a vote of 39-14. 
90 Carnegie Commission, part 1, p 176 
He went on to say how this tradition had been entrenched and encouraged by 
government policy: 
The unfortunate result is that many persons have come to feel that 
they have a right, because they are of European descent, to demand 
higher wages apart from the quality of their work. It is sti ll sadder 
that there are people who encourage them in such an attitude -
often men who wont to make use of the paor in their own interests 
or for personal honour. It is especially regrettable that men with 
ambitions for elective posts sometimes sugg<;lst irresponsible and 
impossible demands to the poorer voters. Disappointment and dis-
satisfaction usually result, or the incen tive to personal exertion and 
increased efficiency is weakened. 91 
Under these circumstonces, inevitabl y the businessman would try to 
evade the artificial restrictions introduced to coerce him to give preferential 
employment to white workers at higher wages. It is important to remember too 
that it was illegal for Africans to strike; 92 that conditions of service under the 
various Industrial Agreements excluded pass-bearing employees;93 and that wage 
scales for Africans were set at a lower rate. The reasons why Africans scored 
over the poor whites become even clearer. 
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The Africans' advantage over their poor white counterparts was of course 
only relative at such a low economic level. This the government ignored. Instead 
they argued that the Africans were in a stronger position because of their capacity 
and preparedness to accept a low wage. The rationalisation here was that most 
Africans could rely on an extra income from the reserves. Or, to recall MacMillan's 
accurate interpretation again: 'the South African idee fixe is that the Native is a 
lucky being, able to I ive on very I ittle, working only when it suits him - passing 
I ightly between town house and country seat' from their' idyll ic houses' in the 
91 Ibid, p 177 and also part 5, pp 77-78 
92 The Native Labour Regulation Act 15 of 1911 making a criminal offence of the 
breaking of what is, in common law, a civil contract, so that the party, whether 
master or servant, who commi ts a breach of the contract of service is exposed not 
only to an action for damages, but to criminal prosecution. For example, at the 
Iron & Steel Works, Pretoria, Africans asked for 6d a day on their pay. They 
were told that if they did not wan t to work they could go. They left their work, 
were arrested, charged and convic ted of breaking their labour contracts, and 
sentenced to fines of 5/- or 10 days' hard labour. The Star, 30 April 1935 
quoted by Phill ips, p 4. 
93 Industrial Concil iation Act 11 of 1924, as amended by Act 24 of 1930. 
oo'Employee" ... shall not include a person whose contract of service or labour 
is regulated by .•. the Native Labour Regulation Act, 1911, or by the Natives' 
{Urban Areas} Act, 1923.' See also J L Dube, 'Industrial organisation of the 
native people', Report of the National European-Bantu Conference, Cape Town, 
1929, pp 141-147. 
reserves .
94 The detribalised Africans, they said again, enjoyed an unfair 
advantage because their needs were 'primitive' and their standard of I ife low, so 
they were prepared to ' undercut' their poor white counterparts. In short, it was 
the A fricans who were keep ing the poor wh ite class depressed. 
Such argumen ts arose ad infinitum from witnesses throughout the two-year 
period of the NEe's investigation, and there is ample evidence that certain 
members of the comm ission accepted them. Consider this typical line of thought 
from Frankel in discussion with the chairman, Dr Holloway: 
Dr Holloway Speaking absolutely and wi thout considering the 
slightest wha t the immediate effects are, I think one woul d say tha t 
ultimately the benefits of cheaper methods of do ing the same thing 
redound to the whole commun ity - ultimately. But it may take a 
very long time . In the meantime one has to see the practical position 
that in every society where you have different layers of civilisation, 
the lower layers are continually undercutting the higher, and as a 
matter of fact in world trade it is becoming, os you know, a very 
grave problem, how to prevent the undercut-ring of the standards that 
have been held up in more civilised countries by less civilised 
countries. Ultimately of course the only remedy is a leve lling up of 
the lower c ivilisa tion to the higher civilisa tions. In the meantime 
we have to find a modus vivend i for the various layers inside the same 
country . Now the pos ition is even more complicated here than in an 
international sphere by the fact, which I think is pretty conclusive, 
that you have the European being undercu t partly by the Indian, partly 
by the Cape coloured man, partly by the detribal ised native, particu-
larly in Cape Town. The detribal ised native complains all over the 
country that he is being undercut by the tribal native and the imported 
native; and the tribal native as a matter of fact complains of the 
competit ion ins ide his own sphere by the imported native . You have 
got all these layers, and unless we can find some sort of scope for the 
various groups while thi s process of assimilation, I suppose, to the same 
level anyway, is go ing on, I don't think we have done anything to 
solve the problem which has been set th is Commission. 95 
The chairman's accoun t of how the African could 'undercut' his wh ite counterpart 
elicited a sharp rejoinder from Frankel. He refuted the assertion that Africans 
had the capac ity and were moreover prepared to accept a lower wage than whites . 
This, Frankel insisted, was one of the central economic fallacies upon which an 
avowedly disc rimina tory policy was said to be justified. The chairman found this 
explanation unaccep table and conrinued: 
Holloway Now ei ther you have to admit that natives are in a 
pos ition to resis t lower wages because they have the reserves, or you 
have to reject your argument tnat the reserves are inadequate? 
94 Iv'oc millan, Complex South Africa, p 118 
95 NEC 1930-1932, oral evidence of S H Frankel, 14 Iv'oy 1931 
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Frankel No, sir. I thought of that. The position is this: you are 
a rguing that a person who has a competency will therefore not care 
very much whether he gets relatively more or less. 
HollowaJ' I never said 'competency'. He has got something; he 
has not got a competency. I think it is admitted that the bulk of 
the natives have not got a competency in the reserves otherwise they 
would not be here? 
Franke l Therefore he has got nothing. 
Holloway No, he has got something, but it is not a competency? 
Frankel There is only a misunderstanding between us which I think 
we will agree to in a moment. The fact that he leaves the reserves 
shows tha t the reserves, to him, do not give him that stondard of life, 
or that protection from starvation, which he needs. Right. He is 
therefore forced to find other work. You argue if he goes out to get 
other work ••.• 
Dr Roberts Contributory work? 
Frankel You argue if he goes out to get other work, he will regard 
that as contributory, and he will hold out in the labour market for as 
much as possible, irrespective of the reserves? The reason he gets 
I ittle is because the pressure on the urban labour market is so extreme. 
And if he cannot get more - let me put the contrary view - if he 
cannot regard that as a contribution only, you would really be arguing 
that he is really not a competi tor who tries to make the best barga in . 
And there is no reason to assume that the native does not try tei make 
the bes t bargain. 
Holloway In actual practice, according to the evidence given before 
this Commission, the bu lk of the natives only go out when they must 
have money. 
Frankel You mean they are incapable of bargaining? 
lucas He may be quite capable of bargaining, but you cannot bargain 
o;;c;n empty stomach? 
Frankel To make my point quite definite. let us assume that there 
is a shortage of urban labour, and that there are the same conditions 
in the reserves as at the present moment, and that the shortage has 
had its natural effect and has raised wages. Would you insinuate 
that the tribal native would actually take a lower wage because he 
says, ' No, I don't need as much as that; I have got something in the 
reserves II ? 
Holloway I don't see the immediate relevancy of that. That is not 
the pos ition that arises in the Un ion. The position that arises in the 
Un ion is that, firstly, a certa in number of people who are supposed 
to make their living from tribal lands, do not do so . They come in 
and compete wi th the others who have definitely thrown in their lot 
with the urbanised population, and undercut them. I think we have 
a very large indication of that? 
Frankel You are using that word 'undercutting again. It is a mean-
ingless term, from on economic point of view. 
Lucas Wha t word would you suggest in its place? 
Frankel It is simply the fact that there is an over-supply of a parti-
cular kind of labour, or it may be commodities, which therefore are 
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sold at a cheaper price. This person undercuts because he cannot 
find work; he does not do it on an ethica l or moral plane. He does 
not want to undercut. It is not his fault; it is not because he has 
got tribal reserves that he undercuts. It is because he has not got 
sufficient tribal reserves that he undercuts. 96 
In other words the government's whi te labour pol icy had generated its 
own vicious circle . By restricting Africans in the amount of land they could own 
and through various other coercive means, they had forced Africans into the 
labour market. The success of state policy had created an over-supply of unskilled 
workers, aggravated by the various artificial means used to keep African wages 
down and the Africans themselves untrained. Once forced into a low-paid job, 
they were virtually tied there, because being an unemployed African in the white 
area was an offence and the threat of being endorsed out as an idle person was 
constant. To hold out for higher pay could even mean the · loss of a job, or not 
being able to get one in the first place. This in turn could mean being endorsed 
out of the district or being ·repatriated to the reserve. 97 
The A frican workers were therefore forced to accept whatever wage was 
offered98 - not a case of accepting lower pay in order to 'undercut' the poor 
whites. In addition, the Carnegie findings show that many poor whites themselves, 
and many politicians too, were adomant that the poor whites had an 'inherent 
right' to accept wages at 'civilised rates'. That being so, one sees more clearly 
why Africans could bargain advantageously and why the poor whites' position got 
even worse. 
The above outline suggests besides that in drafting the 1930 Industrial 
Amendments the state's concern was mainly to raise the position of the poor whites. 
This policy confl icted with skilled whi te worker interests, especially those repre-
sented at the time by Iv\adeley and the Councillites. They in turn began to oppose 
the state's 'civilised labour' policy. In consequence the poor whites were being 
ousted or kept out of employment on this front as well. 
This is how Frankel summed up the paradox inherent in the state's 
'civilised labaur' policy: 
96 Ibid 
97 See chap 8 below. 
98 See chap 8, pp 323-327. 
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The tragic irony of this stote of affairs, existing as it does to the 
very present, is that through it all the Poor White, who has suffered 
most by the pol icy adopted, actually gave, on sentimental grounds, 
his political support to the very system of production under which he 
was being driven off the land. That policy consisted in all those 
legislative and traditional restrictions for holding down the Natives 
to the inferior, untrained and ill paid level at which it was profit-
able, and practically unavoidable, that they should be substituted 
en masse for white labour. Even now the old game continues ta be 
played under a new name, and the poverty-stricken White is made 
to compete with the poverty-stricken Native in the town. 99 
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The socia-political significance of the poor white question has still to be 
explored, not least the interrelationship between poor white and poor black prob-
lems at this crucial period in the evolution of the govemment's race policy. 
However, the Cameg ie and Native Economic Commissions and writings of the time 
show unequivocally that this interrelationship was pronounced. Both sections 
suffered from grave disabilities and inequalities. All the writers individually 
recommend that the econom ic underdevelopment and impoverishment of Africans 
and whites should not be seen in isolation, but rather as a cause and also an effect 
of many of the far-reaching maladjustments of the time. As tv'ac millan summed up: 
The 'civilised' labour pol icy takes no account of the interests of 
displaced Natives. The drastic process of substitution falls hardest 
of necessity on the more intell igent of them, coupled as it was with 
a Colour Bar designed to exclude them from such skilled and better 
paid occupotions as they might otherwise hope to fill. The fostering 
of industries, if need be by at once excluding and taxing the 
Natives, has been utterly blind to their progress. Ignoring their 
poverty, utterly neglecting their consuming power ••• this policy 
makes confusion WOrse confounded by further depressing the backward 
race, adding a growing volume of semi-articulate Native resentment, 
making their competition with paor whites ever more acute, and the 
Union itself poorer in the process. 100 
This waming was to be ignored consistently by the govemment, as it had 
been on several earl ier occasions when made by numerous state commissions. This 
is no more clearly demonstrated than in govemment action and pol icy toward the 
urban Africans. It is this aspect which now needs closer study. 
99 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of 5 H Frankel, 14 tv'ay 1931 
100 Iv'oacm ilion, Complex South Africa, pp 112-113 
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8 AFRICANS' DEMA NDS AND 
URBA N AREAS PO L ICY 
African unrest and the need to revise the urban areas pol icy 
The location system, poss laws and labour control 
African protest under worsen ing conditions 
Urban areas pol icy revised - 1930 
Urban areas pol icy and labour control 
Stollardism in the 1930s 
Urban areas policy and white worker interests 
Urban areas pol icy and manufacturers' demands 
African unrest and the need to revise the urban areas pol icy 1 
While whites demanded more restrictive laws, Africans were protesting. 
vigorously about their rapidly deteriorating conditions at work and home. Their 
actions showed fresh zeal in resis t ing other discr iminatory prac t ices. 
The government could not have stayed oblivious to the growing unrest 
amongst Africans. Their response, however, was thorough ly negative. Just as 
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they had reacted before to a new and cohesive African nationalism, so now in the 
late 1920s they began to over- reac t to an a ll eged threa t of the already declining 
ICU. The ICU had first been formed to represen t all African workers, in the hope 
of uniting them eventually in a single union with statutory recognition. As a move-
ment that the mass of workers could identify with, it had ecl ipsed the ANC in the 
twenties. 2 This was understandable, since the ANC was spearheaded by the 
African elite and concerned itse lf more wi th polit ical issues. The ICU's concern 
with bread-and-butter issues had a for grea ter impac t, especially with the rapidly 
sinking economic and social position of the Africans . Eddie Roux, intimately 
involved at the time with the African trade union movement, described this impact 
as follows: 
In this atmosphere of dissatisfaction the newly formed I.C.U. spread 
from Cape Town like a veld fire over the Union of South Africa, first 
to the seaport towns of Port EI izabeth and Eost London, then to the 
country districts of the Central and Eastern Cape Province, then to 
the Orange Free State, then to Johannesburg and the Transvaal. In 
Davenport, 'African townsmen? •. ', 'The triumph of Colonel Stallard ..• ', 
'The beginnings of urban segregation .• • ', Sou th Africa ..• ; D Welsh, 'The 
growth of towns' in Wilson & Thompson (eds), v 2; Shannon. 
2 For analysis of the ICU, its rise and fall, see V Brittain, Testament of Friend-
ship: The story of Winifred Holtby; P Bonner, 'The decline and fall of the 
ICU - a case of self-destruction?', SA Labour Bulletin, v 1, 6, 1974; Hutt; 
S W Johns III, 'The birth of non-white trade unionism in South Africa', Race, 
v 9, 2, October 1967, and 'Trade union, pol itical pressure group, or mms-
movement? - the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa' in R I 
Rotberg & A A Mazrui, Protest and power in black Africa; C Kadol ie, My 
I ife and the ICU : The autob iography of a black trade unionist in South Africa; 
L Kuper, 'African nationalism in South Africa: 1910- 1964' in Wilson & 
Thompson (eds), v 2; R Lesl ie, 'Coloured labour and trade unionism in Cape 
Town', The Journal of the Economic Soc ie ty of SA, v 3, part 2, 6, 1930; 
E Roux, Time longer than rope and S P Bunting: A pol itical biography; H J 
& R E Simons, Class and colour in South Africa 1850-1950; Wa Ishe; P L 
Wickens, 'General labour unions in Cape Town 1918-1920', SA Journal of 
Economics, v 40, 3, September 1972, and 'The one big union movement 
among black workers in South Africa', The Internationa l Journal of African 
Historical Studies, v 7, 3, 1975. 
the words of a writer in the London Times: 'The genuine grievances 
of the South African Natives provided the hotbed in which the I. C. U. 
flourished. Rock-rented Natives in the urban locations, underpaid 
Natives in Government employ, badly treated Natives on European 
farms, flocked to join the movemen t. ' 3 
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At its height the ICU cla imed a membership of 1000004 indicating that 
African workers wanted an outlet for their grievances. 5 Their main can plaint was 
the burdensome restrictions . Increas ingly Africans were being drawn into the 
complex of a money economy by c ircumstonces beyond their own control and in 
most cases specifically designed to force them into the labour market. Driven by 
these forces, many over the years had become progress ively urbanised and wholly 
dependent upon wage earn ing for a I ivel ihood. What is more, many took very 
well to industrial jobs and developed a real tas te for urban life. But it was also 
true that neither wage rates nor job opportunities had kept pace with the changing 
needs and developing capacities of the so-called detribalised African urban dweller . 
The bulk of work over the whole of industry was unskilled because it was labour 
intensive and Africans were paid according to traditional rather than economic 
rates. This produced an impoverished African class, the counterpart of the poor 
white. 
The Africans, moreover, were well aware that for the most part their 
progress was being deliberately and artificially checked for reasons that had nothing 
to do with the level of technical progress in South African industry . The Martindale & 
Sophia town Ratepayers' Assoc iation, a group of men who had suffered under discri-
minatory laws themselves, expressed their resentment: 
we cannot but feel ashamed that it is possible for civilised man to 
be oblivious to a process of natural law. The historical records of 
this country abound with the evidence of the inevitoble reactionary 
consequences of laws which are opposed to the natural operation of 
the law of economy and which knows and recognises no colour bars. 
The law 6f economy has a natural process which operates in an 
absolutely opposite direction from a ll art·ificial machinations of man. 
We have witnessed the force of its power in the existence, in a 
young and virgin country like ours, of poor whites and unemployed. 
In order to create counter-agencies against it, our Stotute-Books 
are full of laws designed to divert its course. They are of cause [sic] 
artificial barriers which have succeeded to disturb and to disorganise 
the labour market and set up val ues on the colour of individua ls, 
irrespective of capacity and efficiency of the individual. The 
3 Roux, Ti me I onge r than rope, p 156 
4 Estimates vary on the actual poid-up membership. See P L Wickens, 'The 
Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of South Africa', unpub seminar 
paper, Conference of Southern African Labour History, African Studies 
Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, 1976. 
5 C Kadalie, My life and the ICU 
labour market has in consequence been handicapped and del iberately 
inundated for the purpose of keeping wages at the lowest possible 
level. The Industrial Conc iliation Act and the Wage Act seek to 
entrench the policy of 'white-ism' and to disregard the inte rests of 
non-white workers; while the pass laws, Iv\asters and Servants Act, 
Native Labour Regulation Act and the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 
all seek to perpetuate a policy of top-doggism and to e ntrench a 
system of cheap labour which drags the economic prosperity of this 
country to a disreputable level . Industrial development is being 
retarded and arrested; and the home market sacrificed at the Altar 
of 'white- ism '. 6 
So Africans knew they were being borred from certain positions, not 
because of incapacity or inefficiency but because of the colour of their skins. 
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They were aware that jobs such as tha t of a ra ilway porter {mentioned by Dr Semel 
were reserved for unskilled whites at a 'civilised' rate of pay, and thereafter 
closed to Africans. Naturally their resentment increased. When the stigma 
traditionally attached to 'kaffir work' was suddenly removed, these tasks formerly 
done efficiently and well by Africans were upgraded and suddenly seen as fit 
only for 'civilised' men. If a like task was performed in the other segregated 
field by Africans, it was done for 'kaffir pay'. African bewil derment, frustration 
and ange r at these terms is both readily and easily unders tood. 
The shibbole ths were many. 'Africans were prepared to accept lower 
wages; 'they were paid what they were worth'; their needs were 'primitive' and 
they were 'accustomed to a low standard of life'; they were' inherently incapable 
of carrying out the tasks associa ted with the civilised western way of life'. Not 
that these fallacies caused the rift between 'c ivilised' and 'kaffir' work in this 
transitory phase of inter-racial competition. That was largel y done by the spectre 
of poor white degradation and despair. But people quoted the myths about 
African otherness to jus tify the two grades of work. 
As more Africans became educated, they inadvertently made the work 
rift worse . Aware and aspiring, they symbol ised a socia l change that was anathema 
to most whites, and the state set ou t to ensure that this small but vocal group would 
not undermine the whites' v iew of their own superior status. 
The continued failure of whites to observe the hopes, aspirations and 
grievances of the Africans, the depression, drought, steady impoverishment of the 
reserves - all these increased inter-racial tensions and led to a period of acute 
6 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of the Sophiatown & Iv\artindale Rate-
payers' Associa tion, Benon i 
7 Quoted in chap 7, P 277 
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unrest similar to that which hod followed in the woke of the recession after the 
Great War. A growing number of whites were insisting, as they had done in the 
early 1920s, that the country's economic ill s which had led to this situation could 
be traced to the uncon trolled influx of Africans to the 'white' urban areas. A 
remedy would have to be found for the 'native problem'. Increasingly, whites 
said that the government would have to dea l with the urban Africans as a root 
couse. 
Opinions ranged on pol icy. At I-he one extreme there were those who 
believed in the totol segregation of Africans and whites, on all levels including 
the economic; whi le at the other were a good many whites who supported the 
'Cope liberal' ideal of gradually assimilat ing the 'civilised' Africans. It was 
within these two parameters that the revised urban areas pol icy was debated in 
1930 when Hertzog reintroduced the Natives' (Urban Areas) Amendment Bill. 
Colonel Stallard, who hod been appointed to choir the Transvaal Local 
Government Commission on urban policy in 1922, continued in 1930 to behove as 
a self-appointed authority on urban problems. He insisted - os he hod under 
similar circumstances in the early 1920s - that the problem of white unemployment, 
inter-racial competition and the shortage of labour for the primary sec tors was 
caused, as he put it, 'by the presence of this "redundant" block population in our 
urban areas' . 8 
He said the only remedy was to limit and immediately cut down on 
Africans in urban areas. (This was an elaboration on his earlier doctrine.) During 
the second reading on the Natives' (Urban Areas) Amendment Bill, he appealed: 
whether the time has not come to toke a bold step •.• to soy not 
only whether the gates should be closed but reduce the numbers of 
natives who are there, because unless that is done, I believe we 
are leaving the whole question of the relations between white and 
block in urban areas only half solved. 9 
Surely the 1923 Act, he continued, giving his original view, 
embodies as a basic principle the treatment of the whole of the black 
population within the towns as being subordinate to the interests, 
and desires and aims of the white population which is there. 10 
8 A 'redundan t' African was 'one who was required to administer to the wants of 
the white population, but does not include the native who ministers to the 
needs of his fellows within the municipa! areas' - Colonel Stollard, House of 
Assembly Debates, 30 January 1930, col 228. 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid 
Until recently it has been widely held rhat the 1930 Natives' (Urban 
Areas) Amendment Act was a further commitment to Stallardism. In a series of 
papers on urban policy, however, T R H Davenport has shown unequivocall y that 
th is was not so . As he says, 
One thing which the legislators of 1930 cleorly did not have in 
mind was the control of African influx in to the towns as such. 
Provided there was work to be dane there, Parliament was prepared 
to let them in to do it. A few speakers, and among them notably 
Colone l Stallard, saw the immigrant black worker as the white man's 
competitar - a natural enough reaction during the depression; but 
the shortage of work in the towns was as often attributed to white 
immigration from the rural areas as to black. Perhaps equally 
important, men doubted whether this influx could in fact be stopped. 11 
The theory of Stallard ism enunciated in 1921 was being called into 
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question again in 1930. African influx to urban areas had speeded up during the 
depression, and inter-racial confl ict and tension were aggravated by the retrench-
ment and high rate of unemployment amongst whites generally and poor whites in 
particular. Yet, except for Piet Grobler (then Minister of Agriculture) and Heatan 
Nicholls (an arch-segregationist), Stallard's proposals were firmly rejected by 
Parliament. 12 We shal l consider this almost total rejection, but first we must see 
why it was felt necessary to revise the urban areas policy at all and what olternotive 
to Stallard's solution was accepted. 13 
11 See Davenport, 'The triumph of Colonel Sta liard', p 83, ond Welsh, 'The 
grawth of towns', p 187. The NEC also recognised this: 'It is perfectly clear 
that a considerable number of Natives have become permanent town dwellers. 
No good purpose is served by disregarding this fact, or by acting on the 
assumption that it is not a fact' (UG 22-32, p 72). 
12 Stallard also tried persuading the Joint Select Committee to accept an amend-
ment to the Natives' Representation Bill which would include measures for 
influx control. This the JSC rejected on 7 May 1930. He reintroduced his 
proposals as an amendment to the Natives' Land Bill on 13 March 1931. The 
Committee re jected this too. But on 4 March 1932 and 27 April 1932 the JSC 
did an about turn. They then agreed with Stallard that the number of Africans 
entering the urban areas should be I imited; an occupational census should be 
taken and redundant Africans should be removed from urban areas. See the 
supplement to JSC 1-1935, pp 18, 35, 81 and 97, a lso appendix A (1933), 
p 730, for each of the three dates. The Committee's acceptance of the 
Stallard proposals is analysed in the concluding chapter. 
13 It is impossible ta describe in any detail here the manifold grievances voiced 
by Africans at the time. We can on ly choose those grievances that are relevant 
ta the solution in the per iod under discussion - ones relating to the Act possed 
between 1924 and 1933. Mareover, no enquiry inta African economic condi-
tions can follow the usual I ines of analysis into white socia-economic conditions, 
looking at family budgets, prices and so on. What facts we have about Africans 
are confused by such things as pauc ity of information, and failure ta differen-
tiate between urban ised and migrant workers. 
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On the failure of the Ac t, municipal authorities blamed the increased 
and uncon trolled influx of both Africans and whites to the major cities . The rote 
of urbanisation was unpreceden ted, as the following statistics show. In the Union 
as a whole the inter-censal rate of increase in the different population groups can 
be depicted thus: 
Table 8.1 RACIA L COMPOSIT ION OF THE 
POPUlATION OF THE UNION 1904-1946 
/"1 ' I '("<;"~ ________________ --, 
14 
~ . 
to , 1 ( 
The average annual percentage increase in the population as a whole wos: 
Table 8.2 AVERAGE ANNUAL % POPULATION INCREASE 15 
Race 1904-1 911 1911-1921 1921-1936 
White 1. 93 1.76 1.86 
African 2.03 I 1.57 2 . 29 
I Asiatic 3.12 0.86 1. 90 , 
Coloured 2.41 I 0.37 2.32 
Total avo 2 . 07 1.49 2.19 
14 Social and Econom ic Planning Council report 13: Economic and soc ial 
conditions of the racial groups in South Africa, UG 53-48, p 9 
15 Ibid, table 1, p 13 
Between 1921 and 1936 the various race groups were distributed as follows: 
Table 8.3 DISTRIBUTION OF RACE GROUPS 1921 -1936 16 
Race Urban Rural Total 
Whites 
1921 847508 67 1 980 1 519488 
1936 1 307 386 696471 2003857 
Africans 
1921 587 000 4]]0813 4697813 
1936 I 141 642 5455047 6596689 
Although there was a high percentage rate of increase for all urban 
population groups between 1921 and 1936 - whites 3.6 per cent, Africans 6.3 
per cent, Asiatics 12.3 per cent, and coloureds 4.4 per cent 17_ compared with 
the growth in the Union population as a whole, the urbanisation trends for the 
various popula tion groups were uneven. These are shown in the following table: 
Table 8.4 PROPORTION OF EACH RACE GROUP IN THE 
URBAN AND RURAL AREAS BETWEEN 1904 & 1936 18 
Race Yeor Urban Rural 
Whites 1904 52.91 % 47.09 % 
1911 51.70 48.30 
1918 53.94 46.06 
1921 55.78 44.22 
1926 58.18 41.82 
1931 61.25 38.75 
1936 65.24 34.76 
Africans 1921 12.50 87.50 
1936 17.31 82.69 
Asiatics 1921 30.90 69.10 
1936 66.27 33.73 
Coloureds 1921 45.82 54.18 
1936 53.91 46.09 
Non-wh i fes toto I 1904 15.00 85.00 
1911 17.45 82.55 
1921 16.42 83.58 
1936 22.44 77.56 
All races total 1904 23.18 76.82 
1911 24.74 75.26 
1921 25.05 74.95 
1936 31.38 68.62 
16 Report of the Native Laws Commission 1946-1948, UG 28-48, P 6 
17 Ibid 
18 Figures taken from Report of the Native Laws Commission 1946-1948, UG 
28-48, p 6; Official report of the 1936 census, UG 21-38, P 5; Union Year 
Book 8, 1910-1925, P 861; Union Year Book 22, 1941, P 993. 
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These figures confirm the claims made by municipal authorities . The 
white move to town from the rural areas had accelerated from 1911 onwards, while 
that of Africans grew after 1921. Although the rate was proportiona te ly smaller in 
absolute terms, there was an increase of Africans over whites during that time. 
In considering the problems faced by urban authorities, it must be remem-
bered that not 011 towns were forced to accommodate this influx . The following 
tables show that in 1936 one third of the urban population lived in three out of the 
455 towns, and almost half the urban population lived in the five largest towns. 
The spread was as follows : 
Table 8.5 DISTRIBUTION OF URBAN POPULATION BY RACE (1936) 19 
Size of town No Total popn Non-white White 
, 
500 000 and over 1 519384 261 713 257 671 
250 000 - 500 000 2 603829 335384 268445 
1 00 000 - 250 000 2 238462 108 066 130396 
50 000 - 100 000 8 534 849 349839 185 010 
25 000 - 50 000 4 160105 105993 54112 
10000 - 25000 13 209 014 123471 85543 
5000 - 10000 27 211 790 122024 89766 
2500 - 5000 70 241 626 141 878 99748 
Under 2 500 328 341 793 191 489 150304 
-
Total 455 3060852 1 739857 1 320995 I 
The following table analyses the position in the largest towns more closely: 
Table 8.6 DISTRIBUTION BY RACE IN THE LARGEST TOWNS (1936) 20 
Town White African Asia tic Coloured Total 
Cope Town & suburbs 173412 14160 3740 152911 344 223 
Port Elizabeth 53461 28290 2459 25631 109841 
East London 31 311 24388 853 4011 60563 
Kimberley 15741 14499 977 9014 i 40231 
Durban 95033 68 698 88226 7649 259606 
Pietermoritzburg 22446 15671 9088 2334 49539 
Witwatersrand area * 402223 570726 14183 30058 1 017190 
Pretoria 76935 45312 2982 3392 128621 
Bloemfontein 30291 31 042 8 2892 64 233 
Total 900 853 812786 122516 237892 2074047 
* includes the whole urban area of Johannesburg and the Witwatersrand mining crea 
19 From Union Year Book 8, 1910-1925, p 861; Union Year Book 22, 1941, p 993 
20 Ibid 
The remain ing 70 per cent of towns in the Union had populations of less 
than 2 500. Their attitude to a state urban policy and their demands would thus 
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be very different from those of the large urban centres. This emerged c learly when 
the state tried to devise a uniform policy to deal with Africans in the urban areas. 
In his analys is of the failure of the 1923 Urban Areas Act, which was the 
first attempt at a uniform policy, Davenport points out that local authorities had 
encountered 'special difficulties over the administration of the Act' . Before the 
depression, he suggests, few mun ic ipal ities had seen the need to use the pre-ex isting 
powers and regulations offe red in the Principal 1923 Act: 
G iven the large number of urban locai authorities then existing in 
South Africa, these statistics do not give the impression that they 
were impatient to grab the new powers which the law made ava il-
able. In fact, there was I ittle interest in the white-controlled 
municipalities over the improvement of location life, and some 
apprehension in the smaller towns that the adoption of the Act 
would greatly increase their obligation to spend money. 21 
With the depression, comp laints increased and municipalities clamoured 
for extra powers to deal with the 'native problem'. Their demands were mainly to 
do with the physical distress of both Africans and whites during mass unemployment. 
This, aggravated by the vast influx from the country, engendered a common fear 
22 
that inter-rac ial conflict, which had already broken out, would spread. All 
this forced local authorities into action . 
The 1923 Act was hopelessly inadequate for the crisis, they sa id. Some 
authorities simply called for the review - and amendment if need be - of existing 
rul ings on urban Africans. But others demanded direct state intervention, which 
meant more centralised control, and financial aid for their part in local affairs. 
21 Davenport, 'The triumph of Colonel Stollard ..• ', pp 79-80. Davenport 
quotes these statistics: 64 urban locations proclaimed under section 1, most 
of which had existed prior to 1923; compulsory residential segregation in 
26 towns; 31 urban areas in which service contrac ts had to be registered 
under section 12; 18 municipalities had applied for housing loans and between 
them received £135 000. 
22 During the second reading debate on the Riotous Assemblies Amendment Bill, 
the Minis ter of Justice pointed out, 'in many areas, as ot Potchefstroom and 
Carnarvon and latterly at Rawsonville the white population will defy the law 
in an organ ised and armed manner with disastrous resul ts • .. if we reach the 
posi tion where the natives are sullen and restive, and the white population is 
arming itself, our present police force will be quite incapable of maintoining 
order'. House of Assembly Debates, 20 March 1930, col 2152. 
294 
The location system, pass laws and labour control 
There is little doubt that these demands were immediately related to th,e 
worsening crisis. As R Colson, the Assistant Magistrate of Johannesburg, reminded 
the NEC, whites had clamoured for powers to deai with an urbon crisis under very 
similar circumstances a decade earl ier. In fact, he looked back even further in 
time: 
There hos been some stirring of the European conscience in regard 
to Location conditions, due partly to humanitarian ideas, but chiefly 
to fear of having plague beds in the immediate vicinity of the 
European popu lation. 
The lessons of the bubonic outbreak in Johannesburg in 1905 and of 
the influenza epidemic in 1918 have not been forgotten altogether . 23 
Given powers for the crisis in 1920, few had bothered to use them. The 
Durban situation is ind icative of this. There 
the African urban population was growing fast, women were settling 
in Durban in larger numbers, and grievances were accumulating, 
such as inadequate housing for fumilies and the humiliating precau-
tions taken by the municipal authorities against the spread of typhus. 24 
Matters like these inflamed African unres t and played into the hands of the Natal 
ICU leader, George Champion, 'whose talent', Wickens writes, 'for exploiting 
grievances fell I ittle short of gen ius'. 25 
Africans and whites had some common ground. People were critically 
short of accommodation so that sites were turning into slums and the unhygienic 
shanty-towns inevitably mushraomed. It was all ci grave reminder to both groups 
of those earl ier episodes, and everyone saw the urgent need for rei ief measures. 
But here the accord between African and white outlooks ended. 
For while urban officials were demanding extra powers so that they could 
force all but exempted Africans to I ive in the segregated locations, Africans 
(though not opposed to the creation of separa te areas) were asking for the unrestric-
ted right to buy land in freehold which, as one witness sa id, 
23 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of R Colson, Assistant Magistrate of 
Johannesburg 
24 Wickens, 'The Indus trial and Commercia l Workers' Union ••. ', p 8 
25 Ibid 
would relieve the present congestion in Native locations, and also 
improve civic life amongst the Natives. There is a great need for 
certain tawnships ta accommodate the growing and permanent urban 
Native population. 26 
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Governmen t officials agreed that this issue was important and needed 
settling one way or another, but tended towards a for more pragmatic and bureau-
cratic line. Government policy would not work under the 1923 Urban Areas Act, 
they complained. The chief administrative man in the NAD, Major Cooke, stressed 
that 
the question of the establishment of Native Townships outside, but 
in the vicinity of, industrial and urban areas has arisen in ::ertain 
instances and has not yet been decided. 27 
The reason no firm decision had been taken was that 
the increasing growth of the Native population of urban and industrial 
centres has created a class of Native who is desirous of acquiring 
definite and permanent residential sites in the vicinity in which they 
are or have been working. They aspire to be free from the irksome 
restrictions which are associated with the Municipal Native Location. 28 
He reminded the commissioners that this excluded a ll pass-bearing Africans who 
under the i923 Act were expected ta live in the segregated locations. His staff 
had been unable ta enforce the law because of certain loopholes in the Principal 
Act . 29 But the main reason why Africans resisted going ta locations, he said, 
was the' irksome restrictions' they found there. This was confirmed by Johannes-
burg municipal officials who complained that houses in Orlando stood empty while 
the backyards of African houses in the unproclaimed municipal areas were crammed 
with Africans who had found a way of evading the segregation law. 30 
According ta Cooke, the limited powers of proclamation under the 1923 
Act were partly responsible for this evasion. The courts had ruled out enforced 
26 NEC 1930-1932, oral evidence of Dr Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, 6 May 1931 
27 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of Major H S Cooke, Director of 
Native Labour and Chief NC, Witwatersrand . Note the fact that even in 
1931 the question of crea ting a permanent African urban population had 
not been decided. See third term of reference: ' ... the residence of 
Natives in urban areas and the measure, if any, to be adopted ta deal 
with the surplus Natives in, and ta prevent the increasing migration of 
Natives to such areas'. UG 22-32, p 3. 
28 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of Major H S Cooke 
29 See n 8.31 below. 
30 Davenport, South Africa ... , p 340 
segregation unless 'suitable' alternative accommodation was provided. 31 Local 
authorities, rather than become involved in costly legal proceedings, had there-
fore eased up on enforcing the segregation clause in the 1923 Act. 
29c 
Even more hampering, perhaps, were the geographic limits of municipal 
control. Restrictions and regulations applicable to municipal locations could not 
be implemented in unproclaimed freehold areas within municipal boundaries. 
Freehold areas such as Sophiatown in Johannesburg, Lady Selborne in Pretoria, 
and Korsten in Port Elizabeth had grown overcrowded in consequence, Cooke said. 
Peri-urban African freehold areas such as Evoton and Alexandra tawnship - which 
fell outside municipal control altogether - were also a strong attraction for 
Africans seeking a permanent place to stay in the towns. On the outskirts of 
almost every town or city, espec ially where local authorities had failed to se t up 
proclaimed locations, 'squatter' locations had sprung up to serve the town 's needs. 
These areas inevitobly grew degraded and unhygien ic with the mass influx from the 
farms and reserves owing to the depression and drought, as Cooke explained. It 
was in those areas, he went on, that the more serious problems arose because 
Africans there were free of the' irksome' controls. 
The hundreds of African witnesses certainly confirmed Cooke's assessment. 
X h d .. h' 'd 32 I h Id h d uma touc e upon It In IS eVI ence. n terms t at wou ave angere every 
white impressed by the 1923 Act, Xuma denounced the location system. To 
Africans, he sa id, any good the Act did was outweighed by the dreadful conditions 
Africans had to endure in these proclaimed areas. Slums prol iferated. fv4.any 
Africans showed a determination to live outside municipal locations, even if it 
meant contravening the law, and this pointed to the true position. He went on: 
31 Formerly no request by any urban authority for the issue in respect of its area 
of a proclamation under section 5 could be en tertained until the NAD were 
satisfied that adequate and suitable accommoda tion was provided for Africans 
who under such proclamation were required to I ive in a location, 'native 
village' or hostel. In the cases of Solly Abelman v Rex TPD and Lammas v 
Rex EDCD, however, the Supreme Court held that the mere provision of a 
dwelling site in a location would not suffice for the efficacy of such a pro-
clamation and that housing accommodation must be provided for the na tives 
affected. The resul t was that the section was ren de red largely inopero tive , 
as not many local authorities were in a position to show in advance that 
they had provided enough houses in their locations for all natives to be 
removed from the town. Under the 1930 Amendment Act urban authorities 
could procure the proclamation of an area for segregation purposes even 
though it had not provided the requisite housing accommodation. UG 22-
33, p 281. 
32 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of A B Xuma 
even accommodation which is available for occupat ion by Natives 
is often not conducive to decency and self-respect because of the 
general surrounding and environment. 
The Location Compounds with their iron bar fences, houses that are 
small and alike, and guarded gates are wrong in principle besides 
being objectionable in suggesting either slavery or prison life rather 
than homes of free men and women. 
Lodgers' fees and a rresting of people Or auctioning the ir furniture to 
make up the ren t due before one is ejec ted are aspec ts of Location 
life that seem to cause a real grievance against the system. In 
principle they are wrong and objectionable even though they may 
be officially expedient. 33 
Why WOs it necessary, as another witness commented, to 'deliberately herd some-
thing like 13000 people into a location with only two gates, one of which is 
usually kept closed'? 34 
Cooke repl ied to this. His evidence showed that the location system and 
its adjunct, the myriad of pass regulations, were essential for the urban policy as 
part of influx contral. Lucas addressed Cooke on this point: 
today do you think you can control the Natives who do not apply 
for permits to seek work and who try to remain here for a long time? 
Cooke To a very great extent, yes. 
Lucas Why can you do that when quite a number say they cannot 
do it, that it is not really a feasible proposition? 
Cooke I think they could if they organ ised; lack of organisation 
is the chief reason for failure in that regard. 
Lucas Now taking affairs as they are today, do you think all that 
elaborate machinery is necessary; do you think there would be much 
more influx into the towns today than there is if you did not have 
that machinery? 
Cooke I will not say there will be mOre influx; there will be a 
greater tendency for Natives to remain unemployed and to frequent 
haunts of vice and become vitiated. 
Lucas Why do you think there would be more if you did not have 
the passes? 
33 Ibid 
34 NEC 1930-1932, joint oral evidence of H D Tyamzashe and T Nibeki, 18 
May 1931. Henry Tyamzashe ran The Workers' Union, mouthpiece of the 
ICU, and then New Africa, the paper of the Independent ICU. A former 
chief lieutenant of Kadalie before the ICU's demise, he was arrested in 
East London in 1930 and then discharged. Thomas Nibeki, one of the first 
African recruits of the Young Communist League, joined Kadol ie's ICU 
when it moved to Johannesburg in 1924, serving as Transvaal Provincial 
Secretary for a time. When Communis t Party members were expelled from 
the ICU executive in 1926, Nibeki chose to stay in the ICU. See Karis & 
Carter, v 4. 
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Cooke One of the major incentives to canforming to the rules laid 
down would be lacking. Putting it as a test, yau see, every now 
and then the pol ice do - and they regard it regrettably as necessary 
- have raids ar the stopping of Natives with the idea of examining 
their passes. The passless Natives are then usually shepherded along 
to the pass office to have their identity tested and the percentoge of 
people that you get among that who ore idle and dissolute is very 
high. 
Lucas Is not the percentage today without passes a very small one 
of the tota I number? 
Cooke Yes. 
Lucas It does give me an impression rather of using a steam hammer 
to drive in a tin tack. 35 
So it appears that passes were necessary firstly to force Africans to keep to the 
rules. A second claim made was that pass laws kept the idle and dissolute out of 
the towns. 36 
Cooke .•• the method adopted was to stop Natives as they were 
leaving the location and ask them to produce their tax receipts, 
they were given an opportunity of securing them; and I supply a 
staff of clerks to go with the raiding party and any Natives who are 
prepared to pay are then given the opportunity of doing so. 
Lucas That is not a raid in the usual sense; that was merely closing 
the gates? 
Cooke That is virtually what it was; that is the practice usually 
adopted as regards taxes. 37 
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African abhorrence of the pass laws was not only on this account, however. 
They resented the power given officials to proscribe work seekers in a specific area. 
M:Jny witnesses described how their privacy had been completely violated by these 
laws; 38 others decried the penal sanctions involved, which led to innocent people 
35 NEC 1930-1932, oral evidence of M:Jjor H S Cooke, 4 f.kly 1931 
36 This is corroborated by Phillips - see his section 'Native crime on the Wit-
watersrand ' and analysis of predaminant 'technical' and 'criminal' offences 
there, pp 176-182. Phillips queries the assumption and states, 'The charge 
has not infrequently been made that the type of man entering police service 
has deteriorated and that promotion in rank depends upon energy in arresting 
offenders .' (Ray Phillips gives voluable detail on crime rotes in his excellent 
book, The Bantu in the city.) See also Report of the Police Commission of 
Enqu iry 1937, UG 50-37, para 60, and Rand Daily Mail, 28 November 1934, 
article on 'Roll of honour' in the police force. 
37 NEC 1930-1932, oral evidence of f.kljor H S Cooke, 4 f.kly 1931 
38 This was the grievance of most African witnesses . See also UG 22-32, paras 
A 360, 728, 731; and UG 41-22, para 137 . 
being bronded as criminals for technical offences. 39 Ray Phillips analyses in 
detail the technical crimes committed under measures applying to Africans alone, 
and compares these with crimes committed by all roces. 
Table 8.7 PREDOMINANT OFFENCES, WITWATERSRAND AREA 40 
Convi ctions 
Offence 
1931 1934 1935 1936 
Possession of native liquor 18857 32 378 37814 41 451 
Natives (Urban Areas) Act 15603 31444 22014 2209 
Municipal offences 10661 17598 18850 18 139 
Native Labour Regulation Act 17608 17574 18024 14511 
Location regulations 602 4460 9070 13886 
Native pass laws 9 131 3487 15844 32438 
Native Taxation Act 2068 3380 3861 2446 
Illegal possession of 'other' liquor 1 628 3066 2267 1 251 
Mines and Works Act 1 033 1 287 1 099 939 
Drunkenness 10077 15885 13077 11 039 
Common theft (under £5) 2789 3457 3432 3678 
Common assau lt 2363 2479 2623 2731 
Assaul t with intent to do 
grievous bodily harm 1 554 2050 2 361 2862 
Breach of the peace 1 186 1 942 2040 2548 
Motor vehicle ordinance 454 886 648 956 
Dagga laws 644 1 016 1 083 1 154 
Housebreaking by night 494 687 586 508 
Trespass 927 402 3520 7086 
Cycle theft 360 636 643 689 
The number of convictions of African offenders in the Union, under Union 
provincial and municipal laws, in 1936 was as follows: 
Total number of con travent ions 
Offences under Native Taxation Act 
For possession of native liquor 
Native pass law offences 
Urban Areas Act, mun ic ipal, labour 
and location regulations 
Serious offences (4.05% of total) 
459911 
62941 
68012 
62864 
108692 
18643 
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Statistics suppl ied by Director of Census & Statistics, Race Relations, February 1938 
39 Report of the Police Commission of Enquiry, paras 296-298, confirmed the 
findings of the NEC cited in n 8.38. See also Phillips, chap 5. 
40 Phillips, P 177 
Thus, 
The total offences for 1936 which are peculiarly African - those 
created by statutory acts and regulations under those acts - reach 
the remarkable total of 125 032, or 77,79 per cent of the total 
offences (160729) shown on the schedule. Even this large number 
would be considerably increased, were it possible to determine what 
proportion of assaults, breaches of the peace, housebreaking, 
drunkenness, and traspass, were due directly or indirectly to the 
laws applying only to Africans . 41 
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Those favouring the pass laws quoted such figures to support their opposite 
claim that passes were essential. After all, they said, Africans were convicted 
only when they were proved' idle, dissolute and disorderly'. Passes were necessary 
identification for police purposes. Without passes, urban authorities would find 
it even harder to cope with the uncontrolled influx of Africans. Passes were 
defended even on the grounds that they protected African workers a bit: employers 
who ignored wage determinations or conditions of service agreements could be 
easily identified, one official sa id, or as another argued, 
the fees payable for the monthly registration of the service contract 
were the only and a necessary tax upon the employers of Native 
workers, in the interests of the employees. The numerous duties were 
laid upon the municipal ities relating to the housing, health, recre-
ational and other amenities of the Natives without any tax to meet 
them, and it would be disastrous to rob the municipal ities of this 
tax. 42 
Cape witnesses counter-argued that the pass laws were never used to 
identify Africans for pol ice purposes, and statistics could be advanced to show 
that the incidence of crime was not higher in the Cape than elsewhere. The NEC 
confirmed this. In the Cape Province, they wrote, 
there is in European areas no pass law, and no complaint on this 
score came from that Province •. • in the Transvaal, where there 
were 39000 out of a total of 42 000 convictions ... the desire for 
the maintenance of these laws appears to be based on a mistaken 
view of their value and efficacy . There is no more crime among 
Natives in the Cape, with no pass law, than there is in the Trans-
vaa I which has a very strict law. There is no more overcrowding 
and no more difficulty in deal ing with Natives and there are no 
worse Native slums in the towns, in the Cape, than there are in 
Natal or the Transvaal. Judging from the comparative smallness of 
the number of N1aster and Servants cases in the Cape, there would 
seem to be fewer desertions from farm service there than in the 
T ransvaa I. 43 
41 Ibid 
42 J R Brent, NAD N1anager, Pretoria Municipality, address to SAIRR, January 
1946, reprinted in Race Relations Quarterly, v 13, 2, 1946, P 35 
43 UG 22-32, p 228 
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Furthermore, the idea that one had ta be able to identify' idle, dissolute 
and disorderly' Africans did rather assume that members of the other races did not 
suffer from these disabil ities. As for protection of African workers, opponents of 
the pass lows pointed out that the only way was by hav ing minimum wages and 
enforcing the laws against exploitation . On reg istration fees needed ta fund 
location improvement, another contentious issue, Ell ison Kahn showed this was a 
further rationalisation at the expense of Africans: 
It is only recen t ly that the proceeds of this tax have been allocated 
to the Transvaal municipalities. The melancholy early history under 
which they were first allocated for hospitals, and later, under the 
Financial Re lations Ac t, it fell to the prov ince, which in the ten 
years 1928-1938 collected £5 mill ion, and spent only £1 million on 
Native wei fare, need not be brought up here . 44 
Questioned further by Lucas, Cooke agreed that these points were val id. He 
confirmed that the pass laws octually had very I ittle to do with checking the num-
bers of criminals, loiterers and won' t-works in the urban areas; he admitted there 
were other methods employers could use to register their workers; he accepted 
that the poss in itse lf did not stop Africans from evading registration control - it 
was the pol ice who farced people to obey the rules. 
Lucas then suggested that the primary usefulness of the pass system was 
ta control lobourers. This Cooke admitted: 
Lucas So that really your justification for the pass system comes 
down to the case of new entronts into the town? 
Cooke No; there is the Native who leaves one employer and he 
may enter a slum yard and remain there for a month. 
Lucas That is a variant of the first. It is greatly a question of the 
control of those who are out of work? 
Cooke Yes. 
Lucas And your control, therefore, can be evaded even todoy by 
a Native who does not want actually to do ord inary work? 
Cooke Oh, that is so, yes; but my view is that, in proportion to 
the relaxation of these methods of pressure, so the Natives who will 
not conform to the rule, will increase and you will get a very much 
larger proportion of the vagrant and then dissolute Natives. 
Lucas Can you give us the reasons why you arrive at that; because 
the result you arrive at does not seem to harmonise with the general 
evidence we have got about Natives . You emphasise in your report 
the Native is very law-abiding? 
Cooke Yes, that is so . 
44 Brent, Race Relations Quarterly, v 13, 2, 1946, p 35 
Lucas And the number of the criminal closs in Johannesburg is a 
very small percentage of the total? 
Cooke That is so. 45 
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This admission reflects on Cooke's remarks quoted earl ier where he suggested thot 
the failure of other municipolities to implement the various regulations was due to 
'lock of organisation' . 46 Qu ite clearly Cooke believed that where Africans lived 
in the locations, effective organ isat ion and control was a simple matter of 'closing 
the gates'. Then Africans illegally in the urban areas for non-payment of tax, 
rent, or with a pass endorsed under anyone of the service contract lows for farm 
employees or mineworkers, could easily be caught. They would then be repatri-
ated, endorsed out, or - in the case of the' idle , dissolute or disorderly' closs -
be sent ta gaol or a form colony. In the case of pass-bearing Africans, according 
to Cooke, the prablem was simplified . And where officials hod to contend with 
many thousands I iving in unprocla imed urban areas, the threat of the pass raid was 
47 
the only means of contro l, Cooke averred. 
With so few controlled locations one can understand why mony local 
outhorities were finding it hord to 'organise' urban Africans along the I ines Cooke 
suggested. This was also one of the main reasons why the govemment amended the 
urban areas lows in 1930. 48 
But controlling these Africans was not half as hord again as regulating 
the others on the edge of most towns in so-called 'squatter' locations and in 
villages such as Alexandra township, for (as we have already noted) these fell 
outside municipal bounds altogether. So said Graham Ballenden, Manager of the 
Johannesburg NAD, who went on to reject flatly the idea of developing 'native 
villages' where Africans had freehold ownership of land: 
I would soy this, that with regard to the estoblishment of privately 
owned freehold townships on the borders of Johannesburg, the 
Council is opposed to their establishment. The fear is that they are 
uncontrolled areas and that you will build up a dangerous population 
on the border . The Counci l are not altogether pleased with the 
existence of Alexandra Township in some respects. 49 
45 NEC 1930-1932, oral evidence of Major H 5 Cooke, 4 May 1931 
46 See p 297 above. 
47 See Davenport, 'The triumph of Colonel Stallard ... ', p 79, and p 301 above. 
48 Before 1930, section 2 of the 1923 Act was still permissive, but after thot 
dote the Govemor-General was empowered to proclaim areas if the local 
authorities refused to act. 
49 NEC 1930-1932, oral evidence of G Ballenden, 12 May 1931 
Lucas' re joinder that segregaTed locations were preferred because they gave local 
autho rities 'an opportunity for the big brother view' possibly sums up the whites' 
position best. 
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African resentment ogoinst the location system and the pass laws was spelt 
out for the ICU by Henry Daniel Tyomzashe and Thomas Mbeki. After what Cooke 
and Ballenden said, this other evidence suggests a new economic motive for 
con troll ing Africans : 
Tyamzashe in Johannesburg, the Natives are given six days, 
to look for work - unemployed Natives, and, after six doys, if the 
Pass Officer I ikes he gives the Native another chance to look for 
work for anothe r six doys; after the second six days, the Native is 
transferred to another port of the Reef, where he may not have friends, 
- and the Government is not concerned how he ge ts there . He is 
unemployed, as you will understand, and he has got either to walk 
to that p lace, or to get there somehow. IWlny Natives try to ovoid 
this pos ition, and it leads them inta crime or deperation, as I have 
sa id there in my statement, and dissipation. [sicJ We have hod 
many cases like that. I think the Commission will see that it is a 
very unreasonable attitude to toke up towards on unemployed man . 
Mbeki . .. Another thing mentioned by my friend is with regard to 
Na tives seek ing work. There is a deplorable state of affairs . If the 
Native is taken to the Native Affairs Reception Depot - even if he 
has got a friend, he cannot stay with his friend unless he has his own 
receipt to show he has got a particular fr iend. 
Chainman What receipt? 
Mbeki He must have his own receipt to soy he has a house in town. 50 
There is another thing which I think the Commission should take notice 
of; it is the fac t that . •. I have seen a lot of emp loyers there [at 
the Reception Depot]; immediately they come there ta get some 
Native employees, they generally choose which employees they wont 
.. •. The people are there simply because they must have their boys 
and these boys must be under the Pass System. 
What I mean is this; on employer goes there. They know the Native 
cannot go there unless they have a pass, and they can offer their 
services for any amount of money. 51 
These remarks appl ied to the northern provinces where it was ill egal for 
50 Under local au thority regulations, lodger's permit, permit to enter a location. 
See GN 1546 of 1924, as amended by GN 1962 of 1924, 191 of 1925, 1894 
of 1926, 657 of 1927, and 1562 of 1928. See also UG 22-32 for special 
pre-Union lows in the various provinces, and Report on native pass laws, UG 
41-22. 
51 NEC 1930-1932, joint oral evidence of H D Tyamzashe and T Mbeki, 18 May 
1931 
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Africans to be without one or several passes even inside a proclaimed area. 52 The 
reception depots53 indirectly gave urban employers a cheap rese rve of labour. 
Their specific function (however de-emphasised) was to contro l and register serv ice 
contracts, passes and documents issued under the various Acts. 54 These papers 
specified the ' right' of an African to be in the urban area in the first place; and 
once there, his 'right' to seek work; his 'right' to reside in a specific place -
only whil e employed; and his duty to pay his taxes. 55 Failure in anyone of these 
could mean summary arres t. 
The pass laws and their operation came under review during the He rtzog 
era. The thrus t of the new regulations - both under the 1929 Native Administration 
Amendment Ac t and the amended 1930 Natives' (Urban Areas) Act - was towards 
new restric tions and better ways of running the scheme. 
We must understand the euphemism in Cooke's' irksome restrictions' to 
see how the pass laws, which may not have done much for urban control, nonethe-
less controlled the flow of labour toward the primary secto rs. The location sys tem, 
it is suggested, was vital to the whole process. The fact that the government 
persevered with such a negative scheme for African urbanisation shows how hugely 
the labour demands of mine and farm weighed in policy. 
52 Different types of pass laws to control and regulate the movement of African 
workers which had been instituted by 1932 would fall under one of the fallow-
ing headings: Travelling pass - 30 days' duration, see Proclamation 150/1934; 
Seeking work pass - 9 days, Urban Areas Act; Native service contract of 
farm labourer - see Native Service Contract Act which specifies that a pass 
must be endorsed to show that the labour service contract has been fulfilled 
before other employment; Special pass - if moving out of registration area 
in labour district (Ordinance 37/1901 and 27/1903) or under cu rfew regulo-
tions framed under the 1923 Act; revised Poss laws exemption certificates -
this came into effect only in 1934, see Proclamotion 150/1934. The Cape 
proper was exempt from most of these regulations. See appendix C.5 for details 
of laws from which the Cape was exempt. 
53 Section 5 , subsections 25-33 of Natives' (Urban Areas) Act 1923. See regu-
lations framed under section 23 (1) of the Notives' (Urban Areas) Act for the 
proclaimed areas defined in Proclamation 203 of 1924. 
54 Under Native Labour Regulation Act 15/1911 applied to labour districts 
procla imed under section 17 of Natives' (Urban Areas) Act 1923, and special 
endorsements on passes of farm labourers under the various Master and Servants 
Ac ts . See regulations framed under section 23 (1) of Natives' (Urban Areas) 
Ac t fo r proclaimed areas defined in Proclamation 203 of 1924, regulations 7-
11. 
55 Native Taxation and Development Act 41 / 1925. See chap 5 above. 
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Africans had many reasons for resenting the urban pal icy. Officials d id 
not care where work seekers lived or whether they got jobs. Life in the town-
ship was fraught with lega l obstacles. Restrictions even got in the way of Africans 
trying to win a better deal for the locations. 
In the Cape, outside the proclaimed urban areas, service contracts were 
not regis tered and the carrying of passes had been abal ished. 56 Nonetheless, 
since the proclamation of certa in urban areas under the 1923 Act, some restrictive 
measures came to apply to non-exempted Cape urban workers as well. So, some 
of the disabilities imposed on Africans in the North were beginning to be felt in 
the Cape too . The Rev A Mtimkulu 57 the effect: . 
The labour conditions in the Cape Peninsula are uncertain since the 
operation of the Urban Areas Act and the conditions of work for 
Natives have decreased, as most of the employers prefer registered 
voters and coloured labour, instead of taking responsibility and 
expense of registering their labourers. 58 
Suggesting the motive behind the law, Mtimkulu went on to note that 
'The supp ly of labour is more tha n the demand, conseguently recruiting for the gold 
. h b . ,59 m mes as een ac t Ive ..•. 
It was not only the economic injustice that Africans focussed on. Reading 
through any of the documents collated by Karis & Carter under the heading 'We 
respectfu lly submit', or the poges and pages of evidence submitted respectfully to 
the NEC, one becomes aware of the Africans' deep understanding of the whites' 
point of view, but at the same time there is an underlying frustration and anger, 
espec ially at the loss of human dignity and the price their wives and families had 
ta pay. This statement is typical; 
No race, other than the A frican people's, knows how much of its 
degrada tion has resulted from economic fallacies practised on them 
by the State, and how much of these economic fallacies have , like 
a disease, infected a sec tion of a European's which has been made 
the means to keep the Africans on the lowest economic level. Yet 
56 Report of the Inter-departmental Committee on the Native Pass Laws, UG 
41-22, paras 29-35 
57 Abne r S Mtimkulu, Methodist min ister active in the Natal ANC 
58 NEC 1930- 1932, typescript evidence of AS Mtimkulu . Only registered 
African voters in the Cape were exempt in proclaimed areas. See also NEC 
1930-1932, typescript evidence of J R Cooper, NAD Manager, Bloemfon tein, 
and Report of the Inte~-departmenta l Committee on the Labour Resources of 
the Union , 1930, An 89-1931, para 91 which states that male servants were 
preferred to female because the former were subject to the control of the pass 
laws. This con tradicts Mtimkulu's evidence. 
59 See pp 234-236. 
no other roce, other thon the Africans has shown a determinotion to 
resist any artificiol force employed to submerge it. Our women folk 
have lived up to the best trod it ions of Ban tudom by making themselves 
martyrs of the roce . Men, too, have not lacked courage. The liquor 
queens and pilferers are the victims of a bad economic system. When 
the demands of life cannol- be sat isfied by the existing standard of 
wages it behoves those who feel the pinch to throw all scruples of 
moro ls to the wind and seek salvation in every humonly possible way 
and by such caprices as may even tua ll y place the ir children in better 
economic circumstances. It has been C:efinite !y ascertained that 
whereas it costs an African family between £7. O. 0 and £8. O. 0 per 
month (w ithout clathing and other conven iences) to I ive in Johannes-
burg, the average wage eamed is anyth ing between £4 and £6 per 
mon th, and in some cases much iess. For this reason, women have 
had to abandon their homes and chiidren to go and tend for them. 
Most of the ch ildren thus abandoned grow wild and free from necessary 
discip line and parental supervision, with the result that we are watch-
ing the generot ion growing before us with scarcely anything in the 
form of morol restroint. No wonder many mothe rs have taken to all 
sorts of illicit deolings . Le t us here state definitely that the mojority 
of chi ldren ottending school in troin ing institutions are children of 
'Liquor queens'. The parents who ottempt to send their children for 
highe r education and are dependent on I-heir wages invariably fail. 
With an economic system such as this the who le of our social life is 
nothing but a hideous picture, degroded to the depths of degradation 
by the slums - dens for crime and immorality: it is inevitable . 60 
African protest under worsening cond itions 
Little wonder that African frustrotion wen t on the march under the 
magnetic leadersh ip of Clements Kadalie of the ICU . Margaret Ballinger was not 
merely stirring up trouble when she sa id, 
the grea test burden on the Native is, I fancy, spiritual and moral. 
He is in a state but not of it. He is denied the exercise of the virtue 
of loyalty. His imagination is turned not towards but aga inst the 
commun ity with in which he I ives. That community denies him citizen-
ship, which is as much an injustice as the refusal to allow him the 
freedom ta improve his material status. It is even more emphatically 
a den ia l of hi s personality . 61 
60 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of the Sophiatawn Ratepayers' Associa-
tion. [sic] ,Vtajor Cooke in his ev idence sto ted, ' it would probobly be true 
to say that a minimum of £6 (pe r month) in the way of income is essential to 
the wellbeing of a Na tive fami ly of four persons residing in a loca tion or 
Native village in Johannesburg ano that the average is well below tha t 
figure .' Mr Lucas said, 'The evidence showed that Natives, in order to sove 
their wages to take them home often over-economised in food, with the con-
sequent ill effects on thei r hea lth. ' Th is ev idence was supported by the 
statement of the SAR & H. UG 22-32, paros 233 and 236 respectively. See 
also annexu re 24, tables I - V I. Severol other witnesses made the same 
point . 
61 M L Hodgson, 'Repress ion or reform: South Africa's Riotous Assemblies Bill ', 
Ballinger papers , UCT collection, D70/ 80 2 (t) 
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To these remarks at the time she added a warning: 
And like the material injustice, it will bring its own nemesis . If the 
Native loyalty is not enlisted for the State, it will be enlisted against 
it. 62 
The powerfu l economic base that had strengthened ICU support was 
broadened into a political platform. By this move Kadalie had hoped to merge 
the economic interests of the mass of the African workers with the more politically 
oriented members of the ANC. But Kadalie found himself confronted with embry-
onic African nationa lism - which was then iess militant than his own movement. 
Having shifted from his purely economic stance, he found his method of protest 
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did not suit the ANC. There was deadlock on action and so the support for each 
group steadily declined. Still, the events and developments precipitated by the 
Pact government and the increasing material burden the Africans were being forced 
to bear meant African protest would not stay dormont for long. A new pol itical 
mil itancy in the ANC emerged under the leadership of Gumede, displacing the 
ICU as the spearhead of African activism. Al ready tens of thousands of Africons 
in town and out had been politicised through ICU activities. In 1929 the pent-up 
African frustration was directed and burst out in a series of strikes. 63 
Some dismissed African criticism as inconsequential, including the NEC: 
'the Native economic question', they wrate in the opening remarks to the published" 
report, ' is not primarily a problem of a small, vocal, dissatisfied, semi-civilised 
group of urbanised Natives' - which was to say, an insignificant minority. But 
the government itself and general white citizenry said it was the work of agitators 
ond in the late 1920s and early 1930s mounted a barrage of Acts against them. 
Among the first of many Amendment Bills on African affairs, the Riotous 
Assemblies Amendment Bill was passed in 1930 specifically to deal with African 
'agitation'. Africans hod struck on economic issues and the pass lows before 64 
but in 1929 when the Minister of Justice first introduced the Riotous Assemblies 
Bill - dubbed' Pirow's law of oppression' - they attacked the law itself. 
Under this Bill the Minister could prohibit ony public gothering, or ony-
one from attending such a gathering if, in his op inion, 
62 Ibid 
63 For details see Raux, Time longer than rope, p 186ff. 
64 Ibid, P 132ff, and Davenport, South Africa .. " p 179ff 
there is reason to apprehend that fee l ings of hostil ity would be 
engendered between ony Eurapean inhabitants af the Union on the 
one hand, and any pe~ans belonging to any other class or section 
of the inhabitants of the Union on the other. 65 
Similarly the Minister could censor the press by prohibiting the publica-
tion of any documentary information - any bock, magazine, newspaper, periodi-
ca I. And fina lIy, 
when after due enquiry, the Minister is satisfied that any person is 
in any area habitually promoting feelings of hostility between any 
European inhabitants of the Union on the one hand, and any person 
belonging to any other class or section of the inhabitants of the 
Union on the other hand, he may by notice under his hand •.. 
prohibit him, after a period stoted in such not ice and during a 
period likewise stated therein, from being within any area defined 
by such notice. 66 
In short, the Minister of Justice had decided to deal with the 'rising tide 
of the black menace' by putting the liberty of Africans at his own mercy and 
destroying their right of free speech or movement. In 1927 this freedom of move-
ment had been curtailed, as Edgar Brookes put it, by 
a specia I insolence of bureaucracy, the restriction of the fundamen-
tal right of publ ic meeting in Native areas has become a matter not 
of Statute, but of Regulation under Section 27(1 )(c) of the Native 
Administration Act (1927). 67 
The need for excessive measures to crush the ICU suggests that this first 
working class movement deserves reassessing both in its own terms and to see what 
conditioned, from this time onward, the 'Kadalie complex' in whites. (Debates 
on these measures focus on the ICU even after its decl ine in the early 1930s.) 
Opposition was also at grassroots level, and the ICU was aware of its 
impact. As Eddie Roux wrote: 
the I. C. U. leadership, which, carrying on the hamba kahle tradition, 
endeavoured always to give that organisation the outward appearance 
of an innocuous body interested only in co-operation with the Govern-
ment ond opposed to all forms of extremism, it was inevitable that the 
spread of the movement should be viewed with apprehension by farmers, 
missionaries and others. Farme~' organisations, particularly in Natal 
and the Orange Free State, threatened drastic action against any of 
their labourers who joined the I.e. U. 68 
65 House of Assembly Debates, debate on Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law 
Amendment Bill, 20 March 1930, col 2151 ff; and also Hodgson, op cit, p 3 
66 Hodgson, opcit, p4 
67 Brookes, The colour problems •.. , P 10 
68 Roux, op cit, p 173 
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tvIorgaret Ballinger, another witness to the passing of the Bill, confirmed 
Raux's impressions. She wrote caus tically about SAP failure to react to a Bill 
designed to undermine personal freedom and the Rule of Law. She demonstrated 
the congruence of white ottitudes when it came to African repression 'in the 
interests of the state'. Their variance was in degree, not in kind. The point she 
underlined was how cynically the government played up the bogey of a black 
uprising, and she wrote in 1929: 
Mr. Pirow, in moving the second read ing of this amazing Bill, made 
a valiant attempt ta terrify the country with the bogey of a black 
Communist revolution. The attempt was a decided failure - the 
case was hopelessly thin. Unfortunately for South Africa, however, 
there has ceased to be a Pari iamentary Opposition on the Native 
issue, and the South African Party, while refusing to believe in the 
bogey, had obviously agreed ta act as if they were really frightened. 
If the situation were not so serious it would be extremely amusing. 
The Minister of Justice might fail to unearth a wide-spread plot to 
blow the nation up, but the Opposition was not going to spoil the 
game for a I ittle failure of that kind. 69 
Echoing African fears, tvIorgaret Ballinger continued: 
It would be foolish as well as futile to deny that there exists serious 
unrest omong the Native population of the Union at the present time. 
It is only tao true. But what we must face is that repressive legisla-
tion will never cure that unrest. Indeed, it is bound to aggravate it, 
for one of its root causes is to be found in the fear of what the Govem-
ment is going to do. This is one of the occasions in which fear begets 
fear. The Government is actuated by a panic fear of a 'black South 
Africa'; the Native is becoming actuated by a panic fear of the ways 
in which the Government will try to avoid that eventuality; and this 
situation, complicated by real economic grievances which, in the 
meantime, are receiving little or no attention except of the 'Colour 
Bar' type, is leading ta unrest of a dangerous kind. 70 
With the Riotous Assemblies Act in 1930, the 'rising tide of the black 
menace' had been temporarily crushed. Using the dictatorial powers granted him 
under the Act, Pirow banned meetings and exiled Congress leaders. He picked his 
deportees astutely, Eddie Roux wrote, so that 
the orders of banishment were extended to cover almost all the Cape 
Province with the exception of towns like Cape Town and Port Eliza-
beth, where it was felt that Congress agitators could not do much 
harm. After the banning of the principal leaders, members in the 
different local ities tried to ca rry on with the work of the Congress 
under increasing difficul ties. A number of branch secretaries then 
69 Hodgson, op cit, p 4 
70 Hodgson, op cit, p 5. See also Xuma in Karis & Carter (eds), v 1, doc 41d, 
p 219 
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received notices to leave their homes, among them Plaatje, 
the Chairman at Worcester . Finally the whole movement was 
bea ten into su llen silence. 71 
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ANC activities in fact came to a standstill. For 18 months the leadership 
was split into two camps. Not even a convention was held. The President General, 
P ka I Seme, was accused of 'culpable ine rtia', and at a special emergency con-
vention held eventually in July 1932 there was an attempt to reassess the future of 
African opposition. 
In deal ing with African grievances simply by trying to repress them, the 
government effected a revival of concerted African protest. In 1932 a special 
emergency conven tion of the ANC denounced the government for 'the increasing 
burdens and disabil ities infl icted upon the race by retrograde and medieval laws ' 
and their indifference towards Africans during the depression. They continued: 
This special convention deplores the fact that the voice of the 
African people, which has been consp icuous by its absence in the 
following among other matters, has lent colour to a silent acquies-
cence thereto: 72 
the 1932 Service Contract Act; the death of 4000 Africans in Zululand from 
malaria; the evic tion of 150 families from the Lydenburg distri c t with no provis ion 
for their resettlement and a similar noti fica tion to 'thousands living near towns in 
Natal'; the destitution of Africans 'under an unparalleled depression ' and their 
'displacement from work by whites in accordance with government pol icy'; the 
failure of the government 'to provide relief work for those left destitute' - these 
73 
were among the ma tters I isted. The spate of discriminatory amending laws had 
undoubtedly had immediate effect. 
The last stronghold of African resistance, the ICU of Natal (ICU yase 
Natal) led by Johannes Nkosi and George Champion, was finally destroyed after 
71 Roux, Time longer than rope, p 243. Bunting had belonged to the Communist 
Party . During the debate on the Riotous Assemblies Bill , the Ministe r of Jus-
ti ce sa id, 'This House in deal ing with the Native Administration Act in May 
1927, drafted clause 29 with the avowed obiect of getting at the agitator, and 
the Bunting and Ndobe cases show we failed in our obiect.' House of Assembly 
Deba tes, 20 March 1930, col 2158. Courts had found Bunting not guilty of 
inci tement. Bransky Ndobe and Elliot Tonieni, both miiitant members of the 
ANC, broke away in 1930 and tried to form an independent ANC. Ndobe 
was tried with Bunting under the Native Admin istration Act. For some 
detail on ANC leaders, see Karis & Carter (eds), v 4. 
72 Report on the proceedings of the Special Emergency Convention of the ANC, 
Umteteli wa Bantu, 23 July 1932, in Karis & Carter (eas), v·,, doc 48k, p 312 
73 See appendix D for list of discriminatory laws. 
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a pass-burn ing ral ly on Dingaan's Day, 16 December 1931. Nkosi was shot while 
the pol ice were dispersing the gathering, and Champ ion was deported along with 
many others in a mass rou nd-up of communist leaders who had dared to address this 
and other protest mee tings. 
At this point African oppos ition reached its nadi r and stayed the re until 
1935 when the first AII-Africon Conven tion (AAC) was cal led to discuss the new 
drafts of 'Hertzog's Bills'. 
Urban areas pol icy revised - 1930 
IV-ony Africans rejected officialdom so completely that they dismissed 
even some improvements from that hated source. This attitude was compounded by 
the inabil ity of the state to resol ve the contentious issue of how or who was to 
fund the estab lishment and maintenance of the locations segregated by law. 
There had to be a satisfactory basis for the financial re lationship between 
local authority and Africans. Attempts to devise one were made repea tedly from 
1913 onwards when the TB Commission a lleged that many urban local authorities 
were making a profit on their locations. 74 The 1923 Urban Areas Act introduced 
this first formal financial scheme . The prime purpose was to make every loca l 
authority concerned under the Act open a Native Revenue Account. This would 
prevent local authorities from making a profit out of the locations under their 
control which they might otherwise do by incorporating location revenues in the 
General Rate Fund and spending less on loca tion maintenance. 
A very contentious issue was the need for funds to meet recurring expendi-
tures on ordinary municipal services and for redeeming capital on building schemes, 
as well as for administering the location. Under the 1923 Act an even more con-
tentious solution was foun d, involv ing the control and supply of 'koffir beer' . 
Total prohibition of intox icat ing liquor to Africans (with some almost 
negl igible except ions) had been in force since before Union. KaHir beer, partly 
fermented kaffi r com malt gruel, rarely exceeding 2 per cent by weight in alcohol, 
was sub ject to different laws in the different provinces. In the 1923 Urban Areas 
Act there was an attempt at uniformity. The Act provided for a municipal monopoly 
on domestic brew ing to be introduced in areas approved by the Minister of Native 
Affairs. But, as the Act was permissive only, there was no way of compelling 
74 Davenport, op cit, pp 343-344 
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municipali ties ta provide, by whichever method, for Africans to obtain kaffir beer. 
In Johannesburg and on the Reef, for example, where total prohibition was in 
75 force, no change was mode. In Natal, where the Natal Beer Act 23 of 1908 
allowed local authorities to claim a monopoly in the manufacture and sale of kaffir 
beer, eight local authorities including Durban and Pietermaritzburg had been doing 
so before the 1923 Act was passed. 
Profits from the municipal sale of kaffir beer were so great, ond they were 
so valuable for sub-economic housing subsidies and other needs in Natal, that 
many municipal authorities began to reassess their kaffir beer regulations. The 
supply of kaffir beer was no longer regarded primarily as a liquor problem but had 
become part and parcel of the wider problem of local finance . As later develop-
ments were ta show, the 1923 Act by introducing fiscal segregation in this way, 
initiated a practice whereby municipal authorities were tempted to make Africans 
(the poorest sect ion of the community) pay for their own services. Beer became a 
most profitable source of revenue, and local authorities began to follow a self-
balancing policy in regard to the Native Revenue Account. 
These developments were inevitable, considering the reluctance of the 
central government to take responsibility for funding location improvement. R H 
Godlo, Chairman of the African Location Advisory Board Congress, in his 1929 
report slammed the government, commerce and industry for the parlous state of 
urban locations. Like the municipal authorities, he held that the state and indus-
try should do more to help their development: 
The point of view of the municipalities in this respect is not altoge-
ther unreasonable as this unsatisfactory sta te of affairs has been 
crea ted by the Government in pass ing the repress ive prov is ions of 
the Natives' Land Act of 1913 •... Commerce and industry come 
under the same category, as the inadequacy of wages paid to 
Natives is one of the contributory causes to the existing state of 
affairs, because commerce and industry are benefiting at the 
expense of both the municipal ities and Natives. ... 76 
75 Except that employers of 50 Africans or more might provide kaffir beer graded 
for consumption on the employers' premises. See Social and Economic Planning 
Council report 8 for detai ls on the financing of location development from the 
Kaffir Beer Account; E Hellman, 'The importance of beer brewing in an urban 
slum yard', Bantu Studies, v 8, 1; evidence presented ta the Committee of 
Enquiry on Kaffir Beer Profits by the SA IRR, Race Relations, 205/45; and 
Swanson. 
76 R H Godlo, President/Chairman, Location Advisory Board Congress of South 
Africa, 'Urban Native legislation' in Karis & Carter {eds}, v 1, doc 51a-51c, 
p 314 
Lucas, in the NEC report, come to the some conclusion . Hobart Houghton, on 
economist, argued that the white community gained cheap labour through the 
location system at the expense of the Africans: 
The inevitable result of the gop between wages and necessary expen-
diture has been the creation of appalling slum conditions, and muni-
cipal authorities have been faced with the burden of providing 
housing at sub-economic renlo. This has led ta municipal authorities 
regording Native labourers as a liability rather than on asset, but 
the true fact is that the European employers are being subsidised on 
their wages bill. 77 
This was strongly contested by R H Henderson, on opposition MP representative of 
commercial intereslo. During the second reading of the 1930 Urban Areas Amend-
ment Bill he stated: 
I notice in the evidence of the Johannesburg deputation to the select 
committee they said that not only is it the amount of money they have 
spent, and the work done, but there is on· annual loss of £15000 to 
the Johannesburg munic ipal ity. One of the representatives stated 
that the municipal ities stand the loss, and that employers get labour 
at a cheaper rate. After all the municipality and employers are all 
taxpayers and it comes to prac tically the some th ing, so that if some 
of the extra money of the taxpayer is expended to corry out this 
excellent Act, he is getting it back in another way. 78 
For Henderson and many others, location development was up ta the government . 
Again some insisted that, because the government hod started the segre-
gated locations and specified how they should be, it was responsible for them. 
313 
In most cases that meant funds. This claim was reinforced by others who criticised 
the government's policy of having houses built by white labour at union rates for 
which Africans ultimately had to pay. That ideo was denounced by those who said 
that white taxes were used, at the expense of poor whites, for African improvements 
and development. 
This ongoing debate is of particular importance, for in many ways it was 
the main obstacle municipalities had in effecting location development. As the 
Chief Magistrate of Johannesburg, Henry Britten, explained: 
The Borough Council decided to erect small cottages in one of the 
Locations . Tenders were called for, coloured labour was exc luded 
and the cost was so high that up ta the time I left, the natives for 
77 Hobart Houghton, Some economic problems of the Bantu •. " p 39. See 
also the NEC comment cited below, p 314, and n 8.79. 
78 House of Assembly Debates, 19 January 1930, col 242 
whom the cottoges were erected refused to occupy them on account 
of the exorbitont rent charged which was based on the cost of erection. 
The anomaly however was that the money used would, by the payment 
of ren t, be repaid by the natives. They were not only prevented from 
accep ting employment in connection with the erection of the buildings 
bu t were being made to meet a much higher rent, as the result of suc h 
exclusion . 79 
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As he a nd mony othe rs pointed out, this in itself was undermining the whol e segre-
gation policy too, and was leading to the degradation of the existing viliages . 80 
The NEC, told to deal with this question,81 could show that the Native 
Revenue Account was funded solely from African sources. They al so showed tha t 
the loca l Native Revenue Account bore the interest and redemption of capital on 
building schemes, so that the Africans themse lves pa id for it all in the end. 82 
They condemned thi s practice in the strongest terms, citing as one of the reasons : 
This over- capitol ises the location ab in itio and frequently there is 
no escape from the necessity to subsidise rent. In time this will have 
a ha rmful e ffect on the location itself, in as much as urban authori-
t ies , faced by successive losses on the Native Revenue Account, will 
be chary of unde rtoking further expenditure. 83 
This typifies the confl icts that deadlocked government pol icy. How in fact did 
the government reso lve this particular problem? 
Urban areas pol icy and labour control 
Aga in, it is interesting tha t the government bowed once more to pressure 
from the country . It was shown earl ier that most farmers opposed segregating 
Africans comp lete ly from the towns because that was the one way labour te nants 
could earn a cash wage afte r completing their compulsory labour service. This 
town-earning became even more importont, from the formers' point of view, a fter 
79 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of Henry Britten, Chief /v'ogistrate of 
Johannesburg. Sheila van der Horst notes, 'In so far as the Act has extended 
the compulsory segregation of Natives, who may be compelled to live in 
areas remote from their work, the attractiveness of work is diminished; whe re 
train fares have to be paid out of wages, the va lue of the wages to the reci-
pient is re duced'. Such factors would also oct to undermine the success of 
the 1923 Act. SA Journal of Economics, pp 496-497 . 
80 See statements by Mbeki and Tyamzashe, n 8.34. 
81 See terms of reference, UG 22-32, p 3. 
82 See n 8.75 for references. 
83 UG 22- 32, pa ra 506 
the mines extended their contractual term for recruited labourers to an II-month 
or 270-hour one in 1923. This clashed with the extended labour service of farm 
tenan~ who before had served a six-month shift on the mines with ease when they 
on ly had to work for the farmer for three consecutive months. 
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From the early twenties the towns provided this cash outlet. To ensure 
Africans and their famil ies were not attracted to the urban areas on a permanent 
bas is, though, the farmers urged the government to keep a system of housing single 
African males in the town rather as the mines did under the compound scheme. 84 
As a commentator on the farmers' demands wrote at the time: 
The idea apparently is to reproduce at the towns the system that 
exists at the mines and to rep lace the present Native villages (loca-
tions) by compounds for single men or at least men without their 
famil ies. This would mean that the famil ies evacuated from their 
present houses in the locations would have to find homes elsewhere, 
and, as there is no room for them in the more congested rese rves, 
they would be forced to apply for permission to I ive on farms, where 
the men would be obi iged to give three months' labour in each year 
to the farmers without pay before they left for the town compounds 
to work for a wage, leaving their famil ies on the farms for the rest 
of tre yea r . 85 
The farmers as well as the mineowners made their influence felt in another 
way. Under the 1930 Urban Areas Amendment Act the government agreed to pay 
only for building single quarters. Now, as the 1923 Act laid dawn that suitable 
accommodation had to be provided before an African could enter an urban area, 
it can be assumed that the government's intention here was to encourage local 
authorities to build compound-like state-subsidised hostels rather than family 
houses - which would deter African families from moving to the towns. It was a 
disguised form of influx control. 
W'f;Jny local authorities and industrial ists supported the state in this. The 
1923 Act required employers to see their African employees were properly housed, 
86 but this provis ion, Davenport shows, was unenforceable. One reason was that 
the hostel system was a cheaper way of financing location development and so it 
got greater support than family housing schemes, espec ially from urban employers 
still re liant on unskilled migrant labour. In the 1920s such employers were still 
in the ma jority. 
84 See chap 5 
85' Wil son & Perrot (eds), 'Forced labour', April 1930, p 322 
86 Davenport, op cit, p 344 
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The compound system on the mines had praved the cheapest form af accom-
modation. 87 It also legitimised low wages, on the argument that Africans living 
in the urban area as s ingle men did not have a wife and family to keep, and besides 
they drew a partial subsistence from the land . This would also put a check on the 
uncontrolled influx of African women, and with workers I iving in hostels they could 
be more closely controlled. 
The urban areas pol icy reveals another of the many paradoxes in the 
government's segregat ian plan. The poorest people not only had to pay for much 
of their own welfare and development, but ultimately for a policy most of them 
abhorred. Yet whites converted to a belief in segregation were not prepared to 
make sacrifices and endure its teething troubles. 
The 1930 Urban Areas Amendment Act seems to have been at cross-
purposes in that its regulations included some that aimed to stabilise the detribalised 
urban Africans already resident in the urban areas. Of particular importance was 
the power given the Governor-General-in-Council to force local authorities to 
allow African trading' in their own areas' of the towns; and also the matter of the 
influx of women, on which Davenport writes: 
Symbolic of this lack of interest in influx control was Parliament's 
ottitude to female urbanization, with all the potential risk which 
this carr ied for the future of the segregation policy. The legislators 
saw it primarily os a phenomenon linked with the growth of illegiti-
macy and the brewing of ill icit I iquor, and therefore accepted a 
clouse empowering the local authority 'to refuse permission for any 
female Native to enter the proclaimed area unless she is in possession 
of a certifica te issued by the urban local authority •.. that accom-
modation is avoilable'. But any African woman whose husband or 
father had been resident in the area for two years was to rece ive a 
certificate as a matter of right. 88 
On trading rights, Davenport notes how a Free Stote MP found the prin-
ciple of the clause 'diametrically opposed to the old Free Stote policy, which was 
to treat locations as only sleeping and living places for the coloured people who 
were required to do the work of the villages'. 89 Nonetheless, the government 
took the extraordinary step of empowering the Governor-General to extend 
trading rights to Africans in the urban areas. AI though Jansen, the Minister of 
87 See J Rex, 'The compound, reserve and urban location - essential institutions 
of Southern African labour exploitotion', SA Labour Bulletin, v 1, 5. Also 
UG 31-41, para 393. 
88 Davenport, 'The triumph of Colonel Stollard ... ', P 83 
89 Ibid 
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Native Affairs, made it clear he would not compel local authorities, Parliament 
had still given Africans the go-ahead to trade in white areas . The government's 
failure to fulfil its promise became a real source of grievance. But, with a growing 
number of whites firmly opposed to Africans having a stake in the white areas, 
whether this clouse ever had a chance of being accepted is open to debate. 
Stallardism in the 1930s 
Opposing these and ather concessions in the 1930 Urban Areas Bill, 
Stallard stoted: 
Underlying the policy of urban segregation was the desire to reduce 
the power of the block man in the urban areas by making it difficult 
for him to acquire a stoke in the town or, indeed, in his own loca-
tion, for - as the Stollard Commission emphasised - the man of 
property could hardly be den ied the municipal vote. 90 
This att itude hod led to the deletion of the clause in the original 1923 Urban Areas 
Bill which made provision for some Africans to get land in freehold. This was only 
one of the many assumptions underlying Sto liard's panacea for an urban pol icy 
solution. The proposals he enunciated in 1923 and again in 1930 in a more elaborate 
form catered for a complex array of demands and sectional interests, as we can see 
from the points he aired during the debate on the Urban Areas Amendment Bill: 
In the colour bar you introduce different legislation. You soy that 
we sholl have certain walks in life in which the natives sholl not be 
allowed to function at all. We know that that has been practically 
a dead letter .•.. You have introduced three classes of legislation 
which is exemp lified in the Wage Act ..•. What is the result? The 
result has been not to displace the blocks but to raise the whites. 91 
He deplored the artificial raising up of whites. His solution was to weed out 
'redundant' and 'surplus' Africans from the towns. This, in Stollard's terms, meant 
all those occupying jobs, menial or otherwise, that could be filled by whites. 
He questioned the efficacy of the state's 1930 revised urban areas pol icy 
on the following grounds: 
Natives, undesirable in respect of earning a living, idle or disorderly 
natives etc ., will flock into the towns ..•. It is indisputoble that 
they are coming in in such largely increased numbers that the munici-
pal authorities will have difficulty in exercising powers of control. 
90 Davenport, South Africa • .. , p 342 
91 House of Assembly Debates, 30 January 1930, col 288 
•.. The natural increase without any ingress at all, is of no insigni-
ficant dimension. How do you propose to deal with that? The 
origina l Act left tho t problem untouched, and I regre t to see, search-
ing the amendments to the Bill as carefully as I have been able to do, 
that the problem is still le ft untouched. The removal of disarderly 
natives is no mitigation of the position at all. 92 
The whole system of labour control and allocation, Sta ll ard insisted, 
rested on the prov ision of proper machinery fo r repatriating and redirecting labour 
away from the towns to the mines and forms. He sa id, 
The authorities have been unable to cope with it. The measures in 
force are insufficient to enable these people to be weeded out. But 
if they could be weeded out, what are you going to do with them? 
By the provisions of this Bill they will be sent to the place to which 
they belong . Where do they belong? /v'v:Jny of them have been 
born in the towns, and are part of the population in that particular 
area •••. The Bill I think foil s to deal with thi s aspect. 93 
Stallard accep ted Hertzog's view of the labou r cris is on the mines and 
forms, but not his 1930 solu tion. That was inadequate, Stal lard said: 
The question of the surplus was dealt with by ,-he Prime Minister in 
terms of very great certainty . If the sta tements of the Pr ime Minister 
this afternoon are correc t, then the prob lem becomes a very small 
one indeed. The surplus can go to the place to whic h they belong, 
which is the native reserves, and where in the Tronskei and Zululand 
there is ample scope for them .... The real trouble is the deplorably 
low stondard of agriculture and stock and the incapacity of sustained 
effort of the native population .••• The problem of how you are going 
to deal with their settlement need not be a bugbear. It is susceptible 
of a perfectly simple solution. I understand there is a very great 
demand for further native labour on the land . 
An han. tvlember Whot about the mines? 
Stallard They also require a very great deal of labour. 
An han. Member Where does the white man come in? 
Stal lord •.• I have not the sl ightest doubt that the needs of the 
mining indus try can fa irl y be met, and the method I suggest - which 
is cleaning out your towns and removing the redundant black popula-
tion from the towns - is ca lcu lated to hove the effect of supp lying 
the wants of the forming population and aiso the wants of the mines 
for a further supply of labour. 94 
Stallard emphas ised three key points. First, the urban areas shou ld be kept white 
so as to prevent inter-racial competition. By the some token, Afri cans would be 
92 Ibid, col 229 
93 Ibid, col 232 
94 Ibid, cols 221-232. Hertzog insisted there was adequate land to resettl e 
Africans repatriated under section 17 of Act 1923 . Failing this, he said in 
slight self-contradiction, there was enough work on the farms. 
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unable to get a stake in the white areas that might eventually have undermined 
the whites' position of dominance and privilege. Second, Africans who could not 
be accommodated in the reserves cou ld be resettled on white farms. And last, the 
state, by interven ing and 'cleaning out' the towns, would assure the mines of their 
labour supply. 
In the interes ts of the primary sec tors and poor whites Hertzog undoubtedly 
agreed that African labour should be rechannelled away from the towns, but he 
refused to endorse Stallard's tactics. Overa ll, Hertzog's legislative programme 
shows that - despite what Stallard sa id - the Natives' {Urbon Areas} Amendment 
Act was dovetailed into several other laws . In theory this is how it worked. 
The location system and the gove rnment's approach in implementing the 
system were prov ing counter-productive. Instead of Africans co- operating and 
accepting volun tarily the benefits the scheme allegedly offered, the state had to 
intervene with more stringent controls to enforce the system. As Davenport says: 
The normal way to maintain social control in towns all over the world 
is ta rely upon the local police to enforce municipal by-laws and 
deal, as need arises, with vagrants, drunkards and other offenders. 
Normal soc ial controls, though, were found to be insufficient by the 
South African legislature because the Urban Areas Act was required 
ta do abnormal things: to make rules for blacks which did not apply 
to wh ites; to enforce a segregationist legal system; •.• to expel 
blacks from town {but not whites} for vagrancy, idleness, d isorderli-
ness, failure ta pay rent, and other causes. 95 
Stallard argued that because the location system had broken down the government 
had no way of rechannell ing. surplus urban labour. This prablem wou ld be obviated,96 
he argued, by restric ting the number of Africans entering the towns to whatever was 
needed for the work available. The scheme devised by Hertzog's government was 
another way of using Stallard's proposals. Under this scheme the flow of labour was 
to be controlled primarily at SOurce - that is, from the white rural a reas, the 
released areas and the schedul ed reserves . The loca tion system then became just a 
checkpo int at the other end of the control system. 
The revised urban areas plan of the 1930 Amendment Bill certainly shows 
this. Briefly here are the major changes it made to the 1923 Act. The state inter-
vened to tighten up registration and administration of service contracts and pass law 
controls once an African entered the tawn. This prevented Africans illegally in 
town from getting jobs. Al though in 1923 Africans who either fell under the various 
95 Davenport, op ci t, P 346 
96 Stallard's praposals were only incorporated in the 1937 Notive Laws Amend-
ment Act. See Conclusion . 
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Moster and Servants' Lows or the 1911 Native Labour Regulation Act were preven-
ted from entering town while still under contract (as Cooke's evidence showsl,97 
municipal authori ties hod found it hard to enforce the low as they hod I ittle control 
over Africans in their areas who lived outside the segregated locations. The whole 
system had therefore to be revised, especially since by 19300 whole new closs of 
Africans fell under the definition of illegal resident. These included reserve 
Africans who hod been refused a permit to a 'closed area' under the 1927 Nat ive 
Administra tion Act; labour tenants in Notal and the Transvaal who by 1926 hod 
come under the some service contract sys~em as full-time farm employees; Africans 
living outside the reserves in specifically proclaimed pass areas under the 1929 
Native Administration Amendment Act, who like the reserve Africans could now 
be prevented from seeking work in a 'closed area'; and lastly, all Africans whose 
posses carried the new endorsement instituted under the 1932 Native Service 
Contract Act. To ensure that these Africans were not illegally employed, the 
loopholes in the 1923 Act which had mode it easy for Africans to live outside the 
proclaimed segregated locations were closed. Municipol authorities were empowered 
to proclaim districts established prior ta 1923, and Africans could be removed from 
unproclaimed areas even though no other suitable accommodation existed. Once 
in a proclaimed area, Africans automatically fell under location restrictions and 
regulations. Any failure to comply with these would be more easily detected from 
the time a work seeker arrived at the reception depot. 
If a work seeker could not find a job during the six-day period of grace, 
98 
under the 1930 Amendment, he could be refused a second work seeker's pass. The 
Act fa iled at this point - as Thomas Mbeki's evidence showed, these men were 
left to their own devices . Forced out of one area, they took the chance that a 
job might be found in another area. But mOre often than not, the evidence showed, 
because they were penniless they stayed in one area, hoping ta find a job before 
they were caught for breaking the low. In desperation many of these men would 
then accept any wage offered. It is little wonder, therefore, that the authorities 
at that stage refused to extend the period for work seekers in the towns. 
Assuming that this system would work, labour could then have been 
rechannelled ta the mines and farms by closing certain districts to Africans from 
specific areas who were seeking work. So for the first time there was a direct link 
between the source of labour and where it was going. The flow of labour from the 
97 NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence of Iv'ojor H S Cooke. See n 8.21 above. 
98 See evidence of T tvIbeki cited above, p 303. 
reserves cou ld be directed to the mines, ond Africons living in the white rural 
areas could be immobilised for at least six months in the year to serve the formers' 
needs. Presuma bly, once the mines and fa rms were adequately supplied, the 
' closed' districts 'would be opened once again. 99 
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Once the lega l machinery had been se t up, the Urban Areas Amendment 
Act would serve a dua l purpose. It would reinforce existing barriers to employment 
of illegal Africans in the towns, and at the same time help to swe ll the labour 
supply to the primory sector. How was this to happen? 
We have already seen how the location system worked to give the deftest 
form of urban labour control. 100 Under sec tion 5 (l) extra proclaimed areas could 
be created, the Governor-General could force all non-exempt Africons to stoy in 
these locations, and he was given ex tra powe r to proclaim any urban area under 
section 12 of the Ac t if the situation warranted it. Among other things, section 
12 laid down that on African could be refused permission to be in a proclaimed 
area 
if he fails to show tha t he has comp lied with the laws relating to the 
carrying of passes by Natives and, in the Provinces of Transvaal and 
Natal, if he is without a document of identification ,as prescribed by 
regulation under the Native Se rvice Contract Act, 1932, or if he is 
in possession of such documen t of identification and it appears there-
from that he is domiciled on land outside a location as defined in the 
said Act, and has not been released from the obi igation of rendering 
service to the owner as defined in the said Act of the land on which 
he is domiciled. 101 
There were sim ila r regulations framed for Africans registered under the 1911 Native 
Labour Regulation Act . These would affect Africans registered as mineworkers . 
Specia l regulations governed the employment of women, 18-year-al ds, 
'togt' or casual labour, and ex-Union labourers going to areas other than The mines. 
Africans infringing any of the regulations would be deemed to be illegally in the 
urban area, and cou ld be required to leave it, or they could be removed to their 
102 homes. 
99 Under Proclamation 150/1934, the seeking-work pass was extended to 9 
days. See n 8.45 . In 1937 the regulation period was extended to 14 days. 
100 See Cooke's ev idence cited above, pp 295-298. 
101 Natives' (Urban Areas) Act 25 of 1930, section 12 
102 Ibid. See section 17 as amended, Act 25 of 1930. 
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Extra devices were to act as deterrents to Africans thinking of settling 
permanently in town. The c lause providing for 'suitable and adequate housing' 
before removing Africans to proclaimed areas was deleted in the 1930 Amendment. 
The decision by the cen tral government not to fund family housing and location 
improvements can also be seen in this light. lVtaintenance of low wages under the 
Wage Act preven ted inter-sector competition, as did devices to ensure an over-
supply in the unsk illed sectar. 103 The hostel system for 's ingle' ma les and the 
restriction of ingress of family members wanting ta join people already in the towns 
were indirect forms of influx con trol. Without women, men would naturally tend 
to return home. Even though the restrictions enacted in 1930 were explicitly to 
limit prostitu tion and illicit brew ing, it was certainly hoped that the restrictions 
in themselves would make the urban areas less attractive to Africans seeking work . 
The repatriation clause under whic h 'idle [that is, unemployed], dissolute 
and disorder ly' Africans could be endorsed out of the proclaimed areas was recog-
nised as a way of increas ing the labour supply to the primary sectors. Hence the 
policy makers would not provide for the state to resettle this class, or for the extra 
land they would need. All that, the government argued, would make it easier for 
Africans ta evade employmen t on the mines and farms. Seen in the context of the 
debate on convict labour 104 and the decision to extend this system, clearly those 
who favoured the conv ic t labour system bel ieved that the thousands of tec hn ical 
offenders infringing all these ru les would amount to an army of reserve labour for 
use where the need was greatest, while also acting to keep wages low . 
Finally, for the best ordering of labou r, the powers vested in various 
authorities were JPdated and made more effective. In this, regulation and control 
rested with the Governor-General- in-Counc il and worked down ta the employer 
who had to ensure that a ll employees were legally in the towns before offering 
them work. 
Urban areas pol icy and wh ite worker interests 
Viewing the programme I ike this, one can see that Hertzog had no need 
for Stallard 's more drastic scheme, but it is less easy to understand the rejection 
of Stallard's argument on how to gradually eliminate competition between Africans 
and whi tes in the tawn. (Until other evidence of this period emerges our assumptions 
103 See chap 7, pp 277 and 280-283. 
104 House of Assembly Debates, 18 lVtay 1931, and above, chap 5, pp 201-207 
must necessarily be tentative and exploratory.) For the underlying motive here, 
we must see the revised industrial lows in the context of the urban areas pol icy, 
party political interests and the bas ic principles of the segregation policy as a 
whole. 
The deepest assumption throughout was that the master-servant relation-
ship and the paramountcy of white interests in the white areas should be secured. 
Some devices would 'keep the native in his place' as an unskilled, ill-trained and 
inefficient worker: the payment of 'uncivilised' wages to Africans; the provision 
of next to no state assistance for African educational needs, 105 which in turn 
would deprive Africans of the qualifications they needed ta compete with whites 
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for skilled jobs; restraints in law on African residence and movement; the depriva-
tion of equal bargaining power. We hove already seen how this subordination was 
achieved, 106 and noted the success of these measures in terms of the widening gap 
between wages of not only the unskilled and skilled workers, but also unskilled 
whites and unskilled Africans. 
The legal checks to prevent permanent African migration to the towns had 
a further significance here. Migrant labour, casual by definition, could not possibly 
hope to compete eventually with the more stable, trained unskilled and semi-skilled 
whites, who also had the advantage of compulsory state education to standard 6. 107 
Hence the decision to finance only single hostel accommodation. This, together 
with laws to deter Africans from bringing their families to the towns, appears as a 
method to advance the poor whites at the expense of Africans. 
The Carnegie commissioners laid emphas is on another point of friction: 
the difficulty of finding employment for a daughter of poor white parents in the 
face of African competition . 
Whot employmen t is there open to her in the town? She can work 
in shops, cafes and facto ries and, in exceptiona I cases, in domestic 
service. [108J The girl from the poor family stands a very poor chance 
105 See chap 7 above, p 273. 
106 See chop 7 above, p 280-283. 
107 The level of education demanded by mos t apprenticeship committees for 
entry into scheduled trades. 
108 Domestic service was still monopolised by African males . As Professor Mac-
millan noted, 'In domestic service .•. the degree of skill required and 
exacted has perhaps brought about a fair rise of wages - more than £4 a 
month, with full keep, being quite common in the better districts of johan-
nesburg. But these are the aristocrats of native labour. Among the lower 
grades, even in domestic serv ice, there is acute competition set up in no 
small measure by the exodus from the farms.' Complex South Africa, p 247. 
of being employed in the shops. She is usually too deficient in 
social training; she cannot afford the necessary clothes, nor con 
she, in her overcrowded home (which is often one room shored by 
the whole family) give herself the bodily care ond attention that 
are necessory for giving her a good personal appearonce. The same 
may be soid with regard to cafe employment; here, even more, the 
girl must have an attractive appearance. One employer used to 
ask straight out at the office of the Juvenile Aid Boord for pretty 
girls . There remain therefore for the girl from the paor home domes-
tic service and the factories. 109 
Eorl ier Mrs Rothmann in her port of the report noted: 
Of the three places where poor famil ies congregate - the diggings, 
the settlements and the towns - it seems indisputable that the towns 
offer the young girl the best opportunities for advancement. . .. The 
family remains the earning unit, and •.. in Port Elizobeth and 
Johannesburg, had decidedly improved their whole position, even 
where the fathers did not earn any more in the town than they had 
in the country. 110 
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From ev idence to the NEC clearly there was a concerted effort then to 
persuade housewives to employ female domestics instead of tying up many thousands 
of males who (it was alleged) could be more productively employed in farming and 
industry. Linked with this was the opening up of opportunities for girls from poor 
families to enter domestic serv ice. This avenue could also be closed if there were 
cheaper African female labour to compete for these jobs. That was another 
reason for imposing obstacles barring African women from town unless they could 
prove they were bona fide dependents of Africans who had already resided two 
111 years there. 
As the state saw it, the poor whites were to get primary attention what-
ever the cost to their African counterparts. 
Similarly, it appears that the state was not prepored to brook any opposi-
tion from the skilled sector who fought the upgrading and uplifting of the poor 
whites. As we have sa id, the real obstocle to this class was the virtual autonomy 
and monopolistic bargaining power still effectively used by the skilled workers to 
the detriment of both Africans and poor whites. 112 Under the various industrial 
109 Report of the Carnegie Commission, part 5, pp 208-209 
110 Ibid, p 208 
111 The same argument would of course apply to female factory workers, but 
here the threat would be greater, for the late influx of African women to 
the towns had already given white women an overall advantage in this 
field. 
112 See chap 7 above, pp 272-273. 
Amendment Acts in 1930 113 the Minister of Labour, Colonel Creswell, assumed 
such wide powers for himself that, a s one MP sa id, in the field of industrial 
relations the sta te had the power to 'leg islate by regulation'. 114 Clearly, the 
state's success before 1930 in the public sector, where it had been abl e to deskill 
jobs and dilute the traditional lines between skilled and unskilled labour, had set 
the Minister on a course to undermine the conservative indepe ndence of the trade 
unions and apprenticeship committees . 115 This he was to do even a t the cost of 
further alienating the sk ill ed workers whose support the NP had prized during the 
National-Labour Pac t. 116 
Urban areas pol icy and manufacturers' demands 
Where employers resisted, other tactics were used 117 ta help the poor 
wh ites. The figures are quoted earl ier and show that these other methods had 
succeeded to some ex tent. Poss ibly here too the government felt Stallard's fore-
bodings were exaggerated, and as for as Hertzog was concerned the process of 
urbanisation could not be artificially ha lted. 118 Instead, given time, cheap 
African labour cou ld be displaced in both the publ ic and private sec tors. Under 
these circumstances the state possib ly fe lt that there was no need to exclude 
Africans from the towns - where they were needed, even though only as unskilled 
cheap labour. 
The availability of unskilled cheap labour in the towns was important 
also for the 'civilised labour policy' to work. As we saw, the government would 
need the co-operation of private enterprise for the replacement of cheap African 
labour by whites at 'c ivilised' rates of pay. One way to guarantee that emp loyers 
could balance the costs of expensive white labour was by ensuring Afr ican labour 
stayed cheap . To create an artificial shortage by exc luding Africans from the 
113 In particular the Industria l Conci lia tion Act, the Wage Amendment Act, 
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and the Apprenticeship Amendment Act, all in 1930. See above , pp 268- 272 . 
114 House of Assembly Debates, 13 February 1930, F C Sturrock (Tu rffonte in) 
115 Ibid, 13 and 26 February 1930, and especia lly co ls 1227-1228 where this 
argument is suggested. 
116 The sign ificance of the erosion of the support of labour is analysed in the 
next chapter when the reasons for the move towards Fusion are considered. 
117 See chap 7 above, pp 265-267 and n 7.61 . 
118 See Davenport, ' The triumph of Colonel Stallard ... ', p 81. 
. . I· d 11 9 Id f towns, private enterprise c a lme, wou orce wages up . Influx control 
measures and I imitotion in stric t accord with the labour needs of a particular 
district - as Stallard was demanding - would have had this effect and many of 
the sub-economic indus tries, wh ic h the stote was inten t on develop ing to absorb 
poor whites, might not have been able to survive. 
Availability of enough cheap African labour was even more vito I during 
the depression . In the short period of prosperity 1923-'1928, the stote had been 
in a financial position to buy the co-operation of private en terprise by offering 
various incentives . But with the onset of the depression the stote could not afford 
to indemnify bus inessmen aga inst any loss they sustoined in a rranging for 'satisfac-
tory labour rela tions ' demanded by the state. One way private enterprise found 
to cut casts was by selective wage reductions and retrenchment of white workers. 
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It was therefore no coincidence that Creswell introduced the series of Amendments 
to industrial legislation in 1930 so as to stop employers from substituting cheap 
African labour for wh ites. The sto te by its actions also showed that it was deter-
mined to keep a tight grip on the setting of African wages. Obviously the cheaper 
African labour was , the greater the profit and also the more li kely that the priva te 
sector would follow the idea of subsidising white wa ges. They would have the 
leeway to fo llow the state's scheme. 
The cheapest labour, moreover, was migrant labour. To limit Africans 
to a migrant life in town, the state indicated that it would subs idise single 
accommodation only. Likewise, the private sector was encouraged to build 
hostels in the segrega ted locations . Accommodation was to be on a rent basis, 
and only employed Africans qualified to stoy . As a natural corollary to all this, 
it was specifica ll y enacted that Africans wi thout special permiss ion could not 
acquire land or I ive outs ide the segregated locations. 'Slum landlordism' and the 
erad ication of slum areas were the excuse , but in effect it sti fled migrant families 
who used to find homes outside the municipal boundaries . 
Provided that Africans in the urban areas could be brought under effective 
municipa l con trol, the stote was prepared therefore to co-operate with the private 
sector by keep ing up a supply of cheap labour. The mare capitol-intensive 
industries needing a more efficient and stable labour force were to draw on white 
workers for their supply. Thus the stote assumed powers to keep white workers 
from being ousted from their jobs. As long a s Africans were pre vented from 
119 See the second read ing debate on the Natives ' (Urban Areas) Bill, 
R Stutto ford (Newlands) and R H Henderson (Hosp ital). 
taking jobs reserved for whites, it wos accepted that Africans were pennanent 
members of the work force in town. The NEC confinned the inevitabil ity of this 
120 
trend. 
Finally, on a far more practical level, and for reosons of stringency, 
Stallard's proposa ls would have needed complex labour control machinery and so 
121 
would cost too much to be acceptable. Not only had the state found it 
impossible to persuade local authori ties to introduce and enforce the limited 
labour control measures under the 1923 Act, but few municipalities outside the 
big cities had the funds to develop the loca tion system which (we showed) was 
vital to the system of labour regulation and control. The Stollard proposals would 
have meant an immediate major expense too, something the government itself 
could ill afford. In fact, the 1931 national census had been cancelled because 
of the cost. It does not seem likely, therefore, that the government would agree 
to the detai led labour and occupational analysis of each district that would have 
been needed in a scheme for limiting the supply of labour to what each district 
required. 
Perhaps Hertzog was reluctant to introduce the radical proposals Stallard 
recommended before the findings of the severa l reports 122 had been tabled. Or 
was Macmillan justified when he wrote this?: 
Of late ideas on Native pol icy have been strongly coloured for mony 
people in the Union and elsewhere by alarm about the ' rising tide of 
colour'. This alann has arisen less from knowledge of facts about the 
Natives than from fear for the pi ight of the European population ••.. 
Tempting ond inevitable as speculation about the country's future 
may be, Europeans will do well to devote good concrete thinking to 
bettering the present, since, in truth, our statistics are too imperfect 
to afford a sure basis for prophecy, any more than for panic alann. 123 
This statement was made in 1930. Six years later Hertzog, supported by 
the old SAP group who had joined the NP to form the Fusion government in a new 
United Party, declared that he had achieved the 'final solution to the Native 
problem' . The nature of th is solution and the reasons for reversing many decisions 
and revamping the Bills and laws passed between 1924 and 1932 fonn the basis for 
analysis in the concluding chapter. 
120 See UG 22-32, para 500. 
121 Davenport, op cit, p 81 
122 In particular the NEC and Carneg ie Commission findings 
123 Macmillan, op cit, p 33 
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CONCLUSION 
Throughou t our country to-day, tnere seems to be a spirit of 
excitement, of fear, of unrest, ond of uncertainty. Everywhere 
our Europeon community seems to have a nightmore of rising 
black mosses encroaching upon thei r position of privilege, hence 
we have had the 'Black Manifesto' . The farmer presses upon the 
Governmen t, to bind the Native down to the farms by restrictive 
legislation. The Mines are crying for more labour, more 'cheap 
Native labour' . The Municipalities are clamouring for more 
powers to deal with the unemployed, the' redundant' Notive in 
the urban areas. 
In raising these issues Dr Xuma gave an accurate description of the 
issues that had dominated the 1929 'swart gevaar' election. Most whites would 
have readily agreed that, taken together, these issues constituted what was 
commonly called the 'native problem'. Over the years the electorate had been 
conditioned to bel ieve that these 'problems' were the source of their fears and 
uncerta in ties about the future. But - as Xuma went on to say - the white man 
was not alone in his fears. African fears about the future were very different 
but just as real. They stemmed from the government's action, he said, for 
The Government, without asking why the African is leaving the 
farms or where the ' redundant' urban Native must be repatriated 
to, feverishly introduces more restrictive legislation to give effect 
to these cries. 'Colour Bar' legislation appears on the Statute 
Book in one form or another at every sess ion . The idea seems to 
be to legislate in haste and to think and discover the facls and 
mistakes at leisure. 
In all this, the African, for whom the Government legis lates, has 
no voice. His part is merely ta obey the law without protest or 
expression of even his most legitimate grievance .... 
The African is dissatisfied with his present lot, uncertain and 
anxious over his future. He is disgruntled, sullen and has largely 
lost confidence in the justice or the White. 2 
Xuma, in Karis & Carter, vI, doc 48d, p 219 
2 Ibid 
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Xu ma charged: the government legislated 'without asking why .... ' 
Why the rural exodus from the forms and reserves continued unabated despite the 
myriad lows that existed to regulate and contro l labour; why Africans avoided 
form labour and resisted recruitment for the mines; why men accompanied by 
their wives and children were migrating in their thousands, leaving the re serves 
for the squalor and slums in the towns and why, once they were in the towns, 
local au thorities found themselves unable to use the machinery designed to 
repatriate those said to be there illegally; why, despite the fact that the govern-
ment hod approved the appointment of several important commiss ions3 expressly 
to solve these questions, it hod then gone ahead without woiting for their answers 
and within a single session 'feverishly introduced more restrictive legislation' to 
give effect to the white man's cries. 
The full measure of African cynicism and their lock of confidence in 
the procedures adopted by success ive governments since Union were reflected 
in the open ing remarks of R V Selope Thema's statement to the NEC: 
I wont to soy at the outset that some of us are surprised that while 
Parliament is proceeding with suc h Bills as the Land Amendment 
Bill, the Representat ion of Natives in Parliament Bill and the 
Native Service Contract Bill, this Commission is touring the 
country taking evidence on the conditions of Native I ife , condi-
tions which have been created by repressive legislation which 
this country has pursued since the consummation of Union. It 
may be that we are not intelligent enough to think that the 
proper way would have been to postpone action in these matters 
until the Commission hod reported. In 1913, we urged the 
Government not to proceed with the enactment of the Natives 
Land Act before the Commission which was contemplated hod 
reported. To this appeal the Government turned a deaf ear . ••. 
The resul t was the operation of the Land Act rendered thousands 
of Natives landless and homeless, disturbed the working and 
living conditions of Natives on the farms, and worsened the 
congested conditions of the Native reserves, with the result 
that thousands of Na tives migra ted to the towns. • • . 4 
The Land Act hod ensured that there were very few Africans abl e to 
res ist entering the wage economy from sheer necessity for at least port of every 
3 During the period 1929-1930, before Xuma's speech, evidence was being 
collected for the following reports: Report of the Commission of Enquiry into 
the Cost of Living, UG 36-32; Report of the Inter-departmental Committee 
on Labour Resources of the Union, An 89-31; Report of the Unemployment 
Investigation Committee, UG 30-32; Report of the Low Grade Ore Commis-
sion ( Interim), UG 16-32; NEC report 1930-1932, UG 22-32; Report of 
the Joint Select Committee on the Native Bills 1930-1934, An 149-33; and 
a lso JSC 1-35; and Report of the Carnegie Commission on the Investigation 
of the Poor Whites in South Africa, 1929. 
4 NEC 1930-1932, typescript ev idence of R V Selope Theme 
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year. Attracted by higher wages and better conditions of service in the towns, 
Africans not bound by service contracts were by-passing the mines and the forms. 
It was this uncontrolled influx of Africans to the urban areas that 
triggered the 'nigh tmare of rising black masses encroaching upon [the whites'] 
position of privilege' and dominance. This in turn had led to renewed demands 
for legislation to protect the wh ite workers' 'civil ised' standard and status. In 
response, the government between 1929 and 1932 hastily introduced several far-
reaching, contentious and avowedly discriminatory Acts5 dealing with urban and 
industrial relations, and others to accommodate the primary sector's demands to 
resolve the labour crises . 6 
This was the real ity of the whi tes ' 'native problem'. For any solution, 
Dr Xuma averred, what was needed most was 'a revolution of the people's 
thoughts, their ideas, their ideals, and their spirit to recognise the African as 
a human being with human desires and a spirations which must be sa tisfied,.7 Not 
more repressive and restrictive iegis lation to accommodate white fears and 
demands. 
Such a revolution was practically impossible in the Union at the time. 
During Hertzog's first term in office, efforts by the two leaders to solve the 
'native problem' on a non-party basis had come to naught. There had been 
divisions within Smuts's own party; and also the two parties differed in what 
they meant by segregation, especially in its territorial aspects. The breach 
between the two parties widened in 1925 when Smuts refused to commi t his 
party on Hertzog's Smithfield declaration before the proposals were drafted as 
Bills. Then, when they were published, Smuts opposed them at their first reading 
on the grounds that they were a reversal of Botha's 1913 Natives' Land Act. In 
this he not only confirmed that the two parties differed on the pol icy of terri-
torial and pol itical segregation, but he had denied Hertzog the opportunity of 
5 During the parliamentary sessions 1929-1932, the following amending Acts 
were passed on industrial relations: the Factories Act 1918 Amendment Act 
of "j 931; Apprenticeship Act 1922 & 1924 Amendment Act 22 of 1930; Wage 
Act 1925 Amendmen t Act 23 of 1930; Mines & Works Act 1911 Amendment 
Act 25 of 1926, which was ogain amended during the 1931 session. 
6 Those dealing with urban policy and the labour shortage: Natives' (Urban 
Areas) Act 1923 Amendment Act 25 of 1930; Nat ive Taxation & Development 
Act Amendment Act 28 of 1926; Native Service Contract Act 24 of 1932. 
Others on African unrest: Native Administration Act 1927 Amendment Act 9 
of 1929; and Riotous Assemblies Act 1914 Amendment Act 19 of 1930. 
7 Xuma, in Karis & Carter, v 1, doc 41d, p 227 
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having his segregation solution accepted in principle. This did nothing to 
improve the situation between them, and further dashed the hopes of the two 
parties finding a joint solution to the 'native problem' . 
Their sparring turned to open war during the 1929 election. As early 
as September 1928 Tielman Roos, Hertzog's Minister of Justice, hod picked the 
'native question ' as an election battle cry. In his first no-confidence motion 
since the Pact came to power, Smuts deplored Roos's and the government's 
approach. Recalling Roos's earlier challenge, Smuts commented: 
He [Roos] said the Pact could have no more favourable battleground 
than these Bills on which to go to the election. I called that propo-
sal at the time a devilish proposal, that a party, face to face with 
a general election, without a programme, should be forced to take 
this issue, the most far-reaching, the most dangerous, the greatest 
of all in South Africa, for electioneering purposes ...• That was the 
proposal of the Minister of Justice - 'stompede the people of South 
Africa; the native is in disfavour, rouse the cry of a white South 
Africa against a black South Africa, whip up public passion, whip 
up the latent feel ing there is in South Africa on this question, and 
let us, on that vast wave of passion, try to get victory once more.' 8 
The no-confidence debate, coming shortly after Smuts' s abortive but 
far-seeing Ermela speech, gave the NP all the ammunition it needed to launch 
the 'Black Manifesto' election. From then on, the country was thrust into a 
mast bitter election campaign fought aver the future status of the voiceless, 
politically impotent African majority. 
The 'swart gevaar' election showed that Hertzog and his supporters 
were prepared to exploit white racism whatever the cost, to ensure re-election 
and support for Hertzog's segregation pol icy. The wrangl ing between the two 
parties and the bitterness it left in its wake are legendary. NP Members, 
alarmed as they were at the menace of white poverty which could erode the 
eminence of whites, felt the state had a duty to counter this poverty. Equally 
significant was the fact that white workers were becoming a very strong pressure 
group politically . The Carneg ie commissione rs noted that fact in their report 
two years later. They stressed how bad the effect could be on ways chosen to 
solve the poor white problem, for 'when it is borne in mind', they wrote, 
that the franchise is possessed by all European adults, and that 
practically all the White indigents have the vote, and in several 
constituencies they hold the balance in political party divis ions, 
it can be assumed that the Poor Whites exercise a considerable 
amount of influence on any government. .. . 
8 House of Assembly Debates, 29 January 1929, col 49 
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Public men have increasingly created wrong ideas and foolish 
expectations in the minds of the poor. tvlen who are returned 
ta Pari iament on the strength of election promises are obi iged 
to use all their personal influence to obtain something for their 
consti tuents. 9 
The extent of white racist susceptibilities at that time can be gauged 
by the results of Hertzog's successful 1928 election campaign. Not only had 
the NP won, but it had gained an extra 15 seals. Hertzog was thus able, had 
he so wished, to form a government without the pact with the Labour Party. As 
for Labour itself, fragmented as it was over the 'native question' before the 
election, it had been thoroughly beaten in 1929 and was left with only five 
. P I' 10 seats In ar lament. 
With the electorate behind him, Hertzog determined to push ahead 
with his segregation solution. In the earl ier chapters it was shown that between 
1929 and 1932 the Hertzog government 'made progress bockwards' on many things. 
Their more reactionary steps can be traced as follows. 
On the pol itical front we saw a progressive onslaught on the Cape 
African franchise. By 1933 Hertzog had averted the 'danger' of polls being 
swamped by the feared 'hordes' of black voters. This had been achieved adminis-
tratively by implementing strict new registration controls. These were applicable 
only to blacks in 1931 because at the same time universal suffrage was granted 
to whites. The success and significance of this attack was indicated by the 
absolute and relative reduction of Cape voters between 1929 and 1933 when 
over 5000 African voters in the Cape lost the vote. II 
Changes in the 1926 and 1931 draft Representation Bills also showed 
the retrogressive line of the NP on this issue of African representation. A 
reduced council with only advisory powers, and the scrapping of representation 
altogether in the House of Assembly, were the first fruits of co-operation by 
members of the Joint Select Committee. Representation for Africans was to be 
12 in the Senate only. 
9 Carnegie Commission report, part I, p 12,) 
10 Among the 148 MPs, the final result in 1929 was: NP 78, SAP 61, Labour 
5 (Creswell ites who stayed in the Pact with Hertzog), National Council 3 
(the breakaway Labour wing led by W A MJdeley and J Christie), Indepen-
dents I. For a discussion on the spl it, see chap 7. 
11 See chap I, p 43 and table 1.4. 
12 See chap I, pp 24-26. 
332 
Meanwhile the fallacy of whites being swamped at the polls hod been 
fully exposed by the Joint Select Committee. In their del iberatio[ls they hod 
considered various ways to I imit the voting strength of Africans in the long tenm, 
and the government hod won their immediate goal of devaluing the Cope 
African vote. The administration could not have foiled to see that on this basis 
the power to decide the Africans' rig ht to vote rested entirely in the hands of 
an all-white Parliament. Hoving already reduced the real value of the Cope 
African vote - just as long as it stopped short of abol ition - the government 
had no apparer.t need to resort to any other way out of their difficulty. 13 
Hertzog's most notable achievement {from his point of view} was that 
he had spl it the SAP on the franchise issue and found a way to solve the questior, 
on a non-party basis through the establishment of a Joint Select Committee. 
Smuts's hand is also discernible here: the rule of silence observed by the Joint 
Select Committee in the five years it sat to find a solution; the decision to 
del iberate on a non-party basis and allow a free vote, and the representative 
character of the committee, 14 which included key people of all parties from 
both Houses, suggests that Smuts 15 had persuaded Hertzog that a solution could 
be found only under the conditions and in the spirit of the 1909 National Con-
vention. Once the two porties agreed on this, Hertzog hod every reason to 
believe thot he would eventually get the support he wonted for abolishing the 
Cape African franchise. 
The degree of co-operation already reached on the Hertzog Bills was 
confirmed by SAP Members during the coalition debate in February 1933. The 
debate gave the NP an opportunity to challenge the statements bandied about 
by some SAP Members that a coolition government would be a positive move 
towards finding a solution to the 'native question'. As the Minister of Lands 
said: 
The assistant leader of the Opposition, Mr. Duncan, spoke about 
the smoll political differences that existed, but I wont to point 
out to him that the differences are not so small. He said that we 
must be honest, that we must carry out principles, and that the 
ideas must be put to the proof aport from party interest. But I 
wont to ask the ass istant leader of the Opposition whether, e.g 
there is such a small difference of opinion about the native questiof, . 
13 Seechap1,p25. 
14 Ibid 
15 During the 1929 election Smuts had mode the call ing of a Natiana :::::>rov ,::" 
tion a key point of his campaign. 
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Mr Duncan But there we are cooperoting. 
Minister of Lands Then all is right if there is cooperation, but 
in that case I wou ld like to ask the hon. member why it cannot 
be done now. If we all agree on it then there certainly is no 
need to establ ish a national Government. 16 
So the tide had final ly turned agoinst the few SAP Members who still 
staunchly defended the Cape franch ise. Smuts knew this and therefore willingly 
agreed to co-opera te in the Joint Select Commi ttee on a non-party bas is. 
Obviously this was not disc losed at the time, and opposition to Hertzog's Bills 
ou tside Parliament continued unabated. As Nicholl s sn ide ly remarked: 
For over five years the nat ive question was the sport a lone of our 
budd ing professors, and an academic reputation for being expert 
on the native question was ea sily obta ined by these theorists . ..• 
During all this time the Se lect Commi ttee, studying a ll the evidence 
close ly from day to day, said nothing. 17 
For the researcher the paucity of official evidence on the de l iberations 
of the Joint Select Committee confirms just how complete the offic ial sil ence 
was. It is not surpris ing, therefore, that the publ ic and writers afterwards were 
ready to accept that He rtzog entered coa l ition more read il y for seeing it as a 
way to get two-thirds majority support for his Native Bills. It is suggested here, 
however, that even the compromise UP programme was in fact no compromise. 
Principle 6 of the programme stated: 
It is recognised that a solution of the political ospect of this 
question on the basis of separate representation of Europeans and 
Natives, or otherwise, being fundamental in character and not 
having hitherto been a matter of party division, should as far as 
possible be sought through agreement and should be left to the 
free exercise of the discretion of the individual members. 18 
The inclusion of this programme principle was a mere formality, seen 
against the background of the procedure agreed upon in the Joint Select Comm it-
tee and coup led wi th the fact that by the t ime of coa l ition the committee had 
agreed that the Cape franchise would go. Hertzog by 1933 already had a good 
idea of his poten tial support on the franch ise ques tion. Cool ition mere ly con-
firmed it. 
16 House of Assemb ly Debates, 25 January 1933, cols 85-86 
17 Nicho ll s, p 285 
18 The Un ited South Afri can National Party Progra mme of Principles odopted 
on 5 December 1934, quoted by Kruger, p 85 
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Why then did Hertzog sti ll insist on moking the supplementary Land 
Bill depend on the abol ition of the Cape franchise, especially as its delay meant 
he had to find a separate solution to the squatting problem? 
Tatz has it that Hertzog saw 'the Land Bill to be additional compenso-
tion to the granting of the "substance" of land for the "shadow" of the vote'. 19 
But the evidence shows that both the 1926 and 1929 Land Act Amendments Bills 
offered hard ly anything more than lifting the restrictions that barred individual 
Africans, or groups of more than six, from purchasing land on the open market, 
and then only in the so-called released areas. In fact, there had been so much 
opposition to granting extra land that in 1926 the land allocation had been cut 
by over two million morgen. 20 Even the adm inistrotive dispensation, which 
offered token financial aid to African tribes, was quietly dropped. 21 The final 
blow fell in 1932. In that year the segregation fallacy was finally exposed by 
the Native Service Contract Act. It la id down that all squatters in the white 
sector, even those hiring or leosing land in the proposed released areas, could 
be summarily evicted if they refused to accept the new labour service conditions . 
The same fate awaited them if their absentee landlords refused to pay the prohi-
bitive squatter tox. As Pirow proclaimed (without correction from Hertzog}, the 
land question was not a geographic question but one of numbers . 22 So, for the 
NP, a solution to the squatting problem could be separated from the ideal of 
establishing segregoted reserves. Not only could it be dealt with separately 
but most farmers demanded it should be, for many were totally opposed to their 
opponents' plans of resettling evicted squatters in the reserves. 23 
Sauer in his 1913 Land Act had provided for extra land for the reserves 
before squatters could be evicted. The reason for this was that the mines' 
migront labour system could only work if migrant labourers had a subsistence 
base for their families in the reserves. Since by law Africans could not hi re , 
lease or own land outside the scheduled reserves, the only way to give security 
of tenure for landless squatters was by extending the reserves. Beaumont showed 
that these areas were already congested in 1916 and could not possibly absorb 
the tens of thousands of displaced squa tters who would be uprooted once the 
19 Tatz, p 48, and chop 2 above, p 101 
20 See chap 2, p 77. 
21 See chap 5, p 208. 
22 See chap 5, p 208-210. 
23 See chap 4, pp 163 and 166-169 • 
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anti-squatting measures provided for in the 1913 Act came into effect. Hence 
the moratorium in Sauer's Bill on the wholesale eviction of squatters before the 
extra land was released. 
The lang-term plan mooted in 1926 under which Africans could on ly 
buy competitively in the released areas showed that Hertzog had no intention 
of carrying through his predecessors' squatter resettlement pol icy. 24 The land 
schedules were not even a feature of the 1932 Native Service Contract Bill, 25 
even though the Bill contemp lated the immediate eviction of tens of thousands 
of squatters. This move gives further substance ta the idea that the NP, strongly 
backed by the rural e lectorate regardless of party-political allegiance, fully 
supported Hertzog's squatter solution. 26 The farmers were determined to regain 
monopoly over the local labour supplies, which they knew would be lost once 
they had to depend on reserve Africans as their chief source of labour. 
We saw too that the delay in enac ting the land laws and their concomi-
tant squatter measures had led finally to the adoption of alternative proposals. 
Thus the farm labour problem was partly solved simp ly by lifting the clauses on 
labour tenants and squatters from the draft 1926 Land Bill, and turning them into 
the more restrictive Iv\aster and Servants' (Transvaal and Natal) Amendment Act 
in 1926 and the Native Serv ice Contract Act in 1932. Theoretically these 
restrictions succeeded in tying down all African tenants in the white rural areas 
to a period of at least six months' service in the farming sector. 27 
On the whole question af how ta solve the labour crisis, any suggestion 
that the reserves be extended, developed or conserved was consistently opposed 
not only by the farmers but by the mining sector too. That, though, was where 
unanimity between these two sectors ended. 
The in ter-departmental committee that had been set up to gauge the 
available labour supply in the Union had exploded a commonly held notion that 
there was a surplus of loca l African labour available for the mines and other 
industries. 28 The urgency in appointing such an enquiry had been obvious once 
24 See chop 2, pp 63-66. 
25 See chap 5, p 21O, and House of Assemblz Debates, 4 February 1932, cols 
642-646. 
26 See chap 5, p 211. 
27 See chop 6, pp213-214. 
28 Ibid, p 230 and n 6.42 
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the mines knew that their recruitment of foreign labourers was to be curtailed 
under the new 1928 tv'oozambique Convention. No previous estimates had been 
made, and the fear was expressed that the mines, by recruiting locally, would 
29 
exacerbate what the farmers saw as a labour shortage. 
Inevitably a labour-hungry market pointed up the importance of the 
Cape as the mines' main saurce of local workers.3°To ensure a regular supply 
from there, the land restrictions would have to apply to the Cape too. tv'ooreover, 
with the migrant labour system and the system of labour tenancy both threaten ing 
ta collapse, as the NEC noted, the labour cris is grew still worse. In the face 
of these hazards, the mines entered a new expans ionary phase in · the earl y 1930s 
_ . and so their insatiable demand for a better supply of cheap labour rose even 
further. 31 
By then the state's land pol icy had proved sa successful that in ever-
increasing numbers impoverished Africans with no land in the reserves were being 
forced onto the labour market. But, deprived of a family anchorage in the 
reserves, they were moving permanently into the towns, by-passing bath the 
mines and the farms. 32 
These factars together amounted ta another important reason for incor-
porating the Cape into the national system of labour control. Extension of the 
Natives' Land Act ta the Cape was given tap priority. Unless the Cape African 
franchise was abol ished, the segregation policy would by definition stay ul tro 
vires in the Cape. 
Informed African opinion showed unequivocally that it was not deluded 
by the state's professed reasons for having to abolish the Cape franchise . The 
unmistakable reason was to get rid of all the exclusions and privileges the vote 
conferred on Cape Africans exclusively. African opposition focussed on th is. 
It showed Africans were well aware that the Bills had been yoked together, 
first to deprive Cape Africans of the vote and then to drow them into the hated 
. 33 
segregation system. 
29 See chap 6, p 238. 
30 Ibid, pp 233-243. 
31 Ibid, p218ff 
32 See chap 8, p 290, table 8.3 and p 292, table 8.4. 
33 See chap 1, pp 52-54, and chap 2, pp 96-99. 
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So the quid pro quo of land for the lass of the franchise was 0 factar, 
but only of value as a lever to win over white opposition. The mines would 
want some assurance that their labour supply would not be completely disrupted 
by the wholesale eviction of squatters. The progressive Members would want 
to bel ieve in the real ity of a quid pro quo if Africans were to be subject to 
arbitrary restriction and eviction. The refrain was always that squatters should 
not be evicted from the white areas un less alternative land was provided. 
But the NP had abandoned the principle of extending the reserves. 
Thus by 1932 the rhetoric of land as a .suid pro quo for the loss of the franchise, 
or even as a future territorial base where Africans 'could develop along their 
own lines', remained only as a plausible empty slogan. 34 
A vital role in this segregation plan belonged to the separate native 
administration system devised to apply in the scheduled reserves. The crux of 
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it was the extension of administrative control over areas awarded ta the Governor-
General as Supreme Chief in the northern provinces . It amounted to letting him 
or any nominated NAD official rule by proclamation. But with the government's 
failure to define the scheduled areas, even the further extension of the Governor-
General's power to non-scheduled areas under the 1929 Native Administration 
Amendment Act had not improved the position. 35 
The reinstatement of tribal authorities under the official pol icy of 
retribalisation also presupposed the proper definition of the chief's district. 
This pol icy was doomed to fail if supplementary land legislation were not forth-
coming. Already the reserves as scheduled and restricted areas in 1913 had 
caused many tribes to become fragmented and scattered. Since then, many 
more tribes had braken up and the chiefs' position was undermined still further. 
Even in Natal, the home of tribal traditionalism, the NEC showed the system 
was on the point of collapse. 36 
The disintegration of the tribal system had important impl ications for 
government pol icy. Local government under the counci I system could not work 
without prior definition of the scheduled areas . The prime justification for 
segregating Africans in the first place and for treating them differently, was 
based on the idea that Africans and whites were inherently different. The 
34 See chap 3, p 134. 
35 Ibid, pp 112-120 
36 Ibid, pp 126-129 
forced reinstitution of tribal custom ond low was meant to highlight and perpe-
tuate these differences . Thus the ideologists urged the adoption of a proper 
I. 'J7 reserve po ICY. 
Detribal ised, assimilated Africans were also being exhorted to 'develop 
along their own lines' in accordance with the so-called segregat ion ideal. One 
big sign of this was that the whole representation system devised by Hertzog's 
govemment was geared to undermine the position of the African urban elite. 
This is made abundantly clear in Herbst's memorandum to the Joint Select Com-
mittee. He urged them to reconsider the method of voting through electoral 
colleges, for he contended that only Nato l would easily adjust to the system. 
On the Cape he wrote: 
It should be bome in mind that Native opposition in the face of 
deprivation in the present franchise is to be expected. If it is 
desirable to achieve the object in view with as li ttle disturbance 
of sentiment and tradition as possible and so as to make the change 
less unpalatable, I would urge that matters not actually germane 
to any scheme to be adopted, for wh ich no great or urgent neces-
sity can be shown to ex ist and for wh ich no clear compensatory 
advantages can be urged be avoided. Is it necessary to swell the 
chorus of opposit ion? [sicJ 38 
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The Cape Africans had already condemned the pol icy of forced retriba-
lisation. The communal voting system, biased in favour of the rural electorate, 
did evoke concerted opposition when the Representation Bill was finally published, 
but to nO avail. By then the policy of retribalisation launched by the 1927 
Native Administration Act was the accepted ideal in 'native policy'. 
The political importance of the retribalisation policy was overshadowed 
by its economic implications. There was general agreement among administrators 
that an efficient scheme for labour control would be achieved if a way cov . d 
be found to reinstate both the chiefs' and the parents' authority. With farmers 
and mineowners demanding stricter use of the measures to check African influx 
to the towns, the only solution seemed to be to co-opt the chiefs into the system .39 
Moreover, tne govemment be lieved that by calculating the chief's 
stipend on the number of taxpayers under his control they would be able to 
37 Ibid, pp 133-136 
38 Memorandum by J F Herbst on adjustmen t to electoral districts, sub-
committee, 27 February 1931, JSC 1-35, p 31 
39 See chap 3, pp 124-126. 
extend the chief's desire for authority. The system had worked in Natal, so 
why not in other provinces and dis tri cts? Coupled with this, the 1925 Native 
Taxation and Development Act obliged Africans to pay their pol I tax in their 
rural district. Passes to ente r or stay in a specified labour district could on ly 
be issued after this tax had been paid. This was another way in which control 
from the rural areas was to be effected. This system might have worked, had 
the chiefs' authority not already been undermined. In many other cases chiefs 
were unwil I ing to co-operate in strict implementation of the system. Hence it 
was shown thot to regulate the flow of labour from the reserves, the chiefs would 
have to be given real status and authority. 40 
The collapse of the tribal system was not the only reason for the govern-
ment's fai lure to halt the efflux of Africons from the reserves. The most important 
single factor, according to the NEC, was the gross underdevelopment of these 
areas following the land restrictions imposed in 1913. 
The NEC had been asked to consider the whole question of African 
urbanisation and its effect upon the urban white and coloured groups. Central 
to this investiga tion was the problem of how to stem the African influx. The 
enquiry was ta be made 'with a view to recommending measures, if any, to be 
adopted to deal with surplus Natives in, and to prevent the increasing migration 
to, such areas. ' 41 
Their findings show that the commission agreed that the fact of a 
permanent urban African population would have ta be recognised and accepted. 42 
The main thrust of their report, however, was on finding ways and means of 
slowing down the urbanisation pracess. This was to be done by keeping Africans 
on the land. They wrote: 
In the economic development of the Reserves must inevitably be 
sought the main solution for the Native economic problem. 
Here your Commissioners wish to sound a very earnest note of 
warn ing, namely, that unless this is undertaken soon, and on a 
large scale, the country must assuredly expect certain serious 
resul ts: 
1. The rapid extension of the process of ruination which is 
now almost everywhere in evidence, where excell ent 
areas ore be ing worked according to the very backward 
methods of a primitive subsistence economy. 
40 See chap 6, p 243. 
41 NEC terms of reference, UG 22-32, p 3 
42 See chap 3, p 131, and UG 22-32, paras 523 and 539-543. 
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2. The resul ting rapid diminution of the carrying capacity 
of the No tive areas for both human beings and animals. 
3. The rapid increase in the drift to the towns wh ic h has 
already assumed such a magn itude as seriously to disturb 
the European mind, and to create grave problems of urban 
housing, administration , and Nati ve morality. 
The economic deve lopment of the Reserves - which postulates social 
and educa tional development, as hereinafter defined, of the Natives 
in those areas - transcends in importance every other phase of the 
Native economic policy. It affects direc tly a very la rge proportion 
of the Native popu lation. Ind irec tly it is at the root of the whole 
NCltive econom ic question. The undeve loped state of the Reserves, 
with the consequent pressure of the population on the land, is 
largely the cause of the universal Native demand for more land. It 
is directly one of the important causes of the steady drift to the 
towns: the dead uniformity of life in the Reserves results in an 
emigra tion of a large number of Natives who desire to follow occu-
pations other than primitive pastora l ism and peasant farming. This 
includes many of the more advanced Natives. The Reserve Natives 
are thus cont inually being depr ived of many of their people who, 
by following more advanced methods, would gradually work like a 
leaven throughou t Reserve communi ties. 'The exodus of Natives 
with brain and education', sa id one witness, 'is hav ing a terr ible 
effect on the te rri tories'. 43 
They then firmly linked the influx of Africans into the towns with the 
state's inability to so lve the poor white problem. They asked which members 
of the white race were opposed to the mOre ambitious, the more progressive, 
the mOre energe tic members of the 'native' race found in the towns: 
Those in the forefront of the batt le are the men who through lack 
of skill, ability Or training, have to be satisfied with the less 
lucrative occupations. Moreover, if any of these show signs of 
develop ing, they are withdrawn from the line of bottle, and other 
and weaker members of their race pushed into the breach . 
The effect of this state of affairs has been a grow ing impenetration 
of Natives into occupation which were formerly filled by whites, 
accompan ied by a growing white unemployment problem. 44 
It is no coincidence that major revisions in Hertzog' s original land 
and urban policies were mooted and adopted by the Joint Select Committee at 
this time. The changes introduced show unequivocally that the committee 
members at leas t were persuaded by the finding of the NEC that 'fundamentally 
the problem lay in the Reserves ,~5 and the only way to solve the land, labour 
and poor white problems, they ag reed, would be by systema ti cally develop ing 
43 UG 22-32, paras 83-86 
44 Ibid, para 87 
45 Ib id, para 16 
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and conserv ing these areas. 
A chrono logica I review of the developments in the Joint Select Com-
mittee gives the sequence of government policy chonges and substantiates this 
argument. After adopting Nicholls' draft of the Natives' Representation Biil, 
the committee proceeded to consideration of the 1929 Natives' Land Amendment 
Bill on 20 IVIorch 1931. 
On 15 April 1931 Heaton Nicholls submitted a revised draft of the 
Natives' Land Bill for the committee's considerotion. 46 Essentially his draft 
incorporated three new ideas: the Natal trust sys tem, a 20-year period for the 
purchase of land, and the handing over of unalienated crown land to be adminis-
tered on the Africans' behalf by a board of trustees to be established in specified 
districts . 
No final decision was reached on these proposals, for squatting was 
again the mast contentious issue. Squatting licences were either too high or 
too low, and the period of grace before a squatter could be evicted was again 
in dispute. When the committee adjourned in lVIoy 1931, none of these issues 
had been agreed on. 
Reconvening the committee in February 1932, the chairman laid a new 
Bill before them for consideration. This Bill, the Native Trust and Land Bill, 
hod been prepared by the NAD - an entirely new departure4~ and thus was a 
measure framed by a public servant. To help the commi ttee consider the Bill, 
it was also resolved that the Secretary for Native Affairs, IVIojor Herbst, 'be 
given special leave to be present during the proceedings of the committee,.48 
The innovations introduced into Herbst's draft and the later amendments 
added by the committee show conclusively that the committee were influenced 
by the NEC findings. 
46 See JSC 1-35, annexure F. DelOi ls of Nicholls' omendments appear on p 7 1. 
The committee had omitted to make specia l note of his contribution when he 
first submitted the Native Trust and Land Bill in 1936. See Davenport & 
Hunt, doc 63, p 39 and doc 82, p 51. 
47 See JSC 1-35, 3 February 1932, p 70 for deta ils of Herbst's draft Native 
Trust and Land Bill. They are included in the report, annexure A, p 106. 
48 JSC 1-35, 3 February 1932, p 70 
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The major change was accepting that the reserves would have to be 
extended, conserved and developed . To this end monies from Par i iament would 
be appropriated. A sum as high as £30 000 000 was suggested by Nicholls, later 
reduced to £10000000 by Hertzog in Parl iament . A time limit, most members 
agreed, would have to be set, and a quata of 7250000 morgen was agreed upon. 
For the first time compensatory land of equal pastorol and agricultural value 
was stipulated, and if Africans a lready owned land in released a reas this amount 
would be added to the quota. A proper definition of segregated areas would 
be aimed at, as the terms for the acquis ition, disposa l and expropriation of land 
show. 
The Natal trust system originally proposed by Nicholls was to be 
extended into a new corporate body, to be known as the Sauth African Native 
Trust~9This body would administer the funds, both from Parliament and other 
sources, but not in iso la t ion, for it was recommended and accepted that the 
Native Trust work closely with the NRC constituted under the new African 
representation system. 
In brief, these were the ma in changes in principle and policy. Com-
pared with Hertzog's 1926 and 1929 Bills, they reveal that the government had 
reverted to many of the SAP tenets. This was particularly noticeable on the 
question of squatting . Although chapter III of the 1932 Native Trust and Land 
Bill (chapter IV in the Bill of 1936) provided for the immediate eviction of 
squatters, this would only happen in specifically proclaimed areas . Moreover, 
land was to be made available for resettling squatters, and the NAD was made 
responsible for providing alternative accommodation. Sauer's policy had been 
reinstated with this latter proviso added into the bargain. 
This was not all. The Joint Select Comm ittee a lso moved towards the 
acceptance of Stallardism. On 7 Moy 1930 Stallard had put forward an amend-
ment to the draft Natives' Representation Bill, that Africans in urban areas be 
limited in proportion to the number of jobs availoble in a town, and redundant 
and surplus Africans be removed to the reserves. The minutes and proceedings 
give no indication that the members even debated these proposals. It can be 
assumed, the refore, that Sta llard's proposals were rejected as finn ly in the 
Joint Select Committee as they had been in the House when he proposed them 
during the debate on the Urban Areas Amendment Bill. 50 But not even two 
49 Ibid, 7 May 1930, P 17 
50 See chap 8, p 317, and House of Assembly Deba tes, 30 Januory 1930. 
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years later, on 4 t-Aarch 1932, Stallard again recommended that the Joint 
Select Committee adopt his proposals. The revised Native Trust and Land Bill 
d ·d· h· 51 was un er cons. eratlOn at t e t.me. On this second occasion his recommen-
dation had a very different reception. Firstly Patrick Duncan, 'on a point of 
order', asked the chairman's ruling as ta whether 
the question of the el imination of natives from urban areas fell 
within the terms of reference of the Committee in view of the 
fact that provision existed in the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 
1923 for deol ing with the removal of redundant natives from such 
areas. 52 
In reply, the chairman overruled Duncan, declaring that since one of the 
questions referred ta the committee was 'that of providing for the acquisition of 
land by natives', 'should the Committee decide to propose legislation for the 
removal of redundant natives from urban areas provision would hove to be made 
for the acquisition of land for such natives' . 53 
Senator Langenhoven then moved: 
That machinery shouLd be provided for the exclusion and removal 
of natives from white urban areas where and to the extent to 
which their competition unduly forces white workers out of em-
ployment. 54 
An amendment by Sampson that a sub-committee be appointed to give 
effect ta these proposals was accepted, as was Payn's amendment that adequate 
provision be made for Africans removed from the urban areas. 55 On the latter, 
the NAD was made responsible for finding reserve accommodation for Africans 
found to be redundant in the towns. As in the case of squatter removals from 
farms, a clause was inserted in the Native Trust and Land Act (clause 37) 
giving effect to this innovation. 
A sub-committee was appointed which recast Stallard's proposals in 
the form of an amendment to the Native Trust ond Land Bill. The question was 
thought so important, and in prospect it embodied such wide impl ications, that 
the Joint Select Committee decided a sub-committee should be set up to draft 
Stallard's proposals as a separate Bill al together. This was eventually tabled 
51 JSC 1-35, 4 t-Aarch 1932, p 81 
52 Ibid 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid 
55 Ibid, P 82 
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as the Native Laws Amendment Bill in 1937. 
Thereafter the Native Laws Amendment Bill was made an integral 
part of the state's revised trusteeship pol icy. The NRC demanded its postpone-
ment in 1937 on the grounds that its enac tment would be 
a violation of the pledge which had been given in Pori iament, 
during the debate on the Native Representation Act, that no 
legislation specifically affecting the native people would be 
introduced without reference to the Natives Representative 
Council for its opinion. 56 
But the NAC, wh ich significantly had Heaton Nicholls as a key 
member, gave the fo llowing strongly worded rejection: 
The Native Laws Amendment Bill forms an integra l part of the 
Native Legislation passed by Porliament almost unanimously 
last year. It is the last of the tril ogy of Bills which were designed 
. to translate into law the pr inc iple of trusteeship establ ished by 
the Natives Represen tation Act and the Native Trust and Land 
Act in place of the undefined and contradictory policies hitherto 
prevailing •••• 
This subjec t formed part of the whale pol icy of Trusteeship as 
considered by the Joint Selec t Comm ittees of Pari iament, which 
were ass isted in their del iberations by the Native AHa irs Com-
mission, as well as by the principal officials of the Native 
Affairs Department. The principle of limitation of notives in 
urban areas was adopted in the draft Bi II agreed upon by the 
Parliamentary Commission which sat in Pretoria in 1932. 
There can be no doubt, as the records prove, that the principle 
of I imita tion was intended to be accepted as a fundamental part 
of the native policy accepted by Parliament last year. Indeed 
if that principle were not accepted, there would be I ittle use in 
going on with the purchase and development of additional land 
for natives, since, if nothing is done to prevent the increasing 
momentum of drift to the towns, the grea ter portion of the native 
population will, within an appreciable lapse of time, have left 
a number of the native reserves. It will be a long time before 
rural development can overcome the lure of the city, where the 
gl itter and excitement of the street open up a new world to the 
adventurous amongst the unrv tored natives. 57 
Stallard ism had thus finally been accepted. So had Sauer' s squatter 
rese ttlement policy. Both these changes to Hertzog's original segregation 
policy depended on first extending the reserves. As the NAC so explicitly 
said, 'there would be I ittle use in going on with the purchase and development 
56 NAC report 1937-1938, UG54-39, p 7 
57 Extracts from the letter addressed to the Minis ter of Notive Affairs on 
10 May 1937. The full text of the letter appears in UG 54-39, pp 8-9. 
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of additional land for natives •.. if nothing is done to prevent the increasing 
momentum of drift tc the towns'. 
Both the acceptance af Stcllardism and the adoption of a land pol icy 
to conserve the Teserves and extend them immediately came in 1932 along with 
the economic depression and the reports of the several commissions that, during 
1930 and 1931, had investigated the Union's economic and social ills. 58 
The NEC's startling revelations on the desert-like condition of most 
areas in the reserves and their contention that this was the root cause of the 
uncontrolled influx of landless Africans to the towns must have shocked Hertzog 
and the other committee members, for, as late as 1930 they had insisted there 
was room enough in the reserves to take the' redundant' population from the 
towns. 59 This and the warnings sounded by the Carnegie commissioners on the 
serious plight of the poor whites certainly influenced the committee to revise 
its pol icy on methods of influx control. Langenhoven's resolution in the Joint 
Select Committee cited earl ier shows just how closely African urbanisation and 
the problems of poor whites had become I inked. It was th is rather than a sudden 
altruism in the Hertzog administration that led to a reversal in the previously 
restrictive land policy. The government was finally canvinced that the only 
way to safeguard the interests of whites was to keep the urban areas as a wh ite 
preserve. If Africans entered town, they would come as temporary sojourners 
willing to minister to the needs of white masters . This in part would account 
for the reversal in the state's land pol icy. 
It is no coincidence that Stallard, as MP for Roodepoort, should have 
been the one to promote strict influx control measures as these were favoured 
by the mines. The grave warnings by the 1932 Low Grade Ore Commission, 
the Inter-departmenta l Committee on Labour Resources, and the Government 
Mining Engineer on the bleak outlook for mining development and the economy 
as a whole if the labour crisis were not resolved, made Hertzog reappraise hi s 
labour policy towards the mines. The gold standard debacle finally forced his 
60 
hand, and he agreed to introduce strict influx control. 
58 See n 3 above. 
59 See chap 8, p 318 and Hertzog's speech during the second reading debate 
on the Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Bill in January 1930. 
60 See chap 6, pass im. 
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The decision to reinstate the 1913 squatter policy is less easily explained. 
J F Herbst, in a confidential letter to Rheinallt-Jones, gave the following insights: 
Persona lly, I am quite satisfied that if this is to be the final settle-
ment, then the land is of course quite insufficient for if all Natives 
today in the European areas are to be located in the Native area, 
wholesale starvation would result. It must be remembered that when 
the Commiss ion and Committee reported there was no such thing as 
a White labour pol icy, on the contrary, it was stated that there 
would be no great influx from the European farms to tne towns. 
It is only now since the White labour policy has been started that 
there is talk of remov ing Natives from the urban areas. I know what 
will happen - you will find all the farm Natives still on the farms 
in 20 years' time, probably more of them. Public opinion will not 
allow of any interference in this respect. The farmers on the Com-
mission sat with tongues in their cheeks when Chapter IV was under 
considera tion. Personally, I am slTongly in favour of free hired 
labour in preference to the squatter system which is tantamount to 
slavery, but it will be a long day before farmers will surrender their 
present privileges. All the farmer witnesses from the Northern 
Transvaal and Natal opposed the provision in the Bill. You will 
find the Committees will be most liberal in the interests of the 
farmers in allowing labour tenants. 61 
The Bill was aimed primarily at the eviction of squatters from company 
land, but as Herbst remarked, even then 
the Bill states definitely it is the duty of the Government (not the 
Trust) to provide land for every ejected Native or at least a home, 
and of course money will have to be provided on the estimates . 62 
It is sign ificant that he reiterated this and also remarked, 'the law will 
say it is the duty of the government to provide for all evicted Natives though 
am sure the Commiss ion never fully apprecia ted the effect of this clause' . 
It can also be argued that Hertzog's main objective was still the uniform 
extension of the segregation policy to the Cape. The mines' labour problems 
made such a solution even more urgent in the 1930s. On the strength of this 
and to preven t the mines from disrupting the farmers' supply of labour any further , 
Hertzog may have been prepared to comprom ise on the squatter issue. It was 
laid down, furthermore, that on ly bona fide squatters would be allocated land 
in the reserves if they refused to accept labour tenancy service conditions . 
The farmers' interests, as Herbst intimated, were stil i safeguarded. 
61 J F Herbst to J D Rheinallt-Jones, 5 December 1935, Rheinallt-jones papers, 
SAIRR archives, B (100)0, p 2. On Rheinallt-Jones's request that Herbst's 
views be published, Herbst asked that they be kept confidential. He wrote: 
'as you understand I heard ali that was said - said with the knowledge that 
it was privile ed; similarly my Minister in consulting me naturally had to 
speak his mind and so I am in a privileged position to criticise, and I feel I 
would not be playing the game .' See p 5 of the letter. 
62 Ibid, p 4 
Reviewing the revised 'native policy ' in this way, it can be argued 
that the comprom ise in Hertzog 's 'native policy' was on the land policy and 
not the franch ise question, as is traditionally held. He rbst's remarks on this 
issue seem to substontiate this view. He wrote on the Parliamentary Represen-
tation Bill : 
Of course, I know all the difficulties of the present situa tion, 
and that the Government, on account of the preference of the 
Native for one particular party, the South African Party as it 
was in later years, was practically p ledged to rid politics of 
the Na tive vote and cannot withdraw w ithou t a complete break-
up. 
Unfortuna tely, the oppos ition of the Nats was augmented by the 
Natal Party, and so though Genera l Hertzog started off with 
represen tation in the Assembly, he was outdis tanced by Natal 
and naturally took his cue from them. I still think the Natives 
should accept the position, but insist on representation in the 
Assemb ly, and not in the Senate. From what I can gather the 
Nats are assured of the necessary majority to pass the Bills, and 
I am afraid all that can be done is to try and retain representa-
tion in the Assembly which was the Prime Minister's original 
proposal, and he can hardly oppose that. 63 
The foregoing sugges ts it can be said that the significance of the 
'native policy' solution eventually arrived at in 1936-1937 is threefol d : the 
solution bore the stomp of the SAP especially in its reserve pol icy in the interests 
of the mines; the compromise was not on the franchise question as is traditionally 
held but on the land and urban pol icy; lastly, the compromise solution was in 
fact reached by the middle of 1932 - before the move towards coalition of the 
SA Pond NP in January 1933. Hence the ideo that Hertzog entered coo l ition 
and then fusion with the SA P in order to secure the necessary two-thirds majority 
support for his franchise proposals is erroneous . 
As in 1909, the two sides in 1936 hod merely agreed to differ on certain 
aspects of the government's po licy and Africans were again sacrificed on the 
altar of white needs. Professor R FA Hoernle was one of the few who apprec ia-
ted this at the time. He wrote of the trusteeship pol icy: 
on the short-range plane, progress in the name of 'trusteeship' 
can sometimes be achieved by carefully dodging the' long-range ' 
question, what sort of trusteeship is intended. The I iberal-
minded trustee can soy to himself: 'this is a nother step along 
the rood which terminates in the abol ition of trusteeship', whil st 
63 Ibid, p 5 
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simultaneously the illiberal trustee can say to himself: 'so far as 
I can see, this leaves the fundamenta I relation between trustee 
ond ward unchanged; therefore, I can safely a ll ow it to happen.' 64. 
As he so aptl y concluded: 
The segrega tion ists have won the day: they have got their racial 
caste society throughout the White areas of the Union. But, the 
best, the most conscientious, among them are ill at ease. Still 
talking of 'segregation', they are in truth beginning to dream 
dreams of 'separation'. They dream of raciall y-pure societies. 
They are afraid of the White group losing its racial identity through 
absorption, by miscegenation, into a 'coffee-coloured' mixture. 
Race-and-colour-proud themse lves, they would gladly see an 
answering race- and colour-pride on the side of the Africans. 
They bel ieve that this much desired consummation can be achieved 
only by kraaling Blacks and Whites aport in territorially-separated 
areas, which for Natives are called 'Reserves' and which only the 
desire not to hurt the feel ings of the White dominant coste prevents 
us from call ing 'Reserves' for Whites, too. Their great obstacle, 
however, is the economic entang lement of the two race groups: 
White domestic life, White agriculture, White factories and mines, 
White conveniences and services, are built upon Native labour. 
Caught in this entanglement from which there is no visib le escape, 
except at a price which the White group is not I ikely ever to pay 
willingly, their dreams of separation reduce in practice to the 
ca ste society with which we are fam iliar now. 65 
64 Professor R FA Hoemle, 'Present-day trends in South African race relations', 
presidential address delivered at a publ ic session of the counc il af the SAIRR, 
20 January 1941, reprinted in Race Relations, v 8, 1, 1941, p 16 
65 Ibid, p 19 
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APPENDIX A 
Growth of the Cape Province common roll electorate (oil races) 
2 Slow grawth of the Cape African vote over 20 years, 1909- 1928 
3 Devaluation and reduction of the Cape African vote 
4 Graph showing proportionate value of Africon and white voters 
in the Union, 31 December 1926 
5 Cape African franchise and the Natives' Lond Act 1913 
A 
GROWTH OF THE CAPE PROVINCE COMMON ROLL ELECTORATE (ALL RACES) 
Black African 
Year White Black vaters Total vaters voters 
voters vaters as % as % 
African Coloured Total of total of total 
1905 119906 8 190 14836 23034 142 940 16. I 5.7 
1909 121 336 6637 14394 21 031 142 367 14.8 4.7 
1921 156501 14282 26790 41 072 197573 20.8 7.2 
1927 173291 16481 26091 42572 215863 19.7 7.6 
1929 167 184 15780 25618 41 398 208582 19.8 7.6 
1931 352658 12271 26378 38 649 391 307 9.9 3. I 
1933 369 182 10776 25005 35781 404 963 8 .8 2.6 
1935 382 103 10628 24793 35421 417524 8.5 2.5 
1937 396237 - 26700 26700 422937 6.3 -
Sources: L M Thompson, The Cape Coloured franchise, SAIRR New Africa pamphlet, p 55 
and the Union Year Book 23, 1946, chap 2, pp 47-48 
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The (TO"'-; 11:1(:11('(1 ~l' .~II\1'lIls in lilt' cirt' lt's .... ho\\' tl'l ' 
prllpor-tion of cololln.'d Yuk!'!"; the hl ~ td{. Ihl' prtlporlion oj 
~ali\'l·s. 
In the M't'oJul diaHr.11ll it will he ~el'1l th;d Ihe ;X;ltin' 
,"ok in tWI'Jlty-Ji\,c yr;II'~ 11:.:-- .Ir..:I"OWIl from S,OOl! to 1I1,iHJ!t, 
"'hill' the EIII'0(1(,:111 \'01 .... ill the Cal't' h:" illt:I'C;I'''''d irolll 
11j,()OO to 1iO,OOO. The .'\:Iti\'c vote lilert'i',)rt' has il1llt'.I":'<:tl 
ill tWt'llty-fl\'l" ycars hy 11,000; .he Europt'an "ote ha ... 
increased by :)~).O()\l. 
1909 1928 
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Source: Cape Times, 11 June 1929 
A.2 
The following article, which appeared in SA Outlook while the Natives' 
Representation Bill was being debated in Parl iament, confirms the deductions 
mode by Archibald Linton that the Cape vote had been both devalued and 
radically reduced without the government having to resort to a constitutional 
way out of their problem. 
THE NATIVE VOTE 
The Deportment of the Interior, by means of a Government Gazette published 
on 3rd January [1936], furnished interesting figures relating to the registration 
of voters in the Union. The total number of voters is now 960, 129, consisting 
of 504,752 men and 455,377 wamen. The provincial totals are Cope 417,524; 
Transvaal 349,000; Orange Free State 101,089; Natal 92,116. In the Trans-
vaal and the Orange Free State all the voters are White . On the Notal roll 
there are the names of 1 ° Asiatics, 343 persons of mixed or Coloured races, and 
1 Native. The Cape has amongst its voters 1,401 Asiatics, 1,796 Iv\olays, 
21,596 mixed or Coloured races, and 10,628 Natives. In 1921 the number of 
Native voters in the Cape was 14,282 and in 1927 it was 16,481, the highest 
number ever recorded. Since 1927 the Native vote has steadily dropped and 
now stands, as stated, at 10,628. Over the whole Union the European voting 
strength is 924,354 and the non-European 35,775. In view of the commonly 
expressed fear of the effect of the Native vote in the Cape Province, it is 
interesting to note that the Native vote in the Province forms only 2~% of the 
tatal. Out of 61 constituencies in the Cape only ten have more than 450 
Native voters. Even in Tembuland, the so-called "Native constituency", the 
Native vote is not one-third of the total. The figures for the ten constituencies 
referred to are as follows: 
Total voters Native voters 
Tembuland 5,258 1,440 
Griqualand 5,410 975 
Cathcart 5,933 810 
King William's Town 6,260 680 
Queenstown 6,351 591 
Iv\o itland 7,299 569 
East London (North) 8,356 524 
Uitenhage 7,572 482 
Aliwal 5,565 481 
Fort Beaufort 5,858 461 
.. -- - -- - . 
Source: SA Outlook, February 1936 
A.3 
PROPORTIONATE VALUE OF AFRICAN & WHITE VOTERS 
IN THE UNION ON 31 DECEMBER 1926 
Cape 
Transvaal 
OFS 
Natal 
ID 
E! 
o 
African 
Coloured 
Wh i te 
Voters in 000s 
50 100 150 200 
14900 
25 100 
162 300 
143000 
49000 
40500 
Source: Data from Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, 
Memorandum 4, In defence af the Cape franchise, para 6 and p 12; 
and SC 10-27, appendix B, p ix 
A.4 
THE CAPE AFRICAN FRANCHISE AND THE NATIVES' LAND ACT 1913 
171. It is interesting to note l,ow far the Na,tive in the Cape Province has 
availed himself of the right to become u registered ,·oter. 
172. According to the figures given in the Statistir"l Year Book, 1913, the 
total lhntu, Asiatic.. ani Coloured rnalcs in the Cupe I'rovince in 1911 was 
1,982,588, aud of these th"'e were 23,OU2. 01' a little oYer 1 per cent., registererl 
voiers ; but most of lhese vnters are the coloured 01' mixed people. The bulk of 
the N:dive popubtioll is to be fOUlld in th p. Tl'UllSkeian Territori es awl, OJllittill~ 
the Divisions of Ell iot lI'lHl ~I~P}e:ll', whidl are .< white l' urt".:\ s, thE' Tr:I1lRkeia,1I 
male nantu populotiou is afl8,5118, of whom onl)' 1.194, or ·3 pel' ceul. (tinee ill 
en~l'y 1;000), arc registered DS yoiers. Hm'f wany of these exercise their right 
by virtue of the property qualification ano how mow:" by the receipt of wages 10 
the amount of £50 pf'l' unnum, cannot oe uetel'Illill(·d; but it is wore than pl'olmhlp 
that tile large majority rely ou wages aud uot on property. In the rest of th,' 
Cape llroviuce there are 322 ,U33 m(/l( ~ Nntiycs of whom ollh ' 5,090, or 1·75 pel' rent. 
are l'egi~teJ'eJ ns votef's. . 
17;1. Tile bc-ts lea.! to the conclusioll that, so far as the ]\ntiYes are COll-
cerlled, the appli"ati!>lI of the Art to the Prm'ince of the rape JlOW would a!fed 
not more than nine individuals in {loVel"." 1,000 Natit"es in respect of their right 
to qualify for the Frallchise. The eJf~ct on tlle Europea n POl'ulntioll woul,1 
he fnr g'l'eater. 
174. ]\0 cue ·"011 doubt that by reason of the right to become a registere,l 
,"oier the Natiyp in thE' Cape Province has hf'eu ellablpu to sp.cnre atteuti(1) t.o hi~ 
wants und his intere~ts Ilud to make his voice heanl ill Parliament. It is not 
suggested that he should be deprived of this right; but it is suggested that by the 
~ppljcntion of th<" principle of teI"l'itorial separation as elllbodif'd in the Natives 
Land Act the restriction imposed on the opportunity of the Native to qualify 
hjmself for tlle FrflUchise is an f'xtremely limited one, and thnt it ,vauld he n. 
mailer for serious J'egret jf for this reason the principle of the Lands Act cannot 
be applied to an are.n comprJsing more than half the Fnion. 
li5. The o.rux of the whole qu estion lies in Ille fact that in the Cape Proy-ince 
there i. no difference between white. coloured, and blao.k, as to quaJificatiollR 
necessary for the Franrhise: one of these qual ifications is the property qualifir,,-
liou. and it is th is qualifieation ",1 ,i,· 11 tile ~ at iyps Laud Ad tou(·hes. e'an it be 
said t.hat this is au insuperable diffi,·u1t~·? 
176. Attach .. l is a Return of the number of coloured voter8 in the Cape 
Pl'O"-ince. 
Source: Report of the Natives' Land Commission (Beaumont minute), UG 25-16, p 20 
A.5 
THE CAPE VOTERS - 1911 AND 1914 
Cj.PJ: (Pnopu). I TUJluzlJ.}t" TI:aIlITOJlIQ. P&O'llroa or Ta8 CJ. .. a 0,. GOOD Dope.. 
RACE Total No. of T,I&' N" I r'J1:.lntag' of 
I 
Total No. at I T,l&lN" I Perctota,. of I 
Total No.. of Tot.J No. ! ~t..veof 
1I1.1n. rqlrtered Vota,. fe,tl.tered 1I.ln, refiltered Vote,. n.J!~~~~ )!~. ~litend Vot.noI nci~red (I'Jl). (1914). Votere. (lllll). (11114.). (1111). (1'14). I Vow", 
European 
.,' 293,834 12;,987 43'56 7,434 3,453 .S·"4 301 ,268 131,440 0'62 
Kn.ffir ... } 322,93a{ 3,9i 1 } { 1,108 } { 5,07'1 } 1'76' 398,509 ' 29' 721,441 '95' Fingo , .. ... 1,719 88 1,807 
Other ... ... } 222,029 { 14,123 } { 221 } { 14,344 } 6-48 4,328 6'93 226,357 8 '48 Hottentot. , .. 270 80 350 
Indian ... , .. I) 6,557 { 1,669 } { • } { 1,673 } Mal.,. ... ... 1,080 42'01 48 - 8'33 6,605 1,080 41'92 
Chineae ... 16 - 16 
-
Total 845,353 150,'45 
-
"10,318 ",952 - 1,255,671 Hli5,697 
Source: Report of the Notives' Lond Commission (Beaumont minute), UG 25-16, P 21 
APPENDIX B 
Estimated area and papulation of African areas, 1916 and 1926 
(this chart should be read in conjunction with the map inserted 
at the end) 
2 Actual occupation of various classes of land by Africans in 1916 
a Union of South Africa - areas 
b Un ion of South Africa - A fr ican population 
c Categories of land owned by Africans in released areas, 1926 
3 Actual occupation of various classes of land by Africans in 1916 
a Chart showing graphically areas and classes of land occupied 
by Africans 
b Chart showing graphically the numbers of Africans occupying 
various classes of land 
4 Reduction in morgenage of scheduled and released areas between 
1913 and 1927 
a Allocation of scheduled and released areas, 1913 to 1927 
b Table comparing various classes of land exclusively occupied 
by Africans in 1916 and 1926 
c Table illustrating percentage increase and decrease of various 
classes of land occupied by Africans in 1916 and 1926 
d Table illustrating various classes of land exclusively occupied 
by Africans in each province of the Union, 1916 
e Table illustrating various classes of land exclusively occupied 
by Africans in each province of the Union, 1926 
f Population distribution on various classes of land by Africans, 
1936 
contd 
B 
5 Land purchased under administrative dispensation in 'committee' 
areas, 1919 to 1928 
6 Estimate of area of arable and other land in scheduled reserves 
7 Comparison of population and livestock in white and African areas 
8 Average annual percentage increase in population, 1904 to 1936 
9 Incidence of migrant labour in the Union of South Africa, 1936 
10 Chart showing land company land occupied by African and white 
tenants 
B. 1 
7!St,,"ale4 Area and l'oputaJum of ,Valw. Areas (a), 
(The sub-totals are repeated in Column 4 only where Trust Purchases took place in the Region between 1936 and 1939). 
Region . (b) 
Cape Prqvinc&-
North Western (Total) .. . ........ .. . . . .. . . 
Mafeking . ...... . .. .. . .. ... ... •..... •. 
Vryburg . .. • .. • . .. .. . : . . .. . • .• . . . . . ••. 
Taunge ........ . ..• _, ..•..... • . ... .. .• 
Barldy West ..................•..... • . 
Kuruma.n ......... . ....... . . . . , ..... " 
Herschel ..... . . . ..... . .... ... ... . ..... .• 
Glen Grey/ Queell6town ....... . _ ........ . • 
Ciskei (ToW) ... . . .. ... . .... . .. • . ... . . . • 
Kingwilliamstown . . .. ....... .. • •.. .. .. • 
~r;ddledrift . ...... . . ..... . .. ...... .... . 
Keiskamahoek . ..... __ ..•• • _ . .•• .. . . . .• 
Victoria- East . •.... . • .. _ • •. .. . . • . ..... . 
Peddie . . . ... . . .. . .. ......•.. .• • •• . . . . . 
East .London ....... .. .... . .. _ . , .. .... . 
Trawei (Total) ..... . ...... . .. . . . ...... . 
lfighlond. (Sub. total) . .. . .. . . . • • . . . .• . . 
Ma-tatiele .. .. ......... _ •. ..... __ •. . . 
Mt. Ayliff ... ... .. ... ... . ..... ... . . . 
:\It. Currie .••. _ .. .•...• . . . ...•..... • 
Mt. FIetoher ...........••...• • .... . .. 
Mt. Frere ......... ..... .. .. . .. . . .. . 
UDl7.i.m..kuln ... . .. . .. ' _ ... .. . . . . .. •. 
Qumbu ••.............. • . ... • . .. .... 
Midlond. (Sub·total) . ... ... . ... . . . .... _ 
F1ogataff. , ... .. ... . . ... . . .......... . 
Taba.nkulu .... . ... _ ... . ... _ . • .. . . .. _ 
Libod.: .... . . . . ........... •.. . . .• .. 
T80Io .••.... .. .... . . • . • • . .• .• .. ..• . . 
Umta.ta .... . ... . . • ... .• . . . .• • ....... 
Engoobo . ...... . .• .. . .••.... .. . .. .. • 
Idutyw .... .. . .. . ... . ........ . . ... .. 
Nqamakwe . . .... . _ • .... . . . ...•..... • 
T80mo .. .... .. ... . .. . •• • . . • • • .. . • • • 
Butterworth . .......... • . ....•.....•. 
St. Morks ..•... . ....... .. ..... . . . ... 
Xalanga . .. ... . .. ..... .. ...•. . . . . • . . 
Coostal (Sub. total) .. . . . ..... ... .... ... . 
Bizana . . .. .. ... _ ... . . .....•. ....••. 
Lusikisiki .. . ...... .. ..• . . . .• • .. .. . . . 
Port St. Johns .. .... ... ....... .. . . .. . 
Ngqeleni •....•.. ... . • •. . .• .• • .. .. •. . 
Mqonduli .. .. . .... . ... •. ...••..... • . 
Elliotdale ........ ... .. : .... • ....••.. 
Willowvale ........ . .... . . . •... . . • •.. 
Kentani .... _ . _ ... . .... .. .. .• .. . .• •. 
Xata.l, excluding Zululand-
Highlands (Sub·total) ........ . ....... _ .. . 
Be'l!'ill .... : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 
Dundee ...... . .. .. . . ....• . .... • . . .. ••. 
Estcourt ..... . ... . .• .. . .. ... . •. .. . . . . . 
Klip River .........•....• . ....••....•• 
Newoastle .. . . . . ... ... . .•• • . . .• • •... • •. 
ImpendhIe .. .... . _ ..... __ . ......•.. . .. 
Polela. .... . " ........... . • . .. .•• ... , .. 
Midla.nds lSub.tQtaJ} . ... . ... . .. ......... _ 
Msinga ..... . _ . ...... .... . . . . _ . • ..... . 
Krsn.skop .. , .... .. .. .. . .. _ .. • .. . . _ .• _ 
Mapumulo . . , . ... __ ..•.... . . . ..•. . . , . • 
Umvoti . .... . , ...... • .•.. • •. . . .. • . . . . • • 
New Hanover . . . . •.. ..• • , , , ..•. , ... 
Ndwedwe ••...... , ........ • .. . .• • .. , .• 
C~mperdp:wn ' " .. .. . .. , . .•. . - . • •. .. • • • 
Pietermantzburg . . . .. . _ . . . .. , ...•....• • 
Riohmond .•.. ... .... , .. . , .... . • _ . .. . • 
Ixopo ........ .. . . ................. . 
Alfred .......... . . .. ... . .. . . . . .. . . . . . 
Coostal (Sub_total) .... . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. 
Pinetown .•. . .. .. .. . .. . ..• . . . . . . . . .. 
UmziDto •..... , .. . . .. .. . . •. . . . ..... 
Port Shepstone .... , . . _ . . .... , .' " .. 
Zulnl.a.nd (Total) . . . .. ... ..... .. . .. . ... . . . 
North (Sub. total). ..... . • . . . .. . . . . • . . .. . 
Ingwavuma . . . , .. ... .•. •• . . . . .•....... 
Ubombo ................ . ....... . ... . . 
Hlabisa. ...•..........•....•.....•... 
Inland (Sub.total).. . . . .. .. .. . . . 
~~:ami·.:·.: :: :::: :: : : : ::: :::: ::: .. . 
Entonjaneni ... , . , ... . .. .. . .•.. , .. • . . 
Eahowe......... . . • . . ' . . . .. " .. . 
Nkandhlo. . . ... ... .. ... . .. .. . 
Nqutu.. .. .. . ... .. ... . . . . ... . 
Ca.atal (Bub.total) . . . . .• .. . . .. 
Lower Umfoloei. '. .. . . • . . 
\fhl ttdni 
~ -. -_. .. ..... . 
Native 
Areas, 
1
1916. (e) 
sq, mIs . 
Native 
Areas. 
1936. 
; sq. mls. (d) I 
4,215 
1,208 
1,232 
642 
377 
756 I 
682 
l,l:!' 
1,1:;1) 
737 
98 
260 
60 
13,563 
3,663 
656 
330 
82 
921 
644 
513 
537 
5,893 
412 
SOl 
515 
592 
562 
1,030 
~38 
418 
392 
240 
447 
346 
3,987 
697 
904 
293 
427 
484 
279 
500 
403 
0,988 I 
1,216 I 
2,800 
676 
377 
919 
682 
1,\88 
1,2;; 9 
424 
308 
115 
105 
256 
51 
13.916 
3,717 
606 
362 
32 
923 
662 
608 
524 
6,060 
420 
503 
520 
600 
562 
1,060 
440 
418 
392 
237 
567 
341 
4.139 
697 
918 
298 
531 
484 
279 
500 
432 
1,282 1.202 
459 418 
123 66 
200 180 
144 12\ 
79 84 
70 106 
207 227 
2,487 2,623 
670 706 
298 202 
215 324 
176 ISO 
III 116 
256 272 
52 80 
114 \30 
81 64 
215 281 
299 298 
893 819 
308 298 
338 293 
247 228 
6,540 7,661 
2,589 3.486 
1,405 1,609 I 
618 1,066 
586 812 
3,236 3,558 
692 868 
458 606 
329 311 
1567 557 
627 626 
1573 690 
716 617 
~: ~"g j 
Native 
Areas, 
1939 
(Trust 
Added ). 
sq. rote. 
.'),98R 
1,216 
2.800 
676 
377 
919 
682 
1,204-
1,392 
471 
308 
115 
105 
271 
122 
14,084 
3,885 
733 
362 
32 
023 
662 
648 
524 
6,060 
4,139 
1,202 
2,623 
819 
7.676 
3.486 
3,573 
868 
606 
311 
672 
626 
690 
617 
! 
I 
Nati,6 
Population. ( ~ ) per Sqnare Mile. 
r- I 
, 191 6. (f) ; 
I I 
I Population 
- ---,---- ---------
I 1016. I 19~6. 1936. (g) 
! I I 75,100 IB,:.WO 
1:'),400 
:! l ,200 
10.000 
10,300 
39,100 
62,;;00 
}1:~ :::{ 
14,700 
14,600 
7/)()() 
892,100 
192.;!Q() 
37,200 
13,200 
3,\00 
25,800 
38,BOO 
34,900 
33,300 
398.600 
32,400 
40,000 
26,000 
33,900 
41,600 
60,900 
30.100 
32.000 
25,800 
20,300 
39,200 
16,600 
301 ,300 
42,200 
49.700 
18.000 
41,700 
35,100 
34,600 
42,100 
3~,OOO 
89,200 
32,000 
18,200 
19,700 
7200 
J2:000 
36.~00 
73,600 
120,200 
41,500 
25,400 
1:;,300 
9,800 
18,100 
10,000 
1,107,100 
243,100 
44,400 
25500 
3:100 
:l7,I00 
47.400 
44,300 
41.200 
484,100 
42,500 
45.900 
37,900 
38,600 
44,500 
70,100 
35100 
39:400 
33,000 
24,300 
53,500 
19,300 
379,900 
57,300 
69,100 
23300 
46:700 
46,500 
33,700 
55,300 
48,100 
17·8 
;'7 " 
5:") · 8 
105 
61)'6 
,;2·1 
67·6 
65,200 100.600 50·8 
11,900 17,400 -
5,200 10,200 -
10,800 16,500 -
8,200 17,100 -
4,200 7,400 -
7,700 8,500 -
17,100 23,500 -
193,200 309.500 71· 7 
41,200 60,800 -
11,700 17,200 -
31,600 40,300 -
10,000 16,000 -
7,700 13,600 -
26.300 44,400 -
5,900 12,000 -
11,000 19,700 -
5,900 9,900 -
21,500 37,700 -
20,500 37,900 -
88,500 160,600 99·0 
36,200 59,300 -
30,300 59,900 -
I 22.000 0,600 -241,100 318.300 36 ·8 68,700 80,600 26·6 
33.200 39,200 -
17,600 21,200 -
18,000 20,000 -
134,900 193,200 41·6 
16,300 29,400 -
14,000 20,000 -
10.000 16.600 -
36,700 "7,300 -
30,900 42,800 -
27,000 36,100 -
14·9 
{,3 · 2 
6~·O 
91)'4 
79 ·5 
65·4 
79·8 
91·8 
63·3 
117·7 
196·0 
41 ·6 
23·1 
114·3 
Normal 
R&mf.U. 
Ins. (h) 
22 
19 
17 
16 
15 
27 
22 
25 
20 
25 
23 
23 
33 
27 
27 
27 
28 
29 
28 
30 
34 
30 
29 
26 
26 
32 
23 
28 
22 
25 
25 
24 
32 
43 
48 
31 
27 
27 
41 
36 
26 
32 
29 
30 
36 
36 
42 
26 
30 
39 
38 
38 
42 
27 
36 
44 
34 
32 
36 
43 
44 
32 
35 
44 
35 
32 
31 
53 
32 
30 
37,600 44,500l:2 ' 6 72'0 
i l-i,900 . 17,000 - - i' 42 
I .. :2.7~ 27.40<? -:;. .• :.......l._..:-=-_'----""""--' 
.--.- ... -
- " " 
TABLE I.-Esti11Ulled Area and Population ~f N ati've Arens (a) -(continued). 
I 
I 
! 
, 
)iative Natil-e 
, 
Population 
~ative Na.tive ATe-B.S, Popniati(.n. (e) per Square :Mile. 
Region. (b) Areas, Areas, i 1930 
----------1916. (c) I 1936. I (Trust 1916. i II I I Added). 1936. (g) 1916. 1936. sq. mls . , sq. mls. (d) sq. mls. ! i 
I I 
I 
Transva.a.l- I Central (Total) ........... ..... . ..... .... 1,486 1,781 2,748 103,iOO 114,000 69·6 64· 5 
Rustenburg ...... .• .. ... • . ........ .... 750 1, 108 1,845 42.600 46,000 - -
Brits ..... . . . .. : . .• o • • • • •• • • ••• ••••• • • 
- 90 97 - I S,OOO - -
Waterberg •.......... .. . " ........ ... 163 100 110 26,800 i 6,300 - -
Pretoria ........... ..... ... ... ... .... . 345 255 270 18,900 I 28.300 - -Middelburg . . . ......• .. . ..• • .. .... ..... 228 228 426 15,300 
I 
2,';,300 I - -
Western (Tota])., . ... ....... . ............ 856 856 1.290 :12,700 n,700 I 38·2 44·0 
Marico .......•. . : ....... , . , .... ... ... . I 582 582 760 20,000 li,900 I - I -I Lichtenburg . . ...... . ...... • .... • .... .. 274 274 530 12.iOO 10.Roo 
I 
- -
North and Eaat (Total) ......•.... • • .. .• . I 3,816 6,847 8,158 277,000 439,300 72 · 6 64 ·2 
Potgietenrrust ...... . , ..... . . .. ....... I - 514 972 - 37,800 - -Pietersburg ... ... . .... . ..... .. • . ... ... , 1,303 780 1,464 105,600 1I0,IlOO I - -~~!t:~~~: ','::::::: :::: :: ~ : :::::::: I 867 2,632 2,75fi 117,000 146.500 - -
-
1,124 1,170 - 6.1,300 
I 
- -
Lydenburg . .. , ........ ........ .. .. .... 896 767 767 :17,800 43,800 -
-
Pilgrimsrest •....... ..• .• • . .. .••. ' . ' •. . - 280 280 
-
14,200 
- -
Nelspruit ..... .... , • •. .... ...... ...... - 23() 230 - 11,800 - -
Ea.rberton .. . ........ . ... ••. .. . • . .. .•. . 750 520 520 11l,600 11,500 
- -
Orange Free State-
East (Total) .... . ......... ............ . . 456 397 405 21.400 18,600 46·8 46·8 
Ha.rri.smith . .. .... . .. . .. . .. . . . .••. .. 166 165 165 4,700 7,700 
- -
Thaba 'Nchu ... ........ . ....... .. . .... 290 232 240 11l.700 10.!lOO - -
GRAND TOTAL ••••••.•.....•• . ... 38,552 45,219 48,271 2,212,600 :!.9:!6,OOO 57·4 64·6 
Other Areas Dot Included ....... ..... 6,570 6,570 6,860 51l,400 36,400 
-
-
GRAND TOTAL FOR UNION ..... 45,100 51,800 55,100 2,269,000 12,962,400 I 50·3 57·2 
(a) Excludes Nativea on European.owned land (see paragraph 17 of text). 
I 
I 
B,l 
contd 
Norma.l 
Rainfall. 
Ins. (h) 
-
26 
23 
24 
28 
29 
-
23 
23 
-
25 
10 
29 
31 
24 
39 
28 
30 
-
25 
24 
-
-
-
(b) See paragraph 34. Account must be taken of ch.&ngea in magisterial districts. To mAke the Ta.ble of manageable proportions 
Nati"" Areas with only rel&tively smail populations have been inco~rated in" Other Areu." 
(c) Estim&tes by Beaumont Commiseion U.G. 19/1916. Appen ix III. 
(d) For method of calcule.tion see Annexure III. 
(e) See paragraph 36. 
(f) V.G. 19/ 1916. Appendix lV. 
(g) V.G. 21/1938. T.bl. 13. 
(k) Normal annua.l rainfa.ll at longest established station in principal village or town vide V.G. 6/1931:1. There may, of course, 1::e 
considerable variations of rainfall witbin relatively small areas. 
Source: Social and Economic Plonning Council report 9: The native rese rves and their place 
in the economy of South Africa, UG 32-46, pp 8-9 
(See end map for the distribution of 'native orees' in the Union of South Africo.) 
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B.2 
a 
ACTUAL OCCUPATION OF VARIOUS CLASSES OF LAND BY AFRICANS IN 1916 
Union of South Africa - areas (approximate; in morgen) 
NOTE.-Arp,." within Municipalitip~, etc., ex('\uded in (I) to (10) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LandA 
owned and Tot.al Total Crown 
Nat.i"" l\IiARion Nativp Crown unocoupied extpnt extent LandA not 
I }I:f .\·rNCF!. Rp~erveR LandA/lOd owned LnndA by Euro· land under scheduled reservpd 
or l\JiAAion Forms. o(·.(mpied pmtnR but Native Native fOfRnv 
l..{)(·lltion~. ReRer""R. hy Nat.ivflR. occupied. oc('upRtion. AreAR. special 
hy Noti,'eR. PUrpORP. 
. 
CAPT, OF nnon HOPE 
· . 
7,11 ii,iir, 1 2:18,074 397.97:1 58,998 9R,427 7,909,033 6,217,037 3,82S.300 
N ATAT. 
· . · . 
2.H!l7.120 lli2.;;07 176.H34 340,flO2 1,012,139 4.i>79,402 2,972,312 638.31;;; 
THf\N~VAAL. · . · . · . 1,077.;;13 1III,3:11 298,731 042,480 3,045,763 ;;,080,81S 1,159,296 4,689, I S(; 
ORANOF. FRI';]'; ::-:1'A1'F. 
· . 
74.2!l0 :H,431 128,fi01 . . .. 234.222 74,290 7l1:l 
----_. 
TOT\I. .. 
· . 
1I,1fI4.~84 538,343 1,002,0:39 942,280 4,l!i6,:l29 17,803,475 10,422,935 9,156,fl44 
b Union of South Africa - African population 
(I) (2) ( :1) (4) (1\ ) (II) (7) (H) 
LnndR 
oWllr<lund 
Xutiv(> ;\liAAion Notivp Cro\\'Jl lIlH)('('llpied Pri\'Atp 
PROVTN(,~;. Hp~prvPR LRndRRl1d ownpd LonciA by 1<;lIro· Totlll :\Ior!(t'n LundA 
0,' MiHRion -"'ormA. oC('lIpif'd p~onR hut (I) t.o (li). ppr Unit. oCI'lIpio(\ by 
1..1)(,HtiollA. RpArr\'f'R. hy Nltti,·rR. o('("lIpipd EuropeRIlR. 
h~' Nnti"p,.. 
1--. 
- ---- -- -
CAPT'; OF (:00)) HOPE 
· . 
I. I 4!1.4:m 24,:1:11i 3!l.272 12.524 7.592 1,2:33,Hi] :l ·0 2:39.(111:1 
NATAL 
· . · . · . 
479.1l22 44.li:lli :111,2;;0 37,070 X:;.[)O!) 11t-\1l.IS2 Il ·6 35(i.222 
TRANl'<YAAT, 
· . · . · . 
2H:I,I44 24.024 40,43() 7l.lil J 2:12.082 lliil.l!ll 7 ·8 :190.:132 
OR.~ N(;F, FllIu; fl1'A'l'J'; 
· . 17.200 l.illH 4,Ii!ll; .. . . 2:I.flti4 !I.1l 278.:141i 
---
--'--' --------.-
TOT.\i. ., 
· . 
UI2!I.flO4 94,(\(12 12:1.1i48 121.10" :12;;.17!l 2.ii!l4.1!IS li'l:\ 1.2M.lin:1 
(9) (10) 
Europpnn 
ern"'n OWllf'd 
LAnd~ l<'RrmR othe 
reAerved t.hRn 1I1HJf'r 
for Aome Col. I) /tnd. 
partioular including 
purpoAe. Crown Land 
FOTeRt.. etc. 1f'lIlRPd tQ 
EuropeonR . 
1i,007.028 nr..:{Ilr,,53fl 
162,289 0.144.1196 
2.S3fl,fl78 20,31\3,341 
:1.927 14.7S7,7M 
8.;;110.422 J 0;;, 712.3:1S 
(!I) ( Ill) 
('rown l!rh.U1 
LnndR Bnd 
leoRpd to Mining 
1<~"rOrf'lllnH. ArPIlR. 
1H14 1 27.!l!IO 
1,724 37,954 
IH.:lOU :l22.4{\(; 
1.02!l 48.7jil 
21.723 r);ri, I fil 
Source: Report of the Natives' land Commission (Beaumont), UG 19-16, appendix 3, p 9 and appendix 4, p 9 
B.2 c CATEGORIES OF LAND IN THE RElEASED AREAS (1926) 
Total extent Total owned Approx extent 
Province of released in them by of unalienated 
area Africans crown land there 
Cape 1 494 165 135 138 80376 
Natal 436288 119572 44 287 
Transvaal 5007822 405424 1 249617 
OFS 79342 48 157 
-
Total 7 017 617 708291 1 374280 
Source: Report of the Select Committee on the Subject of the Native Bills, 
SC 19-27. Table adapted from appendix A, i-vii 
Areas quoted in morgen 
(1 morgen = 0.857 hectare) 
(11 ) (12) 
, 
Urban Tnt.al Area 
Areaq • .-.f Pro,·in('P. 
1,057,691; S3.7411.093 
95,S91 IO.620.1i.t3 
400,5i3 33,390.:;!lfl 
209,919 II'i,23fl.112fl 
1,764.0ill I 42.!l1l1;.!l.;8 
(II) 112) 
TO!.111 
Rural TotRI for 
PopulR' PrO\·inee. 
tion. 
- -- -
1.473."IS 1,(\0\,:;08 
1,044.12H i l.nH2.0R2 
].llli!U~2!l i 1.:11l2.2l\!\ 
:lO:I.n:l!I I :liil,'!·11 I 
i 
j 
I 
:l.R811.fiI4 1,417.IHi5 
i 
The various classes of land can be categorised as follows: 
a RESERVES which consist of scheduled areas under the Natives' Land Act 27 of 1913 
as amended by Acts 28 of 1925, 34 of 1927, 36 of 1931, and 27 of 1935. Included 
under this heading of reserves are the Notal mission reserves, but not mission stations 
in the other provinces. These were the 'native areas ' proper .• 
b RELEASED AREAS. The Beaumont Commission, 1916, provided thot a 'quota' of 
8 365700 morgen of land should gradually be added to the scheduled reserves. This 
quota was reduced subsequently by the five local land committees (UG 8, 22, 23, 
31, 34 and 41 of 1918). The released areas included in Hertzog's revised Land Bills 
ore referred to here oS COMMITTEE AREAS. The latter correspond roughly with the 
areas recommended by both the Beaumont Commission and the local land committees. 
See appendix B.4o and table 2.1 for varying allocations. 
After 1923 ~ areas recommended by the local land committees were deemed 'com-
mittee areas' and could be purchased by special dispensation. See Government 
Notice in Gazette, 14 July 1923, and appendix B.5 below. 
c AFR ICA N- OWNED LA ND. This includes land bought by Africans individually, as 
syndicates, or as tribes, and not scheduled as 'native areas'. (That is, Acts and 
regulations did not apply to these areas.) Africans outside the Cope could only buy 
such land, -either without special permission, from on African who owned this land 
outside a released area, or with special permission, from anyone of any race within 
a committee area. In the OFS Africans could own land only in the district of Iv'.oroka 
in Thoba 'Nchu. 
d WHITE-OWNED LAND, or 'non-native areas', comprised 011 lond outside the 
scheduled and released areas. It included non-scheduled crown land; farms - either 
occupied or unoccupied - owned by whites; and mission stations (but not mission 
reserves). Africans could reside on these lands with special permission. Under 
certain contingencies, they could be rent-paying tenants. In other cases, an African 
was either a labourer working for wages or a labour-tenant giving a specified period 
of free labour every year to the white landlord in exchange for his right to remain on 
the land. There was no security of tenure in these cases. See chap 5 on farm labour 
and squatters. (4156329 morgen were owned but not occupied by whites in 1916, 
and 105712338 morgen were owned by or leased to whites in 1916. See appendix B.2 
cols 5 and 10.) 
e AFRICA NS I N THE URBAN AREAS. Their rights of residence were regulated under 
the Urban Areas Act of 1923. Chap 8 deals with the government's policy towards 
Africans residing in urban and peri-urban areas. 
* It should be noted that the classification adopted by the Office of Census and Statis-
tics, in the compilation of the agricultural and postoral tables and population censuses, 
uses the term 'native areas' or 'native reserves' in its widest sense to cover (1) crown 
reserves or locations, (2) mission reserves or stations, (3) tribally owned forms, 
(4) African-owned forms, in the names of individuals or syndicates, and (5) crown lands 
occupied by Africans. This is the brood sense in which land 'actually' occupied by 
Africans is specified in the charts and tables incorporated in this study. But strictly 
speaking only those areas scheduled as reserves were classified as 'scheduled native 
areas' under the various Acts and regulations - as one finds, for example, in the 1927 
Native Administration Act or the 1920 Native Affairs Act. 
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B.4 a 
ALLOCA TION OF SCHEDULED AND RELEASED AREAS 1913 - 1927 
SCHEDULED RELEASED 
Scheduled areas Scheduled areas Scheduled areas Beaumont areas CommiHee areas Released areas 
Natives' Land Natives' land Native Locol lond Natives' Land 
Natives' Land Act (1913) Act Administration committees Act (1913) 
Province Act Amend. Bill as amended Bill recommend Amend. Bill 
1913 1927 1933 1917 1918 1927 
Cape 6 217 037 6 044 000 6 107 000 1 313 000 1 608 500 1 494 200 
Netal 2 972 312 2 755 000 2 997 000 1 861 700 430 600 433 600 
TronsvooJ 1 591 296 1 065 700 1 232 000 5 042 700 4 687 300 5 007 800 
OF S 74 290 74 290 74 290 148 300 80000 79400 
Totol 10 422 935 9 958 990 10410290 8 365 700 6 806 400 7 014 400 
2 3 4 5 6 
Natives' Land Act 27/1913 figures quoted by Beaumont, UG 19-16, oppendix III 
2 Figures for scheduled areas, Natives' Land Act (l913) Amendment Bill 1927 quoted in SC 10-27, P 15. See olso n 2.48. 
3 The ,chedule ta the Native,' Lend Act 1913 hod been emended by Acts 28/1925, 34/1927 end 36/1931 which odded 
451 290 morgen to the scheduled areas. Quoted by the Joint Select Committee 1930-1934 in JSC 1-35, p 60 . 
.( Becumont recommendations included in the Native Administrotion Bill 1917, UG 19-16, pp 44-45 
5 See Gazette, 14 July 1923 and reports of 5 local land committees. 
6 Schedule to Netive,' Lend Act (1913) Amendment 8ill 1927; el,o SC 10-27, P 15 
Areas quoted in morgen (1 morgen = 0.857 hectore) 
NOTES ON AFRICAN DISTRIBUTION STATISTICS 
These calculations were based on figures suppl ied by the NAD from their 
district retums for 1913 ond 1926. They should not be confused with the 
various allocations recommended for 'release' or 'schedule' detailed by 
successive commissions and committees between 1916 and 1936. 
2 In 1926 Africans occupied 3 302 440 million morgen more than they had 
in 1916. 
3 A comparison of African occupation of the various classes of lond reveals 
the following interestingchonges: 
a The oreas ca lied reserves have increased only in the Cape (from 
7 115561 to 11 743779 morgen). This increase may be accounted for 
by the fact that land in the Cape could not legally be defined as a 
'scheduled' area. Statistics subm'itted probably included all rural areas 
and privote locations occupied by Africans. Reserve land stays the 
same in the OFSi and is 263910 morgen less in Nato I and 367 058 less 
in the Transvaal. The shortfall in the latter two provinces is explained 
by excisions of lond originally scheduled. 
b The reduction of mission lond in each province is hard to occount for. 
SC 10-27, appendix B, p viii gives full detoils of land purchased by 
Africans between 1916 and 1926. Aport from 4 450 morgen sold by the 
Berl in Missionary Society to Africans in the Tronsvaal, no transaction 
with a mission society is recorded. This still leaves 36726 morgen of 
mission land unaccounted for in the Transvaal. One explanation may . 
be that there was 0 transfer of land previously held by mission stations 
on behalf of Africans. (Further research is needed on this and the 
diminishing morgenage in each province.) In the OFS mission land of 
about 22 000 morgen was included in the quota for release. 
c African-owned land: only in the Cape could transactions between 
Africans and whites legally take place; and despite the shortage of 
land, Africans were forced by impoverishment to sell there. As a 
result, 147225 morgen were lost. (30448 morgen purchased in the 
Cape during this period are calculated from details in SC 10-27, 
appendix B.) In the Transvaal 61 934 morgen are recorded as bought, 
and 2 595 morgen in Natal - these amounts were bought under the 
administrative dispensation. The total of 94 977 morgen in all three 
provinces is far less than the estimates usually given. 
d Perhaps the most interesting change relates to white-owned land. This 
land is referred ta in the text as 'squatting' or 'kaffir-fanming' areas, 
that is, land owned but not occupied by whites. In 1926 Africans 
leased a reduced morgen age of 42 673 in the Cape, 721 883 in Natal, 
and 1 405597 in the Transvaal. This does not necessarily mean Africans 
were removed from these areas. The opening up of new areas would in 
part account for the change. As for land sold by land companies, the 
tenants there were either left, or were evicted, or became labour tenants 
or full-time servants. Regardless of the status of the African residents, 
this land was excluded as a potentiol 'native area' once it was benefi-
cially occupied by whites. The OFS figure shows that 'squatting' there, 
contrary to white assurances, had not been eradicoted. See table 2.2 
and appendix B. 10 for land company ownership, and table 5.2 for the 
OFS sta tistics. 
contd 
AFRICAN DISTRIBUTION contd 
e The overflow from the restricted reserves and evicted 'squatter' areas 
was accommodated on crown lond, it seems, in all provinces except 
the OFS. Even where crown lands were not reserved for any special 
purpose they were also lost as pote ntial for release, being used instead 
for poor white resettlement schemes or expanded forming operations. 
This happened even with crown land that hod been recommended for 
release precisely because it already carried a large African population 
- even that was sold or leased to whites. In 1936 the Trust set up 
under Act 18/1936 acquired just over one million morgen . According 
to the 1926 estimates, Africans occupied over 2t million morgen in 
1926. 
4 To appreciate the increase in de facto occupation of all classes of land 
outside the reserves in all provinces (except the Cope) between 1916 and 
1926, the foregoing charts must be compared with the population estimates 
given in the tobles. 
Some sol ient features are: density within the reserves; 
increase of residents in white rural areas; 
influx to urban areas. 
b TABLE COMPARING VARIOUS CLASSES OF LAND EXCLUSIVELY OCCUPIED 
BY AFRICANS IN 1916 AND 1926 
White-owned 
Year Rural African- Crown Mission land occupied Total 
locations owned land land land by Africans morgen 
A B C D E F 
1916 11 164 484 1 002039 942280 538343 4 156329 17803475 
1926 15 161 734 986078 2557747 299387 2 100969 21 105915 
c TABLE ILLUSTRATING PERCENTAGE INCREASE AND DECREASE OF VARIOUS 
CLASSES OF LAND OCCUPIED BY AFRICANS IN 1916 AND 1926 
A B C D E F 
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Source: Tables based on figures quoted in Report of the Notives' Land Commission, UG 19-16, 
appendix 3, and NAD report 1922-1926, UG 14-27, p 22 
d TABLE ILLUSTRATING VARIOUS CLASSES OF LAND EXCLUSIVELY OCCUPIED 
BY AFRICANS IN EACH PROVINCE OF THE UNION 1916 
Class af land Cape Transvaal Natal OFS Total 
Rural locotions 7115561 1 077 153 2897 120 74290 11 164 484 
Africon-owned lond 397973 298731 176834 128 501 1 002039 
Crawn laflds 58998 542480 340802 - 942280 
Mission lands 238 074 116 331 152507 31 431 538343 
White-owned land 98427 3045763 1 012139 4 156329 
occupied by Africans 
. 
Total 7909 003 5080818 4579402 234 222 17803475 
e TABLE ILLUSTRATING VARIOUS CLASSES OF LAND EXCLUSIVELY OCCUPIED 
BY AFRICANS IN EACH PROVINCE OF THE UNION 1926 
Closs of land Cape Transvaal Netal OFS Total 
Rural locations 11 743779 710455 3633210 74290 15 161 734 
African-owned land 250748 510 176 131612 93542 986078 
Crawn lands 152 185 1 598429 807 133 
-
2557747 
Miss ion lands 64 514 79605 146 168 9 100 299387 
White-owned land 55754 1 640166 290256 114793 2 100969 occupied by Africans 
Total 12226980 4538831 4008379 291 725 21 105915 
Areas quoted in morgen (1 morgen = 0.857 hectare) 
B.4 
d&e 
Source: Tables based on figures quoted in Report of the Netives' Land Commission, UG 19-16, 
oppendix 3, ond NAD report 1922-1926, UG 14-27, p 22 
Population. 
a5. Native population censuses, as well as being 
subject to a wide margin of errOf, have been few 
and far between. Sufficient information is avail-
able, however, if one also takes into account the 
age composition of the Native population and such 
vital statistics as are available, to indicate that this 
population i. increasing rapidly. 
Despite rural-urban migration, Table J *show:'l 
the population in Native areas to have illcreased 
from 2·3 millions in 1916 to 3 millions in 1936-
an a.vera.ge annual increase of 1·3 per cent. 
According to population census figures the total 
Native population increased by 2·3 per cent. per 
annum between 1921 and 1936 
3G .. The 1936 Census-the last complete Census-
shows the population in the different types of Native 
areas, and these figures are reproduced in Table 
III. Unfortunately the 1911 and 1921 population 
censuses no not differentiate between Reserve and 
other Natives, with the result that it is impossible 
to give the population density of the Reserves over 
• period. In Table I, therefore, the approximate 
population figures quoted by the Beaumont Com-
mission are used to compute the density per square 
* See appendix B, 1 above, 
B,4 f 
mile in 1910, and are compared with the 19;1fi 
Census figures (columns 7 and 8 of Table I) . 
The. rate of increase in population far out-
stripped the rate at which land was added to the 
existing N utive areas, with the result that average 
density of population per square mile increased 
from 50·3 in 1916 to ;;7·2 in 1936 (Table I). '1'he 
Natal Reserves showed the greatest increase in 
density, whereas some of the Ciskeian districb 
actually showed a decrease, Comparisons of crude 
density figures are apt to be misleading, 
particularly in Africa, where all areas are not open 
to all races: thus the comparison of European and 
Non-European densities per square mile in rural 
areas in the Union has little SIgnificance. N ever-
theless, it is interesting to compare the fi~ure for 
individual Native areas with that of the °Union'. 
total 20·3 per square mile, Basutvland's 48, the 
United States of America's 41, Argentine's 11, 
Australia's 2 or India's 220. 
37. The distribution of the Native population in 
the Native areas of each of the Provinces at the 
time of the 193fl Census (i.e. before the formation 
of the S.A. Native Trust) is shown in the following 
Table:-
AFRICAN DISTRIBUTION ON VARIOUS CLASSES OF LAND (1936) 
Crown Mission Tribally. Native-Reeerv .. Crown 
or Rural Reserves or owned owned Le.nds. Total 
Loca.tiOIl8. Stations. Farms. Farms. 
~:ki ........... ~:::::::: 1,393,000 14,000 4,000 26,000 9,000 1,446,000 693.000 74,000 10,000 81,000 46,000 904,000 
rra.nsva.al. ..... , .,' .. 320,000 20,000 120.000 32.000 9:5,000 692,000 
Orange Free State ... 16,000 1,000 
-
4,000 
-
20,000 
UmaN . ,. 2.421,000 114,000 134,000 143.000 150,000 2.962,000 
Source: Social and Economic Planning Council report 9, UG 32-46, p 9 
LAND PURCHASED UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE DISPENSATION 
IN 'COMMITTEE AREAS' 1919 -1928 
I,A~'D PURCHASED FOn. XATI\"ESETTJ.E;\fEXT PURPO,3Ef' Tn 31 / 1/28. 
NAml! and No. of Fnrm. 
GI"JI Adelaide 
VI." Hoop 
:llnu nt Prospect 
Di!ltrirt .. Prn "inrl'. 
Glen Grey 
:-.rnf. Sq . Rd~ . 
2 .~\18 
$71 
1.3 ,-1 
1~1 
II'" 
-Ion 
PUrrllfLM! 
prk.'. 
lOIil:·1919. 
£18,:JA,i 0 (I 
• ,3:,6 n (I 
6,1 110 (\ II 
3:, £2~.~41 0 0 
1!l20·1P21. 
TrFlD~rt"r 
nml Olhl'f 
" 'l~t};. 
Tnt~r. 
£~7 2. 2. £18.4~~ 
56 1 8 U 12 
6;.16 3 0,105 
, 2 I • 
" , 
£219 0 I £2.9.060 (I I 
)Jllwof 
tr:tl\~ f · · r . 
!!8 /3 I1 P 
:il l S / IS) 
]0 , .,19 
B.5 
~&me I"If Sf'lIer. 
J. A. Sppuce . 
J. P. Kruger. 
C. Krull!!r. 
PietrMlhurg TrlU\!I\'nn l 2,0:;0 4:l:! £2,3HI 0 n £11" 0 £2,336 of 0 
r-----------r-~I~o7,~I.~17~2='~'.--r---C------i-----------1 Za/I /21 Brrlinrt MIlII'ioDlI:f'IIf'lbeh.tt. 
Alton/l. 23 . . . . . . 
Prndrmtla ' 22 .~lld GtlIL~t('lin~ 2 I 
1)rllo iwaler 20 .. .. .. 
111uckhill 106A. 1;dner 10ml. Gnln · 
~hll"J8 100i. llillb:mk 11)6G ,~. 
:\'I"\\" .Jl~ru~:1 lcm t Uti':'. 
T.n 1' 1t~('lla 1101 
f:1tlll.~ .-\ « C. ) ri! I<1I "I lrit · 
Farm H. -,n,hll·ldeiil. 
Schllpncifontein ,9 
Khp\\ol 83 
ijut1el~hoek 10,2 
lnnrnan 10i3 .. 
l[clklJoomloutl.'in 4~5 . . " 
::kh l'~Pl·fAtU.t lja ,t :'<1 'I"i ll lnntl 
A I i'l l 
li u: trnnll"n A. 4,2 
~p"l,bo"l1I 3f! 
l"'lrl. ;\rrrrimnn 
i\Jl'I~ hn t'(II) rt 
Ruulpt!l 
\\'nndlnnctll 
Prrtori o. 
I'if't Hetier 
l'ictersburK 
l'rl'toriA 
J'irt. j{eti<'f 
!;,tullrrhl'im 
1'I'I Idil' 
Trau!\'I'1.,l 
:1.~::3 
;;,U!IG 
:!.()!)3 
1.-, .. j2; 
2.5;)0 
1.1.14:. 
'f.X 
800 
~. 331 
2,:W8 
1.181 
1,12 ;~ 
2,;."5 
1:1.241 
2.0i!'l 
3, ~ilO 
~3i 
li90 
,00 
1,302 
II,OfU 
:IIJO 10 
:10, 
] :y, 
261 
4,3 
t(l . Hi' 0 (1 
\U ~ f, ;j 0 
:J, ;-0:3 14 .. 
15.3P8 8 I 
633 12 0 
e..OIlO n C) 
!I.IUM 10 U 
1!l22·1923. 
£2,000 ° 0 
0,100 0 0 
.1.~60 0 0 
Ui20 ° 0 
:,.; ... i Ifl 6 
~.:! 3P 15 0 
,. 
1923,1924 . ~ I 
.£:1,485 I i II . 
2,033 .. 2 ~ 
5,7r.0 U (I H 
1,200 0 0 ' 
1.750 0 n 
3,900 0 0 
3;'1 £18.i l \) 2 1 
£2Q 10 II 
116 ld 5 
20 :! 0 
l!il S 0 
]02 S 10 
.15 14 0 
£14 0 6 
201 .. 6 
850 .. U 
54 2 6 
07 10 ij 
39 g 0 
£1.226 11 0 
£24 " 6 
.. 0 
1,11 2 3 3 
II Ii 1 
56 18- 6 
1 .... 18 0 
£6.470 If) fI 
ll.t .. S .1 ;, 
3.i:!3 16 .. 
15.!i"9 10 1 
736 0 J,l 
,q.OS[. I.. I' 
:I,HIS 10 II 
£2,014 0 6 
6,3UI .. 0 
4.810 4 u 
1,514 2 6 
r.,6H. I I) 
~,2i9 .. (1 
£28,09 ~ 2 6 
£3.510 4 " 
2.6:01 II 2 
f •. flU 3 .1 
1,211 17 1 
1,F106 I B 6 
4.0H I~ 6 
£438 10 10 £lA.1 5i 12 11 
.11 ilO / 21 
2{11/21 
t5 , 3/22 
IZ /EI :!I 
I i /3 '23 
:!I ,'S lt:! 
IY !a , 22 
1 /2/'1.3 
3 / 2 ;23 
411 , :! :l 
15 6 /:!3 
26 /"/2:1 
2/,11 /23 
30 16 124 
30 16 ·2 .. 
30 '6 :24 
~rlddleton F.I't.cof Knkuno. 1 .. Llchll'nbur~ 
HE'ri l{' rt 
. . TrnM\'n:l! i.n3!! 
3.n:!; 
1924·11')2:;. 
t!i.Y;;". (J 0 
l,i:,O 0 0 
£2!i 0 0 £6,000 (I (l 11 !'I!2:. 
~i\'onr t .... 
,-\~'lifl'dl\i f' ,\. Xott illl!:hnm •. 
'1IITterl\'{)od~ . . . . . . 
1':drntIHlc •. . . 
c;l'lll'nk .• 
~\fl~it~:f'Y .. Hes(,f~·~ : : . . 
M r K3r~nf· l; .t P tll.l!oot lldl"lI:l·n 
~f i lldrtknp . . 
R iPI)li nj:! Stf't'a m~ 
ArllRtll . . . . 
llhlelw . . .. .. .. 
f'linkzrllllri(1 Ptn. B.l1 ~1 . . 
KIt\k~prni! fl12.t- A. neTl.:7.lrh t RI4 
~fiml)lla Park 
Kopic8 .. 
OIf'nfernC!'! . 1121 
lIRlokong, 861 
"';Ulllmflr!l. 
Ktlrnmltn 
0 1('1l Gre,}" 
Prr.totia 
Pietrrsbllfg 
Pjt'ieMllm~~ 
l'o tgi C!t (, I"!'TII,t. .. 
l!U8-191!1 
1(12U·I021 
1!)21-1922 
1!l22-1023 
Hl23_!!I:! .. 
Ifl24-1f12;; 
Hl25_ 1!l:!O 
l026-10~7 
1927-H128 
CIlI)" " 
Capl" .. 
en-pc " 
Transv;;\ 
19 14 0 1,76\1 14 U I J . /24 
11,~1J!) 
1,~Hl 
81:, 
l, !H(l 
8rlll 
~4!1 
til 
~50 
1.3 17 
i4!1 
H.693 
!'I04 £7.72(, 0 0 
562 
:129 
53 
153 
523 
234 
:.73 
40, 
102:;·1 !126. 
£7,000 0 0 
4,2/iO 0 0 
}O,OOO 0 0 
5,100 0 0 
0,000 0 0 
I,Sr.O 0 0 
!i,i50 0 0 
S,OOO 0 0 
S,S50 0 0 
43 1 46,iOO 0 0 
1Q26·1Q2i. 
H5 0 ° £i, " 0 f\ 0 
£1 n 0 
303 18 4 
I 0 0 
£,,001 n n 
4.250 0 It 
10.:103 13 " 
5.100 II (l 
6,001 0 0 
1.3:)0 0 (J 
!i.750 n 0 
S,UOfl n 0 
:I.S;,o 0 0 
£305 13 4 47,OOr) 13 .. 
3.170 - £1.250 0 0 £20 1 0 £1,270 I n 
54!J - 2,100 0 0 H 12 0 2,114 12 0 
5!J3 324 !J30 15 6 - 5S0 15 0 
22 ;3/2C 
22 .' :1 /26 
2f] 13 /26 
22 /3 /26 
2.2 /S /26 
22 1S /26 
22 /3 /26 
22 /3 / 26 
22 / 3 .'26 
.. t-~3'~'~'0o-__ ~IO~'ct~O~"~'~O __ "o-~O~~~3~3_1~'C-~O~c76.~5~'~.~o __ o~ 
B.2 42 428 £10,371 8 6 £68 6 0 £10,'39 I.f fI 
31 /3/27 
20" (26 
31/3/27 
7 /2/2i 
('np(~ 
Tr~IllI\'n;1 
IP2i-l!l28. 
·HI ~8 £~.081 5!l t:!~ Ii I £4.105 II III :l / ll : :!, 
~O~ :;2.. 3.500 II 0 21 11-1 0 3.~.2 1 pI fI 14 7 , 2, 
·tO~O !In.; ;"SOO 0 ° 2, HI 0 :'.:12, J!. u 2:l i I2 :2; 
".. 1,000 - U,OO 0 0 14 I 0 1,:i H 1 0 30!l~ w I 
t-5~.~80=OC---~'~'~£=I~'-.3='=I--,~.~,-r--~'=8=,--.C-=7f:,71.7.~,7.,7'~17,,--,~ 
4,544 
2.6r,n 
!J I . ,!I:\ 
It.241 
!I.OS I 
IUlml 
~.fI!'J 3 
1l-.2 ~2 
;'.tlon 
:!B.S41 0 0 
2.3In /I n 
" 1i. fiU, \1 ;, 
2(\.1'1117 II li 
11-I . ;1!1 :! I 
7.i2:1 II I) 
411.,00 0 n 
10,Sil 8 6 
14.38 1 !J !l 
:!In 0 J 
17 4 n 
~fl6 1 9 
l.:!:!!l 11 n 
~ 3!l 10 111 
~5 /I 0 
a05 13 , 
68 6 0 
•• • 
2\'1,orlO 0 I 
2. :131) 4 II 
~6.!1I~ :1 II ~ 
2,11.0114 •• Ii 
1!1. 1;li I:! 11 
i.i;O (l n 
4i.005 l:J , 
10.4311 I" r; 
14 . ~1l!l)0 ~ 
W. 1\ . " uE'r :\-fCtWf'. 
:'If. J. Churcb. 
J . )fE'a,.fQch and R. Barano'W. 
1'. G. JAJUI'\". 
f . \'. 7.. Slabll('rt . 
E~tRtl" IR tf' John ThompeoD. 
C~tatt' lat(' W. S. ltams . 
Bt"Tllner MiAaloOR!'8ellJlchan. 
lJ. Blumberg. 
Hendereollll COU8olldated Co r · 
poration. Ltd. 
O. J. van Rooyen.t J. H. Cloetf'. 
u. M. Ypgel It J . R. HOfIchk~. 
J. ,,' . F.berwohn. 
)t ... k"u ·, Tribe. 
1'. ,r. Moolman, A. tt W. F . Sm ut .. 
\\' . A. lIart, 
lfl1l. M . M. BOlIch. 
J. Harward. 
H. W. JlaY"'·ard. 
Xatino,,1 Bank of S.A .. Ltd . 
~:~tate C. J. Rodfll . .E. W. TalTY 
It C. n. RUild. 
'W. :'II. ~. Bolli •. 
.f.V",lIc. 
;So E. Tnrr. 
J. H. E~merer. 
.r. du Pll'llll1l. 
I·;. Roodt. 
II . F. Prinsloo. 
W. C. B. Price &: F. A. VI .. er. 
fl . H . ('orbett. 
!'Iltndard Hanle, \ ryburg. 
I;. A. Spann. 
l' rr \' lml'ly purchuf'd Undf'f Sec, 
A .. J. R.oo~. XI. 
.r. r. l..nnfiml'lrl. 
I·; . f,. !4MYIDall. 
~I", . :\' . H . J."ngrman. 
II"rltnl"r )f18Rtonge-clbchart. 
Source: Report of the Select Committee on the Subject of the Native Bills, SC 19-27, pp viii-x 
B.6 ESTlIvlATE OF AREA OF ARABLE AND OTHER 
LAND IN SCHEDULED RESERVES 
Tot&! Cultivoted ! O .... mg 
I..nd m Ar&ble Residentia.J 
morgan. (morgen). r.c. (morgen). 
(b) 
N orthero .Area.&- I 
Tra.nav&&l ••. . .• •••.. I 3,710,100 803,200 2,906,900 I 
Orange Free State ... 116,500 20,300 96,200 
Northero. Ca.pe ... . .•. 1,467,100 44,200 1,422,900 
TotaJ Northern .Area.a .. . 5,293,700 867,700 I 4,426,000 Not&! .. . .............. 3,096,800 418,800 I 2,678,000 Tra.nakeian Territories .. 4,196,300 732,600 3,463,800 
Ciskei .. . . .. . .. ..... . . 1,000, (X)() 127,100 I 872,900 
TOTAL : Union ofS.A, 13,586,700 2,146,000 11,440,700 
(a) 01 A Note on the Na.tlve m Rural Areaa" by Dr. H. H. Curson. 
(b) Inoludea useless la.nd. 
Source: Social and Economic Planning Council report 9, UG 32-46, p 52 
B.6 & 7 
B,7 COMPARISON OF POPULATION & LIVESTOCK IN WHITE & AFRICAN AREAS 
-'.~ .= . :'=' =--'-=" =.=-=.~ ... . =-:..= "=::: - '=l-~ ' --- ~ ,"T[n: .4o.R£ .... s. ! I fl39 ... Cattll"' ~'niu" Jlcr i square mile (d) . 
Region.(a} 
._----_. 
Cape Province--
North Weetern . . .. .... .......... .... .... ......... 
BenKIbel. . . .. ........ ... . . . ..... ............ 
Glen Grey-Queenstown ... . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . 
Ciskei. ....... . .. ..... .... ....... .... ... 
TranBkei.. ............ . . .. ............. 
Bigh1and<t . . ... .. .. . . ...... 
.. Mid1a.nds . . . .... . ... ... .. . ... .... 
Coastal ... .... ... .. 
Nau:.i (excluding Zululand)--
Highlands ..... '" . . ..... 
Midlands ...• _ .......... 
CoastaL .• ..•. ... . ..... ......... . ... 
Zululand ..... . . " . . . . . . . . . . . ......... ... 
.. North ... ..... .. ..... ....... ... .......... 
Inland ....... . ... , ....... 
Co&8tal .................. Tran~"a.aJ.-
Central .......................... ..... ..... . 
Wostern .... .. .. .... . ..... .... ... ... . .. 
North and East ..... .. ........ ........ ..... ... .. .. 
Orange Free State -
E ......... ......... ....... .. .. . 
SUlI-ToTAL. " .. ...... ... 
TUTAL ... .... .. ... ... 
-- ------.- -
Ca) For details of Regions see TabJe 1. 
I Popula.tion per sqUaT.., mile. 
I 1926 (b) ( .. t.) 1936. 
13 · 7 14'9 
55'4 53·2 
62·1 62·0 
95 · 4 95·4 
71'0 79'5 
58·3 65·4 
72·5 79·8 
82·5 91 ·8 
67·0 83·3 
93·0 I ] 17·7 145 ·0 196·0 
36·2 I 41 ·6 21 ·4 I :!3·1 45·4 54·3 66-:' 72·0 
I Ul·~ 04 .;; 49·0 
" 
·11 
51·4 I 04 . ~ 
5u'0 
I 
4(j·~ 
56·6 fl-1·ij 
i - 50 ~ I ['I .:! 
=-=-"'- --.... 
'--" - -. 
. . - .. - . --I--
I Ca.tt Ie Units pbf sq ua.re 
mile.(d) 
1926.(c) 1939. 
32·8 31 ·3 
96·1 60·2 
113 ·9 108·6 
139·3 158·3 
159 ·4 168·6 
132·3 122·5 
176 ~ 177- I 
159·2 196·" 
10[1 · 7 1;'J.')·4 
15H·:1 170·7 
173·:! 108· I 
79·6 92·7 
au·;j 48·6 
142 ·4 131·9 
lOi ' l/ 139·0 
10.i · ' 105·9 
7:!'9 96·0 
liS'1I i:!·j 
101 ·1 i 55·3 
.J 10!1'5 I 116·0 
gu·:! J 1(11 · f' 
I 
Xative 
Area.a. 
29 ·0 
94'0 
120' U 
lfi8· 0 
1G8 ·0 
131 '5 
]7, ·8 
18~·9 
144·0 
168·9 
177·8 
104·2 
52 · 1 
159 · 1 
144 '(1 
131· ,j 
84· I 
84· J 
70·3 
.. I 
Adj0iniog 
Europeoo 
F&rtlllI{e). 
27 ' 3 
9;)'0 
87'0 
112'0 
114 ·3 
~:.'·7 
fW·O 
:tj'5 
39 ' 8 
(b) The 1926 Native popuiatio, has been estimated on tllp. basi!" nf tlip u\'era~{l annurJ rat.e of increa..c;,· ill f\&I':h 1l.C'6A. 
ee) As the exact area of the indiyjdual Nat iv{'; Resern~s in )926 is nllt known tbf!. 11l31i area (prior to tLe pa.ssing of Act 18/ J936), 
haa been used. 
(d) .. Cattlo Unit " means one head of larSfI or five head of small st{)(·k. (Proclamatio n :J I of 1939. ~tK:tJOIl 1.) L!'timatea have be('\!} 
made where e:!:act figures aro not &vs,ilaLlo. 
(c) A fa.irly compa.rable sampll' of Europesll farms has oUl'n selected by taking tbt, Europea.n o{'cupiod p(lrt il1 1l oflllagist(lrin! rlis.trkt s 
pa.ltia.lly occupied by Rosen·e Natives. Xo ('ompa.ra.LJo statistics an' availa ble ffll IIII' Xa.t."l] oua.,..;lu! "trip wb",ro lbl' Ellr0I'('IaIll' 
concentrate on sugar production. Zululantl ha~ al."o boon 8xcludod. oocause tbf!. E Urll p l\lHlS st.'nllndly owu the bt·tI('Ir agricu lura! 
portions of the land . North.Western l'ralls\,aal had to h(l If'.ft out, because of large pUrt i," " ~ of Crol'u Land uuoccupied anti 
unsurveyoo in many i ll ~lallces. thus. making lUI' area. figuroo '!lr'6liabie. !\ati\'o.owued at.ol·k <,n tho fnrm!' has Lron included. 
Source: Social and Economic Planning Council rep()rt 9, UG 32-46, p 23 
B. a & 9 
B.9 
.. 
B.a AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN POPULATION. 
1904-1911 1911 - 1921 1 1921-1936 : 1936-1946 
----_ .. _-
I 
1·93 1·76 1·86 1·54 
2·03 1·57 2·29 1 ·61 
3· 12 0·86 1·90 2 ' 55 I 2'41 0 · 37 2·32 1·63 
European ........ . .. .. , 
Native . . ...... .. . . . •• • . • • .• . 
Asiatic .......... .. _ . . ....•. . 
Coloured . . ............. . ..• • 
1---- ,----;----1----
1 __ 2 ·07 1'49 2'19 1 ·62 TOTAL •• , .•••• .• . 
Source: Censuses of the Union of South Africa. 
INCIDENCE OF MIGRANT LABOUR 
IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 1936 
TABLE XXXIV.-Absentees from Unio-fI, Nalt'l)e Resen:es (Magisterial Distn'cts). 1931i ,(a) 
.-
-
- ---
. . - -. 
--
, . 
- - =---= .::-.-= , I Ab",ntee, as I )lale abBen"', : I Absentees, 1936. 
i ---_ . ... --- Percentnge of sa Pert'entR.gc : Reg;on. (b) i - - - - Total ·)f ~fal& . 
I 
: Residt>ot Poplilat ioa ! 
i Male. Female. Total. 1 
Population. a~ed 1 s-.,~ 
).ears. (c) 
~fll&'ulinitv 
Rat<> (aged 
21 Years 
and oVf'r) . 
(d) 
I .- - -------- -Cape Province-- ! I North Western ..... .. ... .. . • •• _. .. .. . , 13,199 4,841 18,040 : 20·2 55·:! 80'0 Herschel .........•........... •. •. i 5,585 1.028 6.613 J8 ·2 , 58·1 62- 6 .. . .. I Glen Grey/ Queenstown .. .. . .... ...• • •. 12,317 1,649 13,966 18 ·9 I 62·3 62 · 4 Ciskei. •.•.... ... ... .... .... . • .... • • . 20.789 4,296 26,085 
I 
20 ·8 , 63·2 60·4 
Transkei (Total) . • .. ..... ...• ; ...... . 144,339 8,063 152.392 13 ·8 I 53·0 53·4 " Hi~hland •..... .. .... .. .. .• •. 38,419 2.489 40,908 16·8 61·9 51·7 
" 
Mi lande ... . .. ... .. . . ... . • • . 65.083 4.491 69,574- 14·4 I 54·3 I 54·3 eo .. tal ............... ,. .... 40.837 1.073 41.910 , U'O 45 ·2 54·4 Natal'(excluding Zululand)- , , I Highlands ..... . ......... . . . .. .. . , 15,026 I 2,635 17.61\1 i 17 ·6 [j9'~ 60·6 
.Mid!a.nde .•........ . . . . . .. ..... .. ... 43.663 3,912 47,575 I 1 5'~ , 57 ' ~ 
I 
54·6 
CO&8tal. ..............• . . ..•. ........ 19.073 I 2,157 21.230 i 13 ·2 ; 47'9 76·5 Zululand (To .. I) •.....•. . . . .•. . , . ... 37.739 2910 40.649 i 12 ·8 49 ·1) 64·1 
.. North .• ... ... .. ... . 9,417 I 4:!-I 9,841 I 12·2 ~9 ' O 57 ·7 .. Inl&nd . • .. ' .. • . . . • • • . . . . . 1 23.782 1,876 25,658 13 ·3 .i I · 2 54 ·' 
Tran8~:aal-CO&l!ltal.. ... . . .. ... . . .. ... ! 
4,040 610 5,150 U ·6 ~1 · 6 139·1 (,) 
i i Central ... ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,258 
1 
9.860 I 32,118 27·9 69'0 103,0 Western ........ .... .. . . . . . . . . . . . 6,004- 2,596 7,600 :!j·4 65·' 97·8 
North and Ea.at ... . ' .. . . ... . . .. . . .. .. , 48.507 3,8:12 52,339 11 ·9 -l.g . :1 51·g I 
Orange Free Stat~ I I East .. . ..••...•....... . ....... . . ... . 2.931 971 I 3.902 I 21·0 .~\8 ·R , 81·3 
Other Satin A.r&a.8 ••.•• . . .. ...... ...... I 6,246 1.973 ~,219 , 22·6 ',1 ·6 1 -1 , 
.--.-
I 
TOTAL ),OR UNlOK NA.TIVE AREAS •.• 
1 
396,676 I 60.713 I 447.389 , 16·1 , '''· 9 63·2 tJ) , 
-
.. 
_ ._._-_.-
.. . -
_. 
-
. .. -. 
~ _._. 
- . -
(a) Vid< U.G. 21 / 1938. T.b1. 13. 
(b) For details of Regions see Table I though in th.is insta.nce one " r two I\djoining magisterial districts hlH"e boon 'Hided. 
(c) Male population aged 18-.54 years calculated at 40: per oont. of the total male popu lation. Tbia figure W8.8 Jeri\" .~i from Table III 
of t he Supplement to Vol. IX, Sixth Census Repon, 1936 (T '.G. 50: t 938) after .Itltluoting the number of Tropical X B.tivee in Labour 
Districts. 
i 4) Calcul&ted from L.G. 50; 1938, Table 3. Th .. m.J.dCulinit~· rate 19 the number of tDales per 1' 111 femaltl8. 
~ ) The high m&&culinity rate in this instance is Ulo., to the employmt1Dt of S&ti\'~ maJ08 in the .. ugsr tntluetry . 
..J) E.J:cludes" Other Native Are .... " 
Source: Sociol ond Economic Plonning Council report 9, UG 32-46, p 45 
I 
I 
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<Q 
LAND COMPANY LAND OCCUPIED BY AFRICAN AND WHITE TENANTS 
St(l'i.~t-il'., nf r('riaill 'AUld C:o"'I'(1nir.~ ill (lIP r1il·OIl. 
(Nolt.-The land holding!! menllonl'dln thll T~bll' are all RltuFlt"11 In thl' Trnn~\"Ilnr. wUh Ih!' I':'tM'pllnn tllll.t IIII' VI't1'l'nl"ln~ J.:lltntt·!I h~Vf' nhollt 1\0 p .. t N'nf. nr Ihf'lr I"'ml holtllnr_ ,. 
'hi' Ornnjft ' io'rl'(, !UUl t) . 
Nnml' (If rnm lln ll~·. 
1. Anltln F rp-neh 1.nlHl ('I), i 
Hl'ntl"r~on'lI Trallll\'Rrll 'I· 
E~Inl(,lI.t- n ,.ndenou·" 
Cnulinlitb.II"1 [·nrpn. Ch) .; 
:1. T'~'dl'nhllrlt nohl fn.rm~ !I 
I J.~"If'nh1lr~ 1.1111<1 nn,l 
E'l:I,lnral illll r'n , 
:'\nrtJl"rn Tran""nni 
l.,uln Co, 
(I , O""nUIl Ct>,ulolldntf',1 
1'0\. 
(kf'nnn TJevt'IOpnlfmt 
Go. 
.It ~.A. 1.n.ntl .t I';xp[orn· 
Unn Co, (e), 
(Inti' ,·r 
Hel.llrl!. 
:ItU":!:' 
It}:!ri 
31.1~.24 
:In.O.2~. 
:10.0.2:. 
10.10.25 
30.0 . 2~, 
!11.12.2.f 
11 . ~ . A. Town~htJl~, Mlnlnlt ! 31.IO.2fi 
,t I"j nunce Gortlfl. (d). 
10. 
,I. 
TrnnIVFlnICon~nlldAtf'd 1 31.12.2:; 
T,Rnll .t E)o:plorRtion 
Co , (t), I 
'l'r:ulllVI\RI Rnet De IRJ::o n. j lO, 10,25 
Hay Inv!!stment, l.:u. I 
12, TUln'wnnl Gold Mining I 3L3.2G 
Elltll.t!l!1, 
13, Vcrel.'nlglng I,~,ta.tes 80,11.25 
Xu . of 
IlIrlnl!. 
27 
3~ 
12 
:!i 
12 
" 
130 
455 
27 
f1l11 In-
terest ; 17 
hai( Inter-
cat. 
29 
24 
T olnl In lui lIo [.11nlo[ of ('Olllfll1n~' 
Tnlnl 
nrC"1Io 
(flrr('~) . 
.-\ r{'a IInl11't 
culli\'ntion 
(n"r"B). 
r""11 rnr 
ura ;",! "\'! 
t:H·r'· ~ .) 
. I Xli" ' w'r or [,'Arlllill. 
. - - . - I E:dl'lll. of Lall11 Settiement'l • 
. I 0pc'rlltlollft ,Inre In- O('cnpl~d I' ].1 ' :\:;1.',1 
T n.,IIl'd l"£:jrtiOI1 of Company, by til 
:-;IImln' r o f pr.r~IIII" "" ! ('l'Impann' r..nd "t ,1"", . 
(IH' r,'!!) . jKl1ro{lt'IUlII ' HAth'"!, , 
. --- . : 1-- ----- , ' ·: .. ropl",,"11 Nat"·I''' . 
110,000 
lR2.:J.J!l 
:l7,M.J 
41,Oj.J 
112.400 
4,1 i:! 
4!'l,575 
,---- -: - --
~II :l .: I:,!:! 
Infnrmntioll n ", l\\·nilahll'. 
! lnformnlll'ln n !ol. R"Rlluhll' 
1 
I 
I 
Nil Grallng Rites 1 
Jf't In 01\1' ! 
1'~lIropp.an, 
Inforllll'llion n .nt R\'R!lnhlt', 
1)0, 
Do. 
In;J.8~ 
Nil 
77,50B 1'1716 (leAsed 121,DI.J (1I'llIat 
and), tcra IA.nd), 
1,040,000 3,650 aeN'i1 1 Ahont. ! nf 
50,878 
Nil 
2,350,001 
150,500 
184,350 
120,375 
I workctl by huldinRII 
('OInpllny, '-!fOll'tl by 
No et:\IA M I I{'nnlltll: 1 
to tt'unlilfl, trlO,lIOO Acres 
hy compllny. 
About D,OOO About I GCI,OOO ' 
25,080 I 3, no ! 
to,OM Acrcs rpl~rvrd b y com-I' 
vnn)'. : 
, 
About 
2.000,000 
80,083 
(mollily r.oai 
beMinp:). 
12,064 14 (},2R6 i About 27,500 
; 
33,038 88,726 2,076 
16 fnrm., areA. 75,138 1 :\'11 
'''~ rell. 1011'1 since 1895. 
In 1925 thr'fi were 126 
tenants leasing 104,300 
Ilcru. 
27 (or 
portlonl') ! 1\"01l1! ,1'1I .qP,J, 1 1 ~~~t~' )~~'_' l'i"'ll 
1 Do not offer land for lale but prepllred to con-I-
Iider otTers. 114 farms so let since 1895 
! Nil I 
, 
I Totahrealoldslnce 18971 
I waa 847,090 acrta . 
I 
I 
No S!lttlerl, only Unflnt 
farmtre. 
lin farm. tt"holdlnglsol!d 
!!Inee 1\108; 32 farnl. 
lerued IIDee 1903, 
Nl'llnrormRtJon nvaUnble 
1,400,000 acrci sold tIl) 
Det"tmber, 102'. 
COlnpany not. concerned 
with tltnbllshment of 
IIPtt!l'rll, bllt h]l!l /lold 
30,7PI fLcrCl\, 
Nil 
561eages werc granted In 
1925 ; no In.nrt lold. 
• 
Nil 
II 
.0 
" 
8 
o 
20 
r"i\",-II from i 
rour. . 
\"11 
(} (un ca~h II 
pnYllIf'nt 
bll~i"). 
'I I (nat I \'1' ~qllllt' l 
tl't8 l'ftylnll I 
:£2 p,R.), I 
1 (Oil ca~ h ' I payment 
1 b!l.~ill)4 
I 
I 
• 
~'ill 
(f) 
(,) 
2 
1:!0 Bnd 
11('1'""11-
Ilnnt~. 
• 
• 
.. 
91 aOiI de-
~Od.Db. 
UDknown, 
135 
210 
Abnut In . 
" 
200 
No InfOrmiAtiOD . 
I 
! 
300 I 5,000 
1 
I 
7 
, 
.01 
140 
;50 fRmlllu 
(2,200IDdl · 
't'ldnall). 
2,280 
Source: EWC report, UG 14-26, appendix B, p 365 
APPENDIX C 
Copy of return sent to the magistrates of all districts by the Select 
Committee on the Native Administration Bill, 1917 
2 List of labour districts 
3 Diagram showing effects of excessive subdivision of land 
4 Wage distribution indicating incidence of poor whiteism 
a Money incomes of white farmers 
b Spread of wage incomes of a II races, 1936 
5 Summary of the laws conferring privileges on African registered 
voters 
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t:.d 'tj' i c:lpi t.e: ! 
c',.-nE. r. i lj" C' .. '- I 
" i __ ~ _________ :....!I~~.f::..-:.,..:.. __ .2'. _______ -' _______ -+ ____ -;.-____ _ 
_4:..:.'L.;..:l:...· -,-' ___ 1;.-' ____ -+I ______ -+--'-=.:=..:!._-.::..--'-+_ ( r. ) ?S :-e!1! T'" '" 
.. ", ' 
~'!""~ • 
- . ' . 
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Approxira:tte nl4'1ber of fa{.lilies likely to be turned 
off farY.:!.3 if provisi(j~s of ~ratives L~nd Act prohi-
bi tin!'; sowing- on shares or leasit1g of land etc. cy 
EurOp8ctns to Hc.tivcs were strictly 8:1:forced: 
.---------~------------------------------~--------------
Locrtticn 
or i\et-
erve,. 
~ .: ;, .. . 
'. -.; . 
f. ppr ox i:;;:1. t e 
nunbEr of 
~ia t i yea 
'( !loul s)-: li-
:';ing in ~:::r 
'en C!l 
SClillDUTID AREAS. 
I 
!Approxi~ate extent in each f}toc~ awned by I · such 0.re2.. C.,::T"'T""-:-___ ,--_ };[!ti~€""G liv-ir..g 
1 ( a) 1..:1 nd. sui t - ; Co) [; r.;: si ng i --:i:,;!":::_~-c:::' ::."~Cc:.~";-' ,.;3::.,:::'::..' ~::~.::'''?.''::_ 
:atle for c\.:l- ; lnnd (bei~s , I 
.' tiv:1tio!1: :!"e:r.qini'!"!g ,,-': Cattle Sheep &. 
: ext~nt: . . '# 1 iGo3.ts. 
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LABOUR DISTRICTS 1931 
TRANSVAAL 
OFS 
NATAL 
CAPE 
Randfonte in 
Roodepoort 
Germiston 
Benoni 
Witbank 
Heidelberg 
Lichtenburg 
Christiana 
Ventersdorp 
Heilbron 
Fauresmith 
Voorspoed 
Boshof 
Dundee 
Vryheid 
Barkly West 
Herbert 
Hopetown 
Prieska 
-------- -
Krugersdorp 
Johannesburg 
Boksburg 
Springs 
Roy ton 
Vereen iging 
Kaalplaats 
Breyton 
Source : NEC 1930-1932, typescript evidence 
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DIAGRAM 
SHOWING SUB-oMSION OF 
THE F~M 
NOOITGEDACHT 
(Cape) 
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WAGE DISTRIBUTION INDICATING INCIDENCE OF POOR WHITEISM 
a MO NEY INC OMES OF WH ITE FARMERS ( IN £) 
- 50 50-99 100-149 i 150-199 200 + I 
i 
Owners 6705 9434 7264 5666 25929
1 
Tenants 6 161 6316 3651 2 102 4954 : 
Bywoners 8744 5184 1 669 668 781 
Employees 1 684 2214 1 071 459 794 
Total 23294 23148 13655 8895 37458 
-
b SPREAD OF WAGE INCOMES OF ALL RACES, 1936 
Coloured 
Wage group % of African or Asiatic White 
(£ per annum) workers % % % 
9- 36 55 90 10 -
36- 60 23 66 26 8 
60 -120 
I 
10 28 42 30 
120 - 240 8 4 25 71 
240 -500 4 
-
2 98 
Source for both charts: Report 4, The future of farming in South Africa, 
UG 10-45, p 7 
C.4 
a & b 
NlliEXllRE 'K'· 
NATIVE R3GISTERZD VOTERS. 
C.S 
(7pp) 
SUl:J!ARY' OF TIl:<; vas COh,';';rmnlG PRIVILEGES 
ON NiU'IVE P~:3:JS18P.EV VO'IT:RS. 
No. of Statute. 
Act No. 39 of 
1887 (Cape) 
(T.he Native 
rtcgis"tered 
voters Rellei' 
Act) • 
Act No. 17 of 
l364 -
Certifica~s 
0f Ci t1zeIlShip 
Er'e ndr1Ant Act. 
Nature of Privilege. 
~ this Act regiatdred 
voters w'",re brou.::;.'1t under 
t,p.e SWlle law::; as Europ eana 
and WGrc cxompt8d frcm the 
provi siano of J..·wm 
diff erc.."lti:.ll1y ui':f e c ting 
Natives, as follows ; 
Whether still in 
l'orce or not. 
Repeal.ed by Ant 
No. 38 of 1927 (section 36) in 80 
far as it :1s in 
conflict with the 
provisions of 
this Act. 
Act 17 of 1864 I Certificates 
of Citizcll.chip. 
Act 18 of 1504 I Native 
SUccessiun. 
British Ke.ffruria Ordinance 
10 of' 1;-",-'4 ~ Nz.t'i.ve 
SUccotJ,~j.onc, 0..".'(11. Uu:J.cc. 
Act No. ~:2 oI: l~'l "Passes. 
Act No. 28 oJ: l~l>:lJ : I,l~uor. 
Act No. 37 of U<M : Natives 
Locaticn$ - ~~al. 
(The above ment.ioned Acts 
are dealt with more fully 
be10vi 1n order 01' 
reference) • 
This Act provided for the 
issue of Certificates of 
Ci tiz,cr.ship to colonial 
Fir~0cs ar~ cel~~tn other 
1o;r31 :::uoj ect::;. Native 
R(;g-lct.0:r-r,'Ii voters were 
accordingly exempted from 
the neceaaity of oDtain1ng 
such certificates. 
Repesled by Act 
No. 38 of 1927 (section 36). 
2 -
Ho. of st.atute. 
... ct No. 18 of 
J.364 -
(l'he Native 
SUccessions 
Act) • 
British 
Y.:lifrar1a 
();' di::a. "lC e 
Ho. 10 of 
19~1 -
('Ihe Native 
L"..lcceesions 
()'Cl-lnance) • 
Act No. 22 o~ 
1807 -
Passes. 
2 -
Nature of privilege. 
Under this Act, provision 
wQ.s ma.de for property le1't 
by a deceased persen, hoJ.d-
ing a Certificate of 
Citizenship, and of aLl 
Natives resident in any 
proclaimed Native locat1o~, 
to be administered and 
distributed according to 
the customs and usages of 
the tribe to which they 
belonged. 
Whether still in 
force or noe.. 
Repealed by Act NO. 
38 ot l.9Zl 
(sect.ion 36). 
Registered Voters were 
e..xcmpted from tills Act and 
their property cou.ld accord-
1r~~ be administered accord-
ing to the laws of the colony. 
This Act provides for the 
Administration and distri-
bution accord1.ng to Native 
la';l1 of the property of 
Kafirs, Fingoes and 
Tn~hookies belonging to 
e.r.d dying vlitilin-Br:ltiah 
KaffI'Cll'ia. 
Repeal.ad by Act 
No. 38 of 19Z1 
(section 36). 
Registered voters wore 
exempted and their proparty 
oou~ a.ccording~ ~ adminis-
tered under the laws ot the 
Colony. 
Native registered voters 
are exempted from the 
provisions of this Aot 
'e!hich proh1b;!' ts the entry 
o:f lI:f'o~j.en" N!ltives 
(i. e. pe.rsons not baing 
Ylr,goes) into thG coloo.y 
without eo pass. 
Still in f'orce (1.u cape). 
3 
'" ~t, Ho. ns of 
1.<"->3 -
([J.quor) • 
- 3 -
Nature of Pl'i "Uege. 
Urne\" t .h:l.1? A<'!t (!>0~tio:l 22), 
1I<lt.5.v.::s '1i":!0 ~,l'\")!1':,)1 ten 
fI" ";- '" ',"u': -l:T''''' """"'''1' ~"l" 
.... "'·"'4"""" "c,.' ~ •• _J )I -'" "" 
by vj.r1.uu cf !,~1J Nc • .,'3 of 
lB37 t!l.;.t,.:VH Rczicti.lr"c(l 
votoru V!,,!,\: C~ eturt f rem 
such pJ.'Oh:lbl t.lon. 
Rcp(;')l'.ld by M'r, No, 3() 
01' :l.:o':~f~, ,k:c:t:i.G)1 lCO(l) 
of "';1.l(':11 pl'ovides that 
no pcr~on c~l1 by 
reason only that he is 
a registered voter be 
exOOil't.ed ,from the 
operation of ~ law 
prohibiting the supply 
of llquor 1;.0 him. 
(l.) Regulations 
(GOvernment Notice 
l609 jJ.928) have been 
published under the 
above Act, under which 
the Magistrate ~ grant. 
a letter of exemption 
t.o any Native, Coloured 
or .ASiatic who in the 
uagistrate's opinion 
has re~ched a s~a of 
doV'al.opmEl!lt and h1.s 
manner of livine is 
such as to en~itle him 
to be rega.~d as 
having attained a stand-
ard of life equivalent 
1:.0 that of EUropean 
civilisation. 
(2) In the Transkoian 
Tsrritories there is 
total prohibition 
against the supply of 
liquor to Nat1ves 
except under parmi t 
by the Magistrate 
(Proc' amation . .53/l933). 
4 -
section 6(5) (c) 
Act No. 37 of 
lB84 -(Native 
~:~ .. -
.leta 40 of lSCta 
a.....d B of l.9OS -
(uativa4 
Reserves 
~On&~). 
A.r. t 2,0. 21 r4 
1923 as 8'DendM 
'r;J ~t 25 of 
1930 .. 
(Natives (Urban 
peas) Act ) 
&GetioD 5(2) .• 
(c) • 
S:b.Ll~ ... "(' p"(,j.vl10f(ClG are Still in force. 
c " ... .. (·_ · ,-· ·r' ""," . ..... ~ ... 
",.,1,;, ' • .. l J. '-.~ ... ] .. 1I. 1. \ •. 1 ~ l:.:'''I, 
'l'ric)c.-.v;; I 1I'~1l1~)1' ell i.ld.l·cn, 
~~~~l·;').C~:': ~;":.;J.t.;J."\1:.(~1'f1 or . 
- 4 -
~ ft,U~ in orceb'r no. 
Tbis A,ct pl'O"lidOO for the 
bet.tar and more effectual 
aup(?.rvia~n and !Il./lD.;:Ag;..~ 
of Native locations and ~ 
tbe more ~ay collection 
~2ed b,y A,ct No. 
3.8 of 1927 (aeotiOD. 
~) i.e. 60 wch as 
au DOt ropee'ed. 
ot llllt t~. 
While No.tive Registered 
Vot.ers \'lsre exempted tran 
tho provioicna ~ot, the 
SGnaral. etatamant as regarda 
GXec1ption "aa qlla' j fied "rI:J 
the provisions of aectiotla 
3 ar.d 4. ot Act. No . 39 ot 
1887 uoosr which voW's were 
not exempted from the pa;ymant. 
of' Hut TCJC and WIU'6 w.l;)J eot. 
in all ~specta to tha 
provisions of tho Act (NO. 37 of l884) if they 
reaided in a Native location 
411 d.efined in tbG second or 
tevant~ seotions thQr~f. 
Native RegiGt~red votera 
were e:x.(;;;-:pt :fl'OOl ilia 
provisiona of thaGe Aota, 
wbien providod 'for tha 
6Bts.bl1ab.::lont of li.:l.tivt 
ROQGrvG Loeationa in or 
Repea' "'" by ~t 2.1 
of l.923 ( NOtion 
2'1(1) ). 
near Urben Aroo.s. 
'!'hose Acts ware Z'er"'~ 
by loOt 2l of 1923, 00 
~e NatiVQ Voters ~ 
cxqt. from tho provis1or.a o'f 
the u;xlQ%" toontio.nad aoct 1 on. 
of that Act they still 
retain certldn of tho priv1-
leg ... ~ 1ptljcat.ed balOll1. 
Cape lTative RegisteNd St'" 1ll ~ 
Parllamente.ry Votcra are 
eXSIIi>t from the eegrugat.1on 
ProclA:nationundar sub-
section (1), that is to a4Y. 
~cy (amongst otJlerG) 4I'Q 
Q~t froo:n the occe!>Clty 
o.f resi.d.ing in a l..oC'ation, 
Native vi') age or Native· 
hostel in an urban area. 
5 
No. of statute. 
Act Ho. 25 of 
1030 -
section 19 (CUrfew) • 
Section 167 of 
Act aJ. of 1917 (JUries). 
- 6 -
Nature of Pr!v1lege. Whether still in 
force or not. 
Native Voters or aJ~ 
females dependent upon 
them are! by virtue of 
section 9(4)(b) of Act 
NO. 25 of 1930, exempted 
from the curfew restric-
tions. 
Still in toroe. 
One of the qualifications 
of ajuror is that he t::Ust 
be a registered Parliament.-
ary Voter. There is no 
differentiation as regards 
colour and While Natives 
are not in praotice ampa.nel-
led if they are voters and 
possess the other necessar,y 
qualifications, they are 
el.ird.ble as jurors and do 
in fact s1t as suoh (e.g. at the Cala Cirouit 
court). 
The .law governing fire~S Adm1n1.~at1ve ConLrol. 
in the Cape is oontained 
in Ordinance NO. Ii! of l.853 
and ths peo,cG Preservation 
Act}.13 ot 1878. This Act 
~pJ.l,Qa only to districta 
to ....nicb ita pzoov1B1one have 
bean GXtcOOoo by !l"O¢J "mation. 
It was so extalXled to numer-
ous districts L~ the Cape 
PrOVinl:le but the relative 
Proolamat.ions were sub~ll@.tl.y 
repealed and the Act is a 
dead letter. 
AS far lila Natives are 
concernod a.n administrative 
system of control is in 
forc!j, the controlling 
au~~r1ty for the issue of 
a permit being the Depart-
ment of Wance. 
-
No. of statute. 
- 7 -
Nature of privilege. ~other still in 
:force or not. 
O:l thil pr:lnt8d Ferm N. A. 55 
Vlhi'~h ir. usod for applications 
by ~!:..tlveo for arillS ani 
£l..L!!1~'.l1ti T,:'on pGl"'llli. ts, the follow-
iug qUE:Gtions occur as represent.-
ir~ aualifications of the 
applicants : 
(l) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
To what tribe does appllcant 
belong. 
His character and antecedents. 
iihether he is a registered 
owner or lessee. 
Whether he is a hut 'tax (local 
tax) payer. 
Whether ,he is a registered 
Voter. 
lIhether- he is recommended as 
a fit and proper person to 
car'r'J arms. 
While all these qualifications are 
not essential the fact that an 
a.pplicant possesses them is a 
recommendation and if a Native is 
a registered voter such fact is 
evidence of' a superior status. 
There is also the fact that, by virtue of section 
e1ghJ;(2) of the Natives Land Act, No. Zl of 1913, the 
res ictions ill:i>Osed in regard to the acquisition of land, 
do not ~pl.y in the Cape Province. 
This section is to be repealed by section 
fo~-seven of the Native Trust and Land Bill, the ei'f.ect 
bi) , to put into operation in the Cape Province the 
restrictive proVisions of the -191.3 Act outside the 
released or scheduled areas. 
o 
UNION LEGISLATION SPECIALLY OR DIFFERENTIALLY 
AFFECTING AFRICANS 1924-1934 
Act 11 of 1924 
28 /1924 
Act 27 of 1925 
28 /1925 
41 /1925 
Act 25 of 1926 
26 / 1926 
27 /1926 
28 /1926 
Act 15 of1927 
34 / 1927 
38 /1927 
Act 22 of1928 
30 /1928 
Act 9 of 1929 
Act 18 of 1930 
19 /1930 
22 /1930 
23 / 1930 
24 /1930 
25 / 1930 
Act 31 of 1931 
41 /1931 
Act 24 of 1932 
Industrial Conciliation Act 
Maroka Ward Land Relief Act 
Wage Act 
Native Lands (Natol and Transvaal) Release Act 
Native Taxation and Development Act 
Mines and Works Act 1911 Amendment Act (Colour Ba r Act) 
Masters and Servants Law (Transvaal and Notal) Amendment Act 
Native Affairs Act 1920 Amendment Act 
Native Taxation and Development Act Amendment Act 
Native Affairs Act 1920 (Further Amendment) Act 
Native Lands Further Release and Acqu isition Act 
Native Administration Act 
Old Age Pensions Act 
Liquor Act 
Native Administration Act 1927 Amendment Act 
Women's Enfranchisement Act 
Riotous Assemblies (Amendment) Act 
Apprenticeship Act 1922 and 1924 Amendment Act 
Wage Act 1925 Amendment Act 
Industrial Conciliation Act 1924 Amendment Act 
Natives ' (Urban Areas) Act 1923 Amendment Act 
Electoral Laws Amendment Act 
Franchise Laws Act 1918 Amendment Act 
Native Service Contract Act 
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